Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? : an exploration of financial constraint experienced by small, medium and micro enterprises in South Africa by Von Blottnitz, Magali
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
  
 
 
 
 
Dysfunctional Market or Insufficient Creditworthiness? 
An Exploration of Financial Constraints Experienced by 
Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises in South Africa  
 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in the Department of Accounting 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
First submitted in:  November 2008 
Corrected according to  
examinors’ comments in:  May 2009 
 
 
Submitted by: Supervisor: 
Magali von Blottnitz  
blottnitz@mweb.co.za  
Prof. Enrico Uliana,  
UCT / Finance Department 
Student No: TXRMAG001 +27 (21) 650 2257 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
 Page ii 
 
 
Declaration 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis embodies only my original work, both in concept 
and execution.  
All significant contributions to, and quotations used in, the thesis have been 
attributed to their authors and adequately cited and referenced.  
I am aware of the consequences of plagiarism.  
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
 Page iii 
 
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated: 
To my father, the first small business owner that I have got to know.  
To the countless South African and foreign small business owners whom I have 
encountered in the last years, and who have been a source of inspiration.  
To the researchers who show a genuine concern for the fate of small 
entrepreneurs, especially those on the African continent.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
 Page iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor Enrico Uliana for his patience, 
kindness and non-intrusive guidance throughout the project. 
 I further wish to acknowledge the support of the (present and past) staff of the 
Accounting Department and the School of Economics at UCT. Two persons 
deserve a special mention: Trudi Hatzenberg, who has supervised me in the early 
stages of this project, and A-Prof. Richard Chivaka, who has never failed to 
encourage me and keep me motivated in difficult times. 
 I am particularly grateful to all the persons and institutions who granted me 
valuable data, especially:  
o The GEM team at the Graduate School of Business / CIE, especially 
A-Prof. Eric Wood, Dr. Mike Herrington, Carina Fischer, John Orford, 
Marlese van Broembsen, as well as Mr. Mbatho from Khula Enterprise 
Finance Ltd, who agreed to make GEM data available; 
o Peter Stemmet, from (then) Ned Enterprise, Dieter Schulze, from (then) 
Betty & Dickson, Trevor Petersen and Peter Koch, from Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Hassen Kajie, from (then) Gobodo, and Gavin 
Chait, from Business Beat, who have agreed to let me access some 
financial statements from their files and have kindly granted me 
interviews; 
o and Lesley Africa, from WECBOF (The Western Cape Business 
Opportunity Forum), who has agreed to promote my research among his 
SME members, thereby significantly contributing to the balance sheet 
sample. 
 Most importantly, I am incredibly indebted to all the entrepreneurs who trusted 
me enough to hand out to me copies of their financial statements, as well as 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
 Page v 
additional documents and contacts. I highly appreciate that a number of them 
agreed to give some of their precious time for interviews and to let me visit their 
premises. The owners of the six enterprises which have been selected as case 
studies have greatly contributed to this work. 
 I further wish to acknowledge the support of a great number of people and 
institutions which have, at some stage during the last seven years, showed some 
interest in my research project and provided me with information or simply 
backing. These include: Dr. Hans Falkena from the SA Reserve Bank; Cas 
Coovadia from the Banking Council South Africa; Mike Thomson from the Cape 
of Good Hope Bank; Rae Wolpe and Zolile Siswana from the City of Cape 
Town; Prof. Albert Berry from the University of Toronto; Prof. Andries 
Schoombee and Morné Nigrini from the University of Stellenbosch; Prof. Chris 
Rogerson from Wits University; Wolfgang Thomas from WESGRO; Vandara 
Chandra and Jeffrey Lewis from the World Bank; Gabriel Davel and Rashid 
Ahmed from the MFRC (Micro-Finance Regulatory Council); Gareth Elliott 
from Ebony Consulting International; Stephen Hanival and Rashad Cassim from 
TIPS (Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies) as well as many other persons from 
CIPRO (The Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office), Statistics 
SA, CITI (the Cape Information Technology Initiative), the DTI (Department of 
Trade and Industry), SEDA (the Small Enterprise Development Agency), Ntsika, 
the Bureau for Market Research, and other organisations.  
 My friend and editor, Regine Heuschneider, deserves compliments for her quick 
and efficient review of my draft and improvement of language as well as 
punctuation, style, consistency etc.  
 My last thanks go to my husband, A-Prof. Harro von Blottnitz, my daughters 
Maïwenn and Ella and the child-minders Clara and Louise, for having the 
patience to let me finish this work and for allowing me some quality time in the 
last months.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
 Page vi 
Abstract 
 
The existence and prevalence of financial constraints has been extensively 
discussed in the international economic literature, and is implicit in debates on 
the performance and needs of South Africa’s Small, Medium and Micro 
Enterprises (SMMEs).  However, there is little solid research measuring financial 
constraints among South African SMMEs. In addition, the reasons advanced for 
their financial constraints are often speculative and anecdotal rather than the 
result of sound research. The hypothesis of credit rationing, resulting from 
information asymmetries, is well established in theory but an additional 
explanatory hypothesis, the fragile financial structure of SMMEs, is often voiced 
by the South African finance community. With South African data being scarce 
and patchy, none of these hypotheses has been validated by empirical studies. 
The most likely reason for these gaps in literature is not a lack of interest, but the 
considerable difficulty of raising reliable data from SMMEs, a joint result of 
confidentiality, widespread informality in the sector, and the limitations of 
publicly available statistics in developing countries. Surveys of banks or SMMEs 
raise risks of partiality and limited ability of respondents to provide quantitative 
data, while accounting data are characterised by limited usability and reliability.  
This thesis attempts to address those challenges by exploring primary and 
secondary sources of data, combining the respective strengths of interview and 
financial data. In addition to drawing on largely unpublished data from an 
existing Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey run in 2003, the 
empirical work is based on a database of financial statements of SMMEs from 
the greater Cape Town area, which have been subjected to a thorough quality-
control process. Multiple case studies add a deeper understanding of the 
phenomena.  
Based on these data, the thesis first addresses the types and severity of financial 
constraints experienced by South African SMMEs, based on a typology of 
financial constraints and a methodology to interpret survey data. This review 
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suggests that a surprisingly high proportion of formal SMMEs, between 20% and 
40%, are not financially constrained. Investment constraints and liquidity 
constraints are found to be roughly equivalent in terms of prevalence, even 
though liquidity constraints, which are often severe, tend to have more dire 
consequences on the businesses. 
In the second stage, the thesis examines the role of informational asymmetries in 
explaining these constraints, the focus being on accounting opacity in SMMEs. 
To assess this aspect, a comprehensive scoring model, based on literature with 
input from auditing practitioners, is developed and applied to 64 sets of SMME 
accounts. The reasons for accounting opacity are also investigated: the findings 
indicate that the lack of internal controls is more widespread than the tendency to 
manipulate, but that the latter factor has stronger effects on accounting opacity. 
Next, the relationship between the measurements of accounting opacity and 
financial constraints is explored, yielding rather inconclusive results. Against the 
expectations raised by the literature, firms with more transparent accounting are 
not more likely to access bank finance; in fact, the quantity of accounting 
information produced seems to be more relevant than its quality in opening 
SMMEs access to credit.  
In the third stage, the intrinsic financial soundness of SMMEs is assessed to 
verify the hypothesis that the financial constraints of South African SMMEs are 
caused by their poor creditworthiness. Conceptually, a distinction is made 
between fundamental and financial aspects of creditworthiness (the former ones 
being unaffected by the provision of financial services), leading to a matrix of 
possible diagnoses. A ratio-based scoring model is developed and linked to this 
matrix of diagnoses. The application of this model to the 64 sets of SMME 
accounts is made possible by the thorough quality control of accounting data 
performed in the previous stage. The findings suggest that South African 
SMMEs are not financially more vulnerable than their counterparts in developed 
countries, even though there are indications that their working capital cycle is 
particularly slow. Firms with a good fundamental score are found to be able, 
when supported, to recover from their financial weaknesses. However, the 
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evidence regarding the relationship between creditworthiness and use of bank 
finance or financial constraints is inconclusive. In fact, little evidence was found 
of creditworthy SMMEs being refused bank finance.  
Overall, neither the accounting opacity hypothesis, nor the creditworthiness 
hypothesis, is strongly empirically supported. The inconclusiveness of empirical 
tests probably reflects the complexity of the phenomenon of granting bank debt, 
which involves multiple criteria and factors. In addition to creditworthiness and 
information quality, other aspects are relevant, such as the entrepreneur’s skill, 
network effects, securities, amounts and transaction costs, or even the ambiguity 
of entrepreneurs’ demand for finance.  
The findings have implications for policies fostering the SMME sector 
(encouraging networking; easing access to accounting services; mentoring, 
strengthening internal controls, marketing, capital retention and working capital 
management) and improving the banks’ practices (more differentiated offer of 
facilities; more discerning use of financial information; consistent monitoring 
especially of start-ups).  
Limitations of this research are mainly linked to the nature of the data. The 
sampling method strived to strike a balance between data quality and bias 
avoidance, with both objectives being only partly fulfilled. Moreover, the 
conceptual constructs developed for the research were unequally covered by the 
various data sources, causing difficulties in empirically establishing relationships 
between them.  
In light of the findings achieved, the main contribution of this exploratory 
research is to improve our understanding of the extent to which financial 
constraints affect SMMEs in South Africa. In this regard, it prepares the ground 
for future research: the use of emerging SMME databases (e.g. from credit 
bureaus) should enable researchers to examine more closely specific segments of 
the SMME sector and thereby deepen the understanding of the phenomenon and 
roots of financial constraints both in South Africa and in other, especially 
developing, countries. 
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Section 1. The controversy on SMME finance in 
South Africa 
Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises1 (SMMEs) are widely regarded as 
vehicles for economic and social development in South Africa – potentially 
contributing to economic growth, job creation, broad-based black economic 
empowerment, skills building and even poverty alleviation. This thinking 
underlies many key political writings of the last decades (from the ANC election 
manifesto of 1994 to President Thabo Mbeki’s latest State of the Nation address 
in 2008) and is generally supported by economic literature (Schumpeter 1911, 
Perroux 1953, Hirschman 1958, Teszler 1993, Naudé 2008), although Von 
Broembsen (2005) rightfully cautioned against the naïve belief that all these 
objectives could be achieved at the same time.  
There is also a general consensus that the South African SMME sector is weak 
(Tucker 2000, Ntsika 2001, 2002, Falkena et al 2002, DTI 2004, 2005, SEDA 
2006). Strengthening the sector would thus help to achieve the goals listed 
above. However, opinions differ on the reasons for the weakness observed.  
The role of finance in explaining the fragility of SMMEs is controversial in the 
South African business arena. As in other countries, the circles close to 
entrepreneurs tend to argue that with more support from financial institutions, the 
SMME sector would flourish – while more conservative voices highlight the 
numerous other shortcomings of the sector and the hurdles that would first need 
to be removed. The local debate, in addition, includes some sets of arguments 
specific to the South African context. 
                                                 
1  International literature tends to use the acronym SME (Small and Medium Enterprises); 
however, since micro enterprises play a meaningful role in the finance controversy in South 
Africa, this work uses the South African acronym ‘SMME’ rather than ‘SME’. See Section 
3.4 for a definition.  
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Those on the side of SMMEs argue that funding is not only grossly insufficient in 
quantity, but also unfairly allocated, overly costly and subject to unattainable 
conditions, notably collateral requirements, which are often interpreted as racial 
discrimination (South Cape Investment Network 2000, Mashologu 2000). 
Conversely, critics representing the business and finance sphere highlight other reasons 
for the narrow supply, such as the custodian duties of the financial sector, coupled with 
SMMEs’ poor intrinsic quality. Tucker (2000) stresses the relevance of these issues in a 
country where the savings base is narrow and foreign investments are risk-sensitive. 
The South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) (1999) further emphasises 
weaknesses in the business concepts and management structures of many SMMEs. 
 
Section 2. Literature review: The role of finance and 
broad explanatory models  
A similar polarisation can be found in academic literature. The controversy takes place 
on two levels: the descriptive level (how significant is the financial hurdle for 
SMMEs?), and the explanatory level (what are the reasons for the financial gap?).  
2.1 – Role of finance  
In the last decade, several studies have attempted to identify institutional hurdles to 
SMME development, such as regulations or the political context (corruption, policy 
instability). The importance attributed by these studies to the issue of finance varied 
widely: occasionally this issue was absent (Ahwireng-Obeng & Piarey 1999); at other 
times it was regarded as a minor issue (Levy 1996, SACOB 1999, Karumbidza 2009); 
yet other studies considered it to be an essential factor. To name but a few, Sawaya 
(1996), Rwigema & Karungu (1998), Rogerson (2002), Chandra et al (2001) and 
Thwala & Phaladi (2009) found that access to finance had a significant negative impact 
on SMME development.  
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The focus of these studies is generally on the role of finance for the success (growth 
and profit) of existing firms, but the argument could be extended across the lifecycle 
of SMMEs to include start-up as well as survival or exit. Chapter II provides 
references on these aspects (p. 34). 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (2004:31-32) compared the opinions of 
experts on the relevance of the financial hurdle for South African SMMEs, to similar 
assessments in other countries. They found that while SMMEs do face a problem with 
regard to financial support, they appear to be better off, on average, than in most 
developing countries – possibly as a result of the dual structure of the South African 
economy and society.  
2.2 – Broad explanatory models 
Most authors implicitly acknowledge that finance is a constraint for many SMMEs, 
but disagree on the reasons. This leads to conflicting sets of policy recommendations. 
Broadly, three main streams of opinions are found. 
2.2.1 – Insufficient or unfairly allocated supply 
Several authors have stated that funding - rather than being generally insufficient – is 
only minimally available to some types of SMMEs, such as informal businesses 
(Moore & Schoombee 1995), rural enterprises (Ardington 1999, Karumbidza 2009) 
and micro-entreprises (Schoombee 2004). Nott (2000) further provides evidence of 
inappropriate lending practices by informal lenders.  
This observation is sometimes explained by cost issues: it is widely acknowledged that 
the cost of originating and monitoring small loans tends to make them unsustainable 
(Schoombee & Moore 1995, Tucker 2000). An alternative explanation focuses on 
bank behaviour, including collusion, discriminatory practices, red tape and 
administrative burden (Naudé & Havenga 2004).  
If funding is insufficient or discriminatory, supply-side policy interventions are called 
for, such as: 
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• Coercion, by means of obliging lenders to increase their supply to specific target 
groups, with the loss of banking license as a possible sanction (Ardington 1999); 
• Regulation, through the creation of incentives to increase the supply, such as 
disclosure obligations, improved refinancing for microlenders, or more 
favourable schemes for small banks (Schoombee 2004:13); 
• Investment of funds into target groups of SMMEs, either through institutionally 
supported equity funds (Buys 2009:16), or as a catalyst to private sector 
investment by means of a joint resource pool (Tshabangu 2009:59); 
• Subsidising the provision of financial services (Ardington 1999, who focussed 
on rural finance).  
2.2.2 – A dysfunctional market  
A second line of argument is that frictions or, more radically, market failure is 
preventing a full match between supply and demand. Market failure, especially the 
phenomenon referred to as credit rationing, is a consequence of informational 
asymmetry and deficient enforcement mechanisms (see Chapter III). A contributing 
factor is the lack of transparency on the financial status of SMMEs (Falkena et al 
2004:117).  
This calls for interventions to smooth market functions, remove interest rate ceilings 
and improve information mechanisms (Ebony Consulting International 2000:74-76, 
Falkena et al 2002).  
2.2.3 – Unqualified demand 
A third line of argument, sometimes implicit, is that South African SMMEs do not 
qualify to receive finance, for example because the owners’ managing skills are 
insufficient or their expectations unreasonable. GEM (2002:42-43, 2003:47, 2004:31) 
have repeatedly argued that some entrepreneurs’ difficulties in accessing finance were 
often caused by weaknesses within the firm and its managing team. These may also 
explain why schemes put in place by the banks to enable micro enterprise funding have 
been largely unsuccessful (Schoombee 2004:11).  
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For many authors, the solution lies in skills building, gradually improving 
entrepreneurial capacity and thus creating a generation of SMMEs that will fulfil 
sound lending requirements (GEM 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). In the interim, some 
authors recommend restricting access to finance, either to specific segments, such as 
over-indebted borrowers (Ebony Consulting International 2000) or as a general 
strategy (Cressy 1996).  
The three broad explanatory models are summarised in the figure below: 
Figure 1 – The three main explanations for financial constraints and corresponding 
policy recommendations  
 
 
2.3 – Demand quality: a gap in the literature  
The literature frequently uses the argument that many SMMEs do not qualify for finance. 
However, there is not much systematic in-depth evidence on enterprise quality to back 
this argument. For example, with the exception of the 2003 extensive review of financial 
management  practices,   GEM  assessed  the   creditworthiness   of   SMMEs   based   on  
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superficial proxies such as: blacklisting, unavailability of adequate financial 
records, lack of collateral, or seeking working capital2 (GEM 2002). Schoombee 
also quoted the problem of poor credit records (2004:11), as well as a lack of 
commitment by the owners and non-viable business ideas – but these criteria 
were based on interview evidence of mentors rather than on a systematic analysis 
of SMME data.  
The choice of criteria to determine creditworthiness fuels the controversy. Past 
credit records (including blacklisting), the existence of collateral or the quality of 
financial records are popular indicators but are contested by SMME advocates, 
especially those of black entrepreneurs, on the following grounds:  
(a) past credit records, being related to an unfair historical context (apartheid and 
its legacy that continued after 1994), are regarded as inappropriate predictors of 
future payment behaviour;  
(b) collateral requirements are more difficult to fulfil for Africans, who were 
historically unable to acquire property and still tend to be structurally confined to 
low-value areas;  
(c) adequate financial records are unattainable for small entrepreneurs who 
cannot afford the fees of qualified professionals.  
In part, the reason for this dilemma on criteria is that they are second-best 
indicators, used in a context of imperfect markets, as substitutes for a more in-
depth assessment of the SMMEs’ quality. Therefore a serious investigation needs 
to distinguish between criteria referring to the intrinsic quality of SMMEs as 
economic actors (such as the viability of the business idea or the owner’s 
commitment), and those related to the functioning of markets in a context of 
imperfect information and enforcement problems (such as the credit record, 
                                                 
2  “Seeking working capital” may seem a surprising cause of exclusion. The argument of the 
GEM authors (2002) was that asking for working capital without providing collateral (i.e. 
combination of two factors) would be a sufficient ground for rejection. However, in their 
empirical work they consider each criterion separately.  
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collateral, etc)3. In this way, credit rejections can be attributed more precisely 
either to weaknesses in the foundation of the SMMEs, or their inability to meet 
market requirements. The distinction also has great policy relevance: no amount 
of support can provide durable relief to an SMME whose foundation is not 
sound; nonetheless, targeted policies and infrastructure would be able to help 
SMMEs that have a well thought-out business idea but poor collateral or 
financial records, to access the required finance.  
 
Section 3. Purpose, scope and philosophy of the 
research 
3.1 – The gradual emergence of the focus areas  
When this study began in 2001, the financing problems faced by SMMEs were 
taken as a given, while the unknown was the intrinsic quality of businesses. The 
initial purpose of the study was therefore to gain a closer understanding of the 
financial profile of SMMEs and to assess its impact on their access to finance, in 
order to estimate to what extent SMMEs are victims of unfair credit rationing4.  
The difficulty of gathering and cleansing financial data from SMMEs raised the 
issue of information, especially accounting opacity. Being originally perceived 
as a practical limitation of the empirical methodology, this problem area 
gradually emerged as a conceptually relevant factor. In particular, it appeared 
that issues of financial communication had to be separated from the intrinsic 
quality of an SMME as a potential debtor. This led to the addition of a chapter on 
the role of information problems.  
                                                 
3  The relationship between informational asymmetry, enforcement problems, and collateral is 
discussed in Annexures 26-29.  
4  This paragraph and the next one allude to concepts and processes, which will be defined and 
explained in detail later in the thesis, specifically in Chapter III, Section 2.4 (credit rationing), 
Chapter III Section 3 (accounting opacity) and Chapter IV Section 4.2 (data cleansing).  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter I. Introduction Page 9 
The research purpose was then reformulated to include both the phenomenon of 
financial constraints, and the two sets of explanatory hypotheses, as detailed 
below.  
3.2 – Objectives and research questions  
This research uses business data to review the SMME finance controversy. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, a distinction is made between the phenomenon of 
financial constraint – which is observable – and the explanatory hypotheses, such 
as market or creditworthiness problems.  
This is an important point, as the literature too often tends to make judgments 
based on an amalgamation of concepts, such as interpreting the frequency of 
financially related complaints as a proof of market failure, or regarding the high 
number of loan rejections as a proof of poor SMME creditworthiness. Instead, 
this thesis investigates the extent and type of financial constraints separately 
from their reasons. From the three main hypotheses, the one linked to the supply 
will not be addressed in this thesis, as it would require a different approach and a 
different set of data. The study therefore concentrates on the hypotheses of 
dysfunctional market and uncreditworthy demand.   
The research agenda for theoretical and empirical analysis is then as follows:  
(1) How do financial constraints materialise among South African urban 
SMMEs? How frequent and acute are they?  
(2) Are the financial markets for SMMEs prone to dysfunction? In particular, 
are SMMEs informationally opaque and if so, does this affect their access 
to finance?  
(3) Does the financial profile of SMMEs constitute evidence of poor 
creditworthiness? Does this affect their access to finance? 
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Figure 2 – The research questions 
 
 
The study will explore these three areas separately, and will formulate more 
precise research questions on each issue after a review of the specific literature.  
3.3 – Introducing the research constructs  
To address the research questions and link them with empirical data, research 
constructs were devised, following the coding procedures recommended in 
grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 1998:57ff).  
Initially, the phenomena and concepts that appeared relevant to the study 
questions were labelled and explored through open coding (Strauss & Corbin 
1998:57ff). This process led to a number of constructs, which were then linked 
and ordered together into a coherent framework. The axial and selective coding 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998:57ff) led to seven core categories, which were filled as 
necessary by a number of lower-level constructs, which will be commented on in 
greater detail in the following chapters. The seven core categories are briefly 
introduced below. 
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• An investment constraint is a situation in which a firm is unable to 
realise its ambitions for lack of term funding (i.e. finance that is required 
for a period exceeding one year) (see Chapter II Section 3); 
• A liquidity constraint is a situation in which a business suffers from tight 
liquidity (see Chapter II Section 3); 
• A debt repayment constraint means that a firm has insufficient internal 
funds to repay existing debt (see Chapter II Section 3);  
• The accounting transparency score expresses the ability of a firm’s 
financial statements to convey a transparent view of the firm’s business 
and financial situation (see Chapter III Sections 4 and 5); the lower the 
score, the more opaque is the firm’s accounting; 
• Informality in this thesis refers to the low level of sophistication of a 
firm’s financial management. It involves the failure to implement certain 
practices (such as record-keeping) as well as organisational aspects (such 
as the absence of qualified administrative staff) (see Chapter III Section 
6.3);  
• Opportunism in this thesis refers to the tendency of small business 
owners to tailor their financial statements to a specific objective, such as 
tax-saving or image-boosting (see Chapter III Section 6.4);  
• The ratio-based creditworthiness score expresses the intrinsic quality of 
the firm, based on a series of ratios calculated from the financial 
statements (see Chapter IV Section 4). 
These constructs were connected to the research agenda as represented in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Research questions and research constructs  
 
 
3.4 – Scope and limitations 
As indicated, this study uses the acronym SMME, as officially defined by the 
National Small Business Act of 1996, and revised by the National Small 
Business Amendment Bill of March 2003. “Small business” or “small firm” are 
also occasionally used with the same meaning. 
The official definition of South African SMMEs is based on a matrix of three 
quantitative criteria (staff, turnover and gross assets) for eight sectors of the 
economy (see Annexure 1). Compared to international standards, the South 
African definition has lower thresholds, probably reflecting the different 
structure of the economy, so that an official ‘small’ enterprise in South Africa is 
substantially smaller than in developed countries (see Annexure 2).  
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The present research looks primarily at small independent firms that are engaged 
in manufacturing, construction, trade and repairs, transport or other services, 
with a particular focus on black businesses5.  
As the study was designed in such a way that each firm had to have accounting 
records, two additional exclusions were necessary:  
• Informal businesses:   
In the absence of a clear distinction between formal and informal 
businesses, this research regards the following as formal: companies and 
close corporations (registered with CIPRO), as well as sole 
proprietorships or partnerships that produce financial statements at least 
once a year.  
• Start-ups: 
Firms that are too young to have published their first set of financial 
statements, i.e. on average firms younger than eighteen months, are not 
included in this review. 
Furthermore, the following firms were not, or only peripherally, covered by this 
research: enterprises from the informal sector and from rural areas (excluded for 
practical reasons); not-for-profit businesses; property management and financial 
services, and businesses which are, directly or indirectly, owned by a large 
company (because these are not usually concerned by the SMME finance 
controversy); however, small groups of SMMEs are included, as well as SMMEs 
that are part of a franchise.  
3.5 – Research approach  
This research can be characterised as follows:  
                                                 
5  This thesis uses the official terminology for population groups. In particular, black businesses 
refer to firms owned in their majority by South Africans from African, Indian or Coloured 
background; African refers specifically to owners from a Black African group (and their 
businesses), Coloured applies to owners from mixed descent or from Khoi-San origin and 
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• It is policy research: The definition of agenda and methods has to strike a 
balance between the researchers’ conceptual and analytical rigour and 
policymakers’ need for relevance, realism and ease of interpretation 
(IDRC 2001).  
• It is exploratory. Indeed, although SMME research has flourished in the 
last decade, in South Africa this fast-moving and widely diverse sector 
remains poorly known and data are often flawed (Berry et al 2002 
estimate the error margin on official SMME statistics at +/- 150%!). Even 
on the conceptual side, in spite of a plethora of literature on credit 
rationing, the issues of demand for finance, creditworthiness and 
financial transparency have not been strongly formalised. The present 
research therefore often covers new ground. This combination of 
conceptual complexity and soft data implied a need for unusually long 
explanations of the analytical processes undertaken. To preserve the flow 
of the thesis, such detailed explanations have been provided in 
Annexures, which are therefore extensive.  
• It is multi-disciplinary. To ensure optimal coverage of the relevant 
issues, this research draws on economic concepts as well as accounting 
and financial analysis techniques and is underpinned by methods of social 
science research.  
• This study was inspired by the principles of grounded theory (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998). Although a preliminary conceptual basis is developed 
upfront, the findings that emerged from the data were allowed to enrich 
and occasionally restructure the initial theoretic framework.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
Indian refers to individuals whose origins are in countries North or North-East of the Indian 
Ocean, including the Cape Malay group.  
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Section 4. Empirical methodology: An overview 
4.1 – Combining three research designs 
The general ambition of the empirical work was to collect and assess data on 
SMMEs’ difficulties in raising finance, their situation with regard to 
informational transparency as well as their financial status, and to investigate 
possible relationships between these variables.  
Scoring models were necessary to address the multiple dimensions of the 
constructs of accounting transparency and intrinsic creditworthiness. However, 
owing to the exploratory nature of the research, the research was designed with a 
stronger emphasis on construct and internal validity than on statistical 
generalisability. Comparability between businesses was more important than 
numerical precision, since the scores were essentially used to sort businesses into 
broad categories.  
Since the research questions combine descriptive and explanatory elements, 
design strategies were used in a pluralistic manner, as recommended by Yin 
(1994:15).  
• The core of the empirical work was based on an analysis of SMME 
financial data. The primary approach here was to use archival analysis, 
based on a sample of 64 SMMEs; this had the advantage of combining a 
relatively precise and independent source of data with a relatively high 
number of firms, hence enabling the study of relationships and providing 
a basis for the classification of SMMEs into categories.  
• This quantitative analysis was complemented by case studies, which (a) 
enabled a critical look at the reliability of the archival data, (b) 
established the qualitative background for understanding the 
relationships revealed in the quantitative data, and (c) triangulated the 
findings from the archival data (Eisenhardt 1989:538). The case study 
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method also revealed the interdependences between the phenomena and 
their complex environment (Yin 1994). 
• In addition, survey data were analysed, with two purposes: 
(a) providing additional data on financial constraints and informality, 
and (b) testing and triangulating the findings from the financial 
statements analysis on a larger sample. This empirical exercise was made 
possible by the agreement of GEM and Khula to grant access to their 
survey data (this will be referred to as the GEM survey).  
• In addition to these three main sources, short interviews were conducted 
with finance professionals to help localise financial data and understand 
their limitations. Furthermore, bank files were reviewed where possible, 
occasionally providing interesting insights. 
These various sources of evidence were related to each conceptual construct, 
following an axial coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998:57ff). This procedure 
enhanced the theoretical density and created connections between the constructs.  
Figure 4 illustrates how the research constructs (which will be presented in 
greater detail in the following chapters) helped to link the main three empirical 
exercises to the study questions.  
The boundaries of the data varied from one source to the next. While the archival 
and case study firms are Cape Town businesses from all races, the GEM survey 
targeted only black businesses in South Africa’s four largest metropoles (GEM 
2003:40). All three sources matched the population of interest, namely smaller 
urban SMMEs. The data were collected between 2002 and 2004, but, since it 
included historical data, it went back to the late 1990s.  
The next paragraphs present the individual sources of data.  
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Figure 4 – Research questions, constructs and empirical design strategies 
 
Note: The research constructs will be elaborated in the following chapters.  
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4.2 – GEM survey data  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an annual international survey 
aimed at quantifying entrepreneurship; since 2001, the Centre for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship (CIE) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) has coordinated 
the South African component of this survey, often seizing the opportunity to 
carry out additional research on entrepreneurship-related issues.  
In 2003, the GEM team, in partnership with Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd (a DTI 
agency specialising in small enterprise finance, which has since been 
dismantled), surveyed 224 formal black businesses and enquired about their 
financial administration and the impact of basic practices (cash book, debtors 
book, inventory control, proactive debtor management) on the firm’s financial 
health (GEM 2003:38ff). This work intended to illustrate the effect of the skills 
gap on the success of such ventures. The survey was carried out through face-to-
face interviews with business owners, based on comprehensive structured 
questionnaires (93 questions). Unfortunately, the GEM documentation does not 
indicate how many enterprises were approached for the survey, hence the 
response rate is not known.  
The 224 businesses represented in the GEM sample represent the medium to 
upper end of formal black SMMEs, with relatively well-qualified entrepreneurs. 
The median values for staff, turnover and firm age were 8 employees, R1 million 
and five years respectively. Manufacturing was overrepresented at 40% of the 
sample, but all sectors were included. Also, a majority of firms considered 
themselves to be profitable and to have enough cash (see Annexure 3 for more 
detailed statistics on the sample profile).  
The GEM survey provided data that were relevant to several areas of this study: 
• Cash problems: prevalence, causes and strategies  
The survey includes several questions to probe entrepreneurs’ cash 
situation (notably the existence and use of overdraft facilities, and the 
ability to pay bills in the last six months).  
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• Finance applications  
The survey records firms’ sources of finance. Owners who have applied 
for short- or long-term finance were asked to indicate the outcome of 
such applications. 
• Informality and accounting transparency   
The survey tackles several practices that contribute to transparency 
(separation of business and personal account; crediting cash inflows to 
the bank account; sound record-keeping).  
4.3 – Database of financial statements  
The core of the empirical work was based on a database of financial statements 
for 64 SMMEs from the greater Cape Town area; in the rest of the thesis this 
database will be referred to as the balance sheet sample.  
Accounting information is a type of archival data, which is regarded as 
comparatively stable, unobtrusive, exact, precise and quantitative (Yin 
1994:78ff). Although applying these attributes to small firms’ accounts is subject 
to caution, a financial statements’ database does provide a more objective and 
quantitative picture of creditworthiness and financing schemes than a survey 
would.  
In the absence of an existing database of small business financials in South 
Africa, the collection of accounting data proved challenging. Since most business 
owners were reluctant to provide this type of information, even for research 
purposes, it was feared that relying exclusively on voluntary participation of 
SMMEs would lead to a strong self-selection bias. To remedy this problem, the 
study adopted a two-pronged approach: some financial statements were collected 
on an anonymous basis from financial institutions, while others were obtained 
through direct contact with firm owners.  
For the first part, agreements were entered into with financial institutions such as 
banks and accounting firms about access to their clients’ files. This happened on 
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an anonymous basis: the firm names were erased on the documents provided, but 
profile information was given (sector, number of employees, ownership, year of 
creation). The providers of data were: NedEnterprise, Gobodo Inc., Betty & 
Dickson SA and PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc.6 This approach provided data on 
firms which might otherwise have declined to participate. Furthermore, in the 
case of the bank clients, the bank file provided additional information, especially 
with regard to the facilities granted and the securities pledged. However, the data 
collected under this method could only be analysed by means of desk research, 
since the business owners were not available for feedback. Another disadvantage 
was that the pool of bank clients was biased towards indebted firms, while the 
pool of clients of the good accounting firms was biased towards better 
accounting quality and transparency.  
To complement this sample, additional data were collected from businesses 
themselves, either directly or through the mediation of WECBOF (the Western 
Cape Business Opportunities Forum), which supported this research. The 
response rate was low: nine of the 75 WECBOF members approached agreed to 
participate, while six of the 35 firms contacted individually joined the sample. 
Surprisingly, the expected self-selection bias did not lead to the exclusion of the 
unhealthiest firms; in fact, the motivations of owners for participating in the 
survey were variable – while some were happy to share their successful 
experiences, others were hoping that participation in the study might help them 
out of a desperate situation. This data also had the advantage of enabling follow-
up interviews if required (e.g. through site visits and short contacts with business 
owners and accountants), as well as specifically targeting firms that were under-
represented in the other samples, in particular manufacturing and black-owned 
businesses.  
                                                 
6  At the time when data were collected, NedEnterprise was a division of Nedcor Bank Ltd; it 
was later transferred to Peoples Bank Ltd before being reintegrated into Nedbank Ltd; 
Gobodo Inc. was an independent auditing firm, whose Western Cape branch later merged into 
Ernst & Young Inc.; Betty & Dickson Chartered Accountants SA was an independent 
auditing firm, which similarly merged with RSM to form RSM Betty & Dickson. 
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Lastly, a co-operation with Business Beat provided complementary data in the 
form of reports written by groups of BCom Hons students, describing small 
enterprises of their choice. From 35 reports, ten included usable, albeit scant, 
financial information. This data were used to support and generalise findings 
from other firms.  
The financial statements and profile information collected through this process 
were compiled into an anonymous database, where each SMME had a code 
name indicating the source of data. From the 72 businesses for which financial 
statements were collected, eight were excluded because they did not meet the 
eligibility criteria (being too large, part of a group, operating in a sector outside 
the scope of the study, or having insufficient financial data quality). The final 
composition of the balance sheet sample is represented in Table 1.  
Table 1 – Origins of the balance sheet sample data 
Source of data Number of firms Code names 
NedEnterprise 17 SMMEs, labelled  Ned1-Ned20 
Gobodo 17 SMMEs, labelled  Gob1-Gob19 
Betty & Dickson 4 SMMEs, labelled  BD2-BD9 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 1 SMME,   labelled  PWC1 
WECBOF 9 SMMEs, labelled  Wec1-Wec9 
Business Beat 10 SMMEs, labelled  BB1-BB10 
Direct contact 6 SMMEs, labelled  Dir1-Dir6 
Total 64 SMMEs  
Note: The code names for NedEnterprise, Gobodo and Betty & Dickson do not match 
the number of firms from those sources, because some firms, which had been attributed 
a code name after their accounts were collected, were later excluded.  
The data collection followed a theoretical sampling method (Glaser & Strauss 
1967; see also Strauss & Corbin 1998:176). In particular, the direct contacts with 
targeted groups of firms sought to include diverse situations which may affect 
SMMEs’ access to finance (in terms of age, size, sector, ownership, financial 
health). Therefore, the sample was not statistically representative of the SMME 
population but rather intended to fill conceptual categories (Eisenhardt 
1989:533). In practice, however, it proved very difficult to collect sufficient data 
from African-owned businesses, which were rare in the files of our sources; from 
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all those who responded to our requests, only one (Wec1) was able to deliver 
financial statements.  
Like the GEM data, the 64 businesses of the balance sheet sample tended to 
represent the medium to upper range of the SMME population: 
• Sizewise, 86% of the sample were either very small or small. The 
median size was 7 employees and a turnover of R1,7 million. 69% of the 
sample were close corporations, the rest being companies (Pty Ltd), sole 
proprietorships and partnerships.  
• The age of the firms was slightly lower than in the GEM sample, with a 
median of 4 years7. Apart from the methodologically induced under-
representation of start-ups, the age distribution of the sample appeared to 
be roughly representative of the whole SMME population;  
• Unlike the GEM sample, the balance sheet sample had no manufacturing 
bias; the trade and catering sector represented half of the businesses, 
followed by manufacturing (22%), services (19%) construction and 
transport enterprises (5% each); 
• Firms operating in a franchise scheme may have been overrepresented at 
19% of the sample, but this seems consistent with the fact that new 
entrepreneurs, particularly black entrepreneurs, are increasingly attracted 
to franchises (Sunday Times 2003:12).  
The most significant difference from the GEM sample was its racial 
composition. While the intention was to include all race categories, African 
SMMEs remained marginal at 4% of the sample. Unfortunately, although almost 
                                                 
7  Data was collected between 2002 and 2004, but the accounts collected usually referred to 
financial years that had been closed 1,5 to two years earlier. As a consequence, a 4-year old 
firm could often only provide two balance sheets and income statements. Younger firms (2-3 
years) often had the same number of financial statements, as these had been produced more 
swiftly e.g. to apply for finance. 
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all the African entrepreneurs contacted were willing to respond to interviews, 
they were unable to provide financial statements.  
More detailed statistics on the balance sheet sample can be found in Annexure 4.  
4.4 – Case studies  
To reflect the variability of situations, a multiple case study design was chosen, 
with individual businesses, selected from the balance sheet sample, representing 
single units of analysis (see detailed case study design in Annexure 30). The 
firms were studied within their context, including in particular (a) the partners 
associated in financial management, such as external bookkeeper or accountant, 
and (b) the potential or actual providers of funds, such as family and friends, 
banks, suppliers, micro-lenders.  
The study design also adopted multiple sources of evidence, seeking a synergy 
between quantitative and qualitative data (Eisenhardt 1989:538) and combining 
the advantages of various types of data (Yin 1994:78): 
• interviews, especially of the business owners, which have the advantage 
of being targeted and insightful (Yin 1994:80),  
• direct observations, in the form of on-site visits, which are real and 
contextual, and  
• archival records, namely the historic financial statements, which partly 
compensate the weaknesses of the other sources of evidence by being 
comparatively stable, unobtrusive, precise and quantitative.  
• Occasionally, business brochures, cash flow forecasts or excerpts from 
the bank file were used as additional sources of evidence.  
Potential problems resulting from the volume of data were controlled by axial 
coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998:57ff).  
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As in the archival analysis, the case study objects were selected to cover a 
variety of situations while concentrating on firms with a superior accounting 
quality. In the process of selecting enterprises, however, two problems surfaced: 
(1) unfortunately, no African business was found that fulfilled the conditions 
regarding accounting quality;  
(2) firms that were able and willing to provide both strong accounting data 
and time for interviews all appeared to be reasonably successful (self-
selection bias).  
 
As a result, the design was revised based on the following compromise:  
• Four regular case studies were carried out, based on a combination of strong 
accounting data and interview data; a particular effort was made to include 
constrained businesses – but low-skilled, African or distressed businesses 
were not covered; 
• To cover low-skilled African businesses, a purely interview-based 
methodology was used for an additional case study, and 
• To illustrate the financial distress phenomenon, a failed business was 
examined, based on archival data only (i.e. including accounting and bank 
files, but no interviews). 
This compromise enabled a combination of two strategies for theory-building, 
namely replication of emerging theoretical concepts (Eisenhardt 1989:535) 
through the similarities in the four regular case studies, and extension of the 
theory (Eisenhardt 1989:537, Eisenhardt 1991:620) through the addition of two 
polarised cases (Pettigrew 1988).  
The six case studies undertaken are briefly presented below: 
• CS1 is a failed business that was initially encountered in a bank file 
review. It was started by a white male in 1996 as the first franchisee of a 
Pretoria-based furniture manufacturer, and the initial investment was 
largely financed by a long-term bank loan of R380 000. Unfortunately, 
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the turnover, at approximately R2,5 million, remained below 
expectations, and new debt-financed investments only made matters 
worse. In 2000 the business was liquidated.  
• CS2 is a franchise restaurant sourced through direct contact. The firm 
was started in 2001 by a white-owned serial entrepreneur. With a 
turnover of over R3 million and 47 employees, it is the largest of the case 
studies. The business’s balance sheet shows hardly any debt apart from 
the member’s loan, but the latter is backed by a long-term personal bank 
loan granted to the owner. In the absence of profits in the last two years, 
the business owner might be considering to resell the operation.  
• CS3 was also originally taken from the bank file; it is a manufacturer and 
retailer of safety wear, started informally in 1998 by a coloured man, who 
later registered a formal CC in partnership with a neighbour. Although 
the partnership did not last, the business has undergone a sustained 
growth to reach an annual turnover of nearly R3 million – while carrying 
hardly any debt. The owner is planning to expand its manufacturing 
operation. 
• CS4a+b agreed to participate in the study after direct contact (through 
black business listings). The two close corporations are owned by a 
township-based African couple, and operate as multiple-activity 
businesses specialising in tenders (including cleaning, catering, building, 
and gardening). The first CC (CS4b) was started by the husband in 1998 
and ran a significant cleaning contract for eighteen months (turnover of 
R350 000 p.a.), but poor profitability and extremely tight working capital 
caused him to stop trading. His wife then started a new CC (CS4a) in 
2003, and won a cleaning contract, for which she contracted 
unsustainable debt (buying machinery on a three-month credit in spite of 
her acute need for working capital). Both businesses have been unable to 
secure stable external finance.  
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• CS5 is a tourism business specialising in township tours and cultural 
tours. It was started as a partnership in 1997 and registered as a CC in 
1998. Through regular investments in vehicles (financed by instalment 
sale), the turnover grew to approximately R1 million. When the firm 
became profitable, the main member (a coloured man) bought out his 
dormant partner. The firm is profitable but suffers from seasonal cash 
shortages in winter.  
• CS6 is a thirteen-year old family business involved in industrial 
packaging, specifically the manufacturing of wooden crates. After the 
death of the founding member, his wife and one son took over the 
business, but there has been little growth. The second son then came in 
and used a more aggressive strategy, while the first son started a new 
business – drawing funds out of the older sister company. This led to a 
split and to major cash shortages in the crating business.  
Table 2 summarises the six case studies undertaken. 
Table 2 – Synopsis of case studies undertaken  
Business 
code 
name 
Size 
category 
Age 
(yrs) 
Type of business 
Sector / 
activity  
Race  
Sources of 
evidence 
CS2 small 3 franchise restaurant white multiple 
CS3 small 6 
manufacturing 
(and retail) 
safety wear coloured  multiple 
CS5 small 6 
high-skilled 
services 
tourism coloured multiple 
CS6 small 13 
high-skilled 
services 
packaging  white multiple 
CS1 
very 
small 
4 
failed; franchise; 
manufacturing 
furniture 
manu-
facturing 
and retail 
white 
bank file 
only 
CS4 a+b micro 
8 & 
0.5 
low-skilled 
services 
cleaning African 
interviews 
only 
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4.5 – Enhancing the design validity 
Following the recommendations of the literature, a few measures were 
implemented to enhance the validity of the study design (Kidder et al 1986:26-
29). 
• To ensure good construct validity, the choice of constructs was guided by 
rigorous conceptualisation, and the multiple constructs used, which were 
organised as a chain of evidence (Yin 1994:34), decreased the risk of 
choosing inappropriate constructs. The correctness of operational 
measures was enhanced by using multiple sources of evidence. In the 
specific case of accounting transparency, where the scarcity of literature 
made the development of a scoring tool difficult, external professionals 
were asked to validate the model.  
• Internal validity can be threatened if exogenous factors are ignored. This 
is controlled by the broad focus of the present study, which reviews two 
rival explanations for a phenomenon. 
• External validity deals with the generalisability of findings. The basis of 
generalisation in this study is analytical (Yin 1994:36) rather than 
statistical. This is made possible through theoretical sampling (Strauss & 
Corbin 1998:176), and the choice of multiple case studies with a focus on 
replication and extension (Eisenhardt 1989:535-37).  
• Reliability can be a cause of concern in a study based on SMME 
accounting data, which may contain errors and biases. To minimise the 
risk of error caused by data adjustments, clearly defined and documented 
operational procedures were followed.  
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Section 5. Progression of the thesis 
Because of the broadness of focus, it was decided to follow a thematic line rather 
than the conventional operational line. This means that each of the constructs (or 
groups of constructs) identified earlier is investigated in an individual chapter or 
section following the same model: literature review, conceptual framework, 
methodology, findings, discussion. This approach enables a better logical flow, 
while avoiding confusion between the multiple constructs.  
Accordingly, the thesis is structured as follows: 
• Chapter II investigates the phenomenon of financial constraints, its nature, 
severity and frequency.  
• Chapter III reviews issues related to informational asymmetry, in particular 
accounting transparency.  
• Chapter IV turns to the role of creditworthiness in explaining financial 
constraints.  
• Chapter V assesses the results and concludes by discussing the limitations of 
this research and identifying the need for further research.  
The overall scheme of the thesis is depicted in Figure 5. For the sake of clarity, 
this figure is repeated at the start of each chapter to demonstrate its position in 
the overall framework of the thesis.   Un
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Figure 5 – The structure of the thesis 
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Section 1. Formulating the problem   
This chapter focuses on the financial constraints faced by SMMEs and their 
complexities. More specifically, this chapter addresses the following issues: 
(1) What constitutes a financial constraint? What types of financial 
constraints can be identified, and how do they materialise? 
(2) How can financial constraints be recognised and measured in practice? 
(3) How frequent and severe are financial constraints in South African 
SMMEs?  
The literature study (Section 2) starts by reviewing methodological approaches to 
the identification and measurement of financial constraints, whereafter it presents 
evidence available from South Africa and from other countries. The impact of 
financial constraints is also discussed. From there emerges a general framework 
on financial constraints (Section 3), which forms the basis for the development 
of a methodology (Section 4). The findings of the empirical analysis are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
Section 2. Literature study  
2.1 – Definition and methodological aspects  
Kaplan & Zingales (1997:172) define financing constraints as the wedge 
between the internal and external cost of funds (sic)8, with the understanding that 
the cost of external funds may preclude a firm from making an investment. This 
definition may not fully apply to SMMEs, for which availability of funding may 
be as constraining as the costs thereof. In addition, since it applies only to 
investment finance, it may be understood as a sub-category of financial 
                                                 
8  It would be more accurate to apply the adjectives ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the funds rather 
than the cost.  
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constraints, which we have labelled investment constraint. Similarly, the 
concepts of liquidity constraints and credit constraints are restricted to particular 
types of finance (see Chapter I, Section 3.2). This thesis further uses the term 
financial constraint to include all three.  
The international literature has used a wide array of approaches to identify and 
measure financial constraints, depending on the understanding of the underlying 
concept. The main approaches are briefly reviewed below: 
(i) The most straightforward method is the survey, in which researchers 
ask entrepreneurs whether finance constitutes an obstacle for them 
(see, for example, Levy 1996). This approach is simple and suitable 
for SMMEs; 
(ii) Another option is to use statistics on credit rejections. Firms whose 
applications for finance are declined (or approved but with a smaller 
amount) are presumed to be financially constrained (Atanasova & 
Wilson 2004:598). This is also a simple approach, but it only 
considers credit constraints; 
(iii) More sophisticated indicators can be used, based on the extensive 
reporting of listed corporations. Kaplan & Zingales (1997:181-182) 
estimate constraints based on companies’ financial behaviour: 
postponing the issuance of shares or bonds, cutting dividends, 
renegotiating debt or reducing investments for financial reasons are 
all seen as symptoms of constraints; unfortunately such information is 
rarely available for SMMEs, making this approach impractical unless 
it is done through a survey; 
(iv) Financial constraints can also be measured based on ratios, such as 
the liquidity ratio, the interest coverage or the debt ratio (Kaplan & 
Zingales 1997:183), or a multivariate index (Cleary 1999). Again, 
this method is more difficult to apply to SMMEs where less financial 
data are available; 
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(v) A further approach harnesses the existence of a correlation between 
availability and use of finance. Firms that have more resources are 
often found to invest more. Some authors interpret this evidence as an 
indication that poorer firms would invest more if they had sufficient 
funding, which implies that financial constraints exist. This has been 
discussed on a micro-economic scale (Fazzari et al 1988; Lizal & 
Svejnar 2001; Bratkowski et al 2000:106) and on a macro-economic 
scale (Lederman et al 2003:145)9. Similarly, Dietsch (2003:111) 
argues that a positive relationship between the availability of credit 
(measured by the credit rating) and the use of credit implies the 
existence of credit constraints. However, Kaplan & Zingales (1997) 
have found that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not good 
measures of financing constraints, since more constrained companies 
display lower sensitivities. In addition, this approach is limited to 
credit/investment constraints.  
Overall, there is no consensus on how to determine financial constraints. Some 
approaches are too narrow, while others are not easily applicable to SMMEs due 
to their limited financial reporting. Dietsch’s method, which uses a 
creditworthiness indicator as a proxy for the availability of credit, is not suitable 
for our purposes, since it implies a perfect correlation between creditworthiness 
and access to finance, which is precisely what we are questioning in this thesis. 
Similarly, drawing on the use of credit as an indicator of the need for credit 
ignores the possibility of credit rationing, which will be discussed in Chapter III. 
2.2 – Impact of financial constraints  
There is ample literature on the impact of financial constraints on firms, which 
touches on three main aspects: 
                                                 
9  For a comprehensive literature review on this approach, see also Wagenvoort (2003b:35-36).  
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• Suboptimal capital structure and financing costs: Petersen & Rajan 
(1995) and Houston & James (1996) showed that by making more 
intensive use of trade credit, credit constrained firms suffer higher costs 
for their working capital. Hommel & Schneider (2003:70-71) further 
argued that alternative financing like trade credit is not always available.  
• Reduced investment activity: Hubbard (1998) showed empirically that 
financing constraints have a greater impact on the investment behaviour 
of small firms. 
• Firm survival: There is no consensus in the literature about the relevance 
of finance for the survival of SMMEs. Evans & Jovanovic (1989) and 
Holtz-Eakin et al (1994), as well as Ma & Smith (1996) for developing 
countries, argued that the availability of capital is a strong determinant of 
the survival of a venture. However, Cressy (1996:1253) suggested that 
“human capital is the ‘true’ determinant of survival”. 
2.3 – South African evidence of financial constraints  
There is converging evidence that micro enterprises have specific financial 
patterns: unlike Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), they hardly use formal 
finance, especially long-term finance. In different samples, the proportion of 
micro enterprises using formal credit was found to be 4% (Rogerson 2002), 8% 
(Rwigema & Karungu 1998:120) or 15% (Chandra et al 2001:78-80).  
This low use of formal finance does not necessarily reflect a problem of access: 
It could be attributed to low demand. In Rogerson’s sample, only 22% of 
businesses had applied for loans. Alternative sources, especially informal micro-
lending and hire purchase, are deemed easier to obtain than credit amounts 
between R10 000 and R200 000 (DTI & Unops, 2000:9). Quantitative 
indications on the use of microloans and hire purchase for micro enterprise 
finance in South Africa can be found in Davel (2001) and Ardington (1999) 
respectively. Nevertheless, availability of credit remains a constraint for micro 
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entrepreneurs: the complaint was made by 88% of the respondents to Rwigema 
& Karungu’s survey (1998:120).  
Among SMMEs more generally, the literature has revealed that constraints 
depend on the size, age and racial background of the business. Levy (1996) 
found that younger and smaller firms, as well as African and Coloured 
entrepreneurs, are the most likely to experience finance as a severe obstacle.  
Racial differences are also visible in four recent reviews of term finance for 
SMMEs. Studies by Chandra et al (2001:78-80) and GAB Consulting (2002), 
converge to show that use of long-term bank loans is significantly correlated 
with race, with African and, to a lesser extent, coloured businesses being less 
likely to use bank funds to finance their investments. The comparison of 
sampling between the two consecutive GEM surveys (2002, 2003) supports this 
finding.  
As far as short-term finance is concerned, though, evidence is less conclusive. 
The proportion of SMMEs using short-term bank finance ranges from 4.5% 
(Chandra et al 2001) to 63% in GEM (2003:46). However, the GAB and 
Chandra studies converge to suggest that, unlike for long-term finance, race is 
not a strong determinant of access to short-term loans.  
Table 3 summarises the level of use of bank finance in various categories of 
firms, according to the studies quoted above.  
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Table 3 – Proportion of SMMEs using bank finance in various studies  
Reference Population  
Proportion using bank 
finance  
Reference 
Micro enterprises in Johannesburg 4% Rogerson 2002 
Micro enterprises in Soweto and 
Johannesburg 8% 
Rwigema & 
Karungu 1998 
African Cape Town SMMEs, mainly 
retail / services 
for initial capital 8% 
for working capital: 40% 
GAB 2002 
African Gauteng SMMEs, mainly 
manufacturing for investment: 18% Chandra 2000 
Black very small businesses, mainly 
African 
term loan: 18% 
overdraft: 9% GEM 2002 
Black small and medium businesses 
term loan: 30% 
overdraft: 63% 
GEM 2003 
White Gauteng SMMEs, mainly 
manufacturing for investment: 27% Chandra 2000 
White Cape Town SMMEs, mainly 
retail / services 
initial capital: 35% 
working capital: 44% 
GAB 2002 
Source: As indicated – the utilisation statistics in GAB and GEM are extrapolated from 
the demand and success rate statistics, assuming that all facilities applied for and 
granted are used.  
 
While the low use of bank finance may be motivated by other reasons, the 
following indications constitute evidence of financial constraints: 
• In spite of distortion risks caused by sample differences, international 
statistics on loan rejections are revealing. As Table 4 suggests, South 
African white businesses experience similar rejection rates as in 
industrialized countries (10% or less), whereas the rejection rates of 
South African black firms, especially Africans, are of similar magnitude 
to Ghana (35 to 75%). This strongly indicates a high level of constraints 
for those firms. 
• Chandra et al (2001:34) confirm this by stressing that the reason for a low 
use of bank finance among Africans is not primarily the absence of need. 
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Only 34% of African entrepreneurs indicated that they did not need bank 
loans, as opposed to 67% of the entire sample. 
• In their investigation of cash shortages among black businesses, GEM 
(2003:41) find that 45% of the sampled businesses that have an overdraft 
have exhausted their limit at least once in the last six months. They also 
find that this indicator is correlated positively with the firms’ inability to 
pay wages and salaries. This again constitutes strong evidence of cash 
constraints among black businesses. 
• Conversely, GEM 2002 showed that 15% of the sampled firms granted 
finance have rejected the conditions. The ability to decline an existing 
supply suggests a lower degree of constraint, even among black SMMEs.  
Table 4 – Rejection rates for SME loan applications, for various South African 
and international studies  
Sample Rejection rates on 
bank loan applications 
Source 
South African studies   
African Cape Town SMMEs, mainly retail 
/ services 
69% GAB 2002 
Black very small businesses, mainly 
African 
bank loan: 75% 
bank overdraft: 38% 
GEM 2002 
Black small and medium businesses term loan: 39% GEM 2003 
White Cape Town SMMEs, mainly retail / 
services 
10% GAB 2002 
Foreign studies   
SMEs in Australia 10% Wallis 1997 
SMEs in the UK 5% Cruickshank 
2000 
SMEs in the United States 4% Levenson & 
Willard 2000 
SMMEs in Ghana (sample consisting of 
particularly successful enterprises) 
56% Aryeetey et al 
1994 
 
Altogether, South African evidence shows that SMMEs do not face uniform 
experiences with regard to financial constraints. While some firms are 
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unconstrained enough to reject loan offers whose conditions were not suitable, 
others experience rejections of their applications. There is convergent evidence 
that the smallest firms and black, especially African businesses, experience 
stronger investment constraints; the evidence with regard to short-term finance is 
less conclusive.  
 
Section 3. Conceptual framework  
This section aims to provide a definition as well as a typology for financial 
constraints, in order to encapsulate multiple situations while distinguishing 
between degrees of severity.  
3.1 – Defining a financial constraint  
As suggested in the literature study, a financial constraint is understood as the 
existence of a financial need, which – for whatever reason – remains 
unsatisfied, thus negatively affecting the business. The following paragraphs 
will comment in detail on the three elements of the definition.  
The first element of the definition is the financial need, which, in its broadest 
sense, is at the sole discretion of the business owner. It may include any type of 
present or future need, and may relate to any type of finance: investment finance, 
liquidity, equity or debt.  
In such broad interpretation, the concept of financial constraint is almost a 
tautology: virtually every business experiences finance as a scarce resource, and 
virtually every SMME owner has ideas which he would wish to implement if he 
had additional resources. But the severity of the constraint varies according to 
the type of need and the extent to which plans are elaborated; these nuances build 
a continuum discussed below.  
The second aspect is that the need must be unsatisfied, and there are many ways 
in which this can happen. The most straightforward is the rejection of a firm’s 
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application for finance; however, this case may represent only a minority of 
financial constraints.  
From all business owners who feel a need for finance, only some lodge an 
application for finance with an institution. Many entrepreneurs omit to do so, 
either because of procedural difficulties or a lack of confidence in their chances 
of success (self-rationing), or because of an aversion to debt. The financial need 
hence remains unsatisfied, and the business financially constrained.  
Conversely, if an application for finance is lodged, there can be various reasons 
why the needs remain unsatisfied, such as a rejection of the application (which 
may or may not be caused by insufficient creditworthiness), unacceptable 
conditions, or an insufficient amount. It becomes clear, then, that financial 
constraints are not limited to businesses which have no access to institutional 
finance. Firms carrying financial debt may even be more constrained than those 
with no debt. The multiple configurations leading to financial constraints are 
represented in Figure 6. 
The third requirement in the definition is that financial constraints have a 
negative impact on business. They may force a business to limit growth (e.g. by 
waiving or postponing investments), to use unauthorised resources (such as a 
breach of overdraft or a default on loan), or to use excessively expensive 
financing options (e.g. trade credit, as shown by Petersen & Rajan 1994). More 
severe constraints can preclude businesses from paying bills or repaying loans on 
schedule, and may ultimately cause business failure.  
However, these symptoms can exist with many nuances: a breach of overdraft 
may be seasonal, and the inability to invest may be temporary. Similarly, a 
constraint may be comprehensive (if a type of finance is not available at all), or 
partial (if finance is present but insufficient).  
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Figure 6 – Possible configurations causing a financial need to be unsatisfied 
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3.2 – The continuum of financial constraints 
To understand constraint scenarios along a continuum, we developed a scale, 
numerically rating the severity of constraints from 0 (no constraint) to 3 
(bankruptcy risk), as illustrated in Figure 7.  
Figure 7 – The continuum of financial constraints  
 
The constraint levels are the following: 
• Cost-related constraints are usually the least constraining, since the 
required funds are available, only at a sub-optimal cost;  
• Investment constraints preclude entrepreneurs from realising their 
ambitions, but they do not hinder the businesses in their current format. 
The latent entrepreneurial potential embedded in investment constraints 
may be released when finance becomes more accessible (although there 
is no guarantee that investment plans are sustainable).  
• However, when the lack of long-term finance causes businesses to use 
short-term resources to invest in long-term assets, cash shortages and 
vulnerability can result. When liquidity shortages are severe (e.g. causing 
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an inability to pay salaries), then the business is at great risk of 
bankruptcy.  
• Similarly, when an SMME is trapped in debt which it cannot repay, it 
runs a high risk of becoming insolvent.  
Section 4 (methodology) will explain in greater detail how financial constraints 
were empirically classified along this continuum, including the assessment of 
severity with regard to liquidity constraints.  
3.3 – Synthesis and hypotheses 
Figure 8 illustrates the wide variety of situations that can constitute a financial 
constraint: internally or externally conditioned constraints (depending on the 
type of resource that is missing most); comprehensive or partial credit constraints 
(depending on whether credit is absent or only insufficient); investment, liquidity 
or debt-related constraints (depending on the type of need); mild or severe 
constraint (depending on the symptoms); and seasonal or temporary constraints.  
Based on the literature and the opinions expressed by sector experts, three 
preliminary hypotheses can be proposed: 
H1. A vast majority of SMMEs, at least two thirds, experience some kind of 
financial constraint.  
H2. The most prevalent type of financial constraint among SMMEs is the 
liquidity shortage. 
H3. Liquidity shortages in SMMEs are often severe: at least a third of SMMEs 
experiencing cash shortages are severely constrained.  
Since this is exploratory research, the rather unprecise quantitative indications 
contained in these hypotheses are in essence arbitrary; however, they enable 
empirical testing. The remainder of this chapter is concerned with defining a 
practical approach and testing these hypotheses with empirical data.  
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Section 4. Methodology 
4.1 – Data sources 
The measurement of financial constraints, in terms of prevalence and severity, 
was based mainly on two types of data: open-ended interviews and the GEM 
closed survey data.  
4.1.1 – Open-ended questioning 
Open-ended questioning of a few business owners took place during data 
collection: Whenever data collection (either for case studies or the balance sheet 
sample) involved a direct contact with business owners, they were asked whether 
they were satisfied with their financial arrangements – a question   which   was   
expected   to   be   answered   negatively   by   most interviewees, and to trigger 
more detailed comments. Follow-up questions were used to qualify the 
constraints as past or present, temporary, seasonal or permanent, quantitative or 
qualitative, light or serious, etc. Although restricted to a small number, this 
approach was chosen for a rich narrative, exempt of preconceptions. 
4.1.2 – GEM survey data 
In addition, the GEM survey, with its questions on liquidity shortages and longer 
term plans, enabled assessing SMMEs’ financial constraints on a larger sample.  
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Figure 8 – The concept of financial constraint   
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The GEM database captures a number of symptoms of liquidity constraints 
(exhaustion or breach of overdraft limit, default on a loan, inability to settle 
bills as they fall due, inability to pay salaries). Of these, the exhaustion of 
the overdraft limit10 or the default on a loan did not suit our purpose, as 
these indicators exclude firms which have not been granted such facilities. 
Our preferred indicators for liquidity constraints were therefore the inability 
to pay costs and the inability to pay salaries and wages11. The latter was 
regarded as a severe liquidity constraint, since salaries are a cost item which 
can be anticipated, and whose payment terms are not normally negotiable.  
Other constraints were captured through GEM survey question #65: “If you 
were offered (your preferred form of) finance, how would your business 
change over the next twelve months?” If the answer to this question was “to 
settle existing debt”, firms would be categorised as debt-trapped; if it was 
for expansion (such as investing in or upgrading equipment, expanding 
product lines or regions, investing in new business, purchasing or 
refurbishing premises), firms would be considered investment constrained. 
Firms which would “invest in working capital” were classified as 
moderately liquidity constrained. Firms which did not have clear ideas of 
what they would do with more finance were deemed not financially 
constrained – unless the answers to the other questions indicated that their 
lack of ideas resulted from helplessness in front of severe liquidity 
constraints. The firms that presented evidence of cash shortages but were 
unsure what to do with additional finance were categorised as liquidity 
constrained. More generally, contradictions in data were resolved through 
the following hierarchy: debt-trapped was the strongest evidence, i.e. all 
                                                 
10  Exhausting the overdraft limit at least once in a period of six months was the preferred 
indicator in the GEM (2003) report, although it can arguably happen temporarily even 
in a business which operates with cash surpluses for most of the year. 
11  It could be argued that the inability to pay salaries and wages applies only to businesses 
that employ at least one person – however business owners may have interpreted this 
question as including their member’s salary, in which case it would apply even to one-
person businesses.  
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firms to which this criterion applied were classified into that category, 
regardless of other criteria that also applied; next was the inability to pay 
wages (severe liquidity constraint), followed by the other degrees of 
constraint as per the continuum. 
4.2 – Data assessment 
Table 5 summarises the operational translation of the levels of constraint, as 
proposed in Figure 7, with a numerical score of 0 to 3. 
Table 5 – Empirical methodology to assess levels of constraint  
 Interview data GEM data 
No constraint  
(level 0) 
 
 
the owner is satisfied 
with financial 
arrangements  
 
 
#65: not sure what they would do with 
more finance 
and # 53: always had enough cash to 
settle costs in last six months 
and #76: has always been able to pay 
wages in last twelve months 
Mixed opinion, 
but not presently 
constrained 
either: there have been 
difficulties but these 
were eventually settled 
or: no problems at 
present but are 
expecting difficulties in 
near future 
< not captured by data > 
Cost related 
constraint 
indications that 
financial arrangements 
are not optimal cost-
wise 
< not captured by data > 
Investment 
Constraint  
(level 1)  
indications that the 
entrepreneurs’ 
ambitions have not been 
realised due to a lack of 
finance 
#65: with more finance, would do any 
of the following: invest in capital 
equipment, expand product/ service 
lines, expand geographically, invest in 
new business, purchase premises, 
refurbish premises, upgrade IT systems 
and # 53: always had enough cash to 
settle costs in last six months 
and #76: has always been able to pay 
wages in last twelve months 
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 Interview data GEM data 
Moderate 
liquidity 
constraint  
(level 1.5) 
indications that the 
business occasionally 
lacks cash (e.g. 
seasonally) 
#65: with more finance, would invest 
in working capital 
and # 53: always had enough cash to 
settle costs in last six months 
and #76: has always been able to pay 
wages in last twelve months 
Significant 
liquidity 
constraint  
(level 2) 
indications that the lack 
of liquidity significantly 
hinders business 
# 53: has NOT always had enough cash 
to settle costs in last six months 
and #76: has always been able to pay 
wages in last twelve months 
Severe liquidity 
constraint (level 
3) 
indications that the lack 
of liquidity threatens 
business sustainability 
#76: has NOT always been able to pay 
wages in last twelve months 
Debt constraint 
(level 3) 
indications of 
difficulties repaying 
contracted debt 
#65: with more finance, would repay 
existing debt 
 
Relating the constraint levels obtained to the population studied, for each 
data source, should make it possible to address the three hypotheses (see 
Section 3.3), i.e. to verify whether a vast majority of SMMEs experiences 
some kind of financial constraint, whether the most prevalent type of 
financial constraint among SMMEs is the liquidity shortage, and whether 
this constraint is often severe. 
 
Section 5. Findings 
5.1 – The existence of financial constraints 
For ease of reference, we reproduce here the hypothesis proposed earlier: 
H1. At least two thirds of SMMEs experience some kind of financial 
constraint.  
Surprisingly, the empirical work suggested that a noteworthy minority of 
SMMEs (in the region of 20% to 40%) was non-constrained.  
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In the open-ended questionnaires, despite conscious efforts to circumvent 
the inherent sample bias towards better-off businesses by targeting 
constrained enterprises, almost 40% of firms indicated that they faced either 
no constraints at all, or no constraints at the present time (they may have 
encountered difficulties in the past, or they anticipate constraints in the 
future).   
The GEM study focussed on black-owned businesses, which the literature 
depicts as more constrained. It can therefore be expected that the proportion 
of unconstrained firms will be lower than in the interviews. Given this 
expectation, it is remarkable that, of the 224 entrepreneurs surveyed, 42 
firms (19%) were classified as non-constrained.  
Table 6 summarises the findings from both data sources. 
Table 6 – Analysis of entrepreneurs’ statements about financial constraints 
 
Constrained 
Difficulties at some 
stage, but presently 
not constrained 
Non-
constrained 
Total 
Own data (mixed 
sample) 
11 
61% 
3 
17% 
4 
22% 
18 
100% 
GEM data (black 
SMMEs) 
182 
81% 
n/a 42 
19% 
224 
100% 
Source: Own data: short interviews or written statements (see Annexure 5); GEM 
data  
While statistical generalisation of interview results would be inappropriate 
given the small sample size and the convenience sampling, the data sources 
do converge in suggesting that a non-negligible proportion of formal 
SMMEs, including black-owned businesses, is not financially constrained. 
This proportion could be in the region of 40% overall and 20% among black 
SMMEs.  
Most SMMEs however do experience some constraints. In the next section, 
a review of the symptoms experienced will shed light on how pressing these 
constraints are.  
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5.2 – Types and severity of financial constraints 
H2. The most prevalent type of financial constraint among SMMEs is the 
liquidity shortage. 
H3. Liquidity shortages in SMMEs are often severe: at least a third of 
SMMEs experiencing cash shortages are severely constrained 
Again, contrary to expectations, the evidence shows that lack of investment 
finance is as prevalent as cash constraints, even though liquidity-related 
symptoms tend to be more pressing. 
5.2.1 – Investment constraints 
The GEM sample suggests that investment constraints are highly prevalent: 
of the 169 businesses that knew what they would do if they were granted 
additional finance in the next year, 103 (61%) intended to realise 
investments or expand their operations. 
The interview data showed that these investment constraints could be either 
mild, if the lack of term finance hindered expansion, or serious, if 
investments were carried out on the basis of short-term resources, causing 
cash shortages.  
A mild level of constraint was experienced by several businesses, which in 
different ways were operating below their owners’ ambitions, due to a lack 
of term finance. Table 7 provides details on the cases. It illustrates the extent 
to which a lack of term finance can inhibit the growth of SMMEs and create 
a barrier to entry into the manufacturing sector.  
Investment constraints are more severe when they result in allocation of 
short-term funds to fixed assets, as in crating business CS6. The lack of term 
funds caused the firm to work with sub-standard equipment and drive barely 
roadworthy vehicles, while the rejection of their property finance 
application resulted in high rent costs. More seriously, this lack of long-term 
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finance was remedied at the cost of liquidity. As the majority owner 
reported, the firm’s habit was to buy a new piece of equipment (saws, small 
machines) each time the business completed a larger contract. This put a 
strain on the liquidity of the business, which was severely constrained at the 
time of the case study.  
Table 7 – Firms with mild investment constraints 
 sector / type of 
business 
type of finance 
lacking 
consequences evolution 
Wec6 supplier of 
heating and air 
con systems 
finance for a  
manufacturing 
unit (premises and 
machinery) 
traded for 13 
years as a 
specialised 
retailer only 
succeeded, 
after 13 years 
BB9 supplier of 
narrow textile 
(cam buckle)  
finance for a  
manufacturing 
unit  
trades as a 
specialised 
retailer only 
little hope to 
convert to 
manufacturer 
ACSe security business finance for 
acquisition of 
other business 
limited growth  keeps trying 
to obtain 
finance 
CS3 supplier of 
protective 
clothing 
finance to buy 
premises in 
industrial area 
limited 
manufacturing 
operations due 
to lack of space  
trying to 
acquire 
residential 
property 
Source: Interviews with business owners  
 
Overall, the findings on investment constraints can partly be seen as 
positive. Indeed, mild investment constraints constitute evidence of latent 
entrepreneurial potential waiting for finance to materialise. However, when 
they result in cash shortages, long-term finance deficiencies are a source for 
concern. 
5.2.2 – Liquidity constraints  
The GEM data indicate that cash shortages are significant. Among 224 
black SMMEs, 99 (44%) expressed at least one sort of liquidity constraint, 
as follows: 
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o 34 (15%) would like to invest more funds into working capital 
(moderately liquidity constrained); 
o 77 (34%) have not had enough cash to pay costs at least once in the 
last six months (significantly liquidity constrained); 
o 39 (17%) have been unable to pay salaries and wages at least once in 
the last twelve months, with at least ten cases where it happened 
more than twice (severely liquidity constrained);   
o 67 have exhausted their overdraft at least once in the last six months; 
this represents 45% of the SMMEs that have an overdraft.  
Among the case studies, cash shortages were experienced by four out of six 
enterprises, with various degrees of severity as exposed in Table 8. The kind 
of operating consequences encountered, such as the inability to acquire new 
supplies until previous bills have been settled (CS6), shows the extreme 
vulnerability of cash-constrained businesses. All owners confirmed that the 
use of unauthorised overdrafts (or breaches of limit) was stressful. 
Table 8 – Case study firms with liquidity constraints 
 sector / type of 
business 
level of 
constraint 
strategy consequences 
CS1 manufacturer and 
retailer of furniture 
severe breach of 
overdraft 
bankruptcy 
CS4 township-based 
cleaning and 
construction firm 
severe micro-loan  breach of contract, 
e.g. cleans less often 
than required, uses 
cheaper chemical 
CS5 tourism business 
(township tours) 
seasonal 
(winter) 
unauthorised 
OD in winter 
tight cash in winter 
CS6 packaging (crating) severe breach of 
overdraft 
delay in 
paying 
suppliers  
defer payment of 
saleslady’s salary 
unable to order new 
supplies 
Source: Interviews with business owners 
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5.2.3 – Default on loan repayments and failure 
Debt repayment constraints were only identified in a minority of the GEM 
survey companies: nine owners (4%) mentioned that, if they were to receive 
additional finance, they would settle existing debt. This figure is likely to 
underestimate the reality, as surveyed business owners may be tempted to 
mention more attractive changes to their business even though sound 
business practice would require them to settle outstanding debt first.  
The case studies provided two examples of businesses which had difficulties 
settling debt. CS1, a franchise furniture business, had been granted a 
comprehensive start-up package, but it soon became unable to repay its 
loans according to schedule. The firm then entered a vicious circle of 
contracting new loans and increasing its overdraft to face its initial loan 
commitments, until it was eventually liquidated. CS4b, a young township-
based cleaning business, acquired equipment on credit before starting, and 
similarly found itself trapped in a debt circle. The owner gave up repaying 
the outstanding portion of the loan, and the chances of survival of the 
business appeared slim.  
5.2.4 – Summary: Levels of constraint  
To summarise, Table 9 and Figure 9 show how GEM respondents and case 
studies are distributed among the six constraint level categories defined in 
the framework. It appears that, against the expectations formulated by 
Hypothesis H2, investment constraints and liquidity constraints are roughly 
equivalent in terms of prevalence.  
This result is subject to a possible methodology-based bias, as the hierarchy 
adopted in classifying the firms exclusively into one category created an 
impression that there was a greater number of liquidity constrained firms 
than investment constrained firms. This is because 29 firms, that were both 
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investment and liquidity constrained, were classified as liquidity 
constrained. Furthermore, as indicated, the proportion of debt-trapped GEM 
firms may be under-estimated, as surveyed business owners may be more 
inclined to think of further investments than of their need to settle debt.   
The result may also be influenced by the choice of definition of constraint, 
which gives the business owners discretion to determine their needs. 
Ambitious entrepreneurs may be dreaming of expansion even though 
experts would objectively recommend improving the liquidity buffers first.  
Qualitative data have made it clear, though, that liquidity constraints tend to 
have more dire consequences on the businesses. The findings also validate 
Hypothesis H3 on the significance of severe liquidity shortages, which 
represent almost 40% of cases of liquidity constraints.  
 
Table 9 – Level of constraints of GEM and case study businesses  
 
‘Level’ 
Number 
of GEM 
firms 
Proportion 
Case 
studies 
Total number of  
• investment constrained firms 
• liquidity constrained firms 
 
103 
99 
46% 
44% 
 
(CS1,3,4,6) 
(CS1,4,5,6) 
Apparently not constrained  0 42 18.8% CS2 
Only investment constrained 1 74 33.0% CS3 
Liquidity constrained:     
• only moderately  1.5 10 4.5% CS5 
• significantly   2 50 22.3%  
• severely  3 39 17.4% CS6 
Debt trapped  3 9 4.0% CS1, CS4 
Total 1.49 224   
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Figure 9 – Frequency of each constraint level  
Frequency of each constraint level in 
the GEM sample (n=224) and case studies (n=6)
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Section 6. Conclusion on financial constraints 
To summarise the findings briefly, the empirical results show that financial 
constraints do exist, but do not affect every small business. The data suggest 
that the proportion of formal SMMEs which are not actually constrained 
may reach 20% to 40% – including among black businesses. In this sense, 
Hypothesis H1 is not fully supported by data.  
Hypothesis H2 is not fully supported either, as investment constraints 
appear to be as prevalent as liquidity constraints. The data did confirm, 
though, that investment constraints tended to be less disruptive: when they 
come in isolation, they indicate latent entrepreneurial potential. However, 
they are more worrying when accompanied by liquidity problems.  
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Regarding the severity of liquidity constraints, the data validate Hypothesis 
H3 in showing that approximately 40% of cases of cash constraints are 
severe (implying an inability to pay wages). Cash constraints and the 
situation of debt trap make businesses more vulnerable. 
The following two chapters discuss tentative explanations of these financial 
constraints.  
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Section 1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the first tentative explanation for SMMEs’ financial 
constraints: market dysfunction. In a situation of market failure, either a 
substantial part of the supply is unallocated12, or a substantial part of the 
demand is unmet, or both. The inability of supply to meet demand is then 
caused by obstacles that hinder market forces, including the imperfect 
circulation of information.  
This chapter particularly focuses on the accounting opacity of South African 
SMMEs, a concept coined for the purpose of this thesis to narrow the 
literature’s ‘informational opacity’ concept to accounting records (see pp. 66ff 
for a more accurate definition of this concept). There are two reasons why 
accounting opacity is explored in more depth: firstly, it is a difficult issue 
which has not been well researched up to now, so meticulous scrutiny is 
needed to obtain significant results; secondly, since the use of accounting data 
forms an essential part of this thesis’ empirical work, the review helps to deal 
with data reliability problems.  
It is worth noting here that the discussion on market dysfunction is broader 
than the informational issue. Traditional market imperfection models are based 
on transaction costs, which can easily explain part of SMMEs’ financial 
constraints. Other issues related to the way in which markets function could be 
summarised under the heading of information substitutes, including collateral, 
credit history and networking. These areas are briefly presented in this chapter 
(with more detailed findings in Annexures 24-29). However, the chapter 
concentrates on the area that is conceptually most challenging, and empirically 
the newest, i.e. the assessment of SMMEs’ informational opacity.  
                                                 
12  There is indeed some evidence that this is the case in South Africa. See Hartzenberg 
(1998) on the surpluses of bank funds earmarked for SME finance; DTI/UNOPS (1999) 
on the inability of DTI/Khula to allocate SMME incentives; Karungu et al (2000: 60) on 
venture capital institutions unable to identify deserving entrepreneurs.  
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Informational problems are often mentioned to explain financial market 
imperfections. The ‘accounting opacity hypothesis’ postulates that 
informational asymmetry on financial markets causes market failure, 
resulting in firms’ inability to secure the funding that they would deserve. It 
is argued that SMMEs are particularly affected by this issue because of their 
opacity, which results inter alia from their informality. This topic goes 
beyond market frictions, as it implies not only transaction costs to search for 
and process information, but also enforcement problems and credit 
rationing.  
In order to test the accounting opacity hypothesis, this chapter addresses 
four questions: (i) How does one assess SMMEs’ accounting opacity? 
(ii) Are South African SMMEs informationally opaque, in particular with 
regard to their accounting? (iii) What are the roots of accounting opacity, 
and how can policy address it? And: (iv) Is accounting opacity related to 
financial constraints? Two more questions are briefly touched upon, namely 
(v) What (second-best) strategies do banks use to circumvent the use of 
accounting information? And (vi) What dysfunction results from transaction 
costs on the SMME financial market?  
To answer these questions, Section 2 will seek pointers in the literature. 
These will be assembled into a coherent framework (Section 3). Sections 4 
and 5 will develop and apply a tool to measure SMMEs’ accounting 
opacity13. Among the possible reasons for accounting opacity, resources, 
informality and opportunism are explored in Section 6. Section 7 
investigates the connections between resources, informality, opportunism, 
accounting opacity and financial constraints. Section 8 briefly reviews the 
peripheral aspects of information substitutes as well as the role of 
                                                 
13  This thesis uses the positive term of ‘transparency’ when applied to the scoring model, 
as a ‘score’ normally measures a positive feature. When talking about the problem, 
though, the thesis prefers the negative term of ‘opacity’. The two terms designate 
different perspectives of the same phenomenon, which can be represented on a 
continuum from the most opaque to the most transparent.  
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transaction costs, and Section 9 concludes on the hypothesis of accounting 
opacity and more generally market dysfunction.  
Section 2. Literature review 
This section starts by reviewing the literature on informational opacity as 
well as on SMME accounting, before examining specific evidence relating 
to South African SMMEs. The literature review then looks at factors that 
contribute to opacity, as well as the alleged effects of opacity on access to 
finance.  
2.1 – Opacity in SMMEs 
In a central text on SMME finance, Berger & Udell (1998:3) argue that 
informational opacity is the most important characteristic defining small 
business finance. They define this concept as the inability of SMMEs to 
convey their quality in a credible way, as a result of issues such as the 
privacy of their contracts with employees, suppliers, or customers; the 
proprietary character of their capital; and the lack of audited financial 
statements (1998:3). They link opacity to firms’ lifecycles, arguing that 
informational opacity is inversely correlated with size and age of such firms. 
Since firms in the middle range of the age/size/opacity continuum have the 
highest need for bank finance (with large enterprises having direct access to 
capital markets and micro enterprises relying on informal finance), their 
opacity has the strongest effect on their access to finance.  
In SMME accounting specifically, a number of weaknesses have been 
identified, such as incompleteness, lack of detail, lack of compliance with 
applicable standards, irregularity and missing external validation 
(Mc Mahon 1998:6). Although the literature on SMME accounting has 
seldom discussed detailed shortcomings found in the accounts, it can be 
assumed that issues found in larger firms apply similarly to SMMEs. They 
include the classification and recognition of expenses or revenues, the 
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valuation, depreciation and amortisation of assets, as well as the 
manipulation of accruals, such as estimates of bad debt expense or inventory 
obsolescence (Sharma & Stevenson 1997:131-149). These practices can 
have income-enhancing or income-decreasing effects. An issue of particular 
relevance in SMMEs are members’ or directors’ loans, whose amounts tend 
to be affected by the retention of bonuses or salaries (Howorth 2001:81). 
2.2 – South African evidence 
The South African literature on SMME finance generally accepts the 
premise that poor financial reporting hinders SMMEs’ access to finance. 
Falkena et al (2004:117) quote poor financial reporting as one of four 
reasons for SMMEs’ financing difficulties, along with scale, risk and the 
seasonal nature of business. The GEM survey shows that the financial 
records’ inadequacy contributed to the rejection of 11,7% of finance 
applications by black entrepreneurs (GEM 2002:42). 
The informality of SMMEs and the deficiency of their bookkeeping 
practices have already been reviewed in three studies. Rwigema & Karungu 
(1998), who focused on micro enterprises, found a frequent failure to 
distinguish between business and personal expenditure (37%), or to keep a 
sales record (46%) or other records (kept by less than 20% of respondents). 
Similar shortcomings are reported in the construction sector by Thwala & 
Phaladi (2009:72). Such deficient internal controls, which are typical of the 
informal sector, are likely to exist in at least a portion of formal 
entrepreneurs too.  
Even among formal SMMEs with an overdraft facility, GEM 2003 found 
low record-keeping habits. The failure to maintain records ranged from 40% 
for cash books to 30% for accounts receivable (GEM 2003:43-45). 
The recent FinScope Small Business Survey of small businesses in Gauteng 
(Kubheka 2006:19-22) shows that, in less sophisticated businesses, the 
absence of a business bank account is motivated by high banking costs, 
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insufficient business size as well as procedural complexities. Even among 
more sophisticated businesses, many firms do not keep financial records, 
and only the most sophisticated businesses use professional help with 
record-keeping (Kubheka 2006:24, Chetty 2009:45). Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that SMMEs’ financial statements are 
regarded as poor or unreliable.  
2.3 – The reasons for accounting opacity  
The accounting literature suggests several factors that could explain 
SMMEs’ accounting opacity, ranging from a lack of interest to informality 
and opportunism.  
Against the usual understanding that accounting information is vital for 
business management, in the 1980’s a school of thought known as Austrian 
economics started contesting the decision-usefulness of accounting 
information for owner-managers of small businesses. The main sets of 
arguments were (a) the lack of interest of small business owners for 
financial statements (Levin & Travis 1987:30, Carsberg et al 1985:31), 
especially because accounts fail to reflect the value of their personal assets 
(Hommel & Schneider 2003), (b) their lack of skills in interpreting the 
figures (Thomas & Evanson 1987:570), and (c) the high cost of accounting 
(Friedlob & Plewa 1992:91). The literature also emphasised (d) SMME 
owners’ preference for secrecy and independence (Dietsch 2003:94) and 
(e) the lenders’ failure to pay attention to technical compliance of SMME 
accounts (Friedlob & Plewa 1992:90).  
Informality is another factor of opacity. Its multiple facets, ranging from 
type of activity or business facilities, to documentation, compliance and use 
of financial services, have been interestingly synthesised in Galpin’s model 
of Business Sophistication Measure (BSM) (2006), which the FinScope 
survey (Kubheka 2006) used to segment the South African SMME 
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population14. SMMEs’ failure to adhere to standard management procedures 
such as internal accounting or cash management has also been documented 
in several studies, such as Hommel & Schneider (2003:79).  
A third broad factor for accounting opacity found in the literature is 
opportunism (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman 1978). Although not specifically 
related to SMMEs, this school of thought suggests that managers tend to 
make judicious use of creative accounting techniques (usually within the 
framework of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in order to 
maximise their utility. Bhattacharya et al (2001) use the concept of earnings 
opacity to reflect the possible discrepancy between a firm’s earning number 
and its true economic performance. They observe three tendencies: earnings 
aggressiveness (increasing reported earnings); loss avoidance and earnings 
smoothing. Firms approaching financial distress are often suspected of 
masking performance problems through creative accounting practices 
(Sharma & Stevenson 1997:130). However, the empirical testing of this 
theory reveals contradictions. For example, Lilien et al (1988) found 
income-enhancing behaviour, while De Angelo et al (1994) observed 
frequent income-decreasing accounting choices. The vigilance of auditors 
may reduce such opportunistic practices (Stice 1991). 
2.4 – Imperfect information and credit rationing  
This section provides an overview on the vast literature on credit rationing; 
exhaustive literature reviews can be found in Waller & Lewarne (1994), 
Fafchamps et al (1995) or Valentini (1999).  
The credit rationing theory is inextricably linked to information economics, 
especially the pioneering works of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). Informational 
asymmetry occurs when a lender does not know the true quality of the 
                                                 
14  Unfortunately, since bank loans are included as a criterion of sophistication, the model 
does not allow one to test whether sophisticated businesses are more likely to obtain 
finance. 
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borrower before granting a loan, nor is he able to ascertain the true state of 
the business during the period of the loan. This results in enforcement 
problems related to moral hazard (Hellwig 1977) and adverse selection 
(Stiglitz & Weiss 1981). All strategies available to lenders to deal with their 
ignorance of risk lead to dilemmas. Increasing interest rates would 
exacerbate the default risk (Keeton 1979) and worsen adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981), so banks may prefer to reject a credit 
application for lack of ability to price it correctly (Jaffee & Russell 1976, 
Gale & Hellwig 1985). At a macro-economic level, in this situation, interest 
rates are deemed sticky. Alternatively, second-best contracts may incite 
borrowers to act in the bank’s interest, either through loan size rationing 
(Grossman & Hart 1983), or through embedded penalties, but excessive 
penalties would suppress demand for credit (Zeldes 1989, Zame 1993).  
This complex interaction of risk, enforcement problems and interest rate 
stickiness causes credit rationing, which was defined by Jaffee & Stiglitz 
(1990:849) as “instances in which some individuals obtain loans, while 
apparently identical individuals, who are willing to borrow at precisely the 
same terms, do not”. Credit rationing implies that firms are denied funding 
for reasons other than creditworthiness (Levenson & Willard, 2000).  
The prevalence and significance of credit rationing has been studied in 
diverse settings and with different results (Valentini 1999). While Fielding 
(2000) found empirical support for the existence of credit rationing among 
South Africa’s smaller public companies (which are unlikely to match the 
definition of SMMEs), an extensive literature study did not reveal any 
systematic study of credit rationing among South African SMMEs.  
Unlike neoclassic market disequilibrium triggered by market frictions (see 
Annexure 24), credit rationing corresponds to a stable equilibrium where a 
part of the demand is not satisfied: as such, it represents a challenge for 
policymakers.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter III. The hypothesis of market dysfunction, in particular accounting opacity Page 66 
2.5 – Synthesis and gaps of the literature 
This overview of the literature has revealed useful insights, but remains 
incomplete. On the positive side, the literature has established that 
informational problems can preclude SMMEs from accessing intermediated 
forms of finance, that the accounting information produced by SMMEs 
tends to be poor in quantity and reliability, and that these problems may be 
caused by a lack of interest and skills on the part of the small business 
owners, as well as opportunism.  
However, gaps remain: There is little empirical work on SMME-specific 
accounting problems, especially in the South African context. The extant 
literature has focused on reviewing owners’ motivations and bookkeeping 
processes, rather than on pinpointing actual weaknesses in the final product 
(that is, small business accounts). The literature also lacks an overarching 
theory, linking motivations, accounting processes, and specific outcomes 
visible on the financial statements.  
 
Section 3.  Framework for market failure under 
accounting opacity  
This section purports to fill the gap in the literature by proposing an 
overarching framework that develops the accounting opacity concept in its 
dimensions (3.1), identifies its causes (3.2) and discusses its effects on 
access to finance, hence on financial constraints (3.3). 
3.1 – Dimensions of accounting opacity 
The concepts of accounting opacity and accounting transparency are 
meant to narrow Berger & Udell’s (1998) concept of informational opacity 
to accounting records. Accounting opacity is defined from the perspective of 
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an external user trying to use accounting information to understand a firm’s 
financial situation: it refers to the incapacity of financial statements to 
inspire external readers’ confidence and to convey a view that reasonably 
reflects the performance and the financial status of the enterprise.  
Financial statements, being the concise summary of multiple transactions, 
are always opaque to some extent. But opacity is aggravated when reporting 
presents weaknesses, as tends to be the case in SMMEs. To summarise the 
various elements found in the literature, accounting opacity can be 
organised in four dimensions, which are illustrated in Figure 10:  
(1) a quantitative dimension, referring to the paucity of data, in 
particular the extent of missing indications (e.g. historical figures, 
cash flow statements or notes are often missing or not sufficiently 
detailed);  
(2) a formal-qualitative dimension, related to the sloppiness of accounts 
(poor presentation, deficient technical correctness, lack of validation  
through owner’s signature and/or auditor’s report);  
(3) an intrinsic-qualitative dimension, i.e. the inability of the statements 
to speak for themselves: existence of unexplained/unusual items 
(related party transactions, intangible assets, provisions for future 
expenses), inconsistencies; 
(4) a moral dimension, i.e. the suspicion that misrepresentations by the 
owners convey a distorted view of the performance and financial 
status of the enterprise. 
While the three qualitative dimensions are conceptually distinct, it is not 
possible in practice to keep them entirely separate when examining financial 
statements. This difficulty is raised again in Section 4.  
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Figure 10 – From opacity to transparency, a continuum with four 
dimensions  
 
These four dimensions were the basis for the development of an accounting 
transparency scoring tool, which will be presented in Section 4.  
3.2 – Reasons for accounting opacity 
Accounting opacity is the complex result of many factors. The elements 
found in the literature can be organised in three main areas: (a) the balance 
between accounting needs and accounting resources; (b) the 
interdependencies, informality and instability typical of small business 
operations; and (c) the existence of motives and opportunities for 
manipulation. These elements are discussed briefly below.  
(a) Following Austrian economics, the effort that a small business puts into 
accounting can be regarded as a function of its needs and resources. The 
need for detailed and carefully prepared information can arise from legal 
obligations, from internal management constraints or from third party 
requirements, such as creditors or clients. In particular, firms applying for 
finance or for tenders may be under pressure by their banks or prospective 
clients to provide accurate accounts. Resources refer to the allocation of 
time and staff to the accounting function, the level of accounting skills, 
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especially the qualification of staff, and the affordability of external support, 
as well as material resources.  
(b) Regardless of the effort put into accounting, transparency can be affected 
by the context in which SMMEs operate, with three aspects standing out: 
interdependencies, informality and instability. Interdependencies occur 
when entrepreneurs share staff, equipment or cash between the home and 
the enterprise(s) – especially when they own more than one venture; when 
owners do not separate personal and business accounts, and when their 
remuneration patterns are erratic and poorly documented. Informality refers 
to the lack of documentation, the vagueness of conditions of some 
transactions, such as loans granted by friends or family, and the sometimes 
large amounts of unbanked cash. Instability may be related to rapid growth, 
seasonality or erratic fluctuations, especially if the small enterprise is 
dependent on few clients or mobilises most of its capacity for each job. The 
owner’s personal constraints such as sickness or absence can also destabilise 
the business. 
(c) Window-dressing results from the balance between the owner’s integrity, 
possible motives, and opportunities for manipulation. Integrity will not be 
further considered here as an empirical assessment of this dimension would 
require different data and skills. Opportunities can be conceptualised as a 
function of the rigour of the legal framework, the internal controls in place, 
and the vigilance of auditors. Motives for manipulation depend on the firm’s 
circumstances and include: saving on income and other taxes; boosting its 
appearance, especially when tendering or seeking external finance; and 
concealing fraud, such as non-recording of sales, disproportionate payments 
to agents from the owner’s family, or recording of personal costs as business 
expenses.  
To assess the relative relevance of these three categories of reasons in 
explaining accounting opacity, the empirical work will explore the role of 
resources, informality and motives for manipulation (Section 6). 
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3.3 – Accounting opacity and credit rationing  
In line with information economics and the theory of credit rationing (see 
Section 2.4), the framework assumes that accounting opacity results in 
rationing, and hence in financial constraints. Adopting a differentiating 
approach, the accounting opacity hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
SMMEs with more opaque accounting are more likely to be credit rationed, 
hence financially constrained.  
Any evidence that more opaque firms are more constrained supports the 
hypothesis, subject to two spurious effects: 
• Firms carrying debt tend to have a stronger need for financial 
transparency, both for internal reasons, as their leverage represents a 
higher risk, and because of their creditors, who may pressure them to 
provide financials. The direction of causality between transparency 
and access to debt becomes unclear.  
• It is probable that accounting opacity is correlated with the quality of 
financial management. In that case, a positive relation between 
opacity and rationing may mask a simpler relationship, in which 
banks reject applications by poorly managed firms. The financial 
constraints would then be caused not by a dysfunctional market but 
by the lacking intrinsic quality of the business. The quality of 
financial information here would only fulfil the role of signalling 
(Bester 1985).  
The empirical methodology will address these limitations.  
3.4 – Synthesis, hypotheses and research design 
Figure 11 illustrates the overarching framework covering the factors, 
dimensions and assumed effects of accounting opacity. Based on this 
synthesis, three groups of hypotheses can be proposed, which are related to 
the phenomenon of accounting opacity itself, its roots, and its effects on 
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financial constraints. From the myriad of those hypotheses, six appear both 
relevant for this study and possible to test, of which five involve causal 
relationships. The testing of these was based on seeking evidence of positive 
or negative relationships between the constructs at stake. Given the data 
limitations noted in Chapter I, which did not allow for detailed statistical 
evaluations, links between variables were sought by observing the values of 
one variable for various categories of the other variable.  
The boxes below list the six hypotheses and their preliminary operational 
translation.  
Hypothesis related to the phenomenon of accounting opacity: 
H4. SMME’s accounting is generally opaque.  
Test: See Section 4.4.6.  
 
Hypotheses related to the roots of accounting opacity: 
H5. Accounting opacity is aggravated by a lack of resources.  
Test: There should be a positive relationship between the sophistication of 
the financial function and the firm’s accounting transparency score.  
 
H6. Accounting opacity is aggravated by informality.  
Test: There should be a positive relationship between the implementation of 
internal controls and the firm’s accounting transparency score.  
 
H7. Accounting opacity is aggravated by opportunism.  
Test: Firms applying for finance should have poorer accounting 
transparency scores.  
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Hypotheses related to the effects of accounting opacity: 
H8. Accounting opacity hinders access to bank debt.  
Test: There should be a positive relationship between the accounting 
transparency score and the use of bank debt. 
 
H9. Accounting opacity causes financial constraints.  
Test: There should be a negative relationship between the accounting 
transparency score and the level of constraint. 
 
These hypotheses and tests are represented in Figure 12, which transfers the 
framework from Figure 11 into an operational research design. The 
remainder of this chapter will test these hypotheses, as follows.  
Based on the four dimensions of accounting opacity identified above, a 
scoring model is developed (Section 4) and applied to SMMEs’ financial 
statements (Section 5), in order to test Hypothesis H4.  
Section 6 assesses the three selected factors for accounting opacity: 
resources, informality and opportunism. Section 7 studies the relationships 
between accounting opacity, its factors, and financial constraints – hence 
assessing hypotheses H5-H9.  
Section 8 briefly addresses other aspects related to market dysfunction, 
including transaction costs and the role of information substitutes. Section 9 
concludes this examination of the dysfunctional character of SMME 
financial markets, especially the accounting opacity hypothesis. 
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Figure 11 – Overarching accounting opacity framework 
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Figure 12 – The relations to be tested under the accounting opacity hypothesis 
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Section 4. How to assess SMMEs’ accounting 
transparency: Scoring methodology  
4.1 – Designing an accounting transparency scoring 
model 
The transparency of financial statements, especially the realism and credibility of 
reported figures, is not easily assessed empirically. To minimise the risk of some 
issues remaining unnoticed or some suspicions of improper accounting being 
unfounded, a thorough procedure is required.  
Unfortunately, neither the literature nor practitioners provide a useful research 
tool: the literature was usually too superficial, whereas practitioners (bankers and 
auditors) relied on more data than was available to an outside researcher. A 
specific evaluation instrument was thus developed. The scoring model, as 
presented in the following pages, was drafted, tested, discussed with 
practitioners, and adjusted to fit the data and the requirements of the assessment.  
To reflect the four dimensions of accounting transparency, an analytical and 
dimensional evaluation tool (Scriven 1994:54) was developed. The first three 
dimensions (quantity, formal quality and intrinsic quality) were assessed 
numerically. Owing to the difficulties of validating manipulation, the fourth 
dimension was only expressed via a symbol (* or #) indicating slight or strong 
suspicions of window-dressing. 
For the numerically assessed dimensions, a mixed plus and minus approach was 
preferred to a mere problem-oriented approach, in which good practices would 
remain unnoticed. A list of requirements was defined upfront and the proportion 
of them that were fulfilled led to a preliminary mark. In a second stage, 
unacceptably bad practices or problematic items would lead to penalties. 
It was also decided to adopt a comprehensive scoring system by taking note of 
minor as well as material errors or problems. This would identify businesses that 
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manipulate their accounts by a large number of small-scale interventions rather 
than via a single large manipulation. However, two materiality thresholds were 
defined, at 5% and 25% of the relevant figure, being the latest value for, as the 
case may be, equity, net profit or cash. Potential errors or manipulations 
exceeding these thresholds would trigger additional penalties.  
The dimensional scores were then summarised into one mixed score through a 
numerical weight and sum approach (Scriven 1994:344-355). Intrinsic quality 
received the largest weight (55%), owing to its greater impact on the usability of 
financial information. Quantity was weighted the least (20%) to avoid overly 
penalising younger or smaller enterprises. The resulting scoring structure is 
represented in Table 10. 
Table 10 – Structure of the accounting transparency score 
Dimension Main Criteria Format of score 
Quantity  
- depth of history 
- three accounts 
- notes 
Numerical score  
from +5 to +20  
Formal quality 
- validation (e.g. auditor) 
- clarity 
- structure 
- calculations 
Numerical score  
from -12 to +25  
Intrinsic quality 
- unexplained / unusual items 
- inconsistencies in basic items 
Numerical score  
from -20 to +55 
Trustworthiness 
Suspicion of manipulation can 
be substantiated 
   blank (no suspicion),  
   * (slight suspicion) or  
   # (strong suspicion) 
Total  
Numerical score15   
from -27 to +100  
+ symbol 
 
                                                 
15  The maximum scores in each dimension correspond to the weightings. The minimum scores 
for formal quality and transparency result from possible penalties. For quantity, any firm with 
a score below 5/20 was excluded upfront. In theory, the model allowed any total score 
between -27 and 100. However, negative total scores were rare since the dimensional scores 
tended to balance each other out (multiple inconsistencies were more likely to be detected in 
firms which had provided extensive information). 
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The list of scoring criteria is provided in Table 11.  
Table 11 – List of criteria for accounting transparency scores 
Dimension Detailed Criteria 
Quantity  
• Number of balance sheets (BS) (full or summarised or interim?) 
• Number of income statements (IS) (full or summarised or interim?) 
• Are the dates of BS and IS congruent? 
• Number of cash flow statements (CFS)  
• Number of sets of notes 
• Are any elements missing from notes: depreciation rates, cost of assets, 
intangibles, nature and characteristics of long-term liabilities? 
inventory? related party transactions? cost of sales? tax calculation? 
Formal quality 
 
Serious issues 
• Internal validation 
• External validation (report from auditor or accounting officer) 
• Details 
• Period of reference 
 
Minor issues relating to presentation 
• Comparative column 
• Legibility (e.g. handwriting, “plus minus confusion”, alignment, 
“laundry-list syndrome”) 
• Classification: short-term / long-term, cost of sales 
• Sums in the balance sheet or income statement 
• Correct classification of lease debt (if applicable) 
 
Critical issues of structural correctness (=> penalties) 
• Asset-liability distinction 
• Asset-expense distinction 
• Asset-liability sums 
• Consistency between BS, IS, CFS, notes (e.g. re. depreciation rates, 
inventory, retained earnings) 
 
General judgement: Do the accounts seem to be clean and prepared with 
care?  
 
Intrinsic quality 
 
Testing of obligatory items 
• BS carrying value of fixed assets, in relation to notes, CFS, depreciation, 
previous years 
• Depreciation, in relation to notes, cost, practice note 
• Member’s equity 
• Member’s salary 
• Accounts receivable, in relation to turnover and previous years 
• Accounts payable, in relation to turnover and previous years 
• Cash balance compared to reconstituted CFS and to interest earned/paid 
• Interest earned or paid compared to cash balance 
• Turnover to cost of sales and compared to previous years 
• Operating expenses (compared to previous years) 
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Dimension Detailed Criteria 
Intrinsic quality 
(continued) 
 
Testing of frequent items 
• Inventory, in relation to turnover, previous years and peers 
• LT liabilities, in relation to investments, CFS and previous years 
• Member’s loan 
• Financial expenses (in relation to LT liabilities and previous years) 
• Tax calculation 
• Tax liability  
 
Less usual, non-testable items (=> penalties) 
• Property and intangible assets 
• BS value of property 
• BS value of intangibles 
• Amortisation  
• Loan granted to or by related parties, other than members loan 
• Other interest-free or preferential long-term loans 
• Interest or other payment to/from related parties 
• Fees, commissions, discounts granted 
• Deferred charges 
• Unexplained extraordinary items  
• Provisions for future expenses 
 
General judgement: Do the accounts seem to make sense considering the 
business' stated activity?  
 
Trustworthiness Suspicion of manipulation?  
If slight suspicion, mark *; if strong suspicion, mark #. Justify! 
Abbreviations used: BS: Balance sheet, IS: Income Statement, CFS: Cash flow 
statement, LT: long term 
Before giving more details on the assessment criteria, weightings and materiality 
thresholds, it is worth dwelling briefly on the scoring process.  
4.2 – The scoring process 
Detecting and judging issues of accounting opacity required a comprehensive 
and thorough process. For this, though time-consuming16, a sensible evaluation 
acknowledging the individual characteristics of every enterprise was preferred to 
a mechanical computer-based scoring method.  
                                                 
16  For an enterprise that provided extensive data with intrinsic inconsistencies, the testing and 
assessing process could take 15 to 20 hours. 
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The process is represented in Figure 13. The first two steps, an inventory of 
available data including a date consistency check, and a review of formal 
features of the statements (signature, auditor or accounting officer’s report; 
structure and presentation), were simple and led to preliminary scores for the 
quantitative and formal dimensions respectively.  
The assessment of intrinsic quality followed more complex procedures suggested 
by professional SMME accountants, and used spreadsheet-based cross-
verifications, simulations and ratio calculations. For example, the process 
involved (re-)compiling the schedule of fixed assets, the tax calculations, the 
schedule of the members’ investment and an approximate cash flow statement. In 
those tables, a mass of information was organised (such as 
investments/divestments, depreciation practices, financing schemes, evolution of 
the cash position), which was then connected to the qualitative information 
available to draw a tentative profile of the enterprise, its status and its 
characteristics. This profile ensured an appreciation of firm-specific issues 
impacting on the accounts.  
In a second step, tests were done to verify the consistency of figures with the 
profile drawn. Tests included the analysis of spreadsheet-generated ratios and 
simulations, year-to-year comparisons and comparison with peer businesses. 
Questions or inconsistencies generated by these tests led to an iterative process 
whereby primary data was constantly reconsidered to refine the firm’s profile. If 
uncertainties or inconsistencies remained, the corresponding accounting item 
was marked with 0 (clear inconsistency) or a medium score (if it was difficult to 
attribute the lack of clarity to accounting or to reality).  
Furthermore, each inconsistency potentially triggered penalties, affecting the 
quantitative score (if a clarifying note was missing), the formal quality score (if 
there were errors in calculation or structure), the intrinsic quality score (if the 
potential effect of the presumed error or misrepresentation was material), or the 
manipulation add-on (if it was suspected that the inconsistencies came from 
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misrepresentations). Suboptimal scores or penalties were noted and explained 
separately. 
From this process emerged the four dimensional scores, whose sum was the total 
score. A plausibility check compared the total score to the list of major issues 
found in the statements, to check for scoring mistakes.  
4.3 – Evaluating and applying the tool  
The three chartered accountants from auditing practices who contributed to this 
study (see Chapter I Section 4.3) were asked to give their opinion on the scoring 
tool, and all agreed that it would fulfil its functions. Specifically in adopting 
Scriven’s meta-evaluation criteria (1994:230), the model appeared satisfactory 
with regard to conceptual clarity, comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, 
credibility, explicitness about the standards used, feasibility, relevance to the 
needs of external users of financial statements, and technical soundness. In 
addition, the thoroughness of the evaluation process was found to provide a 
reasonable assurance that most problems would be detected. Therefore, the tool 
seemed fit to be applied to empirical data. 
In the balance sheet sample, the scoring model was applied to the 33 firms for 
which a copy of the financials was available17 (half of the total database). In the 
case studies (except CS4), the scoring process was enriched by interview data to 
triangulate accounting data. For all other sample firms, only the intrinsic quality 
of figures was assessed.  
                                                 
17  That is, accounts provided by NedEnterprise and PWC, or by the SMMEs themselves through 
WECBOF or direct contact. Accounts which had been made available by other accountants or 
by Business Beat were only consulted at the premises of the data provider, so that no copy 
was kept – hindering a full scoring procedure. 
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Figure 13 – Accounting opacity assessment process 
Data 
1. Quantity 
Inventory of avai-
lable information  
2. External review 
(presentation, 
signature, external 
report etc) 
3. Data capture into 
own spreadsheets 
=> semi-automatic 
calculations (ratios, 
fixed assets, tax, 
cash flow, etc) 
4a. 
Tentative 
firm profile 
4b. Analytical 
review (ratios, 
year-to-year 
and peer 
comparisons) 
Iterative process 
to improve the fit 
5. Remaining 
questions / 
inconsistencies
? 
6a. Missing 
clarifying notes? 
6b. Errors in 
structure or 
calculations? 
6c. Material impact 
on the “true and 
fair view”? (in 
relation to firm’s 
key figures) 
6d. Suspected 
misrepresentation? 
Preliminary 
quantitative 
score 
Penalty 
Preliminary 
formal 
quality score 
Penalty 
Preliminary 
intrinsic 
quality score 
Quantitative 
score 
Formal 
quality score 
Intrinsic 
quality score 
Manipulation 
add-on 
Penalty 
7. Summary of main quality issues 
8. Total 
accounting 
transparency 
score 
9. Plausibility check 
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4.4 – Interpretation of scores and examples 
For a better interpretation of scores, and to establish quantitative expectations for 
the testing of Hypothesis H4, this section discusses possible thresholds and 
presents examples. After a theoretical discussion (4.4.1), a few issues emerging 
from the data are isolated for three businesses, and their impact on the scores is 
discussed (4.4.2 to 4.4.5), with more detailed comments being provided in 
Annexure 12. This leads to a discussion on the quantitative translation of 
Hypothesis H4 (4.4.6). 
4.4.1 – ‘Rule-of-thumb’ thresholds 
As Table 11 has shown, the majority of criteria in the quantity and formal quality 
dimensions (which jointly account for 45% of the score), such as the presence of 
notes and cash flow statements or the owner’s signature, represent legal 
requirements for close corporations and companies. Criteria in the intrinsic 
quality dimension (55% of the score) are not related to compliance, but to the 
consistency of the economic content.  
Instead of scientifically establishing thresholds – which would prove overly 
complex – it appeared preferable to work with rules of thumb. In light of the 
criteria, scores under 75% in quantity and formal quality were assumed to reveal 
incomplete compliance for close corporations (CCs) and companies, while total 
scores under 50% were assumed to indicate limited usability of financial 
information.  
To verify these assumed thresholds, three cases were reviewed in greater detail: 
Ned2, a printing firm with a total score of 13,9*; Wec07, a publishing business 
with a total score of 77, and PWC01, a business selling DIY and sports products, 
with a total score of 52,6. As the next paragraphs (and Annexure 12) show, the 
scores of these SMMEs are consistent with the thresholds proposed.  
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4.4.2 – Depreciation of fixed assets in Ned2 
Ned2 did not provide a schedule of assets, so the carrying value of fixed assets 
could not be ascertained. The depreciation of fixed assets was omitted in its 
October 2001 balance sheet. The impact of this omission, estimated at R85 000, 
exceeded 25% of the profit figure and was therefore deemed highly material. 
This was reflected as follows in the intrinsic quality scoring: the carrying value 
of fixed assets was scored at 1,5/3 (insufficiency of data), while the amount of 
depreciation was scored at 1/3 (depreciation correct in February but missing in 
October). The intrinsic quality score was further affected by a 2 points penalty to 
reflect the highly material impact of this omitted depreciation on the last period’s 
profit. 
4.4.3 – Treatment of liabilities in Ned2 
In Ned2’s October 2001 balance sheet, most liabilities appeared as negative 
amounts, while the equity was positive. The member’s loan and long-term 
liabilities were hence subtracted from, instead of added to, the member’s capital. 
Similarly, the current tax liability was added to rather than subtracted from the 
current assets.  
If these liabilities were in fact assets (i.e. the member and other agents had 
borrowed funds from, rather than lent funds to, the business), it is not clear why 
they should have been labelled as liabilities. It seems more plausible that the 
person who prepared the balance sheet had a serious accounting skills shortage 
and assumed that liabilities had to be preceded by a minus. To balance the capital 
employed with the employment of capital, substantial amounts had been added, 
labelled as ‘long-term charges’, which are suspected to have no substance.  
This critical mistake substantially affected the formal quality score, with the 
strongest possible penalty (-6) for the asset-liability distinction and a poor 
general appreciation of formal quality (0,5). As to intrinsic quality, the credibility 
of the three types of liabilities (accounts payable, long-term liabilities and 
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members’ loan) was valued at 0. The material amounts of the long-term liability 
(R24 000) and the member’s loan (R227 000) triggered additional penalties. The 
general assessment of intrinsic quality was set at 0/4. Overall, then, this grave 
mistake in the compilation of the accounts, which critically impinges on the 
usability of the October 2001 balance sheet, affected Ned2’s total score by 23.5 
points, in line with the weight of the October 2001 balance sheet, which 
represented a quarter of total data. 
Overall, this and other anomalies led to a total score of 13.9/100, consistent with 
the judgment that these financial statements were only partly usable.  
4.4.4 – Values of accounts payable and receivable in Wec07 
Compared to peers, the values of current assets and liabilities in Wec7’s accounts 
were not self-explanatory. Accounts receivable were unusually high (with 
average payment terms exceeding three months) and accounts payable had 
experienced a steep decrease from 36 to 19 days between February and 
September 2001. A study of Wec7’s profile did not reveal any particular 
explanation for these surprising values, other than possible short-term 
fluctuations. Therefore, this anomaly did not trigger substantial penalties: the 
credibility of both figures was scored at 2.5 out of 3. 
Apart from this and similar anomalies, Wec7’s financial statements did not 
reveal more substantial inconsistencies. Its total score of 77/100 (see Annexure 
12) is consistent with the threshold of 75% for compliance and usability.  
4.4.5 – Cost of sales and inventory in PWC01 
PWC01 is a medium-sized sports and DIY supplier, registered as a (Pty) Ltd. 
The comparability of its accounting figures across the reporting period is 
rendered difficult by the fact that the Pty changed auditors in 2000, triggering a 
significant reshuffling of accounts. Among other issues, the date of closure of the 
financial year was moved from 31 December to 30 June, leading to an 18-month-
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long reporting period in 1999-2000, as well as probable seasonal effects on 
current assets and liabilities.  
One of the perturbing aspects is the change in the definition of cost of sales, 
which the notes do not comment on. Analysing comparative values reveals that 
for December 1998, the change of method had the effect of reducing the cost of 
sales by 27%. Similarly, other cost items present diverging values: there are three 
different figures for the salaries paid in 1998, ranging from R497 000 (in the 
2000 income statement’s comparative column) to R958 000 (in the 1998 income 
statement). The same applies to debt and finance charges. While this issue is 
fundamentally a matter of classification and presentation, it creates opacity as it 
becomes almost impossible to follow trends in costs, debt or financial charges 
across the period, or to track the source of the difference. Due to these 
difficulties, both the operating and financial expenses were rated with a half-
score (1,5/3) to reflect the lack of clarity. No further penalty was given in the 
intrinsic quality dimension, since the bottom line was not affected, but a penalty 
was triggered in the quantity score, to reflect the insufficiency of notes which 
should have commented on the change of method.  
Another perturbing item was the inventory, whose value in June 2000 was 
proportionately 75% higher than in December 1998. This was likely to be related 
to seasonal effects, with the winter possibly being used to build-up stock ahead 
of the higher sales of sports articles in summer. However, such reasoning creates 
an opacity problem, as it makes it difficult to detect actual selling difficulties or 
stock management problems. Therefore, again, the inventory was marked with a 
medium score (1,5/3); the very material difference amount (which was almost as 
high as the firm’s equity) triggered an additional two-point penalty. 
These and other similar issues lead to a total score of 52,6; the score reflects the 
overall assessment of the firm’s accounting: although a number of items were 
difficult to interpret and compare from year to year, impeding any detailed 
financial analysis, the overall picture appeared as a faithful account of the firm’s 
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situation: hence, the financial statements remained usable, although not for any 
type of analysis.  
4.4.6 – Thresholds and test for hypothesis H4 
These examples have given more tangible insights on the scoring model and 
generally supported the thresholds proposed in Section 4.4.1. It is now possible 
to propose a quantitative translation of Hypothesis H4, which stated that SMME 
accounts are generally opaque. Consideration must be taken of the fact that the 
hypothesis relates to the overall SMME population, whereas the test is restricted 
to a biased sample. Given the thresholds proposed, the hypothesis will be 
deemed supported if at least 25% of the sample firms score below 50% and at 
least 66% of them score below 75%. In this case, considering the bias, it is likely 
that more than half of all SMMEs score below 50% and more than 80% are 
below the legal CC requirement level of 75%.  
The next section presents the scoring results.  
 
Section 5. Accounting transparency scoring results  
H4: SMMEs’ accounting is generally opaque. 
Test: In a sample with a positively biased accounting quality, at least 25% of 
firms score below 50% and at least 66% score below 75%.  
This section comments on the total and dimensional scores obtained from 
assessing the financial statements of the sample. The score review is followed by 
a brief discussion of the most problematic items; Annexures 13-15 provide more 
details.  
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The total scores for the 33 firms vary between 6,5#18 and 86,6 with a mean of 54 and a 
median of 56 – reflecting the variety of situations represented in the sample. However, 
the sample is biased towards better accounting, since firms that could not provide any  
Table 12 – Synopsis of accounting transparency scores of case study firms 
 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS5 CS6  
Quantitative Score 10,5 12,0 13,5 14,0 13,0 / 20 
Formal Quality Score -0,5 17,5 16,0 21,5 20,5 / 25 
Intrinsic Quality Score -3,5 36,0 17,0 38,9 37,4 / 55 
Trustworthiness # * *  #  
Total Score 6,5# 66,0* 46,5* 74,4 70,9# / 100 
*: small suspicion of manipulation; #: strong suspicion of manipulation 
 
Table 13 – Dimensional scores in the balance sheet sample 
 
Quantity  
Formal 
Quality  
Intrinsic 
Quality  
Total Score 
Highest score 20.0 / 20 25.0 / 25 49.6 / 55 86.6 / 100 
Lowest score 5.0 / 20 -0.5 / 25 -3.5 / 55 6.5 / 100 
Median  11.7 / 20 15.8 / 25 29.1 / 55 55.9 / 100 
     in percent19 59% 63% 53% 56% 
Proportion of firms with the following score (in percent27) 
Negative 0% 3% 3% 0% 
0 to 25% 6% 12% 12% 12% 
25.1% to 50% 27% 15% 21% 21% 
50.1% to 75% 45% 36% 48% 52% 
over 75% 21% 33% 15% 15% 
Cumulative 
proportion 
under 50% 33% 30% 36% 33% 
under 75% 79% 67% 85% 85% 
* Slight suspicion 50% Manipulation scores: 
# Strong suspicion 13.3% 
Source: Based on 33 firms from the balance sheet sample. 
                                                 
18  As indicated in Tables 9 and 10 of the previous section, a * indicates a small suspicion of 
manipulation; a # indicates a strong suspicion of manipulation. The numerical scores are out 
of 100.  
19  For easier interdimensional comparisons, the numerical scores have been expressed as a 
percentage of the maximum score in the dimension, e.g. a 25% score in the dimension 
“quantity” corresponds to 5 (25% of 20). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter III. The hypothesis of market dysfunction, in particular accounting opacity Page 88 
 
accounts or whose financial statements were unreadable, were excluded upfront. 
Case studies, especially, were generally selected for their good transparency 
score. 
Table 12 summarises the scores obtained by the five case study businesses which 
provided accounts, while Table 13 presents the results of the balance sheet 
sample (more detailed score results for the balance sheet sample can be found in 
Annexure 13). 
The cumulative proportions found in Table 13 support Hypothesis H4. The 
following remarks further help to interpret the scores. 
• The quantity scores were mostly affected by the lack of cash flow 
statements and notes. In spite of it being a legal requirement for CCs and 
Companies, 73% of the financial statements assessed had no or very 
rudimentary cash flow statements, and no or insufficient notes. 
• The lack of validation affected formal quality scores. The members’ 
failure to sign the accounts, as well as the absence of reports by the 
accounting officer or auditor, or qualified audit opinions, applied to 57% 
of cases. 
• 43% of accounts had inconsistencies between balance sheets, income 
statements and notes, generally related to depreciation figures, variations 
of stock or retention of profit, while seven sets of accounts (23% of the 
sample) contained gross structural mistakes which severely restricted the 
usability of financial statements, such as negative recording of liabilities 
(see the example of Ned2 discussed in Section 4.3). .  
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• The intrinsic quality scoring involved a high number of issues, which 
were often highly relevant to the total score. The most relevant issues are 
presented in Table 14, and include fixed and intangible assets, non-
operating costs and long-term financing schemes. Problems more closely 
related to operations (turnover, operating costs, current assets and 
liabilities) were more difficult to verify and represent a limitation of the 
methodology.  
• While not mentioned separately in the table, related party transactions 
were often a source of opacity, through uncertainties on members’ loans, 
members’ remuneration, as well as dealings with related businesses. 
(Further details can be found in Annexure 14 and in case study narratives, 
Annexures 31-36). 
• Suspicions of manipulation existed in more than half of the scored 
balance sheet sample firms (sixteen out of 33), with four cases of strong 
suspicions. The effect of manipulations on the firm’s key figures was 
material in nine cases, and highly material in four cases. Most suspicions 
were cases of earnings aggressiveness or exaggerations of the amount of 
equity and long-term funds available to the firm. Annexure 15 provides a 
detailed overview of the cases, the context, and materiality of suspected 
misrepresentations. 
To summarise and conclude on Hypothesis H4, the review has confirmed the 
existence of accounting opacity in a number of SMMEs, affecting all four 
dimensions of the model: paucity of information, sloppiness of presentation, lack 
of reliability of the figures and, in many cases, suspected manipulations. In all 
dimensions, at least two-thirds of the sample fell below the level of 75%, which 
is believed to correspond roughly to a minimum legal requirement for CCs and 
companies. This is still an optimistic figure, since the accounting quality in the 
overall SMME population is likely to be far worse than in our sample. Given the 
sample’s inherent bias, though, two-thirds of the sample and the majority of case 
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studies had acceptable or transparent financial statements (total score above 
50%).  
Table 14 – Most problematic items in the balance sheet sample 
Item 
Proportion 
of accounts 
materially 
affected 
most frequent problems 
detectable? 
adjustable? 
Fixed and 
intangible assets 
53% 
- depreciation  
- franchise fee 
generally detectable 
and adjustable 
Equity and term 
debt 
39% 
- retained income 
- members’ loans 
- non-bank loans, incl. 
related party loans  
- financial charges 
detectable but 
adjustment often 
speculative 
Current assets and 
liabilities 
37.5% 
- accounts  payable  
- accounts receivable 
- inventory 
difficult to detect and 
to adjust 
Operating costs 17% 
- e.g. manipulating 
turnover or cost of sales 
difficult to detect and 
to adjust 
Non-operating 
costs 
45% 
- underestimation of 
depreciation and 
financial charges 
- members’ salaries 
generally detectable 
and adjustable 
 
The next section examines the reasons for accounting opacity. 
 
Section 6. The reasons for accounting opacity 
6.1 – Introduction: Practical approaches 
The conceptual framework has identified three main groups of factors for 
accounting opacity, which we have reduced to hypotheses on the role of 
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resources (H5), informality (H6), and opportunism (H7)20. Before testing these 
hypotheses, available data must be used to assess these factors individually.  
The assessment of resources which SMMEs devote to accounting is presented in 
Section 6.2. It focuses on internal organisation as well as on the quality of co-
operation with accountants, and is based on case study data.  
The aim of Section 6.3 is to assess informality. The review of case study and 
GEM data enables determining firms’ degree of informality in their bookkeeping 
and other practices.  
Opportunism is assessed in Section 6.4 by relating accounting opacity scores to 
specific events that are likely to constitute a motive for manipulation, such as 
existing applications for finance or impending failure. This review is based on 
data from the balance sheet sample and the case studies.  
6.2 – The lack of resources 
H5: Accounting opacity is aggravated by the lack of resources devoted to the 
financial function.  
Test: There should be a positive relationship between the sophistication of the 
financial function and the firm’s accounting transparency score.  
Before testing this hypothesis, it is necessary to devise a list of criteria to assess 
resources. Reviewing the organisation of the financial function in case study 
firms throughout their lifecycle, and mapping the progress (or decline) 
experienced by these firms through the years, proved useful in this regard. From 
this process emerged a number of factors (see Table 15), which were organised 
in sophistication levels, as illustrated in Table 16. 
                                                 
20 See Section 3.4 for an elaboration of the hypotheses. Another area is the need for accounting 
information, which depends among other things on external pressure, arising from the legal 
framework, the enforcement of regulations, and banks’ possible requirements. While this 
thesis could not accommodate an in-depth review of these issues, the study found some 
indications of weaknesses in the enforcement of legal requirements, as well as in the incentive 
effects expected from banks; corresponding data is presented in Annexure 8.  
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Table 15 – Criteria for the assessment of ‘accounting resources’ 
Area List of criteria 
Internal human 
resources 
* number of administrative/financial employees 
* existence of administrative/financial supervision 
* level of training of administrative/financial employee(s) 
* purpose of admin/financial function: paperwork or strategic 
information 
* level of owner’s knowledge of the firms’ figures and modalities of 
financial management (intuitive vs. computerised) 
Internal material 
resources 
* existence of computerised systems, e.g. income and cost tracking 
or accounting software 
External 
resources 
* involvement of external bookkeeper (frequency and purpose; 
quality of the co-operation) 
* involvement of accounting officer (frequency and purpose; quality 
of the co-operation) 
 
It seems natural to expect the financial function to become more sophisticated as 
the business grows and matures, as predicted by Berger &  Udell (1998) (see 
Section 2.1 in this chapter). However, case studies display variable evolutions 
between start-up and mature age. As Appendix 9b shows, the pattern of 
increased transparency described by Berger & Udell (1998) applies only to some 
of the businesses. 
To investigate the connection between accounting resources and accounting 
transparency, the accounting sophistication level of each case study (expressed 
numerically according to the levels defined above), was put in relation to the 
accounting transparency score. The values can be read in Table 17.  
While the sample is too small for generalisations, the figures displayed in this 
table are compatible with a positive relationship between the level of accounting 
resources and accounting transparency. 
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Table 16 – Levels of sophistication of the accounting/financial function 
Sophistication levels Examples 
1. No financial function  
- no records 
- no external support 
2. rudimentary 
administration  
- no employees: owner or family members devotes 
some of their time 
- vulnerable relationship with external bookkeeper or 
accounting officer 
3. non-specialised 
administrative function 
- secretary-type employees 
- focus on paperwork 
- accounting outsourced to external bookkeeper 
4. specialised financial 
organisation 
- staff trained on financial issues 
- specialised computer systems 
- accounting officer provides financial advice 
5. sophisticated financial 
controls  
- trained financial staff supervised by qualified manager 
- owner gaining strategic information from financial 
systems  
- required controls by accounting officer (or auditor)  
 
Table 17 – Accounting resources and transparency of case study firms 
Resources devoted to accounting 
 Internal 
 (financial staff) 
External  
(accountant's 
support) 
Total: 
Accounting 
sophistication 
level 
Accounting 
transparency 
score 
CS2 professional 
strategic support 
by chartered 
accountant 
4 65.5* 
CS3 
secretary and  
admin person  
small independent 
accountant 
3 46.5* 
CS4 none none 1 0 
CS5 
admin undergoing 
training 
strategic support 
by chartered 
accountant 
3 => 4 74.5 
CS6 
family and 
salesperson 
limited 
professional 
support 
3 70.5# 
Note: *: small suspicion of manipulation; #: strong suspicion of manipulation;  
Accounting sophistication level as defined in Table 16 
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6.3 – Informality: The study of financial practices 
Conceptually, the informality factor is close to the resources factor as discussed 
above. A firm with a rudimentary administrative function will naturally be 
informal, whereas one with sophisticated financial controls is most likely to be 
formal. The main reason for its separate treatment is not conceptual, but rather 
practical. The existence of comprehensive data on financial practices in the GEM 
database makes a larger-scale assessment possible. Unfortunately, no accounting 
transparency score is available for the firms in the GEM database, so that it was 
not possible to study the relationship between informality and opacity. 
Nevertheless, an informality indicator is useful to test its possible relationship 
with financial constraints (H9), as a means to triangulate the accounting opacity 
hypothesis (H8). 
The aim of this section, therefore, is not only to address H6 on the basis of case 
studies (whose results are expected to echo those of H5) but also to build a set of 
values that will be useful when testing for H9.  
H6:  Accounting opacity is aggravated by informality.  
Test: There should be a positive relationship between the implementation of 
internal controls and the firm’s accounting transparency score.  
After presenting the methodology adopted, the findings on each relevant 
dimension are discussed.  
6.3.1 – Methodology 
The informality indicator is based on GEM data, which provide invaluable 
information on entrepreneurs’ financial practices, such as the records they keep, 
the person responsible for setting up the documents, the frequency with which 
accounting documents are consulted, the accounting fees paid, as well as specific 
practices like the separation of personal and business accounts, the owner 
remuneration patterns, and the proportion of unbanked cash.  
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To reduce complexity and focus on the questions replied to by most respondents, 
this thesis concentrates on four types of practices characteristic of SMMEs and 
consistent with the framework developed in the previous section: 
• Lack of separation of personal and business accounts (question 44). 
Indeed, separating business from private bank accounts is a fundamental 
prerequisite for transparency; 
• Absence of records for: sales, purchases, cash movements, accounts 
payable and receivable, and inventory when applicable (questions 20, 21, 
22, 37, 40, 41, and 42). Without proper records, the correctness of 
financial statements cannot be soundly established; 
• Impractical format for the same records – which can affect their usability; 
and 
• Failure to channel all or most of the cash through the bank account 
(question 25). If most cash remains unbanked, physical cash movements 
are more difficult to control, raising the risk of fraud or theft. 
The failure to remunerate the owner-manager on a regular basis was a fifth 
dimension whose inclusion in the framework was considered but eventually 
rejected21.  
To derive a single indicator from those practices, the four criteria (account 
separation, existence of records, format of records, and banking of cash) were 
combined into a single composite indicator of formality. For this, each of the 
criteria was rated on a scale from 0 (most informal) to 2,5 (most formal), and the 
four scores were added. 
                                                 
21  Remuneration data poses two problems. Firstly, data is ambiguous due to the owner’s 
reluctance to answer (confidentiality) or the risk of over- or understating salaries (if business 
owners try to prove their success or their sense of sacrifice). Secondly, the direction of 
causality in a correlation between regular salary patterns and financial constraints is difficult 
to interpret: in fact, the affordability hypothesis (whereby non-constrained firms pay their 
owners a regular salary because they can afford it) seems more likely than the accounting 
opacity hypothesis. 
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6.3.2 – Description: Failure to implement basic practices 
As Table 18 shows, only 86% of formal black businesses separate their business 
bank accounts from their personal bank accounts. While account amalgamation 
is not surprising for sole proprietors, it is questionable whether the 8% of close 
corporations which amalgamate accounts are able to comply with the rules of a 
formal corporation. The township case studies CS4a+b, whose incorporation as 
CCs seems mainly aimed at improving their chances in tenders, illustrate this 
situation (see narrative in Annexure 34). Other case studies show that owner-
business confusion may even exist with separate bank accounts, with businesses 
de facto paying a variable portion of the owner’s private expenses.  
With regard to record-keeping, the GEM data confirmed the relatively weak 
practices of black SMMEs, except for trading records. The frequent lack of 
records for cash flow and overdue accounts may exacerbate SMMEs’ 
vulnerability to liquidity problems. Furthermore, in approximately half of the 
cases, records are kept physically rather than electronically, potentially causing a 
higher risk of displacement or loss, and making monitoring more difficult.  
As to banking cash, 14% of respondents held more than a quarter of cash 
inflows away from the bank – representing a favourable terrain for the 
development of accounting opacity. Nine businesses did not respond to this 
question. 
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Table 18 – Proportion of GEM firms implementing basic practices 
Proportion of GEM firms implementing 
following practices 
in % Sample size 
a) separating accounts   
Sole proprietors 44% 27 
Close Corporations 92% 160 
Companies (Pty ltd) 100% 33 
Full sample  86% 224 
b) keeping the following records   
• Sales 96% 224 
• Purchases  94% 224 
• Cash in and out 58% 224 
• Cash flow 42% 224 
• Overdue accounts 51% 224 
• Accounts payable  }  (where 76% 218 
• Inventory               } applicable) 65% 162 
c) keeping sales records in the following 
format 
 
224 
• Computerised  48%  
• Cash register 3%  
• Physical filing, e.g. invoice book 40%  
• Loose, e.g. slips, boxes 4%  
• Did not answer / not applicable 5%  
d) retaining the following part of cash out of 
the bank 
 215 
• 0% 58%  
• 0.5-25% 28%  
• >25% 14%  
Source: GEM data, 2003 
 
6.3.3 – Synthetic informality indicator 
Summarising all four factors into a synthetic indicator as described in the 
methodology, the GEM respondents could be classified into five categories, as 
represented in Table 19. The table suggests that approximately half of black 
SMMEs apply a fair degree of formality, whereas a third can be regarded as 
semi-formal, and the remaining sixth are either informal or highly informal.  
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Table 19 – Distribution of GEM firms according to formality  
 Formality score Number of firms in % of sample 
Highly informal22 < 4 19 9% 
Informal 4 to < 6 21 9% 
Semi-formal 6 to < 8 73 33% 
Formal 8 to < 9 55 25% 
Highly formal 9 to 10 56 25% 
Total  224 100% 
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding differences.   
6.3.4 – Applying the methodology to case studies  
The methodology was adapted to five case studies (all except CS1 where 
qualitative data were insufficient) in order to obtain an all-round assessment for 
those firms.  In  the  absence  of  data  on  unbanked  cash,  only  the  other  three 
dimensions were included in the model. The formality assessment was then 
compared to the accounting transparency score. The results, in Table 20, show 
varying degrees of informality that seem to be positively related to accounting 
transparency scores. Again, although the sample size is small, this result is 
compatible with Hypothesis H6. 
Section 7.3 will investigate whether such informality is also related to financial 
constraints (H9). 
6.4 – Motives for manipulation  
H7: Accounting opacity is aggravated by opportunism (the opportunistic 
accounting hypothesis). 
 
After resources and informality, a third factor contributing to accounting opacity 
is opportunism, i.e. the active intervention of business owners to modify the view 
conveyed by the accounts.  
                                                 
22  The threshold of 4 corresponds to a firm that either keeps separate accounts but does not 
reach 0,5 points in each of the other criteria, or fails to separate accounts and does not reach 
more than half the points in each of the other criteria. 
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Table 20 – Informality and accounting transparency score in case studies 2 to 6  
 
CS2 (restaurant,  
TO: R3 million) 
CS3 (textile,  
TO: R2,2 million) 
CS4 (cleaning,  
TO: R200 000) 
CS5 (tourism,  
TO: R1million) 
CS6 (packing,  
TO: R1,4 million) 
Separating 
accounts 
yes yes no partially partially 
Quantity of 
records held 
extensive average deficient deficient average 
Format of 
records 
computerised physical filing boxes 
boxes and files => 
moving to software 
physical filing 
Sales records computer-generated 
partly cash register, 
partly invoice book 
none (only few large 
contracts) 
partly invoices, partly 
booking schedule 
invoice book 
Records of 
costs 
main costs 
computerised 
slips and invoices 
wage register, 
otherwise missing 
bank statements slips and invoices 
Controlling 
computer-generated 
control sheets 
reviewed daily 
vague none none vague 
Financial 
statements 
in the office external accountant none external accountant 
in the office, but has 
to look 
Overall  
formality 
assessment 
highly formal semi-formal highly informal 
informal becoming 
formal  
semi-formal 
Accounting 
transparency 65.5* 46.5* 0 74.5 70.5# 
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The relevance, possible causes, and effects of such manipulation are first 
identified using rich case study data. Based on this, a test is developed, which is 
then verified on a larger scale with data from the balance sheet sample.  
From the five case studies that included financial statements, four provided some 
evidence of opportunistic accounting. This evidence, listed in Table 21, suggests 
that image-boosting and tax-saving are frequent motives for interventions in the 
accounts. Table 22 attempts to illustrate the relative contributions of 
opportunism, resources and informality to accounting opacity. It suggests that, 
while resources and informality affect the quantity and formal quality of 
information, the opportunism of entrepreneurs applying for bank facilities has a 
strong impact on intrinsic quality and manipulation scores.  
Table 21 – Opportunism or integrity of case study owners 
 
Evidence 
Impact on 
accounts 
Mindset / 
Purpose of 
interventions 
CS1 Financial statements delivered while 
applying for an overdraft were favourably 
distorted (considerably different from the 
accounting officer’s version)  
considerable 
opportunism: 
image-boosting 
for bank 
CS2 Owner’s statement: “these accounts are 
those for the taxman; these are not the ones 
I would use if I decided to sell the business” 
supposedly 
limited  
(no profit) 
opportunism: 
tax-saving 
CS3 Accountant’s answer to questions about 
missing costs: “Yes, the costs are 
incomplete: this is only a draft that my 
client needed to apply for a loan” 
sizeable 
opportunism: 
image-boosting 
for bank 
CS5 Owner’s statement: “My brief to my 
accountant is to draw the financials for my 
information, not for anybody else” 
n/a 
integrity: 
strategic 
information 
CS6 Minority member’s statement when 
delivering draft accounts: “Our accountant 
has already prepared draft accounts, but we 
will have to sit with him and see how we 
can avoid paying tax” 
limited  
(final accounts 
have more costs 
than draft) 
opportunism: 
tax-saving 
Source: Interviews and review of financial statements  
Note: CS4 is not mentioned here as they have not produced any accounts. 
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Table 22 – Explaining the accounting transparency score of case studies 
 Resources index 
and Informality  
Motives for 
manipulation 
Q+fq score  
(out of 45) 
iq+m score  
(out of 55) 
Total 
score 
CS1 n/a 
opportunism:  
applying for loan 
10 -3.5# 6.5# 
CS2 4. highly formal 
opportunism: save 
tax 
29.5 36* 65.5* 
CS3 
3.  
semi-formal 
opportunism: 
applying for loan 
29.5 17* 46.5* 
CS4 
1. highly 
informal 
n/a 0 0 0 
CS5 
3-4. informal  
 formal 
integrity 35.5 39 74.5 
CS6 3. semi-formal 
opportunism: save 
tax 
33.5 37# 70.5# 
Note: Q+fq: sum of quantity score and formal quality score (on a 45 points scale); 
T+m score: transparency score (on a 55 points scale) and manipulation add-on 
*: small suspicion of manipulation; #: strong suspicion of manipulation 
 
Case study data seem to suggest that the objective of image-boosting in firms 
applying for loans causes sizeable distortions of accounts in specific years and 
firms. To further probe this preliminary finding, a test for Hypothesis H7 was 
designed as follows: 
H7: Accounting opacity is aggravated by opportunism (the opportunistic 
accounting hypothesis). 
Test: Intrinsic quality and manipulation scores should be poorer in firms 
applying for finance.  
To apply this test on a broader scale, the financial context was reviewed for all 
33 firms from the balance sheet sample whose accounting transparency was 
scored. For thirteen of them, there was evidence that they were applying or had 
recently applied for a new bank facility or increase thereof, while for 20 there 
was no such evidence.  
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Table 23 and Figure 14 show the differences in intrinsic quality score and 
manipulation add-on according to the financial context of the business. The 
striking contrast between the two categories supports Hypothesis H7 in 
suggesting that firms applying for finance are more likely to manipulate their 
accounts and to have opaque financial statements.  
Table 23 – Applications for finance, intrinsic quality and manipulation 
 Firms applying for 
finance 
Firms not applying for 
finance 
Intrinsic quality score:     
- under 15 4 31% 2 10% 
- 15 to 30 5 38% 5 25% 
- 30,1 to 40 2 15% 9 45% 
- 40 to 55 2 15% 4 20% 
Manipulation add-on       
none 4 31% 13 65% 
* (slight suspicion) 5 38% 6 30% 
# (strong suspicion) 4 31% 1 5% 
Total 13 100% 20 100% 
Source: Balance Sheet Sample, including case studies 
Figure 14 – Transparency in firms applying or not applying for finance 
 
Source: 33 firms from the balance sheet sample  
Firms applying for finance 
(n=13)
31%
39%
15%
15%
Firms not applying for finance (n=20)
10%
25%
45%
20%
up to 15
15,1 to 30
30,1 to 40
40,1 to 55
Distribution of intrinsic quality scores  
for firms applying and not applying for finance 
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Overall, the analyses performed in Section 6 are consistent with hypotheses H5, 
H6 and especially H7. The evidence suggests that resources, informality and, 
maybe more significantly, opportunism do contribute to accounting opacity. 
We next investigate whether accounting opacity and its various dimensions are 
positively related to financial constraints.  
 
Section 7. The link between accounting opacity 
and financial constraints 
Section 3.4 had identified two hypotheses related to the accounting opacity 
hypothesis. To test them, informational problems need to be put in relation to 
financial constraints. This, however, raises a practical problem, as most data 
sources available do not cover equally well these dimensions, as Figure 15 
illustrates. 
These data restrictions required testing the accounting opacity hypothesis in three 
steps. First, case studies were reviewed for clues (Section 7.1). Secondly, based 
on the balance sheet sample, use of finance was studied for firms with various 
accounting transparency scores (Section 7.2). Next, based on the GEM data, the 
access to bank debt and the level of financial constraints were related to 
informality measurements (Section 7.3).  
7.1 – Accounting transparency and financial constraints 
in case studies 
Table 24 shows, for each of the case studies, their accounting transparency score, 
the extent to which they have accessed bank debt, and their level of financial 
constraint.  
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If one considers first the relation between accounting transparency and access to 
bank debt, it appears that the case studies with the best score (CS5, CS6) have 
access to bank finance, although CS6’s application for property finance was 
rejected. Among the case studies with very poor or non-existent accounting, one 
(CS4) was unable to access bank funding, while another (CS1) obtained a 
comprehensive package at start-up, followed by an overdraft facility two years 
later. It is worth noting that CS1’s facilities were granted before CS1 produced 
its first annual financial statements, which explains why the poor quality of its 
accounting did not penalise it in accessing them. The particular case of CS1 will 
be commented on in greater detail in Section 7.2.3.  
The data are also inconclusive on the link between accounting transparency and 
financial constraints: while both case study firms with opaque accounting are 
severely constrained (including CS1), a serious constraint is also experienced by 
one of the most transparent firms, CS6. It is clear, though, that CS1 and CS6’s 
constraints are more related to internal management (lack of turnover and 
excessive owner’s remuneration for CS1, poor debt collection for CS6), than to 
credit rationing.  
Overall, the review of case studies is inconclusive as to the link between 
accounting transparency, access to bank finance and financial constraint. It 
reminds us that, when bank finance is granted at early stages of the firm, 
accounting transparency plays no role. Clearly, it is difficult to obtain a clear 
correspondence between the variables in such a small number of cases, since 
individual specificities interfere. Therefore, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 review the 
question on the basis of larger samples.  
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Figure 15 – Data restrictions constraining the testing of the accounting opacity 
hypothesis 
 
 
 
data 
Accounting transparency 
score Level of financial 
constraint  
Correlation 
analysis 
Ideal testing configuration 
Actual data availability 
Case 
studies 
Accounting transparency 
score Level of financial 
constraint  
Statistically 
too small  
Balance 
sheet sample 
Accounting transparency 
score 
Use of bank finance  
(no constraint level available) 
Correlation 
analysis 
GEM 
sample 
Informality indicator 
(no accounting transparency  
score available) 
Correlation 
analysis 
Accounting  
opacity  
Credit rationing  
(no access to bank debt) 
Financial 
constraints  
Conceptual hypotheses (see sect. 3.4) 
Access to bank debt  
H8 
H9 
Access to bank debt  
Level of financial 
constraint  
Access to bank debt  
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Table 24 – Accounting transparency, debt and constraint level in case studies 
 Q+fq score  
(out of 45) 
iq+m score  
(out of 55) 
Total score 
Access to bank 
debt 
Level of 
constraint 
CS1 10 -3.5# 6.5# 
yes, start-up 
package + OD 
severely 
liquidity 
constrained 
CS2 29.5 36* 65.5* 
(indirectly, 
personal loan) 
non-constrained 
CS3 29.5 17* 46.5* yes but limited 
long-term 
constrained 
CS4 0 0 0 no 
severely 
liquidity 
constrained 
CS5 35.5 39 74.5 
yes (vehicle 
finance and later 
OD) 
seasonally 
liquidity 
constrained 
(winter) 
CS6 33.5 37# 70.5# 
partly (OD, but 
not property 
finance) 
severely 
liquidity 
constrained 
Note: OD = overdraft 
 
7.2 – Accounting transparency score and access to 
finance in the balance sheet sample 
H8. Accounting opacity hinders the access to bank debt.  
 
This section investigates the relationship between accounting transparency scores 
and use of bank finance in the balance sheet sample. Three types of facilities are 
considered here: instalment sale agreements (ISA), term loans and overdraft 
facilities (OD). The use of finance is related, first, to the total accounting 
transparency score, and later to specific dimensions.  
7.2.1 – Total accounting transparency score and use of bank debt  
Test a): There should be a positive relationship between the accounting 
transparency score and the use of bank debt.  
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The proportion of the sample which has accessed and/or uses a bank facility, is 
calculated for the most and least opaque thirds of the sample, consisting of 
eleven firms (when the analysis was repeated with smaller, hence more 
polarised, subsamples, it led to the same conclusions). In some cases the data are 
ambiguous as to the existence and type of facilities, leading to low and high 
estimates of the said proportions.  The results are displayed in Table 25.  
Table 25 – Use of bank debt and accounting transparency score  
 Estimated proportion of firms using 
 ISA Term loans OD 
Sample 
size 
All businesses 58-64% 27-30% 58-67% 33 
Relatively transparent firms 
(AT score >71) 
45% 18% 73% 11 
Relatively opaque firms 
(AT score < 50) 
64-73% 27-36% 48-73% 11 
ISA: Instalment Sale Agreement; OD: Overdraft; ranges reflect data uncertainty. 
 
The table suggests that firms with more transparent accounting are less likely to 
use non-current debt facilities. For overdraft facilities, the data are inconclusive, 
as the apparent advantage of transparent firms may result from superior data 
(overdraft facilities may be available in more opaque firms, but this is not visible 
in the data).  
This result contradicts the accounting opacity hypothesis, which raised the 
expectation that opaque firms would be more likely to be credit rationed. Even 
the two additional reasons mentioned in Section 3.3 (higher need for 
transparency and overall correlation with management quality) did not suffice to 
yield the expected positive relationship. There are four possible reasons for this 
counterintuitive result.  
• Firstly, accounting opacity may affect small businesses collectively, with 
banks considering all small business financials as potentially opaque and 
therefore rationing them without regard to the individual information that 
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they provide. This possibility cannot be tested under the present 
methodology.  
• Secondly, the use of debt finance may not be an adequate proxy for 
financial constraints. A number of firms have no need for finance, and 
this proportion may be higher among more transparent, hence better 
managed firms. To test for this possibility, Section 7.3 will use an 
alternative methodology to relate informality (a contributor to accounting 
opacity) to actual financial constraints.   
• Thirdly, as discussed in Section 6.4, firms carrying bank debt may have 
used opportunistic accounting, thereby strongly affecting their accounting 
transparency. This manipulation effect may neutralise the correlation 
expected under the accounting opacity hypothesis.  
• Fourthly, it is likely that the indicator chosen for accounting opacity is 
too sophisticated for the bank, whose internal work processes, capacity 
and cost constraints do not allow for a meticulous analytical process. 
Credit rationing may take place on the basis of an immediate judgment on 
information quality, such as the mere availability of financial statements 
and possibly their formal quality. This assumption is discussed in the 
following section.  
7.2.2 – What matters for the bank: Quantity versus transparency  
Test b): There should be a positive relationship between the scores in the 
dimensions of quantity and formal quality, and the use of bank debt. 
To test for the possibility that quantity and formal quality of financial statements 
are more relevant to banks than their intrinsic quality, the proportion of firms 
using bank finance is calculated again for the third of the sample with the best 
and lowest scores in the dimensions quantity and formal quality. The results are 
shown in Tables 26 and 27. 
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Table 26 – Use of bank debt depending on quantity score  
 Proportion of firms using 
 ISA Term loans OD 
Sample 
size 
All businesses 58-64% 27-30% 58-67% 33 
Quantity of information:     
Firms with quantity score ≥14 73% 55% 91% 11 
Firms with quantity score ≤ 10 45-64% 9% 18-36% 11 
 
Table 27 – Use of bank debt depending on formal quality score  
 Proportion of firms using 
 ISA Term loans OD 
Sample 
size 
All businesses 58-64% 27-30% 58-67% 33 
Formal quality of information:     
Firms with formal quality score 
≥19.5 
55% 27% 82% 11 
Firms with formal quality score 
≤ 13 
73-82% 27-36% 45-64% 11 
Note: ISA: Instalment Sale Agreement; OD: Overdraft ; ranges reflect data uncertainty. 
 
The statistics regarding formal quality are inconclusive, but results regarding the 
quantity score are striking. They suggest that firms which have provided 
extensive accounting information are significantly more likely to be granted any 
type of facility, than firms whose accounting data are scant. The differences are 
particularly striking with regard to term loans and overdrafts. Subject to the 
limitations already mentioned (self-sufficient firms may have no need for 
accounting information), this is consistent with the assumption that credit 
rationing affects firms, which are unable to provide regular and extensive 
financial statements.  
This result may be distorted by the correlation of the quantity score with firm 
size and firm age, as small and young firms face specific obstacles in their access 
to finance, which are unrelated to informational issues.  However, such size and 
age bias is unlikely to explain fully the wide difference between Tables 25 and 
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26, especially for term loans and overdrafts. The results therefore do confirm 
banks’ effective pressure for the production of accounting statements, but cast 
doubts on banks’ abilities, or willingness, to distinguish between intrinsically 
transparent and opaque financial statements. The following paragraphs present 
corroborative evidence on banks’ apparent preference for quantity over quality.  
7.2.3 – Banks’ preference for quantity: More evidence 
Other interview and archival evidence gathered during data collection (see 
Annexure 8) suggested that Nedenterprise, the bank that supported this study, 
deployed substantial effort in collecting its clients’ periodic management 
accounts (which were mainly used for key ratio monitoring), but did not usually 
request auditors’ or accounting officers’ reports or final versions of draft 
statements. It seems, thus, that the practical value which this bank attributes to 
official and validated financial statements is even lower than suggested by the 
literature (Friedlob & Plewa 1992:90). 
Case study CS1 is a case in point (see CS1 narrative in Annexure 31). For the 
year 1997, the bank file contained management accounts (submitted in April 
1998) as well as the accounting officer’s formal financial statements (faxed to 
the bank at the beginning of the holiday season, on 17 December 1998). Even a 
superficial review would have revealed blatant contradictions between the two 
versions and prompted the bank to take some action. The failure of the bank to 
notice, and react to, CS1’s falsified accounts, led to substantial losses when the 
CC was liquidated in 2000.  
Banks’ relatively superficial use of financial information and their lack of 
vigilance with regard to external validations have many reasons. Among them 
are (i) banks’ preference for more timely sources of information such as direct 
contact with firm owners and monitoring of cash movements; (ii) the focus on 
short-term evolution of key business figures in order to anticipate cash shortages, 
which are arguably the most serious risk in SMMEs; and (iii) the general 
difficulty in determining the trustworthiness of financial figures. However, 
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requesting a signed report of the auditor or accounting officer seems a simple 
way of reducing manipulation risks. Without this effort, it does not seem rational 
to place such emphasis on the supply of financial documents. Indeed, it would 
send a signal to SMME owners that supplying any figures, realistic or not, 
suffices to increase their chances of obtaining a loan. The example of CS1 shows 
that when banks pay no attention to audited financial statements, dishonest 
entrepreneurs can manipulate the banks’ favour through skilful filtering, timing 
and distorting of information.  
To conclude on Hypothesis H8, the data suggest that it is not accounting opacity 
as such, which hinders firms’ access to bank debt, but rather some firms’ failure 
to submit a sufficient quantity of accounting data (regardless of quality). More 
research would be necessary to confirm this exploratory result.  
The next section investigates the relation between informality and financial 
constraints.  
7.3 – Informality and financial constraints in the GEM 
sample 
H9 (modified): Informality causes financial constraints. 
Test: There should be a negative relationship between the informality indicator 
and the level of constraint. 
To test whether Section 7.2’s inconclusive result was due to the difference 
between use of finance and financial constraints, a second test was developed, 
which links financial constraints to informality, i.e. the implementation of some 
basic practices. This test is based on GEM data, for which the level of constraint, 
the implementation of each type of practice and the synthetic formality score 
were available. 
The analysis of the link between informality and financial constraints was 
performed in two steps, examining first the effect of individual practices (see 
Table 28), and then the synthetic informality indicator (Table 29). 
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Table 28 – Individual practices and financial constraints  
 
Sample 
size 
Average 
level of 
financial 
constraint 
Proportion 
not 
constrained 
Proportion 
significantly or 
severely 
liquidity 
constrained  
Total sample 224 1.49 18.8% 39.7% 
No separate account 32 1.56 18.8% 53.1% 
Separate account 192 1.47 18.8% 37.5% 
Keeping at least 50% of 
cash out of bank 
22 1.50 13.6% 45.5% 
Banking all their cash  124 1.43 21.0% 37.1% 
less than 3 records 41 1.58 19.5% 48.8% 
6 or more records 53 1.48 22.6% 35.8% 
loose/handwritten records 44 1.72 3.3% 43.3% 
all computerised records 30 1.61 18.2% 47.7% 
Source: Analysis of GEM data, 2003.  
Note: The “level of financial constraint” is expressed on a scale from 0 (unconstrained) 
to 3 (severely constrained); see Chapter II Section 3.2 for more details.  
Table 29 – Informality level and financial constraints  
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Total 19% 33% 43% 4% 1.49 224 
informal + highly 
informal (under 6) 13% 35% 50% 3% 1.58 40 
semi-formal  
(6 to 8) 16% 30% 50% 3% 1.55 73 
formal  
(8 to 9) 22% 33% 41% 5% 1.49 55 
highly formal  
(9 to 10) 23% 36% 37% 5% 1.34 56 
Source: Analysis of GEM data, 2003. 
Notes: * In order to obtain a sufficient sample size, highly informal and informal firms 
were amalgamated.  * Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. *“level of 
financial constraint” as for Table 28.  
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Table 28 supports the informality hypothesis: informal firms have a slightly 
higher average level of constraint, a lower proportion of unconstrained firms and, 
with the exception of format of records, a higher risk of liquidity constraints.  
Table 29 confirms the finding from Table 28: the average level of financial 
constraints experienced by GEM firms decreases monotonically as formality 
increases, supporting the accounting opacity hypothesis. The table, however, 
brings to light more nuances regarding the types of financial constraints 
experienced. Firms in the unconstrained category, as well as those facing 
liquidity constraints, follow the expected pattern, with informal firms being more 
likely to experience cash shortages and less likely to be unconstrained. Long-
term constraints, meanwhile, are not significantly different for informal or formal 
firms, and debt traps may even be more frequent among formal firms – probably 
reflecting the pressure of creditors to implement sound practices.  
Apart from those two categories, the results support the accounting opacity 
hypothesis, although the causality may go in both directions (lack of formality 
may cause constraints, or the lack of funds may make it more difficult for 
entrepreneurs to implement proper practices).  
Overall, the test of the relationship between informality and financial constraints 
is more conclusive than are the previous attempts at testing the accounting 
opacity hypothesis through a relationship between accounting transparency score 
and use of external finance. One may wonder whether these more conclusive 
results are a consequence of the superiority of financial constraints to the use of 
bank debt as an indicator of credit rationing, or whether the latter test masks a 
more simple relationship, in which more formal, hence better managed, firms 
suffer less financial constraints.  
Figure 16 illustrates the results on the relationships that were empirically tested.  
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Figure 16 – The results of empirical tests under the accounting opacity hypothesis 
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Section 8. A brief review of other aspects   
This section briefly presents the results of various investigations that were 
carried out on two issues peripheral to the research: the effect of transaction costs 
on financial constraints and the use and effects of information substitutes. A 
more detailed presentation of the issues, the literature, the methodology and 
findings, can be found in Annexures 24-29. 
8.1 – The role of transaction costs 
The scale effect hypothesis postulates that, because of fixed transaction costs, 
firms applying for a high amount of finance are more likely to access finance. As 
the tables in Annexure 24 show, the analysis of GEM data found that:  
• The success of term loan applications strongly depends on the amount 
requested, with applications for amounts under R250 000 having slimmer 
chances of success.  
• For overdraft applications, scale effects are less obvious. SMMEs’ 
liquidity constraints, hence, need to be explained by different factors. 
8.2 – The relevance and effects of information substitutes 
In a context of informational asymmetry, information susbtitutes are a mitigation 
strategy based on the use of indirect data to categorise the risks along rules of 
thumb. The analysis of case study and GEM data in this regard led to the 
following findings: 
• Start-ups’ access to facilities is eased by networks (franchisor, partner or 
accountant). In addition to more favourable assessments by banks, the 
effect is also psychological in strengthening the entrepreneur’s 
confidence (see Annexure 25); 
• For older firms, extreme credit histories (i.e. spotless records or 
blacklisting) have an effect on access to bank facilities, but mixed 
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records, which represent the majority of cases, are neutral (see Annexure 
25); 
• The ability to pledge collateral gives firms a slight advantage in their 
applications for overdraft, but is essential in applications for term loans. 
Coverage levels are often in excess of 100%, especially for small loan 
amounts (see Annexure 26); 
• Against the theory of signalling, the owner’s net worth seems to be a 
better predictor of his acceptance of collateral requirements, than project 
risk (see Annexure 27); 
• While for white business owners the provision of a letter of guarantee or 
the cession of the member’s loan is often regarded as sufficient, black 
business owners usually have to provide tangible securities (such as 
investments, fixed property, tangible assets). This difference may reflect 
inequalities in the owners’ financial status rather than racial 
discrimination (see Annexures 28 and 29).  
These results are generally supportive of the market dysfunction hypothesis, 
especially in the area of term loans.  
 
Section 9. Conclusions  
This section concludes on the accounting opacity hypothesis by summarising the 
various hypotheses and the results of the tests performed. A synopsis is proposed 
in Figure 17. 
9.1 – Accounting opacity, informality, and manipulation 
Even in a sample biased towards better managed firms, SMME financial 
statements were found to vary considerably in quality. Most do not fully comply 
with requirements for corporations, notably with regard to notes and cash flow 
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statements. In a few cases, gross structural mistakes were detected, denoting 
accounting incompetence. Intrinsic quality problems with regard to profits, 
current position and cash, and related parties transactions, were found in 
substantial portions of the sample (Section 5).  
To explain this opacity problem, resources devoted to accounting were studied, 
revealing a wide spectrum of situations. A substantial proportion of South 
African entrepreneurs show little interest for accounting, implement only 
rudimentary financial functions, and do not fully benefit from the support of 
external accountants – a situation which appears to worsen accounting opacity 
(Section 6.2)  
Informality similarly exacerbates accounting opacity, with the lack of separation 
between owner and business creating a strong opacity problem. Poor record-
keeping and large amounts of unbanked cash also significantly affect accounting 
opacity (Section 6.3).  
The most decisive impact on accounting opacity, however, seemed to come from 
owners’ opportunism, with frequent cases of earnings aggressiveness on the 
dates of applications for finance (Section 6.4).  
9.2 – Is accounting opacity related to financial constraints? 
The accounting opacity hypothesis was weakly supported by evidence, with 
more supportive results for liquidity constraints than for investment constraints.  
On the short-term side, there was a strong correlation between informality and 
liquidity constraints, but the results were inconclusive for the link between 
accounts transparency and use of overdrafts – possibly because the use of 
overdrafts was an inappropriate proxy.  
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Figure 17 – Hypotheses tested under the accounting opacity hypothesis 
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On the long-term side, the relationship between informality and investment 
constraints was inconclusive, and the relationship between accounting 
transparency and use of term loans was negative. Use of debt was, however, 
strongly positively related to the quantity of accounting information produced – 
raising doubts on the ability or willingness of banks to distinguish between 
reliable and unreliable accounts.  
Overall, these results suggest that the accounting opacity hypothesis may need to 
be restated, emphasising the existence of financial statements rather than their 
quality. The latter, being difficult to ascertain, may have a collective impact on 
the entire small business community, in line with Jaffee & Stiglitz’ (1990) 
definition of credit rationing as a phenomenon that disregards businesses’ 
individual features.  
9.3 – Assessing creditworthiness in a context of accounting 
opacity  
In the context of the questionable reliability of accounting figures, the ambition 
of this research project to assess SMMEs’ creditworthiness on the basis of their 
financial statements appears hazardous. It was necessary, therefore, to take 
precautions to avoid misleading conclusions. The strategies used to enable ratio-
based sample analysis in spite of accounting opacity will be discussed in 
Chapter IV, Section 4.2.  
9.4 – The roots of financial constraints: Market dysfunction vs. 
demand-side factors 
While the largest part of the chapter has been concerned with accounting opacity, 
the brief review of peripheral aspects (Section 8) creates a broader understanding 
of market dysfunction as an explanation of financial constraints.  
On one hand, as Section 7 has shown, the role of accounting opacity in credit 
rationing and therefore financial constraints, was not unambiguously confirmed 
by the data available: the relationship between total accounting transparency 
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scores and financial constraints was negative, although the relationship between 
quantity scores and financial constraints was positive. This seems to reflect 
banks’ emphasis on quantity rather than quality of accounting information. The 
effect of accounting opacity on SMME finance may also be collective rather than 
individual, with all SMME financials being viewed with suspicion regardless of 
their particular quality. 
On the other hand, it has become clear that transaction costs are a substantial 
obstacle for the access of the smallest enterprises to term loans (Section 8.1). In 
spite of mixed findings on accounting opacity (Section 7), the relevance of 
information substitutes, especially collateral, for the success of finance 
applications (Section 8.2) can be interpreted as indirectly confirming the bearing 
of informational problems. These findings are especially strong in the area of 
term loans, suggesting that this is the area where market functions are least 
efficient.  
These results have exploratory value and, in part, are limited by the fact that 
supply- and demand-side factors are intertwined. The next chapter will attempt to 
look more specifically at a crucial demand-side factor: the creditworthiness of 
SMMEs.  
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Section 1. Outline of the chapter 
This chapter examines the other tentative explanation for financial constraints: 
the possibility that South African SMMEs are not sufficiently creditworthy.  
Creditworthiness is a popular but seldom convincingly defined concept. For this 
reason, Section 2 reviews the literature on ways to approach and measure 
creditworthiness. Empirical literature on the actual quality of South African 
SMMEs is also reviewed, followed by a presentation of the mechanisms through 
which insufficient creditworthiness may impede a firm’s access to finance.  
This review forms the basis for a conceptual framework (Section 3), which first 
devises a practical approach to creditworthiness in its various dimensions. 
Thereafter, some expectations are formulated on the creditworthiness of South 
African SMMEs. A model of proof is then proposed on the link between 
creditworthiness and financial constraints. Section 3 closes with a synthesis and 
summary of the hypotheses explored in this chapter. 
Section 4 prepares the way for empirical assessments by defining rigorous 
procedures to assess creditworthiness in a context of accounting opacity. A 
multi-dimensional assessment model, of which the most comprehensive part is a 
ratio-based model, is developed.  
Section 5 then presents empirical assessments of the creditworthiness of the 
SMMEs in the balance sheet sample. Comparisons to international evidence are 
also performed.  
Section 6 examines the relationship between creditworthiness and financial 
constraints as well as use of bank debt. 
Lastly, Section 7 offers conclusions with regard to the creditworthiness 
hypothesis.  
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Section 2. Literature review on creditworthiness 
2.1 – Definitions of creditworthiness in literature 
Previous research has often recognised the need to control for creditworthiness 
when testing the hypothesis that SMMEs are treated unfairly on financial 
markets. However, there is surprisingly little academic literature on how to 
define and measure creditworthiness. Levenson & Willard (2000), for example, 
stress the crucial relevance of creditworthiness in a credit rationing model but are 
vague about its definition and omit it entirely in their empirical work. 
One approach is to adopt the perspective of finance providers – literally 
interpreting creditworthiness as the banks’ opinion on which enterprise is worth 
a credit (Čančer & Knez-Riedl 2005:144; see also Galetovic 1994:5). A number 
of studies have reviewed the screening criteria of financial institutions (Gab 
2002, Mester 1997, Berger et al 2005, Zacharakis & Meyer 1998).  
Creditworthiness could be defined as a discretionary judgement from financial 
institutions, whose standards vary according to the economic context (Wolfson 
1996) and according to sociological factors (Lane & Quack 2001). To assess the 
risk of unfair treatment, though, it seems more appropriate to use explicit criteria 
referring to intrinsic qualities of the firms.  
For the sake of empirical practicality, many studies use simple proxies, which are 
generally indicators of success or of risk. Quantitative indicators include growth 
of turnover, or profit or employment during a specific period (Levy 1996, Kesper 
2000:14), as well as financial ratios such as debt ratio (Melnik & Plaut 1986), 
inverse coverage ratio (Guiso 2003:129) or other ratios (see Čančer & Knez-
Riedl 2005:144-5). Qualitative criteria, which play an important role in Africa 
because of a lack of quantitative data, include (i) viability of the business and 
ability to repay out of the cash flow; (ii) character and reputation of the 
borrower; (iii) experience in the business and (iv) collateral (in the case of 
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Ghana, Aryeetey et al 1994:64). The concept of viability was defined by Tucker 
(2000) as follows:  
“A viable business is one which has: entrepreneurial energy; the 
managerial skills necessary to manage the business and the resources 
successfully; a market which is willing and able to pay a profitable price 
for its product; and adequate risk and loan capital in the appropriate 
ratios”. 
More complex indicators include credit agency ratings (Dietsch 2003), which 
reflect mainly the firms’ past payment behaviour23, as well as multiple-ratio 
models. In this connection, it is worth mentioning numerous failure prediction 
models such as Altman’s Z ratio (Altman 1983). Chen & Shimerda (1981) listed 
over 100 ratios used in failure prediction studies, which usually combine 
measures of profitability, liquidity, cash flow and leverage. However, most 
failure prediction models were based on data from large corporations and may 
not apply easily to smaller firms; in addition, Garbers & Uliana (1994) show that 
most of these models do not transpose well to other populations.  
Also interesting in this context is the approach adopted by the modified Du Pont 
scheme (Correia et al, 2007:5-22), which, by breaking the return on equity down 
into various ratios, is able to expose the strengths and weaknesses of a firm. 
The firm’s stability is another relevant aspect, especially for smaller firms 
(Beaver 1966), as firms with strong variations in financial ratios over time are 
generally deemed risky (McMahon 2000:24). 
To summarise, the literature lacks a homogenous definition of creditworthiness. 
Qualitative criteria do not allow for the analysis of large samples, ratio-based 
approaches are usually not practicable for very small businesses, and there is no 
consensus about the essential vs secondary factors.  
                                                 
23  Credit ratings are based on various data sources, especially assessments by banks and trade 
partners as well as court data on the business or its principals (see TransUnion ITC 2003:13). 
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2.2 – Empirical literature on SMME creditworthiness  
Although there is no homogenous empirical literature on SMME 
creditworthiness, there are a number of studies that reflect the variety of 
approaches.  
A significant body of literature has studied SMME demographics, especially 
their survival rates. Internationally, the smallest businesses are vulnerable to 
failure, with a survival rate after five years approximately 20% lower among 
micro enterprises than among medium and large firms (Viennet 1990 for France, 
Baldwin et al 2000 for Canada); South Africa is no exception, as Table 30 
illustrates. Comparisons must be made with caution, though, due to possible 
biases in sampling (size, age, location etc) or methodologies (e.g. treatment of 
mergers or acquisitions)24.  
Table 30 – Survival rates of SMMEs in various countries 
Percentage of 
firms surviving  
UK USA 
Canada 
micro 
Canada 
SME 
Africa 
micro25 
Cape 
Town  
beyond 1 year 88%  72% 89% app. 90%  
beyond 2 years  76%   app. 80% 81% 
beyond 3 years 62%  46% 67% app. 70% 71% 
beyond 4 years  47%   app. 60%  
beyond 5 years 48%  33% 53% app. 50%  
beyond 6 years   28% 48%  47% 
beyond 10 years   18% 34%  27% 
Source: Adapted from DTI (2005) for Cape Town, Benassi (1995) for the UK, US Small 
Business Administration (1995) for the USA, Baldwin et al (2000) for Canada, and 
Marniesse (1998) for Africa.  
 
                                                 
24  Due to the lack of appropriate data by Statistics SA, there are no official mortality statistics 
for South Africa, but only estimations based on data from the Cape Town Regional Services 
Council (RSC) levy database, which presents several biases and accuracy problems (see von 
Blottnitz 2005).  
25  Marniesse (1998) has studied a sample of traditional urban micro enterprises in various 
African countries (Tunisia, Benin, Ivory Coast and Madagascar) as well as Guadeloupe. 
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However, there is a logical flaw in using SMMEs’ survival rates as a 
creditworthiness indicator: mortality could be a consequence, rather than a cause, 
of credit rationing.  
A more satisfying approach is to narrow the focus to individual loans. 
Internationally, SMEs’ high default probabilities are well documented (see 
Dietsch 2003:100 for France) and can be used to justify banks’ rejections of 
SME loan applications, since an average stand-alone credit to an SME is riskier 
than a credit to a large enterprise. There are two pitfalls to this approach though: 
• Default probabilities can be affected by bank behaviour. As Hainz 
(2003:224) noted for Eastern Europe, banks’ persistent extension of 
credit to defaulting customers may explain the poor performance of 
banks’ loan portfolios. 
• Banks can use portfolio effects to diversify their risks. Based on French 
and German data, Dietsch (2003:104) and Dietsch & Petey (2004:786) 
show that SMEs are less sensitive to systematic risk than large 
enterprises, enabling positive effects of large portfolio diversification. 
Expanding their portfolios of SME loans may therefore be in the banks’ 
interests. 
A further approach is to consider SMMEs’ financial structure, which may be 
more vulnerable than that of larger enterprises. However, evidence is equivocal. 
Several authors have found that SMEs are less liquid and more indebted than 
larger enterprises (Chan et al 1985, Gupta 1969, Walker & Petty 1978, Guiso 
2003:127-129, Hommel & Schneider 2003:59-61), but some studies have yielded 
different results. Davidson & Dutia (1991), for instance, find that small firms 
have higher debt ratios but are not less liquid or less profitable. Dietsch 
(2003:96) shows that debt ratios of French manufacturing SMEs are not 
significantly different from larger firms. Based on his study of Australian SMEs, 
Hutchinson (1989:155) argues that the stage and pattern of development of an 
SME is more relevant than its size in determining the financial profile. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 128 
 
Unfortunately, South African evidence on SMMEs is generally limited to 
qualitative statements, such as Rwigema & Venter’s (2004) claim, that the 
limited resources that average South Africans are able to invest constrain their 
SMMEs’ equity ratios.  
2.3 – Creditworthiness and financial constraints  
Given the lack of consensus on defining creditworthiness and the lack of 
empirical data, it is hardly surprising that the literature is ambivalent on the 
causal relationship between the financial vulnerability of many SMMEs and their 
difficulties in accessing finance.  
Internationally, Cressy (1996) suggests that insufficient human capital (which 
can be regarded as an indicator of creditworthiness), is the decisive reason for 
debt constraints. Indeed, a few small-scale empirical studies have linked credit 
approval to firm characteristics such as profitability (e.g. Bratkowski et al 
2000:101). In South Africa, the GEM study (2003:47), which found a correlation 
between good management practices and access to finance, would tend to 
support Cressy’s position. 
However, other authors have emphasised the imperfect ability of banks to make 
lending decisions (De Young et al 2004). South African author Hawkins (2001) 
has argued that banks follow rules of thumb rather than sound creditworthiness 
assessments. A possible factor, as proposed by Galetovic (1994), is the 
concentration of credit markets, causing banks to privilege the surplus that they 
are likely to extract from firms, over their actual creditworthiness26.  
Empirically, Dietsch (2003:111) found that French SMEs’ credit availability is 
usually not influenced by their credit risk rating. Cressy’s (1996) argument on 
the role of human capital is further challenged by Van Praag’s (2002) finding 
                                                 
26  In Galetovic’s terminology, creditworthiness refers to a low default risk (downside), while 
firm quality refers to high (upside) opportunities, i.e. productivity and profitability.  
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that, even when controlling for human capital factors, capital constraints hinder 
entrepreneurs in their performance.  
Overall, what emerges from this literature review is its heterogeneity, with often 
vague or imperfect approaches towards creditworthiness, contradictory results 
and a lack of data. The scarcity of data is even more pronounced for South 
Africa. The discussion on the contribution of poor creditworthiness to financial 
constraints, therefore, is meagre and needs to be relaunched with a rigorous 
approach.  
 
Section 3. Conceptual framework and research 
design  
3.1 – Conceptualising SMMEs’ creditworthiness 
This section uses a grounding theory approach (Strauss & Corbin 1998) to 
remedy the gap in the literature by building a multiple-criteria framework that 
distinguishes between essential and secondary aspects and that can be 
operationalised into a ratio-based model.  
3.1.1 – General understanding 
We understand intrinsic creditworthiness as the presumed ability of a business, 
based on its internal features like operating success or financing structure, 
to honour its financial obligations while creating value for the economy. This 
approach differs from many models found in the literature, in the following 
respects:  
• Creditworthiness is defined based on intrinsic characteristics of the business 
– independently from issues pertaining to the functioning of financial 
markets (communication quality, collateral or credit record). 
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• Creditworthiness is understood as a continuum rather than a binomial 
variable.  
• Creditworthiness is a forward-looking concept: credit is worthwhile when it 
enables a firm to generate future revenue or value. The concept takes both 
risk and performance aspects into account and distinguishes between 
temporary deficiencies and fundamental shortcomings.  
• The measurement of creditworthiness is primarily quantitative, but the 
concept must be compatible with findings on management quality. 
3.1.2 – Open coding: The sequence of factors 
Open coding is a procedure recommended by Strauss & Corbin (1998) to allow 
for a richer model outside the confines of technical literature. For this purpose, a 
sequence of factors was developed that are likely to impede either the firm’s 
performance or its repayment of loans. This sequence includes criteria pertaining 
to the viability of operations as well as the soundness of the firm’s financial 
structure, and will form the basis for our creditworthiness assessment tool. In 
addition to technical details, Annexure 18 provides a detailed justification for the 
sequence provided here.  
• If the business is persistently not selling well, or if the selling price is not 
covering the business costs, then the business concept seems 
fundamentally flawed. For practical reasons (see Annexure 18), we use 
the concept of breakeven as the link between the existence of a sufficient 
market and the adequacy of the selling price. 
• Even firms with a buoyant market and profitable operations experience 
difficulties if their operations require substantial working capital. In 
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particular, businesses whose clients pay late or whose stock turns over 
slowly are vulnerable27.  
• SMMEs need sufficient equity (including members’ loans) to support 
their operations, ensure solvency, especially in case of losses, and enable 
the business to sustain additional debt. The literature (Rwigema & Venter 
2004, see Section 2) raises the expectation that lack of equity is a 
particular weakness of South African SMMEs compared to their 
international counterparts.  
• To avoid the risk of illiquidity, a firm must match the maturity of assets 
and liabilities, and maintain sound structural cash reserves as a buffer for 
unexpected negative cash flow. 
• SMMEs must be able to afford their financing structure in light of their 
operations, i.e. to cover financial costs. 
• SMMEs need committed owner-managers who are prepared to work hard 
for a modest cash reward, until the operating cash flows become 
sufficient. As ABSA (2004:7) puts it, a business must be able to “afford 
its owner”. 
• Volatility is regarded as a limitation of creditworthiness, as creditors 
become unable to predict the firm’s further development.  
Figure 18 illustrates this sequence. For clarity purposes, the figure adopts a 
binomial presentation at this stage – however the actual concept definition is 
based on a continuum rather than a discreet approach. 
                                                 
27  It was initially planned to include debtor quality in this sequence. However, this criterion was 
dropped for lack of reliable data.  
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Figure 18 – Sequence of creditworthiness factors  
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should be independent from access to credit, else it would be self-fulfilling. 
Therefore, problematic issues are classified as either fundamental, if they are 
unlikely to be improved by financial services, or financial, if they have a 
transitory character and may be cured by appropriate financial support. This 
rationale explains the voluntarily limited role played by illiquidity in our 
creditworthiness model: although strongly correlated with failure, illiquidity 
could be relieved through credit – unless it is a symptom of more fundamental 
shortcomings, in which case it will be captured elsewhere in the model.  
From the seven factors presented above, the following are regarded as 
fundamental:  
• the persistent inability of a firm to reach a sufficient level of turnover to 
cover its operating costs: this supposedly hints at unsatisfactory product 
quality or lack of market;  
• the lack of members’ commitment, in particular the owner’s tendency to 
draw remunerations or dividends which the business cannot afford;  
• the inadequacy of financing costs in relation to operating performance; 
indeed, this aspect is unlikely to be improved by standard SMME 
financial services, as additional facilities will only increase the interest 
burden.  
The other aspects, with the exception of volatility, are regarded as being 
financially curable. The inclusion of sluggish working capital cycles as a 
financial rather than a fundamental factor can be debated, as it can be regarded as 
a basic management flaw, especially in the debt collection process; nevertheless, 
this situation may be improved by factoring, and generally appears easier to 
reverse than, for example, the lack of markets. As to the volatility issue, it is 
understood as resulting from the other factors, therefore it is not classified as a 
fundamental or financial flaw.  
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It is worth noting that the three criteria listed as fundamental correspond roughly 
to the viability definition proposed by Tucker (2000) (see Section 2.1), with 
capital adequacy being judged in relation to the firm’s operating potential. 
3.1.3 – Creditworthiness typology 
Based on this understanding of fundamental and financial deficiencies, we 
propose to conceptually classify firms along two scales which, when divided into 
zones, lead to a matrix of possible diagnoses – each diagnosis reflecting a firm’s 
situation at a given point in time. A firm can be: 
(1) fundamentally sound with a strong financial structure – this firm would 
be described as ‘cruising’; 
(2) financially strong but fundamentally unsuccessful, facing a risk that the 
lack of success would gradually erode its strong financial basis – this 
firm would be described as ‘creeping’; 
(3) fundamentally sound, but built on a weak financial basis that made it 
vulnerable –  this category carries the label ‘limping’28; 
(4) fundamentally and financially unsuccessful, therefore under serious risk 
of failure – such firm would be labelled ‘drowning’ if its decline seemed 
reversible, or ‘distressed’ if failure seemed unavoidable;  
(5) Of course, there is always a grey zone which is not easily classified into 
one of these categories – these firms would be labelled ‘uncertain’. 
These six categories are represented on Figure 19’s matrix. 
                                                 
28  We purposefully distinguish between the labels of “creeping” and “limping” with the 
following images in mind: a creeping insect is by its very nature unable to stand, while a 
limping animal is one that may need support in order to recover its ability to stand and run. 
Similarly, financial services providers cannot cure a ‘fundamental’ shortcoming, but can treat 
financial problems.  
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Figure 19 – Creditworthiness matrix  
 
Source: own concept 
Underlying this typology is the belief that a far-sighted creditworthiness 
assessment must take into account the difference between fundamental and 
financial aspects. Fundamental aspects are the most decisive in the long term, 
whereas financial deficiencies such as lack of equity or lack of liquidity can be 
resolved if the fundamentals are good.  
Section 3.3 will come back to this understanding and propose testable 
hypotheses. But first, let us conceptualise the link between creditworthiness and 
financial constraints.  
3.2 – Creditworthiness and financial constraints: A 
model of proof 
Having shed light on the various dimensions of SMME creditworthiness, it is 
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constraint. Since the investigations presented in Chapter III were not entirely 
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insufficient creditworthiness must be tested as an additional possible reason for 
SMMEs’ financial constraints.  
In this regard, the typology proposed in Section 3.1, especially the distinction 
between limping and creeping firms, is useful in conceptualising the dilemma 
between immediate and long-term creditworthiness assessments.  
From an immediate perspective, a creeping firm would be creditworthy since its 
strong financial backbone makes the insolvency risk remote; however, when the 
fundamentals of the business are weak (e.g. the business is not selling well), the 
firm’s ability to create value is doubtful and its financial structure is likely to 
deteriorate over a few years, putting the firm’s survival at risk; consequently, 
creeping firms are not creditworthy in the long term. Conversely, limping firms 
with low liquidity and equity have a high immediate risk of default, but sustained 
financial support would enable these firms to become successful in the long run.  
This duality questions the approach adopted by banks: if these adopt a short-term 
approach to SMME creditworthiness, limping firms, which need finance and 
deserve support under a long-term perspective, could rightfully complain of 
being unfairly rejected, whereas facilities granted to creeping firms may 
contribute to underperforming SMME loans. This chapter will attempt to test 
whether this is the case.  
Meanwhile, a difficulty must be addressed here regarding possible spurious 
effects in empirically testing the link between creditworthiness and financial 
constraints or use of bank debt. Firstly, although some effort has been made to 
define creditworthiness beyond the immediate criteria of debt and cash available, 
these elements do influence the quality assessment of the borrower, as well as the 
level of financial constraint. A negative relationship between constraints and 
creditworthiness might therefore come from definitional similarities. It is 
therefore important to have a second test, which would show that the expected 
relationship does indeed arise from creditworthy firms’ better access to bank 
finance. 
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Unfortunately, as indicated in Chapter III, only case study firms provided 
sufficient information to enable assessment of the concepts of creditworthiness, 
financial constraints and access to bank debt, as defined in this thesis. The data in 
the balance sheet sample only covered the use of external finance, rather than 
financial constraints or access to debt. The difference between use of bank 
finance and access lies in the interference of demand factors: indeed, the absence 
of loans in non-constrained firms may come from the absence of need rather than 
a lack of access to bank finance. This situation will have to be taken into account 
when defining the hypotheses and tests.  
The next section synthesises the conceptual framework and proposes hypotheses 
as well as tests to address these empirically. 
3.3 – Synthesis and hypotheses 
The conceptual framework on creditworthiness and its effect on financial 
constraints must be tested in three steps, which are represented in Figure 20.  
Figure 20 – Three steps in testing the creditworthiness hypothesis 
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Accordingly, the following hypotheses are formulated.  
H10: South African SMMEs display particular weaknesses compared to their 
international counterparts, notably in respect of their equity ratios.  
Test: Equity ratios will be computed on the basis of the balance sheet sample and 
compared to international evidence.  
 
H11: A far-sighted creditworthiness assessment must take into account the 
difference between fundamental and financial aspects, as follows: 
a) Ability to reach breakeven, members’ commitment and adequacy between 
financial structure and operating performance are the three most fundamental 
creditworthiness factors in the long term; 
b) If the fundamentals are good, lack of equity, excessive short-term debt and 
lack of liquidity can be relieved over a few years through adequate financial 
support. 
Test: Firms with poor ratios in respect of breakeven, members’ commitment and 
capital adequacy are less likely to honour their credit commitments in the long 
term, than firms with good fundamental ratios but poor equity or liquidity ratios. 
 
H12: Creditworthiness is negatively related to the level of financial constraints, 
i.e. the least creditworthy enterprises are most likely to be constrained and vice 
versa. 
Test: Among case studies, financial constraints are more severe in firms with a 
poorer creditworthiness.  
 
H13: Creditworthiness is positively related to the use of bank finance, except for 
the most creditworthy firms, where lack of need is likely to cause a low 
utilisation of bank finance. 
Test: In the balance sheet sample, the least creditworthy and the most 
creditworthy firms have a lower use of bank debt, than the firms in the middle 
range of creditworthiness.  
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Section 4. Measuring creditworthiness with 
imperfect data 
To measure creditworthiness as conceptualised in Section 3, this section 
translates the framework into an operational set of tools. Following the advice of 
Mintzberg (1979:587), the assessment scheme draws, where possible, on 
qualitative data to support the interpretation of quantitative data from financial 
statements.  
The following pages describe how qualitative assessments were done (4.1), how 
data were cleansed to reduce accounting opacity (4.2); how a ratio based model 
was developed and applied (4.3); and how quantitative and qualitative aspects 
are summarised in a balanced assessment of creditworthiness (4.4). 
4.1 – The qualitative assessment model   
The model was based on existing literature, with the initial structure adopting the 
three non-financial screening criteria common to banks and venture capitalists: 
management team, product or service, and market (Banking Council 2000, GAB 
Consulting 2002, Zacharakis & Meyer 1998). For a more precise evaluation of 
the management team (which is often presented as the most important qualitative 
criterion), this dimension was divided into two aspects: the level of skills and the 
level of energy or commitment. In addition, to take advantage of the data 
provided by the case studies, a dynamic dimension was included, comprising an 
assessment of the past (the firm’s track record) as well as the future prospects 
(firm’s strategy).  
Accordingly the qualitative assessment of case studies followed a six-tier 
approach, represented in Table 31. Each question is scored from 0 (poor) to 2 
(good) according to the evidence available, and the sum results in a total score of 
0 to 12. The results of the qualitative scoring will be presented in Section 5.  
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Table 31 – Framework for qualitative creditworthiness assessment  
Source Question Indicators 
literature 
(split) 
(1) How skilled is the owner-
manager? 
training and qualifications; quality 
of answers; level of comfort in 
talking about various issues 
literature 
(split) 
(2) Is the owner-manager 
committed and does he 
show entrepreneurial 
energy? 
attitude towards the business; 
physical presence in the business 
and/or working hours; feelings 
expressed; owner’s general attitude 
during the interviews  
literature (3) Is the quality of the product 
or service good and 
recognised as such by the 
market? 
Indications about the owners’ care 
in ensuring customer satisfaction; 
quality control; market response  
literature (4) Does the market have good 
growth potential? 
Indications from the owner or from 
other sources 
dynamic (5) Does the business have a 
good track record? 
Number of years of existence of the 
business and trends; evidence of 
failure  
dynamic (6) Does the management’s 
strategy make sense and 
does it respond to the firm’s 
current risks and 
challenges? 
Likelihood that strategy will 
produce turnover growth; likely 
evolution of financial risks; likely 
ability of the staff to cope with new 
strategy  
 
4.2 – Dealing with accounting opacity  
The review of accounting opacity (Chapter III) has confirmed that the figures 
published in small business financial statements must be interpreted cautiously: 
The balance sheet sample data are heterogeneous in scope (e.g. number of years 
provided, level of details); among the firms assessed, a fifth scored under 50% 
for intrinsic quality, and nearly half were suspected to have manipulated their 
accounts to some extent. At first sight, these findings cast doubts on the usability 
of financials for a ratio-based creditworthiness evaluation.  
To deal with the problem, three mitigation strategies were adopted, which are 
presented below. 
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4.2.1 – Adjustment of financial statements  
The adjustment of accounting data was inspired by a growing body of scholarly 
literature on data cleansing processes (Dekhbakhsh 2002, Maletic & Marcus 
2000, Fox et al 1994, Hernandez and Stolfo 1998, Kimball 1996), bearing in 
mind the risks of user interventions on datasets. From this literature, three 
principles emerged that guided the adjustment process and avoided exacerbating 
opacity through excessive adjustments: they were the principles of relevance, 
transparency and consistency. Due to the specific needs of accounting data, the 
principle of balance was added.  
The principle of relevance means that only material errors were corrected. The 
principle of transparency implies that items were only adjusted if their value 
could be derived logically, and that all adjustments undertaken were clearly 
documented. To achieve consistency across the years and enterprises, 
depreciation and amortisation rates were applied uniformly. This caused 
numerous adjustments on the carrying value of fixed and intangible assets which 
– taken in isolation – may not have been necessary, but were deemed appropriate 
for better comparability across the businesses. The requirement of balance 
implied double-entry adjustments, with balancing entries being either specific 
(when it was clear that the mistake had affected a specific accrual), or unspecific 
by means of a control account29.  
Figure 21 summarises the process followed for the adjustment of financial 
statements. A full list of the adjustments undertaken, as well as explanatory 
details, is provided in Annexure 16.  
                                                 
29  For example, Wec03 had booked most of its equity and liabilities with a negative sign and 
made it up by a disproportionate suppliers’ control account – it was then easy enough to 
correct this by restoring positive values for the equity and liabilities and accordingly reducing 
the amount of suppliers’ credit. In contrast, Wec01 booked its tax liability twice, under 
current liabilities and under retained income – but it was not evident which other asset or 
liability had been affected by this mistake – the removal of one liability was therefore 
balanced through a control account under current liabilities.  
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Figure 21 – Process for the adjustment of accounting data 
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or balance sheet items (turnover, operating costs, extraordinary costs, inventory, 
trade payables or receivables) were not adjusted, unless required and enabled by 
strong data (e.g. case studies).  
The adjustment process led to slightly adjusted sets of financial statements for 
seventeen businesses, and more substantial adjustments for 40% of the database 
(27 enterprises). In some cases the adjustments addressed all the material issues 
contributing to accounting opacity, while in other cases, adjustments were only 
partly successful, e.g. restoring a credible picture of performance but leaving 
some doubts on the financial structure.  
4.2.2 – Selective inclusion  
In some firms, adjustments seemed unlikely to restore a convincing picture of the 
business’ status, especially when there were gross structural mistakes in the 
balance sheets or a presumption of manipulated turnover.  
For those firms, the usable parts of financial data were singled out (e.g. the 
income statement but not the balance sheet, or the 2000 statements but not those 
of 2001) and only these were entered into the ratio analysis. Such selective 
inclusion was preferred to a sheer exclusion, which might have led to a bias in 
the sample, should accounting opacity be related to creditworthiness.  
4.2.3 – Layering the sample  
The next step was to define three tiers to reflect different levels of data 
reliability. Thus, the creditworthiness assessment for the upper tier could be 
regarded as reliable, whereas tentative analyses of the lower tiers could generate 
additional insights, which would need to be interpreted more cautiously. 
Businesses were classified twice into these tiers: once prior to the adjustments, 
then again after adjustments.  
The tiers were defined as follows: those with a total score exceeding 60/100 and 
an intrinsic quality score exceeding 30/55 were deemed sufficiently robust for a 
reliable creditworthiness analysis. For the second tier, an intrinsic quality score 
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of 20 to 29.5 was deemed sufficient to run tentative ratio analysis, with 
reasonable assurance that the results would be correct. All businesses with a 
poorer score would be classified into the third tier.  
The results showed that adjustments were generally successful in upgrading a 
number of poorer accounts to higher tiers: the first tier represented half of the 
initial sample, but 62.5% of the sample post adjustments. The second tier 
contained fifteen businesses prior to adjustments and sixteen post adjustments 
(25% of sample). As to the last tier, initially made up of seventeen firms, it was 
reduced to eight businesses, whose poor accounts were only maintained in the 
sample for a tentative extension of the core results. Table 32 shows how the 
sample was layered (a precise table is provided in Annexure 17). 
Table 32 – Layering the sample (pre- and post-adjustment) 
Label Criteria 
Group size, 
pre-adjustment  
Group size,  
post-adjustment  
tier 1 
robust 
accounts 
AT > 60  and IQ > 30 
      or  
sourced from accountants 
without qualification 
32 40 
tier 2 
workable 
accounts 
IQ > 20-29.5 or  
IQ>30 but AT<60 or  
sourced from accountants with 
qualification 
(except CS3: IQ=17 but 
additional data) 
15 16 
tier 3 
for 
extension 
IQ < 20 or  
less than two final BS/IS 
provided 
17 8 
Note: AT = Accounting transparency score (out of 100);   
IQ = Intrinsic Quality score (out of 55) (see Chapter III) 
 
4.2.4 – Sensible choice of ratio formulas  
The fourth strategy was to select ratio formulas that minimise the impact of data 
unreliability. A sensible ratio framework, for example, assesses performance 
based on operating profit prior to member’s salary, rather than net profit; recoups 
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interest earned and paid with the year-end cash balances to avoid mis-
assessments of the firm’s liquidity; includes the member’s loan in the equity and, 
where possible, works with average values over several years rather than a once-
off value, in order to minimise the effect of outliers. 
These issues will be discussed in greater detail in presenting the ratio model 
(Section 4.3). 
These four precautions (adjustments to accounting figures; selective inclusion of 
problematic accounts; separate assessment of tiers; and sensible definition of 
ratio formulas) made it possible to attempt a ratio-based assessment of 
creditworthiness. Indeed, in spite of their shortcomings, accounting data remain 
the most reliable indicators of performance and financial health. The next section 
describes how the ratio framework was defined and calibrated.  
4.3 – Ratio framework  
The ratio methodology, which aims to provide an objective and standardised 
reflection of the firm’s situation, is the central part of the creditworthiness 
assessment model. The framework is analytical and dimensional and uses a 
numerical weight and sum approach for synthesis (Scriven 1994:54 and 344-
355).  
The aspects of creditworthiness assessed correspond to the sequence presented in 
Section 3.1, and are evaluated individually by means of one or several ratios, as 
well as benchmarks chosen to represent a serious and a mild problem 
respectively. The separate assessment of dimensions helps to localise the 
problems and minimise contagion in the event of data quality issues. The aspects 
are then synthesised in an index reflecting the number and degree of fundamental 
and financing difficulties.  
In order to build a scheme that is rigorous yet does justice to the enterprises’ 
context, the ratios and thresholds were determined in a long iterative process, 
which is represented in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22 – Iterative process for determining the ratios and thresholds 
  
As the chart shows, the initial framework was adjusted several times as the 
interpretation of ratio values was found to depend on the firm’s context, trends 
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and other data. Pattern comparison and interpretation (Eisenhardt 1989:540) 
were key to the process. For example, the framework-testing based on the 
balance sheet sample (bottom third of Figure 22) included the following steps:  
(1) Compute input data for all the sample businesses, taking note of data 
restrictions (such as the occasional lack of cost breakdown);  
(2) Review the spectrum of values of each input figure (for example, 
negative or zero values);  
(3) Identify possible formula problems and seek ways to correct the results in 
order to avoid distortion of the ratios;  
(4) Calculate the ratios for each year and each firm;  
(5) Make corrections where necessary, including outliers or errors;  
(6) Examine the final ratios in terms of trends and means over a period;  
(7) Classify firms according to the preliminary thresholds;  
(8) For each ratio, examine more closely the firms falling into the threshold 
categories, seeking individual clues explaining their poor performance 
(considering the evolution over time, the components of the ratio etc);  
(9) Use case-to-case comparisons to understand similarities between poor 
performing cases or contrasts between poor- and well-performing firms;  
(10) Verify whether tentative clues are consistent with the ratio values 
found in other enterprises. 
This results in a complex scoring framework, which is presented in the following 
pages. More detailed explanations, formulas and justifications of thresholds can 
be found in Annexure 18. 
4.3.1 – Market and Pricing  
Turnover sufficiency is assessed in two steps: the current turnover is 
benchmarked against the firm’s breakeven, which is derived from the firm’s past 
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cost structure. Then, the growth potential is estimated according to the past 
growth rate, which is benchmarked against inflation. This results in two ratios.  
The margin (or deficit) over breakeven (later MBE) is calculated as follows: 
Margin over breakeven = 1−
reakevenEstimatedB
overLatestTurn
  
Turnover growth is calculated (where data are available) as: 
G = 1
Pr
−
overeviousTurn
overLatestTurn
 
A negative MBE is a problem, since it means that the business has not achieved 
sufficient turnover to cover its fixed costs. This is frequent among young 
growing firms that still need to increase their sales.  
The turnover problem is arguably serious when a firm is more than two years 
away from breakeven. Indeed, since the sample’s SMMEs are at least 18-months 
old, two more years of significant losses could irreversibly erode their financial 
structure, as it would mean that they would be at least 3,5 years old and still not 
profitable. To simplify calculations, a firm was deemed to have a serious 
turnover problem if it had a negative MBE and below-inflation growth, or a 
positive real growth but a MBE under -40% (see Annexure 18 for justification of 
this threshold).  
4.3.2 – Working capital 
To evaluate the sufficiency of working capital, the rotation of each item is 
considered, in days of turnover: 
Need for working capital = Inventory turnover + Customer credit   
   – Supplier credit – Customer advances  
  (in days of turnover) 
The pilot test of the framework revealed that the average duration of supplier 
credit was relevant in its own right to identify working capital risks. Indeed, 
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some firms balance their working capital through extensive use of supplier 
credit, and may face problems if their suppliers change their credit policy. This 
was the case for CS6, which took on average 68 days to pay its suppliers, thus 
helping the firm to balance its working capital but making it vulnerable to 
pressure. 
Since firms’ cash cycles tend to follow a monthly cycle (with salaries paid at 
month-end), the thresholds for mild and serious working capital problems are set 
at 30 and 60 days respectively. These thresholds apply across industries, even 
though they are more likely to be reached in some sectors than in others. In 
addition, suppliers’ credit exceeding 60 days, coupled with a positive need for 
working capital, is understood as a sign of vulnerability (mild problem).  
4.3.3 – Equity 
For small and very small firms, profits or losses can cause great fluctuations of 
the equity ratio from one year to the next. Therefore, the assessment is based on 
(a) the mean equity ratio over the period, (b) the last equity ratio and (c) the 
evolution of equity over time.  
The members’ loans are included in the equity ratio as they bear equity risk, 
being often ceded as a guarantee to lenders: 
Equity ratio = 
Assets Total
loans Members' Equity +
  
Mean equity ratio = Average (ER (t), ER (t-1), etc) 
When at least three years of data were available, the year-to-year variations of 
equity were observed, with three types of evolution matching the concept of a 
clear equity growth pattern: a negative equity which becomes and stays positive, 
an uninterrupted equity growth, or a compound equity growth in excess of 15% 
p.a. over the period (as explained in Annexure 19).  
A negative equity ratio, which results from accumulated losses and the member’s 
inability to cover them, is doubtless a serious problem, since the firm is 
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technically insolvent. A mild equity problem corresponds to the absence of a 
clear equity growth pattern, combined with a low equity ratio. Based on 
international benchmarks (see Annexure 18), the threshold was set at 20% of 
total assets.  
4.3.4 – Debt maturity structure 
The risk of excessive reliance on short-term debt was assessed by means of two 
ratios: the current debt ratio, which is industry related, and the net current debt 
ratio, which should not be widely dependent on the industry (see Annexure 18 
for a justification of this choice):  
Net current debt ratio = 
 assets Total
assets) Short term -debt  m(Short ter
 
Current debt ratio = 
 assets Total
debt  Short term
 
Based on international benchmarks (see Annexure 18), current debt ratios of 
50% and 75% were selected as thresholds for mild and serious over-reliance on 
short-term debt. However, these high ratios are only a problem if current debt 
significantly exceeds current assets – i.e. if the net current debt ratio exceeds 
10%.  
4.3.5 – Liquidity reserves 
The focus of the liquidity assessment was on a medium-term picture (refer to 
Annexure 18 for the practical difficulties of this when working with accounting 
data). Following an approach similar to Beaver (1966), cash deficits indicate 
vulnerability if they are unlikely to be covered by future cash flows. Liquidity 
was therefore assessed according to the mean liquidity ratio (MLR) for firms 
with positive net liquidity, and a cash flow to overdraft ratio (CFOD) for firms 
with a net overdraft:  
MLR = Mean (
assets Total
Overdraft Bank  - sequivalentCash Cash +
)period 
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Cash flow to Overdraft 30= 
overdraft net Mean 
  flowcash  operatingLast 
   
Some SMMEs voluntarily keep their liquidity ratio low, for various reasons: 
existence of external emergency cash reserves (overdraft facility or owner’s 
funds); investment opportunities; low return on liquid assets. Therefore, the 
mean liquidity ratio is only presumed problematic if negative. The lack of 
liquidity is deemed a serious problem if the mean liquidity ratio is below -5% of 
total assets and the cash flow to overdraft ratio is below 1 (including negative 
cash flows). 
4.3.6 – Financial costs  
The adequacy of financing structure and operating performance is measured by 
the interest coverage. The member’s salary was excluded from the coverage 
calculation as it was found to be frequently used as profit distribution, rather than 
being a fixed cost.  
Interest coverage = 
charges FinanceInterest
profit Operating
+
 
Undoubtedly, SMMEs have a serious problem if their coverage ratio is lower 
than 1. The threshold for the mild problem is more difficult to determine as the 
operating profit, as defined, must cover financial costs and the member’s salary – 
which are not related in terms of proportions. Therefore the threshold is 
arbitrarily set at 2,5. This is higher than the threshold of financial vulnerability 
used by Guiso (2003), viz. 1,4.  
The pilot testing of the framework revealed that interest coverage ratios are 
highly unstable; therefore it was decided to review them according to lowest, 
highest and mean value for the period. 
                                                 
30  This ratio bears some similarities to the Beaver ratio (Beaver 1966), but its focus is on 
overdraft rather than total debt. 
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4.3.7 – Owner commitment, especially remuneration scheme  
The net flow of cash between a business and its owner (i.e. the member’s net 
cash remuneration) can be an indicator of the owner’s commitment to the 
business, especially when compared to the firm’s cash flow.  
In light of the firm’s lifecycle, two cases appear problematic: (1) when the 
member’s cash reward significantly exceeds the cash flow, liquid assets are 
depleted, causing a serious problem; (2) when a growing business pays too high 
salaries, it cannot accumulate new resources, causing a mild problem.  
This is assessed by the following indicators: 
Monthly member’s cash reward = 
months ofnumber   members ofnumber 
rewardcash    Members'
×
 
Reward to Cash Flow (RCF) = 
FlowCash   Adjusted
reward Members'
  
The problem of owners embezzling the resources of businesses can, at any point 
in time, rapidly endanger the survival of the business. Therefore the attention 
will be on the highest values, rather than on the period’s average.  
Generally, over-remuneration of members was only presumed when the absolute 
monthly salary per member exceeded R 7,000 (i.e. 32% above the national 
average). For businesses in a growth phase, the RCF mild threshold was set at 
75%; for all businesses, a RCF of 100% and more was deemed to indicate value 
depletion and hence a serious problem (see Annexure 18 for a justification of 
these thresholds).  
4.3.8 – Volatility  
For all firms which had provided at least two sets of financials, instability was 
further assessed by calculating standard deviations for all the static ratios, i.e. the 
operating margin (which was more practical than the margin over breakeven), 
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the need for working capital, the equity ratio, the current debt ratio, the liquidity 
ratio and the interest coverage.  
Defining thresholds was difficult, as the six standard deviations had widely 
different ranges of values. Therefore, each firm’s volatility was assessed 
relatively to the sample. For each of the six ratios, the firms in the 15% lowest 
and highest volatility percentile were identified.  Firms which were never 
classified among the most stable, but were 3 or more times among the least 
stable, were regarded as having a serious volatility problem. Firms which had 
been 3 or more times among the least stable, but 1 or 2 times among the most 
stable, were considered as having a mild volatility problem.  
4.3.9 – Summary of ratios and thresholds 
Table 33 summarises the ratio methodology. It is important to bear in mind that 
these ratios only acted as a guideline. Qualitative evidence, when available, 
could override the ratio-based results and modify the scoring. For example, 
interview evidence made it clear that CS2 was unlikely to sustain the previous 
years’ turnover growth. 
4.4 – Balanced appraisal 
 The diagnoses of each aspect of a creditworthiness assessment are synthesised in 
a penalty approach, based on the distinction between fundamental and financial 
shortcomings.  
Each weakness identified in any of the dimensions discussed above generates a 
penalty of 1 (mild) or 2 points (serious), which are deducted from an initial 
capital of sixteen points. Fundamental, financial and, if available, volatility 
indexes are then calculated and synthesised to give a total score. Figure 23 
illustrates the scoring logic. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 154 
 
Table 33 – The ratio framework for a ‘diagnosis’ 
Question Ratios Threshold “mild” Threshold “serious” 
1. Market / Pricing 
Does the business have enough 
markets/clients? Are the operations 
profitable? 
Margin over breakeven:  
MBE = 1−
reakevenEstimatedB
overLatestTurn
  
Turnover growth:  
G = 1
Pr
−
overeviousTurn
overLatestTurn
 
 
 
-40% < MBE < 0 
G > inflation 
 
 
MBE < 0 
G ≤ inflation 
or 
MBE < -40% 
G > inflation 
2. Debtors and Inventory 
Is the business able to finance its 
operations?  
Need for working capital 
NWC = stock + customer credit  
                        - supplier credit – customer deposits 
(in days of turnover) 
Supplier credit 
SC =  360×
Turnover
leTradePayab
 (if applicable) 
 
 
 
NWC ≥ 30 days 
or 
NWC > 0 
SC > 60 days 
NWC ≥ 60 days 
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Question Ratios Threshold “mild” Threshold “serious” 
3. Equity 
Does the firm have sufficient 
equity? 
Equity ratio  
ER = 
Assets Total
loans Members' Equity +
  
Equity growth pattern 
Negative equity turns positive or  
steady increase in equity   
ER < 20% 
No clear equity  
growth pattern 
ER < 0% 
4. Debt maturity 
Is the debt maturity adequate? 
Net current debt ratio 
NCD = 
 assets Total
assets) Short term -debt  m(Short ter
 
 Current debt ratio 
CD = 
 assets Total
debt  Short term
 
 
 
NCD > 10% 
CD > 50% 
 
 
NCD > 10% 
CD > 75% 
5. Liquidity 
Are liquidity reserves sufficient? 
Mean Liquidity ratio 
MLR = mean (
assets Total
Overdraft  - equivts &Cash 
) 
Cash flow to Overdraft 
CFOD = 
overdraft net Mean 
  flowcash  operatingLast 
 
 
MLR < 0 
CFOD < 1 
or 
MLR < -5% 
CFOD > 1 
 
 
MLR < -5% 
CFOD < 1 
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Question Ratios Threshold “mild” Threshold “serious” 
6. Financing costs 
Are financing costs consuming all 
operating profits? 
Interest coverage 
IC = 
esFinanceChInterest
ofitOperating
arg
Pr_
+
 
Mean IC < 2,5 Mean IC < 1 
7. Owner’s commitment 
Can the business afford its owner? 
Monthly member’s reward (MMR)  
MMR=
months ofnumber   members ofnumber 
rd_cash_rewa Members'
×
 
Reward to Cash Flow (RCF)  
RCF = 
FlowCash  Adjusted
rewardcash    Members'
  
Growing business: 
RCF  ≥75%  
MMR ≥ R 7000. 
All businesses: 
 
RCF ≥100% 
MMR ≥R 7000  
8. Volatility 
Is the business stable? 
Standard deviations of:  
operating margin, need for working capital, equity ratio, 
current debt ratio, liquidity ratio and interest coverage 
≥3 ratios within the 
15% highest 
percentile; 1-2 ratios 
within 15% lowest 
percentile  
≥3 ratios within the 
15% highest 
percentile; none within 
15% lowest percentile 
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The SMMEs could then be allocated to the categories defined in Section 3.1 
(Figure 19), following a system of thresholds as illustrated in Table 3431. 
Table 34 – Criteria for classification into the creditworthiness categories 
Category Criteria 
Cruising Total score ≥ 15 
Uncertain  8 ≤ Total score <15 
Fundamental score > 4 
Financial score > 5 
Limping 8 ≤ Total score <15  
Fundamental score > 4 
Financial score ≤ 5 
Creeping 8 ≤ Total score <17 
Fundamental score ≤ 4 
Financial score > 5 
Drowning 8 ≤ Total score <15 
Fundamental score ≤ 4 
Financial score ≤ 5 
Distressed Total score < 8 
 
This section has presented a comprehensive methodology for assessing SMME 
creditworthiness based on qualitative and accounting data. The framework 
incorporates qualitative data from interviews as well as a fully fledged method to 
improve the usability of small business accounting data, compute and interpret 
ratios and synthesise them into a sensible creditworthiness assessment. The 
application of the framework is work-intensive and is therefore not practical for 
all research situations. Nevertheless, this framework does go a long way in 
redressing the gaps in the literature on assessing small business creditworthiness.   
The next section turns to empirical findings resulting from the application of this 
comprehensive methodology to the three tiers of the balance sheet sample and 
the case studies.  
                                                 
31  Due to the penalty-based approach, in which only firms with visible problems have a lower 
score, thresholds had to be numerically high in order to capture firms with problems. 
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Section 5. Assessed creditworthiness of SMMEs 
The results of the creditworthiness analysis are presented in three steps. First, the 
eight aspects of the sequence are presented individually (Section 5.1). Then, 
comparisons with international data are proposed on some of those aspects (5.2). 
Section 5.3 concludes with a balanced assessment of the firms in the sample.  
Figure 23 – Balanced creditworthiness scoring model  
 
 
Problems re. breakeven, 
remuneration structure  
or interest coverage 
(weight 2) 
Problems re.  
working capital, equity, 
short-term debt or  liquidity  
(each weight 2) 
Fundamental score:  
0 (poor) to 6 (good) 
F=6 – (mF*1) – (sF*2) 
Financing score:  
0 (poor) to 8 (good)  
f=8 – (mf*1) – (sf*2) 
Total score (0 to 16) 
T = F + f + I   
Ratios and 
thresholds 
Identify benign or serious 
problems 
Problems re. 
instability 
(weight 2) 
Instability score 
0 (volatile) to 2 (stable) 
I=2-mi*1 – si*2 
mF/ sF = number of mild / serious fundamental weaknesses 
   (a breakeven problem counts double) 
mf / sf = number of mild / serious financial weaknesses 
mi / si = evidence of mild / serious instability 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 159 
5.1 – Review of individual weaknesses of SMMEs 
This section reports on the extent to which the 64 SMMEs32 from the balance 
sheet sample suffer from the various weaknesses identified in the framework, 
and seeks clues on the types of firms most prone to those problems. For clarity, 
each dimension is introduced with a frame in which the parameters of the study 
(P:) are given. More details are available in Annexure 19.  
5.1.1 – Lack of turnover  
P: A persistently negative margin over breakeven indicates an inability to sell or 
cover the business costs, and represents a fundamental flaw. If turnover growth 
is above inflation, the problem is mild. If the business is not growing in real 
terms, or if its margin over breakeven is below -40%, the problem is serious.  
Despite occasional difficulties in applying the breakeven calculation to SMMEs 
(see discussion in Annexure 19), turnover deficiencies were encountered in 
fourteen out of 66 firms; nine were in the lower tiers of accounting transparency.  
Firms with turnover deficiencies can be further classified into three categories: 
(1) some firms seemed unlikely ever to reach breakeven, because their real 
growth was insufficient and their deficits were high; (2) in other firms, the 
turnover deficit appeared mild considering their young age or their real turnover 
growth; (3) yet other firms experienced problematic growth. These three 
categories are illustrated in Table 35.  
Several young (or recently acquired) firms suffered from either heavy initial 
fixed costs or variable cost ratios in excess of 100%. Except for one of them, 
which was expected to reach breakeven as it grew, the extent of turnover 
deficiency did not bode well. Also worrying were the turnover deficits of older 
                                                 
32 Owing to variable data quality, the sample size for some ratios differs from 64. Annexure 18 
indicates for each ratio the firms that were excluded or alternative sets of data that were 
included.  
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firms, including three case studies (furniture business CS1, township-based 
services company CS4 and franchise restaurant CS2).  
Table 35 – Classification of firms with turnover problems 
 
mild deficit  
(-40% < MBE < 0, 
growth > inflation) 
serious deficit 
(MBE < - 40% or  
no real growth) 
problematic growth 
pattern (BE growth 
> TO growth) 
Young firms 1 4  
Older firms  6 3 
 
Another unexpected cause for concern was the problematic growth pattern found 
in some firms, characterised by strong increases in fixed costs. These rises in 
fixed costs resulted either from continuous investments or from rising 
administrative costs, or a combination of both. Under this pattern, turnover 
growth ironically exacerbates the gap to breakeven. The sample yielded three 
firms which changed from profits to deficits as their fixed costs rose faster than 
their turnover. A further three firms were threatening to follow the same pattern, 
with a slim margin over breakeven and fixed costs growing at a rate exceeding 
100% p.a.  
Table 36 illustrates the clues gained from case studies CS1, CS2 and CS4 as well 
as the cases of problematic growth pattern, on the reasons for, and the possible 
consequences of, turnover problems (see case study narratives in Annexures 31 
to 36). 
To conclude, over a fifth of the sample (fourteen firms) suffered from turnover 
insufficiency. Considering the sample’s bias towards better-managed SMMEs, 
the proportion is likely to be higher in the overall SMME population. However, 
the problematic growth experience of a few SMMEs is also reminiscent of the 
negative consequences of growing turnover by raising fixed costs.  
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5.1.2 – High need for working capital  
P: Firms with a need for working capital exceeding 60 days have a serious 
problem. Firms with a need for working capital exceeding 30 days or a positive 
need for working capital coupled with supplier credit in excess of 60 days, have 
a mild problem.  
Table 36 – Causes and consequences of turnover problems  
 Causes of turnover problems Consequences of turnover 
problems 
ca
se
 s
tu
di
es
 (
C
S
1,
 C
S
2,
 C
S
4)
 
• Intense competition (all three case 
studies); 
• Aggressive pricing strategy eroding 
the margins (CS1, CS4) 
• Heavy fixed costs aggravated by 
advertising (CS2) 
• Lack of a well-situated sales outlet 
(CS1, in Montague Gardens for the 
middle / lower-end of the market); 
• Lack of focus and expertise (CS4: “we 
take whatever we get in the tendering 
business” (from building to cleaning 
or catering); 
• Poor customer service (CS4), e.g. 
unilaterally breaching contracts with 
customers.  
• Liquidation (CS1) after 4 
years without a genuine 
profit (the reported profits 
were fake) 
• Planning to sell company 
(CS2)  
• “failed in the way of 
survivalist businesses”: 
suspended and re-emerged 
(CS4a’s operations 
transferred to CS4b), 
because liquidation process 
is too expensive while 
owners have no other 
survival strategy 
pr
ob
le
m
at
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 p
at
te
rn
 
• Continuous investment => fixed assets 
become a burden (e.g. plate hiring 
service Dir01: fixed costs rise by 90% 
p.a.) 
• Lack of discipline or premature 
controls => Rising administrative 
costs (e.g. sports equipment retailer 
Wec02: fixed costs rise by 51% p.a.) 
• Initial profits turn into 
losses (BD5, Wec2, Dir01) 
• Margin over breakeven 
erodes rapidly (Gob5, 
Wec8, PWC1), threatening 
to turn to losses (currently 
11-12% with fixed costs 
increasing at 130-205% 
p.a.) 
 
Subject to accounting accuracy (risks of under- and overstatement of current 
assets and debts are discussed in Annexure 18), the analyses suggest that the 
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working capital cycle of most SMMEs is either balanced, or in deficit (i.e. 
financed by non-trade resources).  
As Table 37 shows, seventeen firms (26% of the sample) had a high or very high 
need for working capital. This probably reflects SMMEs’ weak bargaining 
power in the supply chain. In addition, four SMMEs were at risk due to 
excessive supplier credit. A closer examination of firms with a high need for 
working capital shows that their problem most often stems from high customer 
credit, and occasionally from high stock or insufficient supplier credit. The case 
studies give some clues on the reasons for these situations (see case study 
narratives in Annexures 31-36), which are summarised in Table 38.  
Table 37 – Need for, or surplus of, working capital (in days of turnover) 
 
comfor-
table 
surplus  
NWC< -10 
balanced 
cycle:  
-10 to +10  
small 
need: 
 10.1 to 30  
mild 
problem: 
30.1 to 60  
serious 
problem: 
NWC > 60  
mild 
problem 
(supplier 
credit >30 + 
0<NWC<30) 
sample  
size 
Tier A 6 14 11 6 3 3 40 
Tier B 5 6 1 3 2 0 17 
Tier C 2 1 2 2 1 1 8 
Total  13 21 14 11 6 4 6533 
 
                                                 
33  See Annexure 18 Section 2 for the list of firms included and excluded from this and other 
calculations.  
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Table 38 – Reasons for working capital problems 
Type of problem 
Number of 
firms 
Comments 
Customer credit > 
60 days 
10 Reasons: 
• SMMEs have weak bargaining power  
o Serving public sector (tender business CS4) 
o Long supply chain (tour operator CS5) 
• Insufficient debtor management 
o Lack of management awareness and 
insufficient staff allocation (CS6) 
High inventories > 
60 days 
5 Problem mainly found in: 
• Manufacturing (e.g. jeweller BB7: 189 days) 
• Specialised retail (e.g. clothing shop Gob2: 102 
days) 
Lack of supplier 
credit (< 5 days) 
8 Reasons (other than lack of need): 
• No suppliers in services sector (transport firm 
Ned1, tourism business CS5) 
• Exorbitant cost in townships, 25-50% per month 
(CS4) 
Unsustainable use 
of supplier credit 
(> 60 days) 
10 Consequence:  
• Suppliers refuse to supply more materials => risks 
of operational disruption (CS6, whose supplier 
credit reaches 95 days of turnover) 
 
To conclude, it appears that working capital weaknesses affect at least a third of 
non-food-retail SMMEs34. Apart from specialised businesses, which have to 
keep high amounts of stock, the main cause for concern is the poor payment 
culture, rooted in lack of awareness and slack debtor management, which 
exacerbates SMMEs’ naturally unfavourable supply chain position. The lack of 
working capital can be disruptive to SMMEs’ operations.  
                                                 
34  Supermarkets and restaurants, which are the most frequent activity of SMMEs in South 
Africa, are under-represented in the sample. However, with their cash-based business and 
their fast-moving inventory, these businesses hardly have working capital problems.  
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5.1.3 – Lack of equity  
P: Firms with a negative equity have a serious problem, as they are technically 
insolvent. Firms whose equity ratio is under 20% also have a problem, unless 
there is clear evidence that their equity is growing.  
Subject to the risks of distortion caused by poor reporting, the data, as presented 
in Table 39, suggest that the equity ratios are relatively symmetrically 
distributed, with most SMMEs having ratios between 20 and 50%, and an almost 
equal number having lower or higher ratios. The median equity ratio is 
substantially better in Tier A than in Tiers B and C. 
The qualitative findings from case studies as well as a closer examination of the 
nineteen firms from the balance sheet sample with low equity ratios (below 
20%), help us to understand the reasons for and consequences of low equity 
ratios. These are represented in Table 40. 
Table 39 – Distribution of equity ratios (mean over the period) 
 
median 
equity ratio 
equity 
ratio ≤0 
0-20% 
20.1-
50% 
50.1- 
75% 
>75% 
sample 
size 
Tier A 35,4% 5 5 16 8 6 40 
Tier B 29,2% 1 5 5 4 2 17 
Tier C 28,0% 1 2 1 1 1 6 
Total 33,6% 7 12 22 13 9 63 
 
Equity ratios appeared to be dependent on firm size, with a median equity ratio 
of 52% for micro enterprises, 35% for very small and as low as 24% for small 
enterprises – possibly indicating that micro and very small enterprises find it 
more difficult to access credit than small firms. In medium-sized enterprises, 
though, the median equity ratio was higher (31%). Section 5.2 compares these 
results with European data.  
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Table 40 – Causes and consequences of low equity problems  
 Causes of low equity ratios Consequences of low equity 
ca
se
 s
tu
di
es
 (
C
S
1,
 
C
S
4,
 C
S
5)
 
• Low initial investment and 
subsequent losses (township 
businesses CS4 and coloured 
tourism business CS5) 
• Heavy start-up investments 
(franchise furniture factory CS1) 
• Clear equity growth 
pattern in tourism 
business CS5 
• Liquidation in CS1, 
failure in CS4 
ot
he
r 
fi
rm
s 
• Capital intensive firms (i.e. 
manufacturing, construction or 
transport firms) 
• Small enterprises, as opposed to 
micro and very small 
• clear equity growth 
pattern is rare (only CS5 
and printing company 
Dir02) 
• Important non-financial 
debt, e.g. from sister 
companies or trade credit 
 
To summarise, three in ten businesses in the sample, especially capital-intensive 
firms, had low or negative equity ratios, causing a significant risk of bankruptcy. 
Lack of data made it difficult to identify clear signs of recovery from negative 
equity.  
5.1.4 – Excessive reliance on short-term debt  
P: A net current debt ratio (NCDR) exceeding 10% means that firms use short-
term funds to finance long-term assets. If their current debt ratio exceeds 50% 
(75%), they are deemed (seriously) overly reliant on short-term debt. This may 
indicate an inability to access long-term finance. 
The ratios on current debt and net current debt were subject to the same technical 
(data) reservations as the study of the working capital cycle.  
The analysis (see detailed table in Annexure 19) shows that net current debt 
ratios are symmetrically distributed, with almost a quarter of the sample having a 
balanced ratio, matching the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities. 
Among those which financed fixed assets with short-term funds (NCDR>10%), 
half had a current debt ratio higher than 50% (Table 41).  
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Table 41 – Current debt ratio (CDR) of firms with a high NCDR 
 
NCDR >10% 
CDR ≤ 50% 
NCDR >10% 
50% < CDR ≤ 75% 
(mild problem) 
NCDR >10% 
CDR > 75% 
(severe problem) 
Tier A 8 6  3 
Tier B 3 2  1 
Tier C 1 0 1  
Total 12 8 5 
 
None of the case studies was diagnosed as being overly reliant on current debt. 
However, the sample analysis reveals that high current debt ratios often occur in 
firms with a negative equity, especially when operating in the trade and services 
sector. Firms in capital-intensive industries are less likely to depend on short-
term debt, probably as a result of their easier access to asset finance (see detailed 
table in Annexure 19). 
5.1.5 – Lack of liquidity reserves 
P: Liquidity reserves are insufficient if the mean liquidity ratio (MLR) is 
negative and the operating cash flow does not cover the overdraft. When the 
MLR is under -5% with a cash flow to overdraft (CFOD) lower than 1, the 
survival of the firm is threatened.  
Subject to the difficulties of balance-sheet based liquidity analyses, and given the 
impossibility of measuring slack consistently and neutralising short-term 
variations, the analysis shows that many businesses operate under a zero or 
negative liquidity situation. However, surprisingly many businesses have 
positive and sometimes high liquidity ratios. As Table 42 shows, the likelihood 
of positive liquidity was particularly high among firms with more opaque 
accounting, possibly due to distortions in their accounts35.  
                                                 
35  Anecdotal evidence suggests that these ratios may be distorted, either by under-reporting of 
current assets (as in CS3, where, after correction of total assets to reflect interview data, the 
liquidity ratio drops from 25% to 13%), or by the high start-up cash reserves in young firms, 
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Table 42 – Distribution of liquidity and cash flow to overdraft ratios  
 
MLR ≤-5% 
CFOD < 1 
(severe 
problem) 
MLR ≤-5% 
CFOD ≥ 1 
(mild 
problem) 
-5% < MLR 
< 0 
CFOD < 1 
(mild 
problem) 
-5% < 
MLR <0 
CFOD ≥ 1 
0 ≤ MLR 
≤ 20% 
MLR 
> 20% 
Sample 
size 
Tier A 8 9 1 2 14 6 40 
Tier B 5 0 1 2 8 1 17 
Tier C 0 1 1 0 5 0 7 
Total  13 10 3 4 27 7 64 
 
The analysis further reveals that: 
• Among the thirty firms with a negative liquidity, almost half (fourteen) 
had a cash flow exceeding their overdraft, and hence had a good chance 
of improving or at least maintaining their liquidity ratio.  
• Among the seven firms with a high overdraft (>25% of total assets), only 
CS6 was able to generate an equivalent operating cash flow.  
Table 43 illustrates some reasons for low liquidity ratios and indicates that very 
small firms are most prone to liquidity problems. 
Table 43 – Causes of liquidity problems  
 Causes of low liquidity ratios 
ca
se
 s
tu
di
es
 
(C
S
1,
 C
S
4,
 
C
S
5)
 
• Failure to keep liquidity reserves for the low season (tourism 
business CS5) 
• Tendency to spend all cash surpluses either to increase stock 
(CS3) or to buy new equipment (CS6, CS4) 
ot
he
r 
fi
rm
s 
• 55% of very small enterprises in the sample had a mild or 
severe liquidity problem, as opposed to 29% of small and 
medium sized firms (see table in Annexure 19).  
 
                                                                                                                                    
as in Wec01. In other cases, though, high liquidity ratios are real, as in cash-based businesses 
whose equipment is paid for (as copy shop Ned12). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 168 
 
5.1.6 – Inability to cover interest costs  
P: Firms have a coverage problem if their mean interest coverage is lower than 
2,5 and a serious problem if it is lower than 1.  
The interest coverage synthesises a firm’s operating and financing aspects. A 
large majority of firms in the balance sheet sample (69%) have a coverage of 
over 2,5. However, as Table 44 shows, the frequency of coverage problems is 
substantially higher (over 55%) in more opaque tiers, than in the most 
transparent Tier A (17.5%). Since the sample is biased towards more transparent 
firms, this result is positively distorted.  
Table 44 – Mean interest coverage  
 Coverage 
< 1 
1 to 2.5 2.6 to 20 
>20 and  
no interest 
Sample total 
Case studies 
CS1,CS2, 
CS4* 
 CS5, CS6  6 
Tier A 3 4 22 11 40 
Tier B 5 5 3 5 17 
Tier C 3* 2 2 3 10 
Full sample 11 11 27 19 67 
 16% 16% 40% 28% 100% 
Source: Calculations based on adjusted financial statements, except for CS4, where they 
were based on an income statement simulation for the years 1998 and 2000.  
 
Table 45 – Causes of coverage problems  
 Causes of low coverage ratios 
case studies 
(CS1, CS4, 
CS5) 
• Low profitability (restaurant CS2, furniture business CS1) 
• High debt (furniture business CS1, township business CS4) 
other firms • Coverage problems more frequent among very young firms 
(possibly because firms with poor coverage do not survive 
beyond a few years) 
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Table 45 provides some insights gained from case studies on the reasons for 
coverage problems (see also table in Annexure 19).  
5.1.7 – Lack of commitment to the business  
P: For growing businesses, problems arise with owners’ level of commitment 
when the member’s reward to cash flow (RCF) exceeds 75% with a monthly 
reward exceeding R7 000. For all businesses, a RCF exceeding 100%, coupled 
with a monthly reward over R7 000, indicates a serious problem.  
Although the members’ remuneration scheme appeared to be clearly relevant in 
the case studies, data limitations in the balance sheet sample made it difficult to 
review. Subject to those limitations, the balance sheet sample data suggest that 
few firms pay their owners a high salary exceeding cash flows (see Table 46). 
However, a small number of growing businesses pay most of their cash flows to 
members, apparently failing to see the need for income retention to increase their 
equity.  
Table 46 – Firms with high members’ remuneration 
 young or growing; 
maxRCF>75% and R>7000 
(mild problem) 
maxRCF>100% and R>7000  
(serious problem) 
 
one year several years one year 
several 
years 
possible 
member loan 
effect36 
Tier A 2 3 4 0 3 
Tier B 3 1  0 0  
Tier C 0 0 0 1  
Total 5 4 4 1 3 
 
                                                 
36  These are firms whose RCF exceeds 100% and monthly pay exceeds R7000 at one point in 
their history when including the decrease in members’ loan; but the values go back below 
thresholds when the variation in members’ loan is ignored. Their classification as problem 
firms is conditional on the assumption that the decrease in members’ loan represents a trend 
and not a short-term fluctuation.  
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This review helps to identify cases of apparent over-remuneration of the 
member(s), which may hint at a lack of commitment of the members to their 
business. In three of the businesses singled out in this way, additional 
information (including sale of business or resignation of members) corroborated 
this interpretation (see details in Annexure 19). 
In the case studies, qualitative sources supported quantitative data, highlighting 
different attitudes with regard to entrepreneurs’ commitment to their business, as 
illustrated in Table 47.  
Table 47 – Member’s commitment in the case studies 
 Remuneration 
pattern 
Working 
hours 
Statements / 
attitude 
Conclusion on 
commitment 
Furniture 
business 
CS1 
estimated salary:  
R20 000/month 
(1998) and 
R15 000/month 
(first half of 
1999), far beyond 
the cash flows 
not available apparently 
embezzled  the 
firms’ 
resources prior 
to its 
liquidation 
low commitment: 
personal 
enrichment 
Franchise 
restaurant 
CS2 
no salary (no 
profits) 
“I spend far 
too little time 
in this 
business” 
planning to sell  
(serial 
entrepreneur) 
pragmatic, rather 
disengaged 
Safety wear 
business 
CS3 
on average, 
member salary 
=75% of cash 
flows, but 
<R7 000/month 
  fine, but salary 
retention would 
have helped to 
build up equity 
Tourism 
entrepreneur 
CS5 
in the first 4 yrs, 
salary was under 
R2 000/month, of 
which part was 
retained as 
member’s loan 
until 2000 
twelve hours 
per day  
seven days 
per week 
“they will have 
to shoot me 
several times 
before I sell” 
high commitment 
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5.1.8 – Volatility  
P: Firms with comparatively high standard deviations of their key ratios have a 
problem of instability.  
The data showed that some firms are significantly more volatile than others. As 
Table 48 shows, among the 42 businesses for which such an analysis could be 
done, eleven firms are classified as volatile or very volatile (see Annexure 19 for 
further details). 
Table 48 – Volatility of firms in Tiers A, B and C37 
 
very stable 
stable with 
contra-
dictions 
volatile with 
contra-
dictions 
very volatile total 
Tier A 4 3 4 3 27 
Tier B 1  1 1 9 
Tier C   2  4 
Total 5 3 7 4 42 
 
A closer look at the data suggests that turnover growth and investment patterns 
may explain key ratio volatility (see Annexure 19), with the highest volatility 
being found in firms with high turnover and asset growth, while stability is 
mainly found among firms with a moderate, but not low, turnover and asset 
growth.. The examples of CS1 and Gob18 suggest that remuneration patterns 
may also cause volatility, but the sample was too small to verify this assumption.  
5.2 – International comparisons  
H10: South African SMMEs display particular weaknesses compared to their 
international counterparts, notably in respect of their equity ratios.  
Wherever possible, the ratio values are compared to results obtained in European 
studies. A major source of data for this is a series of papers on SME finance in 
                                                 
37  Due to unequal data availability (firns with less than 3 accounts being more frequent in Tiers 
B and C), the comparison of tiers does not yield significant insights. 
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various countries, published by the European Investment Bank in 2003, where 
the authors have used different creditworthiness indicators (equity ratio and 
current ratio for Germany; equity ratio and credit rating for France; capital 
structure and inverse coverage ratio for Italy). Therefore, for each indicator, this 
review selects the comparable results. 
5.2.1 – Comparison of trade credit terms 
Tables 49 and 50 (see also more detailed tables in Annexure 20) provide a 
comparison of credit terms with a Zimbabwean sample, which, as Fafchamps 
(1999) indicated, is not significantly different from developed economies (Dun 
& Bradstreet, as quoted by Fafchamps 1999).  
Table 49 – Comparison of supplier credit terms, SA-Zimbabwe 
 
South African SMMEs,  
1997-2002  
(balance sheet sample)  
Zimbabwean industrial firms, 
1997-98  
(Fafchamps) 
 
All 
(62)38 
micro   
& very 
small 
(33) 
Small  
(18) 
medium 
(11) 
 
All 
(167) 
Micro 
(13) 
Small 
(56) 
medium 
(49) 
1-15 days 29% 33% 39% 0%  13% 15% 7% 18% 
16-30 days 31% 42% 11% 27%  41% 62% 43% 31% 
31-45 days 19% 15% 17% 36%  23% 15% 25% 27% 
46-60 days 3% 0% 6% 9%  13% 8% 12% 12% 
over 60 days 18% 9% 28% 27%  11% 0% 12% 12% 
average delay 
(days) 
32 24 41 49 
 
45 30 42 42 
Source: Fafchamps 1999 for Zimbabwe / Balance sheet sample for South Africa (based 
on firms which do receive supplier credit) 
 
                                                 
38  Table 49 is based on firms which do receive trade credit, and Table 50 on those which do 
grant customer credit. This led to the exclusion of two SMMEs from Table 49 and 17 
SMMEs from Table 50. 
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Table 50 – Comparison of customer credit terms, SA-Zimbabwe 
 
South African SMMEs,  
1997-2002 
 (balance sheet sample)  
Zimbabwean industrial firms, 
1997-98 
 (Fafchamps) 
N= 
All 
(47) 
micro 
& very 
small 
(25) 
Small  
(12) 
medium 
(10) 
 
All 
(164) 
Micro 
(20) 
Small 
(50) 
Medium 
(43) 
1-15 days 34% 40% 33% 20%  11% 30% 16% 2% 
16-30 days 15% 24% 8% 0%  38% 30% 42% 49% 
31-45 days 9% 0% 25% 10%  21% 10% 14% 30% 
46-60 days 19% 28% 8% 10%  15% 15% 14% 9% 
over 60 days 23% 8% 25% 60%  15 15% 14% 9% 
average 
delay (days) 
40 33 36 61 
 
50 46 54 41 
Source: Fafchamps 1999 for Zimbabwe / Balance sheet sample for South Africa (based 
on firms which do grant their customers credit) 
 
The two tables suggest that the sample’s credit terms are more skewed towards 
the extremes than in Zimbabwe: there is a stronger representation of very short 
credit (probably due to greater representation of micro and very small businesses, 
which do not receive much trade credit), and of very long credit (over 60 days).  
Subject to possible distortions due to accounting opacity (with some firms either 
omitting to account for their trade payables or receivables, or inflating them), this 
result seems to hint at a frequent problem of working capital management in 
South African firms, whose slow payment culture may increase vulnerability.  
5.2.2 – Comparison of equity ratios  
International literature generally does not include micro or very small firms, 
restricting comparisons to the small and medium businesses. The statistics 
provided in Table 51 suggest that the equity ratios in our sample are slightly 
lower than those found in EU manufacturing and construction firms or in French 
SMEs, but higher than those of German SMEs and Italian manufacturing firms.  
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Table 51 – Comparison of South African with European equity ratios 
 
micro 
very 
small 
small medium large 
South Africa: Balance sheet 
sample 
     
mean 52% 44% 20% 28% n/a 
median 52% 35% 24% 31%  
      
EU manufacturing and 
construction firms (Wagenvoort 
2003b:28) 
n/a n/a 34% 35% 36% 
German SMEs 2000 (Hommel 
& Schneider 2003:84) 
n/a n/a 13% 17% 21% 
French SMEs (Dietsch 2003:97)      
first quartile n/a n/a 18% 21% 21% 
median   32% 33% 33% 
fourth quartile   47% 47% 47% 
Italian manufacturing firms: 
median (Guiso 2003:124) 
n/a n/a 20% 23% 24% 
 
This table does not support Hypothesis H10, since equity ratios of South African 
SMMEs appear to be within the range of values found in Europe. This may 
indicate that South Africans are able to keep the size of their businesses in line 
with the limited resources that they are able to invest. This finding will be 
discussed again in Chapter V Section 1.3. 
5.2.3 – Inverse coverage ratios 
Guiso (2003:130) uses the inverse coverage ratio, with a threshold of 0.7, as 
indicator of financial fragility39. In his sample of small manufacturing firms, he 
finds that over a quarter of firms exceed this critical threshold. Even when 
focusing on manufacturing and building firms, SMMEs in the balance sheet 
                                                 
39  The inverse coverage ratio is calculating by dividing interest and financial charges by the 
operating profit. This ratio was not part of this thesis’ methodology and does not appear in 
Table 33, but it was computed for the sake of comparison. Guiso (2003) chose the threshold 
of 0,7 because for a firm with an inverse coverage ratio in excess of 0,7 a decline in 
profitability equivalent to one standard deviation would make the firm unable to meet its 
interest obligations. 
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sample appear considerably less fragile than in Guiso’s sample, as Table 52 
shows.  
Table 52 – Comparison of inverse coverage ratio with Italian SMEs 
 South African sample Italian sample 
 
All 
builders and  
manufacturers 
manufacturing firms 
with less than 30 
employees 
Median inverse coverage ratio 0.13 0.19 0.312 
Percentage of firms with inverse 
coverage >0.7 
6.3%  0.0% 27.7% 
Source for the Italian statistics: Guiso 2003:127 
 
Although our sample’s inherent bias calls for caution, these results serve to weaken 
the frequent assumption that SMMEs are significantly less creditworthy in South 
Africa than elsewhere. Table 53 summarises the observations from international 
comparisons.  More details on comparisons of ratios can be found in Annexure 20.  
Table 53 – International comparison of ratios  
Ratio 
Comparables found in 
literature 
Remarks / conclusion 
Trade credit 
terms 
Zimbabwean industrial 
firms, 1997-98 (Fafchamps 
1999) 
Firms in our South African sample are 
more likely to have either very short, or 
very long periods of trade credit 
Equity ratio 
EU manufacturing and 
construction firms 
(Wagenvoort 2003b:28) 
German SMEs (Hommel & 
Schneider 2003:84) and 
French SMEs (Dietsch 
2003:97) 
Italian manufacturers: 
median (Guiso 2003:124) 
On average, firms in our South African 
sample have higher equity ratios than 
German SMEs and Italian manufacturing 
firms. 
After controlling for size effects, equity 
ratios are similar to French SMEs and EU 
manufacturing and construction firms. 
Interest 
coverage ratio 
Italian manufacturers: 
median (Guiso 2003:124) 
On average, firms in our South African 
sample have far better interest coverage 
than Italian firms 
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Having examined each of these aspects separately, it is time to consider a more 
holistic assessment of the creditworthiness of SMMEs.  
5.3 – Balanced appraisal 
Based on the distinction between ‘fundamental’ and ‘financial’ aspects, SMMEs 
were classified into the six categories defined in the conceptual framework, 
namely cruising, uncertain, limping, creeping, drowning and distressed.  
As Table 54 shows, the proportion of creditworthy firms appears to be linked to 
the firm’s accounting quality, at least in the cruising and distressed categories. 
This relationship is not surprising, considering the expected effect of good 
management on both financial transparency and creditworthiness. However, it 
has implications for this research in terms of bias of the sample data. Indeed, the 
balance sheet sample is, per construction, biased towards businesses with better 
accounting: a number of businesses had to be removed from the sample for lack 
of usable financial statements. Considering this bias and the apparent 
relationship found above, it is probable that the sample overestimates the 
creditworthiness of South African SMMEs.  
Table 54 – Creditworthiness typology and accounting transparency 
 Cruising Uncertain Limping Creeping Drowning Distressed Total 
Tier A 13 11 6 5 4 1 40 
Tier B 3 5 2 2 2 2 16 
Tier C 1 4 2 0 0 3 10 
Total 17 20 10 7 6 6 6640 
 
Annexure 20 provides a more detailed analysis and profile of each category in 
the creditworthiness typology. Although the limits are fluid, the six categories 
seem to have their own identity and typical features. The tentative profiles of 
firms in each category are summarised in Table 55.  
                                                 
40 The sample size here includes CS4 and two versions of Ned6 (see Annexure 21).  
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Table 55 – Tentative profiles of SMMEs in each creditworthiness category  
Category  Tentative profiles  
Cruising  
(Total score ≥ 15) 
17 businesses 
a) “lifestyle businesses” 
traditional low-risk trade firms (retail, wholesale, restaurants); 
often franchises 
b) “successful entrepreneurial ventures” 
innovative firms managed by their founder, with high growth, 
profits and modest current debt (financed either by equity or 
ISA) 
 
Uncertain 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score > 4 
Fin-score > 5 
20 businesses 
a) very young conventional firms  
insufficient turnover, often equity or interest coverage 
problems; but these may level out as the firm grows.  
b) high-differentiation business services 
volatile, often with working capital problems 
c) capital-intensive firms, such as builders or manufacturers 
often higher debt, tense liquidity or working capital problems  
 
Limping 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fin-score ≤ 5 
Fund-score > 4 
10 businesses 
a) young capital-intensive businesses 
low equity, often problems with interest coverage or equity 
(may level out as firm grows) 
b) older firms with high working capital needs 
high overdraft 
these firms are usually relatively stable  
Creeping 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score ≤ 4 
Fin-score > 5 
7 businesses 
a) young firms with poor potential, but highly capitalised 
b) ‘passionate ventures’, not profitable, but highly capitalised 
[c)  poor accounting] 
Drowning  
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score ≤ 4 
Fin-score ≤ 5 
6 businesses 
Young/very young SMMEs which are both unlikely to reach 
breakeven (poor business idea, poor pricing) and financially deficient, 
with a slim equity and high short-term debt 
Distressed  
Total score < 8 
6 businesses 
Mostly young firms, undercapitalised, and unable to reach breakeven, 
or overpaying their members. All firms are illiquid and nearly 
bankrupt.  
Total: 66 businesses  
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To summarise on the creditworthiness of the firms in the balance sheet sample, 
while keeping in mind the sample’s bias, this review has revealed a number of 
creditworthiness problems. However, the South African SMMEs in the sample 
do not score badly compared with European firms. The main difference to 
European firms seems to be the frequently slow working capital cycle – 
presumably a consequence of South Africa’s slow payment culture.  
On individual weaknesses, the review has revealed that:  
• Lack of turnover is a problem for over 20% of SMMEs, with many firms 
unlikely to attain breakeven and three presenting a problematic growth 
pattern, in which fixed costs grow faster than turnover;  
• The need for working capital is usually high, except among food retail 
SMMEs. This comes mainly from customers’ slow payment, possibly 
due to ineffectual debtor management, and leads to a considerable, and 
sometimes unsustainable, use of supplier credit;  
• With a median equity ratio of 34%, the sample is not generally 
undercapitalised. Businesses in the ‘small’ category and in asset-intensive 
sectors are more likely to be undercapitalised;  
• In 20% of firms, short-term debt is excessive compared to the maturity 
structure of assets. The problem often results from a negative equity;  
• Sixteen firms present liquidity problems, with an overdraft exceeding 
their cash flow. Six of the seven firms with a high overdraft (in excess of 
25% of total assets) appear unlikely to recover as they are unable to 
generate an equivalent cash flow;  
• The interest coverage statistics are better than in comparable Italian 
businesses, possibly because South African SMMEs have a more limited 
access to financial debt. The 21 firms with a mean coverage ratio under 
2,5 were predominantly very young, highly indebted and/or poorly 
performing; 
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• Five firms paid their members a high salary exceeding cash flows, thus 
impairing their resources, while nine young or growing firms had a 
remuneration pattern impeding accumulation of equity for growth;  
• Eleven firms were identified as volatile. Instability tended to be 
exacerbated by high turnover and asset growth as well as excessive 
remuneration patterns. 
Meanwhile, the holistic assessment has revealed that 56% of the firms in the 
sample could be classified as either cruising or uncertain – i.e. raising no serious 
concern of creditworthiness. A quarter of the sample, however, was either 
limping (i.e. characterised by a weak financial structure in spite of its good 
operating potential), or creeping (having a strong financial backbone but little 
chance of success). The remainder, by combining fundamental and financial 
deficiencies, threatened to fail.  
Although these proportions are not representative of the South African SMME 
population, the review was helpful in drawing the profile of each category. More 
importantly, the creditworthiness diagnosis of each firm will be useful in testing 
for relationships with use of finance and financial constraint, in Section 6.  
But before this is done, a dynamic look at the case studies will consider 
Hypothesis H11 on the superior creditworthiness of limping over creeping firms 
(Section 5.4).  
5.4 – The dynamics of creditworthiness 
The following hypothesis had been proposed in Section 3.3: 
H11: A far-sighted creditworthiness assessment must take into account the 
difference between fundamental and financial aspects, as follows: 
a) Ability to reach breakeven, members’ commitment and adequacy between 
financial structure and operating performance are the three most fundamental 
creditworthiness factors in the long term; 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 180 
 
b) If the fundamentals are right, then lack of equity, excessive short-term debt 
and lack of liquidity can be relieved over a few years through adequate financial 
support. 
Test: Firms with poor ratios in respect of breakeven, members’ commitment and 
capital adequacy are less likely to honour their credit commitments in the long 
term, than firms with good fundamental ratios but poor equity or liquidity ratios. 
To illustrate how a creditworthiness assessment can change over time, two case 
studies were rated at three different points in time: furniture manufacturer CS1 
and tour operator CS5. A slightly more subtle assessment method, with 
intermediary thresholds, was adopted in order to capture changes from one year 
to the next. The results are showed in Table 56 (see also more detailed tables in 
Annexure 23). These cases had a similar initial total score (12/16 and 13/16) but 
different types of weaknesses (mainly fundamental for CS1, purely financial for 
CS5). The retrospective review shows the contrasting evolutions of both firms.  
5.4.1 – Furniture business CS1: From ‘creeping’ to ‘distressed’ 
CS1’s creditworthiness gradually deteriorated from an uncertain situation early 
1998 to financial distress in 2000, when it was liquidated.  
In January 1998, less than two years after the franchise business was started, it 
suffered from a lack of turnover, which could still appear as an early-stage 
weakness. However, the combination of relatively high debt and poor 
profitability caused interest coverage problems. Together, these two factors 
created a poor fundamental score. Apart from the low equity, though, the 
financial ratios were acceptable.  
Later, the firm’s inability to break even became clear, and, coupled with the 
owner’s unsustainable salary, caused an aggravation of the fundamental score, 
pushing the business from the uncertain into the drowning and finally the 
distressed category. It is noteworthy that over these years, CS1’s financial score 
deteriorated more slowly than the fundamental score. This observation supports 
the belief that the fundamental score is more appropriate to anticipate problems.  
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Table 56 – Evolution of CS1’s and CS5’s creditworthiness assessments 
 Furniture business CS1 Tourism business CS5 
  
Period up to 
Jan 1998 
Period up to 
Dec 1999 Jun 2000 
Period until  
Feb 2001 
Period until  
Feb 2002 
Period until  
Feb 2003 
Penalties:  
Turnover deficiency  0.5 2  2    
Excessive member remuneration  1 2    
Excessive financing costs 2  2  2     
Lack of working capital        
Excessive debt 0.5 1 1 2 1 1 
Excessive short-term debt         
Lack of liquidity reserves   1  1 0.5  
Scores:  
Fundamental score (out of 6) 
 
3.5 
 
1 
 
0 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
Financial score (out of 8) 7.5 7 6 5 6.5 7 
Instability (out of 2) 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Total score (out of 16) 12 9 7 13 14.5 15 
Category Creeping Drowning Distressed Limping Uncertain Cruising  Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 182 
 
5.4.2 – Tourism business CS5: From ‘limping’ to ‘cruising’ 
The opposite evolution was observed in tourism business CS5.  
Having started with a slim equity base and accumulated two years of losses, the 
business found itself in a very uncomfortable financial situation in 2001, with a 
negative equity and tense liquidity. By that time, though, it had already reached 
breakeven and was able to cover its financial charges, so its fundamental score 
was good, justifying the classification as limping.  
Thanks to the member’s commitment, the retention of the member’s salary and a 
further improvement of turnover and operating profits, the business slowly 
accumulated  equity  and  cash,  moving  into  the  uncertain  category  in  2002. 
Eventually, the tremendous turnover growth and operating profitability helped to 
restore an acceptable, albeit still low, level of equity and allowed the firm to 
graduate to cruising at the time of the study.   
The comparison of CS1 and CS5, although anecdotal, is consistent with the 
hypothesis that limping firms, if supported, are more likely than creeping firms 
to strengthen their financial structure and become sustainable.  
 
Section 6. The relationship between 
creditworthiness and financial constraints  
The next paragraphs will present the results of the empirical testing of 
Hypotheses H12-13, as proposed in Section 3.3.  
6.1 – Creditworthiness and financial constraints 
H12: Creditworthiness is negatively related to the level of financial constraints, 
i.e. the least creditworthy enterprises are most likely to be constrained and vice 
versa. 
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Test: Among case studies, financial constraints are more severe in firms with a 
poorer creditworthiness.  
Since only the case study data cover the dimensions of financial constraints and 
creditworthiness, this test can only be done on six firms. To mitigate this 
limitation by examining a more substantial number of data points, the history of 
all case studies was included in the review. The result is illustrated in Figure 24.  
At the bottom end, CS1 and CS4 exemplify the expected relationship between 
the strongest level of constraint (debt repayment constraint) and the poorest 
creditworthiness category (distressed). The evolution of CS1 also approximately 
follows the expected relationship, being labelled as ‘creeping’ in January 1998, 
at a time when it experienced only investment constraints (in spite of bearing 
heavy financial debt). In December 1999, CS1 was already drowning, although 
its cash constraints appeared still moderate from the financials. Only in the last 
six months did the cash constraints severely deteriorate. CS4b has been 
uncreditworthy (drowning) from the start, experiencing severe cash constraints, 
which led to a debt-trap situation after only a few months.  
At the top end, the correspondence between unconstrained and creditworthy 
firms is less evident; CS2 is creeping but shows no signs of constraints, while 
CS3 and CS5 are classified as cruising but do experience moderate financial 
constraints. Even CS6, in spite of its severe cash constraints, remains in the 
second-to-best creditworthiness category.  
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Figure 24 – Case studies’ levels of financial constraint and creditworthiness 
 
Notes: Methodology for financial constraint: see Chapter II; for creditworthiness 
assessment: see Chapter IV. The arrows approximate the evolution of the firm’s 
positioning on the diagram, from the first year for which data are available, to the time 
of the case study. 
 
The positions of cases CS1(1999), CS2, CS5(2003) and CS6 on Figure 24 
deviate substantially from the axis representing the expected relationship. The 
distance is even fairly large if one considers that the model cannot be expected to 
generate cases in the extreme corners of the diagram, which have been greyed 
out: indeed, by construction, a firm that is debt-trapped would inevitably suffer 
from equity and liquidity problems, and cannot be labelled as cruising. Similarly, 
to be qualified as drowning or distressed, a firm would need to experience a 
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number of financial deficiencies, which cannot but imply either long-term, or 
liquidity related constraints.  
An appropriate interpretation of this finding requires an individual consideration 
of these four case studies. After its third year of operation, in 1999, CS1 had 
proven its inability to reach breakeven. The financial charges, as well as the 
generous member’s salaries, placed great strain on the slim operating profits and 
the equity ratio had dropped below 5%: a clear case of poor creditworthiness. 
That the firm, in these circumstances, experienced only moderate financial 
constraints, seemed to be the result of a sluggishness in the bank system: having 
granted substantial funds at start-up, followed by an overdraft facility two years 
later on the basis of falsified financial reporting, the main bank had, in the 
following year, maintained the facilities and CS1 had been able to obtain vehicle 
finance from a second bank. This particular example indeed illustrates the bank’s 
lack of consideration of a gravely deteriorated creditworthiness.  
CS2 was a different case altogether, not least because the financial support it 
gained from the bank was indirect through a personal loan to its owner. As a 
consequence, the bank was not expected to monitor closely the performance of 
the business. In addition, in spite of its failure to reach breakeven and generate 
profits and a salary for its member, the business did not, strictly speaking, run an 
immediate financial risk. Liquidity levels were acceptable and the firm’s 
substance value was high. Under this circumstance, even if it had wanted to, it 
would have been difficult for the bank to justify a withdrawal or restriction of its 
support.  
CS5, which was classified as creditworthy but complained of liquidity shortages 
especially in winter, was also no clear case of bank misjudgement. Indeed, the 
business had received extensive support for the acquisition of its vehicles, and 
was still able to tap into this source for more investments. It tended, however – 
certainly for cost reasons – to use internal liquidity rather than exclusively long-
term bank funds – to finance these fixed assets. The tight liquidity that resulted, 
especially in winter, could have been mitigated through a more extensive use of 
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instalment sale facilities. What is more, CS5’s bank had repeatedly offered the 
owner an overdraft facility to bridge the slower cycle of cash in winter – an offer 
which the owner had repeatedly declined for fear of being “caught in a circle of 
debt”. Eventually, towards the end of the case study and possibly facilitated by 
our discussions, the business accepted the offered overdraft and put an end to its 
liquidity constraints.  
The last is crating firm CS6, whose creditworthiness analysis had revealed 
generally sound potential, with a sustained turnover growth, well-controlled 
costs and extensive loans by the minority member, ensuring a reasonable equity 
ratio. However, resources available for investment were low for a business that 
required a substantial amount of space, machinery and vehicles: their application 
for industrial property finance had been rejected and the business turned to 
immobilising short-term resources in fixed assets. The financial tightness, thus, 
was shifted to more immediate liquidity shortages, aggravated by sloppy debtor 
management, with trade receivables reaching as much as 96 days of turnover in 
February 2004. The business benefited from an unusually high overdraft limit 
(8,3% of its turnover), but exceeding this limit became the norm rather than the 
exception. While CS6’s liquidity shortage was real, extending the overdraft limit 
would not have resolved the problem. The answer was more likely to lie, partly, 
in more stringent debtor management and, partly, in finding more appropriate 
solutions for the financing of long-term assets. But, apart from the unsuccessful 
application for property finance, the business did not seem to be aware of the 
problem or to have solicited the bank’s support in this respect.  
An optimistic conclusion on this review would be that, at best, the relationship 
expected in Hypothesis H12 is not automatic, and that there is some variance in 
the way it applies to individual enterprises. A more pessimistic interpretation 
would be that financial constraints frequently do affect firms that would not 
deserve them, while other businesses, in spite of their low quality, are able to 
experience lower levels of constraints – however, the responsibility for this status 
quo cannot be primarily attributed to misjudgements by the bank, and the 
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examples available (CS1, CS5) suggest that the expected relationship may be 
restored after some time.  
To appreciate the probably exaggerated character of the deviations from the 
norm represented on Figure 24, it is useful to remember that, in collecting data 
for the case studies, a particular effort was made to target constrained firms, as it 
was feared that non- or low-constrained case studies would not deliver enough 
insights into the relevant issues.  
To shed yet more light on this result and restore a more representative picture, 
therefore, the analysis above needs to be complemented by a broader-based 
review. Section 6.2 focuses on the relationship between creditworthiness and use 
of finance in the balance sheet sample.  
6.2 – Creditworthiness and access to finance 
H13: Creditworthiness is positively related to use of bank finance, except for the 
most creditworthy firms, where lack of need is likely to cause a low utilisation of 
bank finance. 
Test: In the balance sheet sample, the least creditworthy and the most 
creditworthy firms have a lower use of bank debt than the firms in the middle 
range of creditworthiness.  
Reviewing the relationship between creditworthiness and the use of finance 
presents various caveats:  
• The sample’s bias and small size, causing a small number of observations 
in the poorer categories;  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Chapter IV. The creditworthiness hypothesis Page 188 
• The possible divergence between use of and access to finance, with only 
the former being visible from the financial statements41;  
• The time mismatch, with our creditworthiness assessment sometimes 
occurring several years after bank facilities were granted. 
Nevertheless, Table 57, which shows the frequency of utilisation of various types 
of finance in each creditworthiness category, does provide valuable insights to 
triangulate the results from Section 6.1. 
Table 57 – Proportion having accessed bank funds, in each category 
Category 
Instalment 
sale  
Bank 
overdraft 
Term  
loan 
Sample 
size 
Cruising 50% 39-50% 22% 17 
Uncertain 55% 40-50% 20-25% 20 
Limping 64% 91% 9-18% 10 
Creeping 0% 40% 0% 6 
Drowning or distressed 45% 55-64% 8% 12 
Total  49% 51-58% 15-18%  65 
Note: Drowning and distressed firms have been analysed jointly owing to the small 
sample sizes.  
The table suggests that the relationship between creditworthiness and use of 
finance depends on the type of facility considered.  
The use of term loans appears to be positively related to creditworthiness; there 
is only one example of a term loan among the least creditworthy categories, viz. 
the furniture business CS1 (distressed). It is possible, however, that more 
examples similar to CS1 would have been uncovered if the sample was not 
biased. It is also possible that the relationship suggests an opposite causality, 
namely that long-term finance helps firms to strengthen their financial structure. 
                                                 
41  For example, the existence of minor negative cash amounts in a balance sheet can hint at a 
low utilisation of an overdraft facility, or at an occasional unauthorised overdraft, while the 
absence of such amounts can mean an absence of the facility or the existence of a facility that 
is not used. A review of interest charges and cash balances helped to apply best judgment, but 
when no clear conclusion could be reached, firms were classified as a possible case of 
overdraft, leading to low and high estimates of the numbers of firms with overdraft. The same 
approach was used for term loans. 
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Subject to these limitations, the data on term loans support the hypothesis that 
banks are careful to discern the most deserving firms when attributing their 
riskiest loans.  
The use of bank overdrafts and instalment sales follow a different pattern, with 
three noteworthy facts.  
(1) The expectation that the most creditworthy firms would (owing to their 
more limited needs) have a below-average use of bank finance is not 
confirmed by data. Subject to the average being distorted by the sample’s 
bias, its similarity with the values for cruising firms hints at the ability of 
supply factors to override demand at the top end of the SMME spectrum. 
This echoes the experience made by tourism business CS5 which, 
although reluctant to apply for a bank overdraft, eventually accepted its 
bank’s repeated offers, even though the amount was higher than what the 
owner would have desired. 
(2) In the middle range of creditworthiness, limping firms are highly 
dependent on these forms of finance, while creeping firms use them 
significantly less. The explanation arguably lies on the demand side, as 
the need for these facilities depends on the firm’s own resources as well 
as the buoyancy of business activity. It is also possible that the higher 
risk rating of limping firms makes them more dependent on overdraft and 
instalment sales, as banks would find it too risky to grant them term 
loans.  
(3) In addition, the use of overdraft and instalment debt in drowning and 
distressed firms is close to average. Here, supply-side considerations are 
likely to be predominant, illustrating banks’ relative success in limiting 
uncreditworthy firms’ access to finance. Nevertheless, approximately half 
of the drowning or distressed firms do hold bank funds on their balance 
sheets. 
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Overall, this review suggests that banks are relatively able to discern 
creditworthiness when awarding long-term loans, while the granting of less risky 
types of facilities such as instalment sales and overdrafts is more strongly 
determined by demand factors. Limping firms, in spite of their risks, benefit 
most from bank facilities. Misjudgements on creditworthiness do however take 
place, leading to distress of debt-stricken firms.  
Section 7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the creditworthiness factor as a 
potential reason for SMMEs’ financial constraints. A creditworthiness model 
was thus developed, tested and applied. This model focuses specifically on the 
long-term viability of SMMEs by distinguishing between fundamental and 
financial weaknesses, with it being possible to cure the latter with appropriate 
financial services. The model was used to classify the 66 firms from the balance 
sheet sample as cruising, uncertain, creeping (if they are currently financially 
sound but fundamentally not successful), limping (if their fundamentals are 
sound but their financial structure is shaky), drowning or distressed.  
Applying the model to our sample created a first set of ratio values for South 
African SMMEs, which can be used as reference in future research. These ratios 
were also, where possible, compared to existing international statistics, showing 
that the businesses in our sample were not generally of poorer quality than 
European firms. The synthesis of ratios shows relatively good ratings, with the 
bulk (56%) of our sample being classified as either cruising or uncertain, while 
only 18% are in the two least creditworthy categories. However, this is unlikely 
to reflect the whole South African SMME population: indeed, we found some 
evidence that creditworthiness is positively related to accounting transparency, 
which means that the balance sheet sample is probably biased towards more 
creditworthy SMMEs.  
The creditworthiness model also yielded a testable implication on the likely 
evolution of limping as opposed to creeping firms. The expectation was that 
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firms with good fundamentals but a weak financial structure (limping) would be 
more likely to recover and become successful ventures, than firms with poor 
fundamentals but a strong initial financial structure (creeping). The dynamic 
review of case studies, especially CS1 and CS5, offered substantial support for 
the predictions of our theory. 
We also find that the level of financial constraints on the one hand and the use of 
bank finance on the other hand are only weakly related to creditworthiness. The 
relationship is most visible in the use of long-term loans, where South African 
banks seem to be successful in screening good debtors. By contrast, overdraft 
and asset finance would appear to be granted according to a more complex 
model: in the high-creditworthiness segment, where the need for bank finance is 
presumed to be low, supply factors seem to override demand, supporting the 
maxim that banks prefer to grant finance to those which need it least. In the 
middle range, though, demand factors would appear to be more decisive, 
explaining the high use of bank debt in limping firms, compared to the low use 
in creeping firms. As to the least creditworthy enterprises, granting of bank 
facilities is substantial, probably owing to a strong demand, but not higher than 
average, hinting at some ability of banks to limit their exposure to bad accounts. 
These interpretations remain speculative and would need to be tested by 
additional research.  
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Section 1. Financial constraints, market 
dysfunction and insufficient creditworthiness:  
Connections between the constructs 
The research objectives on page 9 proposed the following agenda:  
1) exploring the main aspects of financial constraints among South 
African urban SMMEs,  
2) assessing the informational opacity of SMMEs and its possible effect 
on access to finance, and  
3) examining SMMEs’ financial profile to identify possible evidence of 
poor creditworthiness and its impact on access to finance.  
Accordingly, the last three chapters have explored in some depth SMMEs’ 
financial constraints as well as tentative explanations for them: accounting 
opacity (as a factor of market dysfunction) and lack of creditworthiness.  
This investigation, which in several respects was venturing into new areas, 
has gone to some length to avoid the excessive simplifications and 
amalgamations found in the socio-political debate. Nuanced concepts have 
been defined and their various dimensions laid out. Original models have 
been designed to measure empirically the relevance of these concepts. 
Furthermore, a database of financial statements of micro, very small, small 
and medium formal enterprises from the Cape Town area has been 
established, which, in spite of its weaknesses, is believed to be unique in its 
kind on the African continent.  
The developed concepts and evaluation models were applied to this 
database, in order to test a number of hypotheses, with varied success. 
Figure 25 illustrates the hypotheses that were tested and the resulting 
findings. Rather than reviewing the thirteen hypotheses, one by one, the 
next sections concentrate on those which produced clear evidence.  
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Figure 25 – Overview of hypotheses tested 
 
The Prevalence, Types and Severity of Financial Constraints  
 
 H1. Almost all SMMEs experience 
some kind of financial constraint. 
No (corroborative counter-evidence). 
 
H2. The most prevalent constraint is 
the liquidity shortage. 
H3. Liquidity shortages in SMMEs are 
often severe. 
No (possibly biased counter-evidence): 
Investment constraints and liquidity 
constraints are roughly equivalent 
Yes (clear support, in spite of bias) 
Tentative Explanation: Insufficient Creditworthiness Tentative Explanation: Market Dysfunction,  
especially Accounting Opacity 
H4. SMME accounting is opaque. 
H5+6.Accounting opacity is 
aggravated by the lack of 
resources and by informality 
H7.Accounting opacity is 
aggravated by opportunism. 
H8.Accounting opacity hinders the 
access to bank debt.  
Yes (clear support, 
in spite of bias) 
Yes (weak support) 
Yes (clear support) 
Mixed (clear support 
for quantity, but 
counter-evidence for 
quality) 
Yes (clear support) 
H9 (mod). Informality causes 
financial constraints. 
H10: SA’s SMMEs are of poorer 
quality than international SMMEs, 
notably in respect of their equity 
ratios. 
H11: When supported, a firm with 
good fundamentals can recover 
from lack of equity or liquidity  
H12: Creditworthiness is negatively 
related to the level of financial 
constraints 
H13: Creditworthiness is positively 
related to the use of bank finance 
(except at top-end) 
No (possibly biased 
counter-evidence) 
Yes (clear support) 
No (weak counter-
evidence) 
Mixed (support for 
long-term loans, but 
more complex 
relationships for other 
types of finance) 
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1.1 – Financing constraints 
On financing constraints, there was unambiguous evidence, verbalised by 
the business owners themselves, that a substantial portion of SMMEs were 
non-constrained. According to the data, that proportion was estimated at 
between 20% and 40%. Three remarks can help to establish whether this 
finding is biased. On one hand, the apparent correlation between accounting 
transparency and financial soundness suggests that the quality of the 
sample’s SMMEs is above the average, causing a risk of over-estimation of 
the proportion of unconstrained firms. On the other hand, modest retail 
enterprises, which form a great part of the SMME population and are likely 
to operate under low constraints due to their typically low growth, are 
underrepresented in our sample: this effect may balance the possible over-
estimation of non-constrained firms. In addition, the difficulties encountered 
when seeking case study candidates that were effectively constrained de 
facto support the assumption that many enterprises in the formal economy 
are unconstrained. These remarks imply that the 20% to 40% of non-
constrained firms may be too low, rather than too high an estimate.  
This result indicates that financial constraints, no matter how hotly debated, 
are not the key obstacle to survival of the hundreds of thousands of South 
African formal business owners. They remain, however, an essential growth 
limitation for the more entrepreneurial and innovative business ventures. 
Since these ventures are deemed to have the greatest potential contribution 
to economic growth, employment and national investment, research on 
financial constraints remains highly relevant.  
On the types and severity of financial constraints, the methodology adopted 
suggested that investment constraints were approximately as frequent as 
liquidity constraints, but that cash shortages usually had more severe effects 
on the businesses. Some evidence was presented, though, to suggest that the 
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two types were occasionally linked, when a business made up for the lack of 
long-term funds by using short-term resources to invest in fixed assets.  
This indicated a gap in the market in providing SMMEs with financing 
solutions to cover their long-term needs: while the acquisition of some types 
of assets, particularly vehicles and computer equipment, could easily be 
supported by instalment sale facilities, there seemed to be a need for similar 
standardised, easy-to-use solutions to finance industrial property or 
specialised equipment. Short-term debt, of course, was frequently available 
by means of overdraft facilities, but there were indications that such 
facilities did not always fulfil their purposes, as liquidity constraints 
persisted in spite of these facilities.  
1.2 – Accounting opacity 
In a first attempt to explain financial constraints, the functions and 
dysfunction of financial markets were reviewed, with a particular emphasis 
on the exchange of accounting information.  
The financial statements produced by SMMEs were analysed in an 
uncompromising way, and assessed in terms of their ability to provide 
faithful and useful insights on the operations and financial status of the 
business. The results varied from one business to the next, but in general the 
information produced was found to be insufficient in quantity and in formal 
quality, often in contravention of legal requirements for close corporations 
or companies. More worrying yet, there were a number of instances where 
intrinsic data found in the financial statements were fraught with 
inconsistencies or failed to make sense considering the firm’s activity and 
characteristics. In some of the more inconsistent cases, business owners 
were suspected to have intervened in the accounts to get them to convey a 
particular picture of their business.  
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On the reasons for accounting opacity, it was difficult to find clear support 
for the theories of lack of resources and informality, due to the wide 
variance observed and the small number of data points available to test for 
this possibility. Conversely, the data strongly supported the opportunistic 
accounting hypothesis, especially the expectation that firms that were or had 
been applying for finance were more likely to manipulate their accounts and 
have a high number of inconsistencies in their financial statements.  
The effect of accounting opacity on access to finance was not as expected. 
Against expectations, the data showed a more limited, rather than better, 
access to finance for the more transparent enterprises. A further test, done to 
interrogate this counter-intuitive result, yielded a substantially better access 
to bank debt for those firms that produced a large quantity of accounting 
information, regardless of quality. Bank file and interview data were used to 
triangulate this evidence and yielded a strong, albeit sad, interpretation of 
these results. Subject to representativeness of the data, South African banks 
appear to create a double incentive on their SMME clients, namely the 
incentive to maximise the quantity of accounting information computed, 
while distorting this accounting information as needed to convey the desired 
view. The fact that the bank does not ask for auditors’ reports and does not 
seem to compare different versions of financial statements, de facto allows 
abuses by unscrupulous accountants and business owners, occasionally at 
great cost for the bank.  
There was more obvious support of the link between informality (defined as 
the failure to implement basic financial management practices) and financial 
constraints. But while this test was conceived as an alternative approach of 
the accounting opacity hypothesis, with informality used as a proxy for 
accounting opacity, the positive result may reveal a spurious effect in the 
sense that more formal firms are better managed and therefore less prone to 
financial constraints, regardless of market mechanisms.  
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1.3 – Creditworthiness 
The second broad tentative explanation for financial constraints was the lack 
of creditworthiness in South African SMMEs. Again, the financial 
statements collected, after being adjusted to improve their reliability, were 
subjected to in-depth analysis in order to generate ratios on a number of 
aspects that had been identified as relevant for a creditworthiness 
assessment. According to sets of thresholds defined with the support of 
international literature, the ratios obtained were classified as acceptable, 
poor or very poor, following which each firm in the sample was allocated to 
a creditworthiness category, depending on the number of poor or very poor 
scores.  
A first patent result of this process was the finding that the enterprises 
assessed were not usually of poor quality compared to international data. 
Their equity ratios, in particular, which had been expected to be low owing 
to the lack of resources available for investment of most South African 
entrepreneurs, were found to be in line with European norms. Financial 
fragility, measured by the inverse interest coverage, was also found to be 
substantially better in our sample than in a roughly comparable Italian 
sample. The main area in which the SMMEs in our sample appeared to face 
stronger difficulties was their working capital cycles, with larger 
proportions of firms having either no access to supplier credit, or 
considerably long trade debt periods, raising the risk of bad debt and chain 
reactions. This latter finding, though, may have been distorted by 
accounting opacity.  
Again, the suspicion of a sample bias must be raised, since creditworthiness 
appeared to be positively related to accounting transparency. Conversely, as 
discussed in Section 1.1, the sample strongly under-represented the 
multitude of modest neighbourhood retail enterprises, which, in spite of 
their rudimentary accounting, are likely to present few creditworthiness 
problems, so that the bias discussion cannot be unambiguously resolved.  
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The acceptable equity ratios of South African SMMEs raise two more 
observations. Firstly, the international comparison had to be limited to the 
small and medium enterprises, as the micro and very small enterprises, 
which form the bulk of South African SMMEs, are more marginal in 
developed economies and as there are no widely available ratio data on 
them. The equity ratios of those micro and very small enterprises were, in 
our sample, significantly higher than those of small and medium enterprises, 
illustrating their apparently better creditworthiness (ceteris paribus). 
However, and this is the second observation, higher equity ratios could also 
be interpreted as proof of their more limited access to debt, and it could well 
be that the reason for their particular difficulty lies in their insufficient size, 
which raises transaction cost problems (see below). This would be a 
different interpretation of the insufficient levels of capital of South African 
SMMEs, not in terms of equity ratio and creditworthiness, but in terms of 
affordability of a business size sufficient to act as a credible player on the 
credit market.  
Coming back to our creditworthiness model, the enterprises were classified 
into six categories, depending on their scores in fundamental and financial 
types of weaknesses. The expectation was raised that, when adequately 
supported, firms with sound fundamentals but a weak financial structure 
(‘limping’) were more likely to succeed in the long run than firms with a 
strong financial backbone but poor fundamentals (‘creeping’). A 
comparative dynamic review of furniture case study CS1 and tourism case 
study CS5 strongly supported this hypothesis, with CS1’s creditworthiness 
degrading from a ‘creeping’ verdict to liquidation, while CS5’s score 
improved from ‘limping’ to the best category, viz. that of ‘cruising’ firms.  
The study of the link between creditworthiness and financial constraints 
yielded, once more, ambiguous results. The review of case studies found a 
number of deviations from the expected relationship, with two firms (CS1 in 
1999 and CS2) experiencing low levels of constraints compared to their 
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poor fundamental quality, while two other firms (CS5 and CS6) suffered 
from rather severe liquidity constraints considering their relatively good 
creditworthiness scores. These cases provided palpable evidence of the 
occasional divergence between a firm’s merit and its financial comfort, but 
the contextual details exposed indicate that, with the exception of CS1, 
banks were not usually to blame for this discrepancy.  
The relationship between creditworthiness and use of finance yielded 
interesting thoughts about the interaction of supply and demand factors at 
various levels. For long-term loans, South African banks seemed able to 
screen out risky debtors and grant their facilities to the most deserving ones 
– with CS1 representing a notable exception. For other types of facilities, 
demand and supply naturally follow opposite curves: demand is highest and 
supply is likely to be the most parsimonious in the least creditworthy firms 
and vice-versa. In the equilibrium, banks appeared able to ‘create their 
demand’ in the most creditworthy segment and to contain the demand 
coming from poor quality SMMEs, while in the middle range, they 
generally followed demand patterns. These reflections would need to be 
tested in further research.  
1.4 – A subtle balance of multiple factors 
Overall, neither the accounting opacity hypothesis, nor the creditworthiness 
hypothesis, is strongly supported by the evidence presented. The ambiguity 
of empirical results probably reflects the fact that granting bank debt, and 
thus resolving financial constraints, is a process that obeys multiple criteria 
and factors. Creditworthiness is one of them, as is the (perceived) quality 
(which includes quantity) of the information delivered by the business to its 
bank. Undoubtedly, there are other relevant aspects, such as the 
entrepreneur’s personal skill in approaching his/her bank, the existence of 
network effects, the securities offered, or the amount of debt required and its 
sufficiency or insufficiency in a transaction cost perspective. Some of those 
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aspects, although peripheral to this thesis, have been analysed and have 
yielded relatively strong results, especially in the area of term loans (see 
Chapter III Section 8 and Annexures 24 to 29).  
Another factor, which is less evident a priori but whose relevance is 
strongly suggested by case study data, is the frequent ambiguity of 
entrepreneurs’ demand for finance, with entrepreneurs lamenting the lack of 
liquidity but reluctant to accept their bank’s offer of an overdraft facility. 
Debt aversion, the lacking self-consciousness of entrepreneurs and maybe 
excessive perceived costs inhibit the process of transforming a confused 
need into a formal, well-prepared application for finance, which a bank can 
formally accept or reject. Although cases of self-rationing are often rooted 
in a perception of low chances of success, they also involve other processes. 
Under these circumstances, a relationship between a phenomenon like 
financial constraints and each of its factors can only be imperfect.  
 
Section 2. Implications and recommendations 
2.1 – Financial constraints: General implications  
This thesis has addressed the controversy on the role of SMME finance (see 
p.2), with some groups lamenting the lack of support by financial 
institutions, and others incriminating small business owners and their poor 
management. The necessary conclusion flowing from this research is that 
both approaches need to be combined.  
The finding, flowing from Chapter II, that the financial constraints 
experienced differ in varying parts of the SMME population implies that a 
form of solidarity between SMMEs can be of some benefit, as businesses 
can learn from each other’s strengths and weaknesses. The literature has 
suggested that SMME networks often have positive effects, even in sectors 
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where co-operation is difficult, such as retail (see, for example, Janszen & 
Masurel 1998, Parker et al 2003).  
Next, the mismatch between the types of needs and the types of facilities 
accessed (as touched upon in Chapter II and more exhaustively in the case 
studies) implies that it is necessary to improve the accessibility of some 
currently non-standard types of term finance for small enterprises, including 
industrial property finance. Banks may also need to invest resources into 
counselling their clients as to the best facilities to suit their needs. While 
such counselling does already take place in some branches, case study 
evidence shows that in other areas, counselling is limited and there tends to 
be an “overdrafts-suit-all-purposes” mentality – this is not conducive to 
good SMME development.  
2.2 – Implications of accounting opacity 
Chapter III has shown that accounting opacity is a true problem, even if its 
effect on access to finance was not confirmed empirically. In fact, South 
Africa has a sophisticated legal framework to ensure sound accounting 
practices within registered corporations (which represent the majority of 
formal businesses), but this framework does not reach its purpose of creditor 
protection, not least because the creditors themselves (i.e. the banks) fail to 
make it work. The implications discussed in this section, hence, may not 
have a direct effect on lessening financial constraints, but would nonetheless 
probably enhance the smooth functioning of capital markets. 
The study has revealed the two most relevant factors for accounting opacity: 
the informality of financial management and the existence of motives for 
manipulation, especially on loan applications. The following levers appear 
likely to reduce accounting opacity: 
• Banks could revise their use of accounting information. While it is 
understandable that they need frequent and timely reports on their 
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clients’ operations, such short-term information could remain 
rudimentary (in the form of key figures rather than full financial 
statements, which are costly for a small business); in contrast, annual 
statements should be requested yearly, bear a professional 
validation, and be used seriously to verify the credibility of interim 
reports. To the extent that such validation occurs only on a yearly 
rather than monthly basis, and relies on existing legal mechanisms, 
this practice might even reduce the banks’ internal costs, while better 
serving their interests than the current practice.  
• Government institutions should enforce more strictly the legal 
framework, with its requirement for professionally validated 
accounts. When the South African Revenue Service (SARS) allows 
SMMEs to file unaudited draft financials, and does not subsequently 
request a final audited version42, a message is sent to entrepreneurs 
that audits may not be worthwhile after all. The burden and risks of a 
stricter implementation of the legal framework should here be 
weighed against the benefits of an adequacy between legal theory 
and practice.  
In addition, the thesis’ findings are generally supportive of the following 
types of interventions: 
• Offering or enhancing mentoring programmes as well as low-cost 
training, including public subventions to private providers, is liekly 
to have a positive effect on the financial practices on small 
businesses.  
• Options to reduce the cost of qualified accounting officers to the 
smaller enterprises could be helpful. Examples can be a double 
deductibility of accountants’ fees or a bolder ‘community service 
                                                 
42 See interview evidence presented in Annexure 16. 
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year’ for willing accounting students in the same spirit as currently 
practised in the medical profession; 
• Awareness campaigns, targeting both entrepreneurs and lenders, 
could convince them of the potential usefulness of accounting and 
the importance of reports by auditors and accounting officers. 
The financial literacy objectives of the Financial Sector Charter (2003:13) 
provide a good framework for organisations to become involved in some of 
the areas mentioned above.  
2.3 – Creditworthiness: General implications  
The majority of the firms in the sample were not particularly 
uncreditworthy. Banks should therefore be careful when using the argument 
of poor quality of South African firms, which may not be the actual reason 
for their financial constraints.  
However, SMMEs do tend to suffer from various weaknesses which may be 
tackled by appropriate training or mentorship efforts. In particular, there 
appeared to be a need for creating awareness among business owners of the 
following issues: 
• When a business is not selling enough to cover its operating costs, 
increasing the overdraft will not resolve the problem. Growing 
turnover by investing more and more into fixed assets will not do so 
either, since it is likely that ancillary costs will increase faster than 
sales, thus aggravating the deficit in spite of the growth; 
• Capital retention (i.e. accumulation of profits) is important because it 
strengthens a business and helps it to face unfavourable 
developments; profit retention is especially important in businesses 
planning to grow, as they must be able to afford more debt; 
• It is important to maintain cash reserves, especially in firms whose 
business is cyclical or seasonal – this implies that it is preferable to 
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use medium-term debt instruments (such as instalment sales) to 
acquire fixed assets, as diverting liquidity into fixed assets may 
prove irreversible when the cycle turns unfavourable;  
• Perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to mentor and train 
business owners and their staff on ways to optimise their working 
capital by managing debtors more efficiently and taking precautions 
against bad debt; they should acknowledge that debtor protection is a 
process that takes time and requires resources, but it can be critical 
to a firm’s survival; they should also better appreciate the risks of 
over-stretching supplier credit.  
On banks’ reaction to creditworthiness, the findings are too meagre to 
generate recommendations, but the example of CS1 suggests that banks 
should guard against overloading start-ups with debt that will create an 
excessive interest burden – and when they do grant start-up facilities, they 
should ensure – within the limits of practicability – that their close 
monitoring policy is enforced, so that they are able to act swiftly when the 
business appears unable to reach its objectives.  
 
Section 3. Limitations, main contribution and 
need for further research 
Being exploratory in nature, this research presented various weaknesses and 
limitations. It also left a number of issues unresolved and its usefulness 
resided mainly in preparing the ground for future research.  
3.1 – Limitations 
The main limitations of the research were the following: 
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The data used were heterogeneous and presented quality problems; in spite 
of the efforts made to mitigate the poor data quality, some residual 
uncertainty could not be suppressed. 
The study methods employed, especially the case study and survey methods, 
created an external validity problem (van der Stede et al, 2005; Cooper and 
Morgan 2008), which was partly mitigated by a multiple-method design. 
Even then, the question of bias could not be resolved entirely. It may be 
useful at this stage to repeat that this study sought to investigate formal 
enterprises, with formality being practically defined by the existence of 
financial statements. It may therefore be argued that the bulk of SMMEs 
that were not represented in the sample because of their failure to provide 
financial statements, belong to the informal sector and therefore could not 
and should not have been included in the study. It is likely, though, that the 
balance sheet sample, which privileged firms with an over-average quality 
of accounting, was biased towards better-managed firms. Nevertheless, it 
was not entirely clear whether such bias was compensated by the under-
representation of small neighbourhood retail businesses.   
On the conceptual side, the thesis used elaborate constructs, such as the 
accounting transparency score or the creditworthiness score, whose 
measurement was complex and time-consuming. On one hand, the 
sophistication of these indicators was necessary to do justice to the 
complexity of the phenomena. On the other hand, however, this 
sophistication constitutes a weakness in two respects. Firstly, these 
indicators could not be expected to reflect actual practices by small business 
practitioners, especially banks. Thus, empirical attempts to link these 
concepts to practical realities such as the access to finance, could only lead 
to an imperfect match. Secondly, the complexity of the models developed 
may restrict their usability in further research. However, the modular 
structure of the scoring tools makes it possible to use parts of them as may 
be required in different research projects.  
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Perhaps a more fundamental flaw of the research was the fact that the bulk 
of the data used (i.e. the balance sheet sample) did not allow for an 
assessment of financial constraints as defined. Use of bank finance could be 
measured, but this would not suffice to identify financial constraints 
unambiguously. As a result, all relationships, which formed the conceptual 
fundament of the research, were difficult to establish. Triangulation was 
used to mitigate this weakness.  
3.2 – Main contributions 
This research has contributed to increasing the body of knowledge on 
SMME finance in South Africa; in addition, it has developed methods that 
can be useful in future research.  
Empirical knowledge of South African SMMEs was improved through the 
production of first empirical evidence on a number of issues, which will 
serve as benchmarks to be tested by further research: 
• an estimation of the proportion of unconstrained SMMEs in South 
Africa; 
• an empirical assessment of the extent of accounting opacity among 
South African SMMEs, which identifies particularly problematic 
aspects;  
• a list of financial ratios of SMMEs corresponding to different 
qualitative profiles, and their comparison to international evidence. 
• In addition, the case study narratives (Annexures 31-36) provide rich 
qualitative and quantitative data that can be used for further 
grounded theory-building (for example in the area of the demand for 
finance). The narrative for township enterprises CS4a and CS4b 
(Annexure 34) represents one of few detailed documents on African 
semi-formal micro-enterprises and the specific approach that their 
survivalist owners have to business and to finance.  
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Moreover, the understanding of SMMEs’ financial constraints was 
improved by the following insights: 
• Lack of accounting data causes difficulties in accessing finance, but 
in South Africa, poor data quality does not impede access to credit; 
• The relationship between creditworthiness and financial constraints 
is weak, so that poor financial soundness of enterprises cannot be 
deemed to be the main factor for financial constraints; 
• According to the findings in Annexures 24-29, transaction costs and 
the unavailability of collateral truly hinder access to term loans for 
some of the smallest enterprises and constitute a case of market 
dysfunction; this is less evident for the access to overdraft facilities. 
In addition to these contributions to knowledge, the thesis has developed 
concepts and methods, which can be useful to future research. This includes: 
• the development of a framework for the conceptualisation of 
financial constraints and their typology, in a way that strictly 
distinguishes between the phenomenon and its roots: such distinction 
was hitherto lacking in the South African literature; 
• a conceptualisation of the phenomenon of accounting opacity in its 
four dimensions, and the development of a comprehensive empirical 
tool to measure the reliability of SMME financial statements; 
• the design of a creditworthiness model which uses financial ratio 
methodology to classify SMMEs into categories, distinguishing 
between fundamental and financial difficulties. While such models 
existed beforehand, this one presents the advantages of being 
tailored to SMMEs (for example in the way it treats members’ loans) 
and of tackling reporting weaknesses in the very definition of ratio 
formulas. 
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The methods developed are especially tuned for use in contexts with weak 
data availability, and are therefore particularly valuable to researchers 
investigating financial constraints in other developing countries.  
3.3 – Need for further research 
3.3.1 – Replicating to enlarge the statistical basis and update 
All tentative conclusions presented in this research were based on a fairly 
small number of observations, for concepts which – as emphasised 
repeatedly throughout the thesis – are prone to individual variations. For this 
reason alone, any replication of all or part of the research on different 
enterprises would help in multiplying the data points and testing the 
statistical significance of the tendencies observed, as well as exploring 
richer interpretations.  
In particular, the question of bias needs to be interrogated further. Field data 
collection focused on the bulk of small enterprises, e.g. the neighbourhood 
retail businesses, would help to clarify the accounting opacity, 
creditworthiness and link of both these constructs to financial constraints 
that prevail in this essential segment of the small business economy.  
Furthermore, updating the findings by using recent data would potentially 
bring insights on possible improvements since the beginning of the decade, 
which is the period of reference of most of the data presented here.  
3.3.2 – Further research into accounting opacity 
Accounting opacity remains an area that raises many questions.  
Firstly, it is intriguing to understand more precisely how (and how often) 
aberrations like the ones that have been described in Chapter III and in the 
annexures arise. This would require working closely with accounting 
professionals of several SMMEs (including the less competent ones). The 
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purposes would be to understand the extreme disparities from one firm to 
the next in the process of establishing financial statements, and to establish 
the role of incompetence as opposed to opportunism. This is extremely 
challenging research, aiming at shedding light on the invisible, i.e. 
establishing rigorous audit-like procedures in entities that are largely 
informal, and seeking explanations for probably largely haphazard 
phenomena. Such research would have to be run in multiple case studies and 
would be relatively resource-intensive, but would potentially deliver 
fascinating insights on accounting opacity.  
Secondly, there is a need to interrogate further the link between accounting 
opacity and access to credit, as the finding made in this research (that the 
quantity, rather than the quality, of accounting information is relevant in 
opening SMMEs access to credit), would need to be corroborated by more 
systematic data-gathering. Here the purpose would be to study more closely 
the way banks request and utilise accounting information. The data should 
be based on a representative sample of South African banks and, within 
each bank, the different hierarchical levels of involvement in the credit 
decision (local branch, head office, credit control department).  
Thirdly, if accounting opacity is primarily a matter of imbalance between 
the legal requirements and their (financial, time-related and human) costs, 
researchers must engage with the question of the appropriateness of revising 
the accounting requirements for the smallest of businesses, much in the 
spirit of Friedlob & Plewa’s works (1992).  
3.3.3 – Market dysfunction  
Since the relevance of transaction costs has been established for term loans, 
it would be worth investigating more closely the nature of the costs 
involved. Again, in-depth case studies of the work processes and cost 
structure of various banks could help shed light on these aspects and 
possibly identify levers to reduce these costs and mitigate the problem.  
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The relevance, effects and problems of information substitutes would also 
need to be researched in greater depth. A more systematic collection and 
analysis of data on credit records, networks and relationship banking could 
corroborate the insights of this thesis. Collateral would also deserve 
additional and deeper investigations to shed light on its multiple functions, 
to understand the way in which banks determine their quantitative 
requirements and to examine the possible discriminatory effects of its use in 
the South African context.  
3.3.4 – Deeper-going investigations of creditworthiness 
Additional creditworthiness research would greatly enhance the usefulness 
and usability of the present research. Especially desirable is any research 
which would have the effect of increasing the availability of ratios as 
references for various segments of SMMEs, both in South Africa and 
abroad, including other African countries. Basing novel analyses on existing 
enterprise databases, whether from credit bureaus or even the SARS, would 
greatly reduce the cost of data collection. Although accounting opacity 
would have to be dealt with appropriately, the use of such databases would 
enhance the potential for more wide-scale and differentiated analyses, e.g. 
grouping enterprises by industry, size class or other profile criteria.  
3.3.5 – Exploration of the demand for finance function 
Lastly, the present study has created awareness on the need for research on a 
hitherto unexamined issue: the ambiguity of SMMEs’ demand for finance. 
The phenomenon of self-rationing appears to play a role in small firms’ 
financial constraints, and it would be most useful to understand more 
precisely whether the dominant issues relate to debt aversion, transaction 
costs linked to credit applications, low perceived chances of success, or any 
other reason.  
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Annexure 1 – Small business thresholds 
Sector or sub-sectors in 
accordance with the 
Standard Industrial 
Classification 
Size class 
Total full-
time 
equivalent of 
paid 
employees 
Less than: 
Total annual 
turnover 
 
Less than: 
Total gross asset 
value (fixed 
property 
excluded) 
Less than: 
Agriculture Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
100 
50 
10 
5 
R 5.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.50 m 
R 0.20 m  
R 5.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.50 m 
R 0.10 m 
Mining and Quarrying Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R39.00 m 
R 10.00 m 
R 4.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R23.00 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 2.00 m 
R 0.10 m 
Manufacturing Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R51.00 m 
R13.00 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R19.00 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 2.00 m 
R 0.10 m 
Electricity, Gas and Water  Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R51.00 m 
R13.00 m 
R 5.10 m 
R 0.20 m 
R19.00 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 1.90 m 
R 0.10 m 
Construction Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R26.00 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 1.00 m 
R 0.50 m 
R 0.10 m 
Retail and Motor Trade 
and Repair Services  
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R39.00 m 
R19.00 m 
R 4.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.60 m 
R 0.10 m 
Wholesale Trade, 
Commercial Agents and 
Allied Services 
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R64.00 m 
R32.00 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R 10.00 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 0.60 m 
R 0.10 m 
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Sector or sub-sectors in 
accordance with the 
Standard Industrial 
Classification 
Size class 
Total full-
time 
equivalent of 
paid 
employees 
Less than: 
Total annual 
turnover 
 
Less than: 
Total gross asset 
value (fixed 
property 
excluded) 
Less than: 
Catering, Accommodation 
and other Trade 
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R13.00 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 5.10 m 
R 0.2 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 1.00 m 
R 1.90 m 
R 0.10 m 
Transport, Storage and 
Communications 
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R 26.00 m 
R 13.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.60 m 
R 0.10 m 
Finance and Business 
Services 
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R 26.00 m 
R 13.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.20 m 
R 5.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.50 m 
R 0.10 m 
Community, Social and 
Personal Services 
Medium 
Small 
Very small 
Micro 
200 
50 
20 
5 
R13.00 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 1.00 m 
R 0.2 m 
R 6.00 m 
R 3.00 m 
R 0.60 m 
R 0.10 m 
Source: SCHEDULE to the National Small Business Act, as revised by the 
National Small Business Amendment Bill – March 2003 
 
This definition presents several technical pitfalls: 
• There is no rule on how to categorise an enterprise when the various 
indicators do not coincide;  
• It is not always easy to allocate each enterprise to one particular sector;  
• Staff statistics are often ambiguous, as SMMEs tend to work with 
flexible staff structures (non-remunerated contributions of family 
members, casual staff, etc). 
• This definition is not harmonised with the VAT tax threshold. 
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Annexure 2 – Comparison of South African and International SMME definitions 
Source  Maximum turnover Maximum staff Maximum assets Country 
/ Region 
 Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium 
European 
community 
 € 5 m  € 20 m    50 250   € 2 m  € 10 m  
Europe 
EuroStat       9 99 499      
Canadian 
Bankers 
Association 
       250000 $  
Canada 
Industry 
Canada 
    100 or 50 500    
Small Business 
Act (general)1 
R 0.15 m R 3 - 10 m  R 8-25 m 5 50 100-200 R 0.1 m  R 0.6 -2.5 m  R 2 - 7.5 m  South 
Africa Small Business 
Act (SA trade) 
R 0.15 m R 35 m R 70 m  5 50 100 R 0.1 m  R 6 m  R 12 m  
 
                                                 
1   The official South African definition is dependent on the industrial sector. Therefore, we distinguish here between ‘general’ SMMEs (all sectors except trade, 
agriculture and mining) and the trade SMMEs. Agricultural and mining enterprises are omitted here.  Un
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Annexure 3 – Profile of the GEM sample  
 
Number of years operating Number of firms % 
2 or less 36 16% 
2,5 to 5 48 22% 
5,5 to 9,5 78 35% 
10 and more 59 27% 
Total 221 100% 
Average age 7,6 Years 
Median age 5 Years 
 
 
Annual turnover number of firms % 
R 100 000 20 9% 
R 0,1 to 0,99 million 85 38% 
1 to 4,99 million 84 38% 
>= R 5 million 35 16% 
 224 100% 
Average turnover 2 420 902 Rand 
Median turnover 1 000 000 Years 
 
 
Number of employees Number of firms % 
<3 18 8% 
3 to 9 110 49% 
10 to 24 71 32% 
>=25 25 11% 
 224 100% 
Average staff 12 employees 
Median staff 8 Employees 
 
 
City Number of firms % 
Johannesburg 60 27% 
Cape Town 71 32% 
Durban 61 27% 
Port Elisabeth 32 14% 
Total 224 100% 
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Sector number of firms % 
Manufacturing 72 32% 
Construction 26 12% 
Wholesale, Retail and repairs, trade and service of 
motor vehicles, hotels and restaurants 
67 30% 
Transport, tourism and communication  6 3% 
IT, business services, financial services and 
engineering 
42 19% 
Community, Social and Personal Services 11 5% 
 224 100% 
 
 
Gender and race of respondent* number of firms % 
Male 185 83% 
Female 39 17% 
Black 83 37% 
Indian 65 29% 
Coloured 74 33% 
White  2 1% 
Total 224 100% 
* NB respondent is not necessarily the only or the main shareholder in the business 
 
 
Educational level of respondent number of firms % 
Has not completed school 37 17% 
Has only reached matric 57 25% 
Certificate or diploma 63 28% 
Qualified tradesman 28 13% 
Has a degree 39 17% 
 224 100% 
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Type of business registration number of firms % 
Sole Proprietor 27 12% 
Close Corporation  160 71% 
Private Company (Pty ltd) 33 15% 
Partnership 3 1% 
Other 1 0% 
Total 224 100% 
 
 
Profitability and Liquidity Number of firms % 
profitable in last 6 & 3 months 124 55% 
no profit in last 3 and 6 months 42 19% 
mixed 49 22% 
don't know 9 4% 
enough cash in last 6 months 147 66% 
not enough cash in last 6 months 77 34% 
breach of overdraft 77 34% 
no breach of overdraft 78 35% 
no overdraft 69 31% 
total 224 100% 
 
 
Mentorship experience number of firms % 
has not been mentored 178 79% 
has been mentored 46 21% 
 224 100% 
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Annexure 4 – Profile of the balance sheet sample  
 
SIC 
code 
Primary sector of activity 
number 
of firms 
% 
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and fishing  0   
 2. Mining and Quarrying 0  
 3. Manufacturing 14 22% 
30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 2  
31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 3  
32 Wood, straw, paper, printing, publishing 4  
33 Fuels, chemicals, rubber and plastic products 1  
34 Other non-metallic mineral products 1  
36 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1  
39 Furniture 2   
 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 0  
 5. Construction 3 5% 
 6. Trade; repairs; hotels  and restaurants 32 50% 
61 Wholesale, except of vehicles  5  
62 Retail, except of vehicles; repairs 13  
63 Sale and repair of vehicles; trade in fuel 4  
64 Hotels and restaurants 10   
 7. Transport, storage and communication 3 5% 
71-73 Land, water and air transport 2  
75 Post and telecommunications 1   
 8. 
Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and  
business services 9 14% 
85 Renting of machinery and of household goods 3  
86 Computer and related activities 2  
88 Other business activities 4   
 9. Community, social and personal services 3 5% 
93 Health and social work 1  
96 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 2  
10 other activities not adequately defined 0 0% 
  64 100% 
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Type of registration Number of firms in % of sample 
Pty Ltd 13 20% 
CC 44 69% 
Sole Proprietorship 6 9% 
Unclear 1 2% 
Total 64 100% 
 
 
Franchise or independent Number of firms in % of sample 
Franchise 12 19% 
independent 52 81% 
Total 64 100% 
 
 
Size category Number of firms in % of sample 
Micro 4 6% 
Very Small 29 45% 
Small 20 31% 
Medium 11 17% 
Total 64 100% 
 
 
Average size  
Average turnover R 3 188 241 
Median turnover R 1 717 508 
Average number of employees 12  
Median number of employees 7 
 
 
Race of owner(s) Number of firms in % of sample 
White 24 38% 
Coloured 12 19% 
Indian 16 25% 
African 2 3% 
Mixed 1 2% 
n/a 9 14% 
Total 64 100% 
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Annexure 5 – How business owners express (or do not 
express) their financial constraints 
Business 
code name 
Type of 
business 
Financial 
constraint 
expressed 
Statement about finance  
Wec01 
Catering and 
cleaning (black) 
yes 
“we find it difficult to get finance because of the 
company which has been at loss for first two 
years” 
Wec02 
sport supplies 
(coloured) 
Yes “I have been struggling to get finance”. 
Wec06 
HVAC retail 
(coloured) 
Yes 
“That’s hard to get, man. It took me years to 
obtain finance for my manufacturing projects, and 
the increase of my overdraft has not happened 
yet” 
Wec07 
Printing (mixed 
team) 
Mixed 
“We had the usual problems with banks which are 
reluctant to finance emerging businesses, but we 
found one that was willing to take us on”.  
“Financial houses were interested but we had to 
sign our lifes away”.  
Wec09 
Panelbeating 
(coloured) 
Yes 
“This is a very cash-tight business; I am loosing 
quality staff because I have problems paying 
them. I am struggling because I have been 
blacklisted”. 
Dir01 Catering (white) Yes “We are always worried at the end of the month”. 
Dir02 
printing 
(coloured) 
No 
“I was lucky, I have received start-up finance with 
a Khula guarantee, and later an equipment bond 
and an overdraft” 
Dir03 
Franchise 
restaurant 
(white) 
No 
“I had no serious financing problem. My partners 
started the business – I bought my share little by 
little”. 
CS1 
failed -  
furniture 
(white) 
Yes 
stated reason for the business’s failure: “working 
capital”  
CS2 
franchise 
restaurant 
(white) 
No “It is very easy to get finance” 
CS3 
safety wear 
(coloured) 
No 
“Generally we have no problems, we have a good 
standing with the bank”  
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 5 Page 242 
Business 
code name 
Type of 
business 
Financial 
constraint 
expressed 
Statement about finance  
CS4 a+b 
cleaning and 
other services 
(black) 
Yes 
“We’ve been to Khula, we’ve been to Khethani, 
Business Finance, even DTI you phone them 
asking for assistance, but they do not help you” 
CS5 
tourism 
(coloured) 
Yes 
Finance has been “an absolute problem”,  
“in fact, I have given up about finance”  
CS6 
packaging 
(white) 
Yes 
“Finance is very difficult, we have to work with 
sub-standard equipment, our vehicles need 
repairing, but the only people who give you 
money are those who want it for themselves”.  
ACS d 
Furniture 
(black) 
Yes  
“I have no money to buy equipment, but also, I do 
not want to borrow”. 
ACS e 
Security 
services (white) 
Mixed 
“At present I am self sufficient but I can’t grow 
without finance. This is going to be very difficult, 
because my value is my customer base, I have no 
assets” 
ACS f 
Leather 
manufacturing 
(coloured) 
Mixed 
“I started in the middle of last year; Sizanani 
approved my application, but it took more than 1 
year for Standard Bank to give the money”. 
ACS g Tourism (black) Yes 
“Yes, finance is a major problem; I need finance 
for my vehicles”.  
ACS h 
Security 
services (white) 
Yes 
“Getting the finance is difficult. Working capital 
is an issue. The problem also is that I do not have 
enough turnover” 
 
Sources: short interviews (telephonic or face-to-face), written statements, press 
(Wec07), and in the case of CS1, Liquidator’s report Un
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Annexure 6 – Profile of businesses with cash shortages  
and firms without financial constraints (GEM) 
Category 
Sample 
size 
cash-
constrained 
non-
constrained 
All businesses 224 34% 25% 
Number of years operating    
• 2 or less 36 36% 17% 
• 2,5 to 5 48 46% 40% 
• 5,5 to 9,5 78 31% 23% 
• 10 and more 59 31% 20% 
Annual Turnover    
• < 500 000 78 41% 12% 
• 0.5+ to 1.49 million 53 34% 19% 
• 1,5 to 2.99 37 41% 22% 
• >= 3 million 56 21% 50% 
Industry    
• Manufacturing 72 46% 18% 
• Construction 26 38% 27% 
• Wholesale, retail, vehicle trade, hotels 
and restaurants 
67 22% 31% 
• Transport, IT, business services, financial 
services and engineering 
48 23% 29% 
• Community, social and personal services 11 73% 0% 
Gender and Race of respondent    
• Male 185 35% 27% 
• female 39 33% 13% 
• Black 83 37% 17% 
• Coloured 74 36% 30% 
• Indian 65 29% 26% 
• White  2 0% 100% 
Experience being mentored    
• has been mentored 46 37% 13% 
• has not been mentored 178 34% 28% 
Source: GEM survey 2003 
‘cash-constrained’ refers to the proportion who say they have not had ‘enough cash to pay costs 
in last 6 months’; ‘non-constrained’ refers to the proportion who do not know what would 
change if they were granted the finance that they desire (or who answered that the question was 
not applicable).  
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Annexure 7 – Analysis of owners’ remuneration patterns 
Based on GEM data and case studies, the remuneration of the owner-manager 
was studied under the viewpoint of its regularity, which arguably indicates 
discipline and contributes to accounting transparency.   
Unfortunately, the case studies revealed issues with regard to data reliability, 
which were likely to also apply to the GEM survey. In particular, there were 
suspicions that CS1 might have overstated remuneration to prove his success, 
that CS2 may have omitted to mention some hidden remuneration, and that CS4 
had understated their salary to complain about the harsh conditions. The problem 
was particularly sensitive in CS1 and CS3’s provisional financials. 
 
To the extent that answers were correctly interpreted, the GEM data suggested 
that the number of businesses that pay their members a fixed salary every month 
(96 or 42.9% of the sample) is almost equal to those that don’t (it is not clear 
whether they do not pay member’s salaries at all, or whether they follow a more 
erratic remuneration pattern (91 or 40.6% of the sample). A small minority of 
firms (16.5%) responded by ‘sometimes’, possibly indicating different 
remuneration patterns for different members.  
The case studies showed that members’ remuneration was no static issue, but 
rather evolved following three different patterns:  
• There was strong evidence that owners of young businesses refrained 
from taking a salary altogether (notwithstanding possible hidden 
remuneration) in order to keep cash in the business. This corresponds to 
what Buchheim (1994) calls self-exploitation. Such evidence was found 
in CS1 (early years), CS2 and CS4. (For CS3 and CS6 data on the start-
up phase were unavailable). A variation of this is the reinvestment of 
salaries as member’s loan to the business (found in CS5, and consistent 
with Howorth (2001)). 
• The evolution of members’ salaries after these first few years followed 
one of the following three patterns: 
o Once the business started generating profits and cash flows, the 
members paid themselves a salary depending on the business’s 
performance (CS3, CS5 and CS6). For example, CS5 drew a fixed 
salary of R5 000 per month, complemented by a profit-linked 
bonus at year-end (resulting in a total remuneration of R102 500 
in 2003). The monthly salaries for CS3 and CS6 appeared to be in 
the same region (safe for the very high total in CS3’s provisional 
2004 statements, which appeared to be overstated in a context of 
loan application).  
o If the business failed to break even, the remuneration may remain 
inexistent (CS4, CS2), in which cases the durability of the 
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entrepreneurs’ involvement in the business was questionable.  
o Alternatively, moral hazard may cause the owner, after two years, 
to draw a high salary in spite of the firm’s poor performance. This 
was the case for CS1, which after the first 22 months drew a 
monthly salary of R20 000 for over a year, leading the business to 
bankruptcy.  
 
Next, GEM data were investigated to look for evidence of lower financial 
constraints among firms with more regular owner’s remuneration. A possible 
interpretation of such correlation, as suggested in the introduction of this 
Annexure, was the hypothesis that regular owner’s remuneration indicates 
discipline, hence better chances of being unconstrained. The results are shown in 
Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 – Tendency of GEM respondents to pay a regular member’s salary 
 
Sample 
size 
Average 
financial 
constraint 
level 
% not 
constrained 
% debt-
trapped 
% liquidity 
constrained 
or severely 
No fixed salary 128 1.68 10.2% 3.9% 48.4% 
Fixed salary 96 1.23 30.2% 4.2% 28.1% 
Total sample 224 1.49 18.8% 4.0% 39.7% 
 
The table makes it clear that firms which do not draw a fixed salary for their 
members are more likely to be financially constrained. They have a higher 
average financial constraint level, are less likely to be unconstrained, are more 
likely to be liquidity constrained.  
However, in addition to already mentioned data ambiguity, the link between 
remuneration patterns and financial constraint is subject to interpretation 
problems. Secondly, the direction of causality in a correlation between regular 
salary patterns and financial constraints is difficult to interpret: in fact, the 
affordability hypothesis (whereby non-constrained firms pay their owners a 
regular salary because they can afford it) seems more likely than the accounting 
opacity hypothesis. 
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Annexure 8 – Findings on the accounting environment 
 
The conceptual framework proposed in Chapter III suggests that accounting 
quality depends in part on the constraints under which accounting takes place in 
South Africa’s small businesses. Three investigations were undertaken to 
roughly explore this relationship: a review of the legal framework, a cost-related 
mini-survey, and semi-structured interviews with business owners and 
professionals.  
 
1. Legal environment  
Legal obligations, especially the obligation to provide files to tax authorities and 
other administrations, can be expected to be the most compelling and most 
universal reason for small businesses to maintain financial information systems. 
It is therefore natural to start the investigation of the accounting environment 
there, to establish whether the mechanisms designed to ensure a sufficient 
information quality are practically valid.  
Small businesses are, by law, required to produce various information: 
• Partial financial information (turnover, wages/salaries), is required for 
almost all businesses if: they reach a turnover of R300 000 (VAT 
returns)2 or if they employ permanent staff (PAYE tax on employees; 
Regional Services Council Levy3).  
• Full annual financial statements are required for corporate tax 
(companies/CCs) or income tax (owners of non-incorporated businesses).  
To protect the state’s interest, the legislator has established different levels of 
safeguards ensuring the existence and reliability of financials in various classes 
of small businesses. For a CC, these are  
a) the obligation to appoint, prior to registration, a qualified accounting 
officer, who must be a member of a recognised professional 
organisation4; 
b) the threat of SARS penalties if the annual statements are not provided; 
c) and the accounting officer’s duty of notifying the Registrar in case of 
omissions or incorrect indications by the CC.  
                                                 
2 VAT is optional for businesses with a turnover of R20 000 to R300 000. 
3 The RSC Levy in the City of Cape Town was abolished on 30 June 2006, but was still in force 
at the time of collection of data for the present research. 
4 §60.1 Close Corporation Act 
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For private companies, the rules are more constraining, with an obligation to 
have their financial statements audited. The literature has shown that auditors 
tend to play a significant role in preventing creative accounting and that their 
vigilance is especially rigorous in the case of companies in poor financial health 
(Stice 1991).  
However, interview evidence suggests that there are limits to the usefulness of 
enforcement procedures, as follows: 
a) Although a CC cannot register without naming an accounting officer, the 
quality of the co-operation with such officer may vary (see next section); 
b) Interview evidence confirms that the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) applies a rigorous schedule of reminders in case of delays in 
providing the statements. However, one accountant indicated that, when 
they were delayed, they could send draft statements to the SARS, and 
later finalise the audit. He confirmed that the SARS never required the 
auditor’s or accounting officer’s report. This fact potentially opens room 
for unscrupulous business owners to submit wrong drafts to the SARS 
without taking responsibility for it.  
c) As to the ‘Registrar notification’ procedure, interview evidence suggests 
that it usually does not take place. In problematic cases, the accounting 
officer tries to negotiate with the management and, if no compromise is 
found, rather than notifying the Registrar, the accounting officer declines 
his office. There is then no powerful enforcement mechanism to ensure 
that the firm appoints another accounting officer. 
These examples suggest that the legislator’s efforts to protect the State’s and 
creditors’ interest in good information standards are by no means a guarantee 
that financial statements are reliable and of good quality. 
 
2. The work with accountants 
The legal framework assumes a good co-operation between the parties involved. 
Its effectiveness is therefore subject to the practicalities of the manager-
accountant-auditor relationship. This raises the question of the ability of the 
skilled officer, which the corporations are obliged to appoint, to play a role in the 
corporation’s financial information system. 
Interview evidence with a business owners as well as accounting professionals 
suggests that the co-operation of entrepreneurs with their accountants and 
auditors is frequently difficult. 
• In CCs, the role of the accounting officer is often limited to writing up 
the Financial Statements and submitting them to the Receiver of 
Revenue. The ordinary monthly accounting, end-of-year trial balances 
and detailed schedules of income and expenditure are more often 
provided by the bookkeeper, who is either employed by the business, or 
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external as well; the success of such task-sharing rests on good co-
operation.  
• Lack of skills of the bookkeeper, lack of understanding of the accounting 
officer for the realities of the business, lack of understanding of the 
business owner for the information needs of the accountant, as well as co-
operation problems between both officers (especially when geographic 
distances are involved) and between them and the entrepreneur, may 
affect the quality of the outcome. 
• Indeed, many business managers lamented the lack of understanding of 
both their external accounting partners. Statements like “he does not 
understand what my business is about”, “there are mistakes in the 
accounts, because my accountant is a young lady, she is new and she 
does not know what to do” (!), as well as “it is difficult to talk to my 
accountant, his office is so far away and I have no time to drive around”, 
illustrate the perceived difficulty in co-operation. One entrepreneur 
justified his inability to provide accounting figures by his accountant’s 
failure to pick up his documents in the past few months, causing him to 
appoint a new accountant, who would need some time to get the figures 
in good order. This example, although it may have been exaggerated as 
an excuse for the owner’s reluctance to provide statements, illustrates the 
extent of paralysis that may take place when motivation is low on all 
parts.  
 
Another source of problems is the lack of resources allocated to the production 
and validation of financial statements. This issue was confirmed by interviews 
with professionals. One accountant cautioned that the cost issue was the most 
prohibitive, especially for enterprises close to breakeven, for which it would be 
unacceptable that a heavy accountant’s invoice results in a small profit turning 
into a loss. 
To evaluate the likelihood of the problem, a snapshot survey was carried out 
among 18 enterprises from the sample, with average to low accounting quality. 
The results are presented in Table 8.1. The table shows that the fees paid to 
external accountants (and if applicable, to external bookkeepers) in 2001, ranged 
from R2 930 to R82 000, which corresponded to a range of 0,01% to 1,23% of 
the firms’ turnover. The 1,23% seems to be an outlier. 
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Table 8.1 – Accounting costs 
Legal form  S/P CC Pty Ltd Total 
Sample Size 3 11 4 18 
Average costs for accountants and 
bookkeepers (Rand/year) 
5 044 9 596 34 325 15 008 
raw data 0,51% 0,46% 0,48% 0,47% Average ratio of 
(external) 
accounting costs to 
turnover 
after correction 
of outlier 
0,51% 0,46% 0,24% 0,43% 
NB: S/P refers to Sole Proprietorships, CC to Close corporations and Pty Ltd to 
private companies. 
 
Although the sample is too small to assess significance of these differences, the 
share of turnover allocated to external accounting costs was higher for Sole 
proprietors, which tend to have the smallest enterprises, in spite of them 
benefiting from less constraining regulatory regimes. However, for private 
companies the figure supposedly shows only part of the costs, since they are 
likely to employ in-house accounting staff. Under this light, it is not surprising 
that the smallest of enterprises, which often operate at profit margins of less than 
5% of turnover, find it difficult to afford such cost. 
The three accountants interviewed confirmed that accounting opacity was a 
problem among small businesses. Two of them indicated that maintaining 
several sets of financial statements (for the bank, for the revenue service, and for 
themselves) was current practice, and that they could never be sure to detect all 
mistakes. 
 
3. Do banks create incentives for good accounting?  
For businesses which apply for external finance, banks’ information 
requirements may constitute an economic incentive for regular, timely and 
reliable accounting. This however depends on (1) how persistently banks collect 
financial information, (2) how they verify the reliability of figures, and (3) how 
they use the data provided. The interview of a bank professional and a review of 
files from the same bank were used to obtain insights in this area.  
3.1– Use of financial information by banks 
The effort of banks in collecting financial information was found to be 
reasonably high. This is consistent with mainstream credit theory, which 
suggests that financial institutions need accounting information for initial 
creditworthiness analysis as well as monitoring. Interview evidence with a senior 
representative of Nedenterprise (now Peoples Bank) confirmed that the bank 
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collects regular financial statements from their clients: new businesses must 
provide monthly management accounts, while existing businesses (with at least 
2,5 years of history) are only asked to provide quarterly statements. Clients are 
reminded by ways of letter and telephone calls if they fail to provide the 
information. The review of bank files confirmed this, with numerous reminder-
letters found in almost every client’s file. It seems, thus, that banks exercise 
consistent and effective pressure on small business owners to produce and 
disclose their financials regularly – even though de facto, statements are more 
often provided on a half-year or yearly basis.  
As to the banks’ procedure to assess data quality, interview evidence confirmed 
that bank officers are aware of possible data quality problems. The main areas of 
concern mentioned were the reliability of turnover, inventory, and costs, the 
assumption being that clients asking for overdraft would be tempted to overvalue 
their stocks, overstate their turnover and understate their expenses.  
In spite of this problem awareness, the study showed that the bank does not 
usually insist on an auditor’s / accounting officer’s report. The interview 
confirmed that analyses are normally based on monthly management accounts. 
The interviewed officer was rather evasive on the use of annual statements, 
indicating that they are “just verified from an auditing perspective” (sic). The 
review of bank files showed no traces of requests for the auditor’s or accounting 
officer’s report or for final versions of the annual statements. In many instances 
the files contained only draft statements. 
The bank officer mentioned some procedures helping to estimate the reliability 
of accounting figures. In particular, banks can verify turnover, wages/salaries, 
and the cash balance, by reviewing the movements recorded on the business’s 
current accounts (assuming that all these transactions are channelled through the 
bank). Banks may also ask for additional sources, such as VAT returns and the 
salary book. However, it is not clear whether these procedures are indeed 
implemented regularly, or whether their mention was simply induced by the 
structure of the interview questionnaire. The files did not yield any such 
documents.  
The bank officer interviewed was asked to give details on the uses of financial 
statement information. He did not mention extensive financial analysis, possibly 
because such financial analysis takes place at the head office in Pretoria, rather 
than in Cape Town. His answers centered on the use of SMEs’ accounting data 
for ongoing monitoring. Monitoring is based on key ratios, which are calculated 
on monthly management accounts: monthly ratios are compared with past values 
and to budget. Such focus enables the bank to rapidly identify possible 
deteriorations of the key business figures (especially anticipate cash shortages). 
The financial structure itself is not analysed. This is likely to give the banks a 
rather short-sighted view of creditworthiness.  
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3.2 – Effect of these requirements on accounting quality 
Such frequent but superficial use of financial statements has a twofold 
consequence on small business accounting: 
• There is no strong incentive on SMMEs to maintain high accounting 
quality. It seems possible for a business to disclose other figures to the 
bank, than those officially validated by the accounting officer / auditor – 
which puts the creditworthiness assessments at risk.  
• Nevertheless, the fact that banks require extensive and frequent 
accounting reports represents an important burden for businesses. The 
production of full balance sheets and income statements, as required by 
credit officers, rests on a more sophisticated accounting than the 
disclosure of key monthly figures, like turnover, operating costs, cash 
balance and total fixed assets (Friedlob & Plewa 1992:92). 
As a result, small businesses, whose accounting budget is small, have to arbitrate 
between the need to produce one exhaustive yearly statement for tax and other 
official purposes, and the request of the bank for frequent information. They 
often respond to this dilemma by lengthening the intervals between their 
statements (e.g. 4-6 months), and/or by preparing their accounts with less care 
than they should.  
Two examples found in the files of the bank will illustrate those two sides of the 
medal. 
Example: the erratic closures of accounts (Ned01) 
An illustration of the effect of too frequent financial statements is found in a 
client of NedEnterprise, operating as a sole proprietor. Constantly requested to 
send his accounts to the bank, this client did provide relatively frequent financial 
statements, all of them relatively formal, with a report from the accounting 
officer. Six such statements were collected for this research, with the following 
closing dates: 30 June 1998, 28 February 1999, 31 August 1999, 30 April 2000, 
30 September 2000, and 30 April 2001.  
Not only is this irregular, but closer scrutiny revealed that each statement does 
not actually cover the period since the previous statement. For example, adding 
both accounts closed in 1999, one would cover the 14 months up to August 
1999, but the statements dated 30 September 2000 covered the 12 months since 1 
October 1999, so that the month of September 1999 was not actually covered, 
except in the accounts closed on 30 April 2000, which however covered only 8 
months. On the other hand, the report on the 12 months up to 30 April 2001 
would have a 5 months overlap with the statements dated 30 September 2000, 
etc. This is represented in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2 – Accounts provided by Mr. S., t/a School Buses (Ned01) 
Date of 
closure 
30 Jun 
1998 
28 Feb 
1999 
31 Aug 
1999 
30 Apr 
2000 
30 Sep 
2000 
30 Apr 
2001 
Period 
covered 
Sep 97 -
Jun 98 
Jul 98 – 
Feb 99 
Mar – 
Aug 99 
Sep 99 - 
Apr 00 
Oct 99 - 
Sep 00 
May 00 
- Apr 01 
Number of 
months 
10 8 6 
8 12 
12 
overlapping      7 m 5 m  
 
Whether the bank was actually able to use this information for the monitoring of 
the business’s performance and its comparison with budget is highly 
questionable.  
Example: management accounts versus “official” statements 
(Ned04)  
One client sent, in 2001, “management accounts” for the year 2000, which were 
neither signed by the owner nor accompanied by a report from the accounting 
officer. It is likely that the bank based its analysis on these management 
accounts. For the following year, the same client submitted formally validated 
annual financial statements, accompanied by the accounting officer’s unqualified 
report. These 2001 annual statements contain a 2000 column. 
By comparing this 2000 column of the official statements (2000 AFS) to the 
2000 management accounts (2000 MA), the following deviations were noticed: 
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Table 8.3 – Deviations between management accounts and annual financial 
statements – Supermarket CC (Ned04) 
in Rand 2000 MA 2000 AFS difference contribution 
Income statement         
Net profit after tax 68 669 464 858 396189 
(+577%) 
  
influenced in particular by:         
cost of sales 3 494 168 3 569 241 75 073 -19% 
other income 37 873 33 624 -4 249 -1% 
depreciation  117 819 136 755 18 936 -5% 
amortisation of goodwill 
and franchise fee 
21 713 49 213 27 500 -7% 
rent, cleaning, electricity 
and general expenses 
349 026 393 189 44 163 -11% 
members emolument 120 000 84 000 -36 000 9% 
interest expenses 136 463 84 564 -51 899 13% 
profit on sale of asset   478 211 478 211 121% 
Balance Sheet        
Reserves 126 989 359 877 232 888 
(+183%) 
  
Retained Income 126 989 -118 334 -245 323   
Capital reserve  0 478 211 478 211   
Fixed assets  2 459 475 2 395 790 -63 685  
(-3%) 
 
Net current assets -112 427 -345 964 -233 537 
(+208%) 
  
influenced in particular by:        
Stock 351 180 258 098 -93 082 40% 
Accounts receivable 62 925 60 446 -2 479 1% 
Accounts payable 578 026 716 002 137 976 59% 
  
The most significant change is visibly the sale of an asset, which generated a 
substantial profit of R478 thousand. The management accounts do not give 
details on the fixed assets, so that the said asset cannot be identified. The profit 
on this sale was booked as capital reserve, since it did not bear tax (it took place 
before the introduction of the Capital Gains Tax).  
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As for the other deviations, it is not clear what caused them, but they are 
numerous rather than individually significant, and affect the income statement as 
well as the balance sheet. One wonders whether the management accounts have 
been prepared with far too little care, or whether much effort has been put into 
“tuning” one or both of the statements to convey a particular impression. 
Although this is only speculation, it could be, for example, that the statements 
initially presented to the bank were “arranged” to give the appearance of a 
business that is generally profitable and pays a reasonable income to its owner. 
In the version validated by the accounting officer, on the other hand, if it were 
not for the extraordinary profit on sale of asset, the business would make a loss 
in spite of a more modest member’s remuneration. It is possible that a number of 
cost items have then been revised upwards with the consent of the accounting 
officer, for tax saving purposes. Overall, the net profit in the official accounts 
was 577% higher than in the management accounts. 
No document could be found in the bank file regarding the differences between 
the statements, it is even doubtful whether the bank officers actually noticed the 
deviations. The considerable variations prove that key ratio monitoring based on 
unaudited accounts can be strongly distorted. Operating income, member’s 
remuneration and working capital situation were painted more favourably to the 
bank, than what the accounting officer validated. 
 
To conclude, the interviews and review of credit files show that, just as the 
SARS, banks put much effort into collecting the small business accounts, but 
seem to be satisfied with irregular, draft statements, although those do not always 
serve their interests (irregularity, lack of care, and risk of fraud or opportunistic 
accounting).  
A change in this practice, to the effect that the short-term information collected 
be more rudimentary but the annual statements be formally validated, would 
arguably better serve the needs of both credit officers and businesses.  
 
A further example from the case studies (CS1) 
CS1 provides another example of poor financial communication between the 
bank and its client. The firm, a franchise furniture business, was granted long-
term start-up finance in 1996.  
• The file shows no exchange of financial information during the first two 
years of operation - hence, the bank apparently had no means to know 
how the business was performing. 
• At the end of April 1998, the owner applied for an overdraft facility and 
submitted draft accounts, as well as cash flow forecasts. Both were 
optimistic, suggesting: substantial turnover growth, good gross margins, a 
positive profit from year 1, and sufficient petty cash to make up for the 
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negative bank balance. The bank approved an overdraft facility of 
R25 000.  
• 8 months later, on 17 December 1998 (that is, at the beginning of the 
summer holiday period), CS1 delivered the first official financial 
statements, dated February 1997. These were significantly less favourable 
than the management accounts (turnover 33% lower, profit turned into a 
loss, debtors inexistent, but many creditors). Our data show no sign that 
the bank formally asked for clarity on these deviations. 
• From December 1998 to July 1999, no further financial communication 
took place between the parties. The bank hence does not hold any 
accounting record of the financial year closed 28 February 1999. 
Reconstitution suggests that during that year, the owner paid himself a 
member’s salary as high as R240 000 and realised a loss of over 
R700 000. Meanwhile, the cash levels had plummeted to an average 
overdraft of -R80 000. 
• By July 1999, the bank, alerted by permanent breaches of overdraft limits 
and delays in loan repayments, insisted on regular reporting. The owner 
complied by supplying monthly balance sheets amd income statements 
(however still omitting to provide reports at the actual financial year-end, 
in February 2000!). The lack of turnover and high losses caused the bank 
to initiate, with other creditors, a liquidation procedure during the course 
of 2000. 
Altogether, it seems that CS1 has skilfully filtered and timed the information sent 
to the bank as a means to keep its favour as long as possible. The bank’s controls 
have not been sufficient to react has not been able to force its client to a more 
regular reporting schedule, and that it has not paid sufficient attention to the 
official financial statements.  
 
To conclude, it appears that, just as the SARS, banks put much effort into 
collecting the small business accounts, but seem to be satisfied with irregular, 
draft statements. These do not always serve their interests (irregularity, lack of 
care, and risk of fraud or opportunistic accounting).  
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Annexure 9 – Financial management practices 
depending on the type of business (GEM data) 
 
 
 
Table 9.1- Financial practices of the smallest and largest enterprises 
  Number of employees Annual turnover  
  
<3 >25 
≤ R 100 
000 
> R 5 
million 
average 
separate 61% 91% 60% 97% 86% 
accounts 
common 39% 9% 40% 3% 14% 
0 65% 67% 42% 70% 58% 
0.5-25% 17% 14% 21% 20% 28% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 18% 19% 37% 10% 14% 
yes 28% 54% 35% 70% 43% 
sometimes 11% 23% 20% 10% 16% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 61% 23% 45% 20% 41% 
Records of       
yes 22% 64% 50% 90% 58% Cash in and 
out no 78% 36% 50% 10% 42% 
yes 44% 64% 30% 73% 42% 
Cash-flow 
no 56% 36% 70% 27% 58% 
yes 22% 55% 30% 87% 51% Overdue 
accounts no 78% 45% 70% 13% 49% 
yes 53% 100% 68% 100% 76% Accounts 
payable  no 47% 0% 32% 0% 24% 
yes 44% 94% 43% 83% 65% 
Inventory 
no 56% 6% 57% 17% 35% 
Sample size  18 22 20 30 224 
 
NB: The statistics for accounts payable and inventory are based only on the 
firms which do get supplier credit (218 enterprises) or keep stock (162 firms). 
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Table 9.2- Financial practices of the youngest and oldest enterprises 
  Number of years operating   
  ≤ 2 2.5 to 10 > 10 average 
separate 78% 91% 75% 86% 
accounts 
common 22% 9% 25% 14% 
0 46% 61% 56% 58% 
0.5-25% 40% 27% 20% 28% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 14% 11% 24% 14% 
 Sample size 35 135 45 215 
yes 33% 43% 56% 43% 
sometimes 19% 18% 20% 16% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 47% 40% 38% 41% 
yes 56% 60% 53% 58% Record of 
cash in and 
out 
no 44% 40% 45% 42% 
yes 50% 42% 38% 42% Record of 
cash flow no 50% 58% 62% 58% 
yes 56% 52% 45% 51% Record of 
overdue 
accounts 
no 44% 48% 55% 49% 
yes 86% 76% 67% 76% Monthly 
record of AP no 14% 24% 33% 24% 
yes 70% 70% 46% 65% Monthly 
records of 
inventory 
no 30% 30% 54% 35% 
sample size  36 141 47 224 
 
Table 9.3 – Financial practices according to type of registration  
  Form of registration    
  Sole 
Proprietors 
Close 
Corporations 
Pty Ltd average 
separate 44% 92% 100% 86% 
accounts 
common 56% 8% 0% 14% 
0 30% 56% 93% 58% 
0.5-25% 33% 31% 7% 28% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 37% 14% 0% 14% 
sample size  35 135 45 215 
yes 26% 43% 64% 43% 
sometimes 19% 17% 12% 16% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 56% 41% 24% 41% 
yes 52% 52% 91% 58% 
no 44% 47% 9% 42% Record of cash 
in and out blank 4% 1% 0% 0% 
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  Form of registration    
  Sole 
Proprietors 
Close 
Corporations 
Pty Ltd average 
yes 41% 38% 70% 42% Record of cash 
flow no 59% 61% 30% 58% 
yes 30% 47% 85% 51% Record of 
overdue 
accounts 
no 70% 52% 15% 49% 
yes 61% 75% 97% 76% Monthly record 
of AP no 39% 25% 3% 24% 
yes 62% 64% 77% 65% Monthly record 
of inventory no 38% 36% 23% 35% 
sample size  27 160 33 224 
 
Table 9.4 – Financial practices according to sector 
  SIC (Standard Industrial Classification)
5
   
  III V VI-3 VI VII-VIII average 
separate 88% 92% 85% 84% 84% 86% 
accounts 
common 13% 8% 15% 16% 16% 14% 
0 57% 58% 33% 51% 74% 58% 
0.5-25% 26% 35% 50% 29% 20% 28% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 16% 8% 17% 20% 7% 14% 
sample size  68 26 13 65 46 215 
yes 43% 35% 38% 45% 46% 43% 
sometimes 16% 15% 31% 15% 19% 16% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 40% 50% 31% 40% 35% 41% 
sample size  72 26 13 67 48 224 
 
                                                 
5 SIC III: Manufacturing; SIC V: Construction and civil engineering; SIC VI: Wholesale, retail 
and repairs, auto services, hotels and restaurants – with VI-3: Trade and service of motor 
vehicles; SIC VII: Transport, tourism and communication; SIC VIII: IT, business services, 
financial services and engineering 
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Table 9.5 – Financial practices of manufacturing enterprises 
  Manufacturing  
  textile & 
leather 
other 
manufacturing 
separate 100% 84% 
accounts 
common 0% 16% 
0 38% 63% 
0.5-25% 31% 25% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 31% 12% 
  16 52 
yes 31% 46% 
sometimes 25% 14% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 44% 39% 
sample size  16 56 
 
Table 9.6 – Financial practices according to profitability and liquidity  
  
profitable in 
last 6 & 3 
months 
no profit in 
last 3 and 6 
months 
enough cash 
in last 6 
months 
not enough 
cash in last 6 
months 
average 
yes 48% 26% 51% 27% 43% 
sometimes 15% 19% 13% 23% 16% fixed salary 
paid to owner no 38% 55% 36% 49% 41% 
sample size   124 42 147 77 224 
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Table 9.7 – Financial practices of firms presenting signs of distress, compared 
with total sample 
    Distressed 
firms 
Overdraft Term 
finance 
Total 
sample 
separate 82% 89% 89% 86% 
accounts 
common 18% 11%  11%  14% 
0 64% 59% 58% 58% 
0.5-25% 11% 30% 32% 28% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 25% 11% 11% 14% 
yes 21% 44% 49% 43% 
sometimes 0% 40% 27% 16% 
fixed salary 
paid to 
owner no 79% 16% 23% 41% 
sales 93% 99% 97% 96% 
purchases 86% 96% 96% 94% 
cash in and 
out 
50% 61% 64% 58% 
overdue 
accounts 
46% 58% 56% 51% 
accounts 
payable 
67% 77% 75% 76% 
inventory 55% 63% 63% 65% 
Does keep 
records of: 
cash flow 54% 44% 38% 42% 
sample size   28 142 73 224 
NB: For accounts payable and inventory, the statistics are based only on the 
firms for which this is applicable 
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Table 9.8 – Financial practices according to race and education of owner 
  Owner's race Owner's education 
    
African Indian Coloured 
Has not 
completed 
school 
Has a 
degree 
average 
separate 83% 88% 86% 80% 84% 86% 
Accounts 
common 17% 12% 14% 20% 16% 14% 
yes 54% 57% 61% 54% 68% 58% 
no 46% 43% 38% 43% 32% 42% 
Record of 
cash in and 
out blank 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 0% 
yes 46% 42% 38% 38% 55% 42% Record of 
cash flow no 54% 58% 62% 62% 45% 58% 
yes 43% 58% 51% 54% 63% 51% Record of 
overdue 
accounts 
no 57% 42% 49% 46% 37% 49% 
yes 75% 82% 71% 73% 76% 76% Record of 
accounts 
payable 
no 25% 18% 29% 27% 24% 24% 
yes 75% 59% 60% 61% 73% 61% Monthly 
record of 
inventory 
no 25% 41% 40% 39% 27% 39% 
Sample size   83 65 74 40 38 224 
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Table 9.9 – Financial practices according to the participation in mentoring 
programmes 
 Mentored Not mentored 
accounts separate 87% 85% 
 common 13% 15% 
0 52% 56% 
0.5-25% 35% 30% 
cash not 
channeled 
through bank >25% 13% 14% 
yes 48% 42% 
sometimes 15% 17% 
fixed salary 
paid to owner 
no 37% 42% 
keep records of sales 96% 96% 
purchases 93% 94% 
cash in and out 61% 57% 
sales forecasts 54% 61% 
cash flow 43% 42% 
overdue accounts 50% 51% 
inventory 61% 66% 
 
accounts payable 80% 74% 
Total  46 178 
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Annexure 10 – The trajectory of case study firms on the accounting sophistication scale  
5. sophisticated 
financial controls  
- trained staff + 
supervisor 
- strategic 
information  
- auditor’s controls  
 
4. specialised 
financial 
organisation 
- trained staff  
- computer systems 
- external financial 
adviser 
 
3. non-specialised 
administrative 
function 
- secretary-type 
employees: 
paperwork 
- external 
bookkeeper 
 
2. rudimentary 
administration  
- no employees: 
owner or family  
- weak external 
bookkeeper  
 
1. No financial 
function  
- no records 
- no external support 
 
 At the time 
of study  
Sophistication of 
financial function 
CS1 
CS2 
CS3 
CS4 
CS5 
CS6 
At start-up  
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Comments on the graph: 
o the progress of financial sophistication as a firm matures, which is expected and would support Berger & Udell’s (1998) 
prediction, applies only to some businesses;  
o franchise firms (CS1, CS2) generally start up with a specialised to sophisticated financial function, which they may reduce 
later as resources get tight (CS1);  
o A decline in sophistication may be required due to the need to refocus to operations (CS5). 
o Similar declines in sophistication may happen in a context of budgetary constraints (CS1, CS4)  
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Annexure 11 – Accounting transparency scoring model 
 
 
Quantity of information  
          
1 Number of B/S (a summarised or interim BS counts for 0.5) one 1.5 two 3 three 4 four or + 4.5  
2 Number of P&L (a summarised P&L with less than 12 items counts for 0.5; an 
interim P&L as well) 
one 1.5 two 3 three 4 four or + 4.5 
 
3 Are the dates of BS and P&L congruent? no 0     yes 2  
4 Number of CF statements none 0 one 1 two 2 three or + 3  
5 Number of sets of notes none 0 one 2 two 4 three or + 6  
6 Are any elements missing from the note: depreciation rates,           
 gross values of assets, intangibles, nature and characteristics of LT      
 liabilities,  inventory? related party transactions? Cost of sales? Tax? 
number of items 
missing   
(minus 1 per 
item)   
         20  
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 Formal Quality of Information         
         
 Serious issues        
7 Internal validation draft 0 final 2 signed 4  
8 External validation (from auditor / accounting officer) missing  0   provided 3  
9 Details on possible qualifications (for Ptys – CC count as 2) serious qualification 0 minor qualification 2 unqualified 4  
10 Period of reference of the accounts (12 months?) not recognisable 0 irregular 2 constant 12 m 4  
         
 Minor, presentation issues        
11 Comparative column missing  0   provided 2  
12 
Legibility (e.g. handwriting, “plus minus” confusion, 
alignment, “Laundry-list syndrome”) bad 0 intermediate 1 good 2  
13 Classification: short-term / long-term, cost of sales mistakes 0 possible mistakes 1 correct (NAD) 2  
14 Sums in the Balance Sheet or Income Statement mistakes 0   correct (NAD) 2  
15 Correct classification of lease debt (if applicable) mistakes 0 possible mistakes 1 correct (NAD) 2  
         
 Critical issues of Structural correctness (=> penalties)        
16 Asset-liability distinction mistakes -6 not clear -3 correct (NAD) 0  
17 Asset-expense distinction mistakes -3 not clear -1.5 correct (NAD) 0  
18 Asset-liability sums unequal -6 not clear -3 equal 0  
19 
Consistency between BS, IS, Notes (Depreciation rates, stock, 
retained earnings) mistakes -3 not clear -1.5 correct (NAD) 0  
         
20 General judgement: accounts clean and prepared with care no  0 not sure  1 yes  2 0 
         
       25  
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 Intrinsic Quality of Information  
  
     Impact on 
  
  
    
net 
profit  Equity Cash 
 Testing of obligatory items 
clear 
inconsistency 
(0) 
pattern not 
clear or data 
missing 
(1.5) 
test fine 
(3) 
 Year 
Possible 
Margin of 
error     
 Fixed assets          
21 
B/S Value, in relation to notes, CF statement, depreciations, previous 
years 
  
         
22 Depreciation, in relation to notes, gross value, practice note           
            
 Member's investment           
23 Members equity           
24 member's salary           
            
 Current assets and liabilities           
25 accounts receivable, in relation to turnover and previous years           
26 accounts payable, in relation to turnover and previous years           
            
 Cash position           
27 
cash bal compared with reconstituted CF statement & to interest 
earned/paid 
  
        
28 interest earned or paid compared with Cash balance           
            
 Income Statement            
29 Turnover to cost of sales and compared with previous years           
30 Operating expenses (compared with previous years)           
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 Intrinsic Quality of Information  
  
     Impact on 
  
  
    
net 
profit  Equity Cash 
 Testing of frequent items 
clear 
inconsistency 
(0) 
pattern not 
clear or data 
missing 
(1.5) 
test fine 
(3) 
 Year 
Possible 
Margin of 
error     
31 Inventory, in relation to cost of sales, turnover and previous years          
          
32 Long-term liabilities, in relation to investments/CF & previous years           
33 Members' loan           
34 Financial expenses (compared with LT liabilities and previous years)           
            
35 Tax calculation           
36 Tax liability            
            
  
Preliminary score 
         
 
  
Based on how many points 
         
 
  
  
        
  => pro rata to 55 #DIV/0!          
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         Impact on 
 Less usual, non-testable items (=> penalties)       
net 
profit  Equity Cash 
 Property and intangible assets 
questionable 
(-1) 
probably 
reasonable  
(-0.5) 
none (0) 
  Amount     
37 BS value of Property    Year      
38 BS value of intangibles           
39 Amortisation            
            
 Related parties transactions           
40 Loan granted to or by related parties, other than members loan           
41 Other interest-free or preferential long-term loans           
42 Interest or other paiment to/from related parties           
43 Fees, commissions, discounts granted           
            
 Miscellaneous           
44 deferred charges           
45 unexplained extraordinary items            
46 provisions for future expenses           
        Number of material issues 
47       (-2 per issue)   
 
General judgement: The accounts seem to make sense considering the 
business's stated activity            
    #DIV/0!    0    
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 Suspicion of manipulation Strong suspicion   # light suspicion  * cannot say   
      
 If yes, give reasons     
      
      
 
Synthesis 
Quantitative score  / 20  
Formal Quality Score  / 25  
Transparency Score  / 55  
Suspicion of manipulation    
     
Total score  / 100  
     
Main issues:    
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Annexure 12 – Accounting transparency scoring of 
Ned02, Wec07 and PWC01 
This Annexure proposes a narrative of the accounting transparency evaluation of 
two polarised examples: Ned2, a very small white-owned printing business, 
which had a poor score of 14.5*, and Wec7, a medium-sized mixed-race 
publishing business, which achieved a good score of 77.  
1. Ned2: a young, very small printing business 
Ned2 data were accessed anonymously through its bank. The accounting 
information found in the bank file was relatively slim, consisting of a balance 
sheet and income statement at 28 February 2001 (representing the first 9 months 
of the business), as well as an interim statement for the period between 1 March 
and 31 October 2001 and a statement of net assets referring to the business 
owner. These statements represented a total of five pages, written in a mix of 
Afrikaans and English, and were provided to the bank to accompany an 
application for funding, as the owner was busy setting up a second operation to 
complement his first business. 
Ned2’s quantitative score was 6/20, to reflect the presence of one final and one 
interim balance sheet, as well as one final and one interim income statements. 
Cash flow statements or notes were not available.  
The formal-qualitative score for Ned2 was affected by the unprofessional 
presentation of the accounts. Even the accounts closed on 28 February 2001, at 
the end of the first financial year-end, appeared to be drafts rather than final 
accounts; they were neither signed by the owner nor accompanied by a statement 
of the accounting officer. Readability was affected by a number of factors: (i) 
heterogeneous periods (nine and eight months respectively); (ii) absence of a 
comparative column in the October accounts; (iii) mix of languages; (iv) use of 
negative signs in the balance sheet (instead of moving a negative liability to the 
assets). The lease debt appeared to be correctly classified, but the corresponding 
assets were not clearly recognisable. There was also an inconsistency regarding 
the treatment of the inventory: while the income statement for March to October 
2001 indicated a change in stock of R222, the stock in the balance sheet dropped 
from R56 000 in February 2001 to 0 in October (more precisely, stock was not 
mentioned in the later balance sheet – probably due to an omission on the part of 
the accountant).  
 More critically, the October 2001 balance sheet appeared to entail a serious 
mistake in the treatment of liabilities, most of which appeared as negative 
amounts, while the equity was positive. The member’s loan (‘aandeelhouers / 
direkteurs / lede lening’) and long-term liabilities (‘langtermyn verpligtinge’) 
were hence subtracted from, instead of added to, the member’s capital 
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(‘aandeelhouers kapitaal’). Similarly, the current tax liability (‘BTW / Belasting 
Kontrole Rekening’) was added to rather than subtracted from the current assets. 
If these liabilities were in fact assets (i.e. the member and other agents had 
borrowed funds from, rather than lent funds to, the business), it is not clear why 
they should have been labelled as liabilities. It seems more plausible that the 
person who prepared the balance sheet had a serious accounting skills shortage 
and assumed that liabilities had to be preceded by a minus. To technically 
balance the capital employed with the employment of capital, substantial 
amounts were added and labelled as long-term charges (‘Ander langtermyn 
laste’), which are suspected to have no substance.  
This critical mistake in the compilation of the accounts means that the October 
2001 balance sheet is almost unusable, although the fixed and current assets 
(with the exception of the stock, which was omitted) did not appear to be 
affected. It was reflected in the scoring through the strongest possible penalty on 
asset-liability distinction as well as a poor score on the general judgment on 
formal quality. (The judgment was not 0, though, since this mistake appeared 
only on one of the four accounts). 
The assessment of intrinsic quality responded to a series of tests and 
verifications: 
• The plausibility of fixed assets value was scored with a middle score 
since, in the absence of a schedule of assets, it could not be ascertained. 
However, the depreciation of fixed assets was omitted in the second year, 
leading to a 0 score. The impact of this ommission, estimated at R85 000, 
exceeded 25% of the profit figure and was therefore deemed very 
material.  
• The member’s salaries received a neutral score, being not disclosed 
separately; 
• The accounts payable were scored at 1,5 due to the negative tax liability, 
which seemed to be a mistake. However, the amount (R3 000) was not 
material.  
• The cash balance was rated as improbable, as it was strictly 0 in both 
balance sheets, which seems implausible in a business engaged in day-to-
day operations. In addition, a loan apparently granted to a sister business 
should have had some repercussions on the cash.  
• The plausibility of turnover figures was uncertain, therefore rated with a 
medium score. Indeed, the ratio of cost of sales to turnover was unstable 
(2000: 45%, 2001: 61%) and higher than comparative firms in the 
printing industry (30% and 32.5%). However there were no serious 
reasons to suspect understatement of turnover.  
• The operating expenses were surprisingly low in the second year, 
although the turnover was stable: salaries dropped from 11% to 2% of 
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turnover; rent, water and electricity were nearly halved without any 
visible reason. The total impact of these costs, at roughly R100 000, was 
very material compared with the profit. It was not unlikely that the owner 
had understated these costs to display a substantial profit, in order to 
obtain the bank’s favour.  
• As indicated, the inventory seems to have been omitted in the second 
balance sheet, triggering a score of 0. This omission, reducing the 
carrying value of assets by approximately R56 000, was very material for 
the value of equity.  
• The accounting for long-term liabilities in October was, as discussed, 
highly questionable. However, the amount of this particular item itself 
(R24 000) was only slightly material. The member’s loan on the other 
hand (R227 000) was a very material (negative) amount, as was the 
corresponding other debt (labelled ‘charge’).  
• Financial expenses also seemed to have been understated in the second 
period. Compared with the first year, the lease costs were missing and the 
other high financial costs did not appear. The amount, which was app. 
R26 000 in the previous year, would be slightly material for the profit of 
the second period.  
• In spite of the R286 000 profit announced for the second period, no pro 
forma tax calculation is included: the pre-tax profit is entirely ascribed to 
equity. While this is not unusual in interim statements, it conveys a 
distorted view of the firm’s financial situation.  
• Finally, two unexplained unusual items generated penalties: the sister 
company loan worth R19 000, a slightly material amount; and some 
unexplained extraordinary items (“eienaars uitgawes”) amounting to 
R108 000, a potentially very material amount, possibly corresponding to 
start-up costs.  
All these scores cumulated with the penalties for materiality triggered an 
intrinsic quality score of only 6,4 (out of 55), a combined result of the lack of 
data for cross-verifications, lack of plausibility of the profit in the second period 
and the considerable lack of clarity on financing schemes.  
As to the manipulation score, it was set at * (slight suspicion) to reflect the 
possibility that the owner has understated costs in the second period to appear 
profitable to his bank. The suspicion was only slight as an alternative explanation 
would have been the lack of competence or care in preparing this statement 
which was of interim nature.  
Figure 11 illustrates the score calculation for Ned2.  
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Figure 12.1 – Score calculation for Ned2 
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2. Wec7, a medium-sized desktop publishing 
business 
Wec7 data were mediated through Wecbof, and led to direct contact: the 
managing director personally handed out the documents to me, consisting of 
the brief questionnaire, a 7 pages financial report including balance sheets, 
income statements and extensive notes for the periods ended 29 February 
2000 (the first four months of operation), 28 February 2001 and 30 
September 2001, as well as two press clippings and several pages presenting 
various aspects of the corporation (ownership, employees, suppliers, 
equipment, value drivers, social responsibility). At the date of the release of 
the financial statements, the business had already secured substantial long-
term funding and there was no indication that it may be in need of additional 
finance.  
The quantitative score of Wec7 was 15, to reflect the balance sheets and 
income statements for the two completed financial years (ended in February 
2000 and 2001 respectively) as well as the interim statements (September 
2001) and the extensive notes. The difference between the quantity score of 
Wec7 and that of Ned2 shows that very young firms are not condemned to 
low quantative scores.  
The formal qualitative score was good, to reflect the excellent structure and 
presentation of the accounts, only affected by one anomaly: the amount of 
the instalment sale liability was presented net of deferred financial charges, 
a practice which was observed frequently among small businesses but is not 
GAAP-compliant. This results in a formal score of 20.5 out of 25. 
The intrinsic quality score was slightly affected by the following 
observations: 
• the depreciation amounts are difficult to cross-check since business 
has been investing continuously and assets seem to have been 
depreciated on periods shorter than the financial year. However it 
would seem that at least the September 2001 depreciation is too low, 
with an estimated gap in the region of R80 000. In comparison to a 
profit of R689 000, however, this amount was not material.  
• The accounts payable and receivable were scored at 2.5 out of 3 to 
reflect the unusually high value of AR (with average payment terms 
exceeding three months) and the steep decrease of AP from 36 to 
19 days between February and September 2001. These surprising 
values may be triggered by short-term fluctuations and therefore did 
not trigger substantial penalties.  
• The turnover was growing, but operating costs were not entirely 
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stable, especially with salaries representing an increasing part of the 
turnover. This probably represents the firm’s actual evolution of 
growing by increasing staff and realising inverse economies of scale. 
Similarly, the inventory was fluctuating but does not seem 
improbable.  
• The marks for long-term liabilities and finance charges were slightly 
affected by the incorrect practice of deducting deferred finance 
charges.  
• The tax figures were supported by our calculations, except for 
September 2001 but the difference of R50 000 was not material. 
• The other items were generally confirmed by our cross-calculations 
and simulations. (Our simulated cash flow statement resulted in 
almost exactly the actual cash balance for September 2001). 
All these led to a solid intrinsic quality score of 41.5 out of 55.  
The manipulation score was blank, as there was no suspicion of conscious 
misrepresentations by the owners.  
Figure 12.2 summarises the scoring of Wec7.  
 
3. PWC01, a medium-sized supplier of DIY and 
sports products 
The financial statements of PWC01 were provided by its new auditor 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PWC), in the absence of any direct contact. The 
company was described by PWC as a manufacturer of DIY and sports 
products, started in 1982 and supplying app. 350 retail stores in the country.  
The quantity score of PWC01 was quite high at 14,5/20, reflecting the 
access to a four-year accounting history. However, notes and cash flow 
statements were only available for the last two years and, as the following 
shows, notes were considered insufficient on a number of areas.  
The formal quality score was only 13 out of 25, reflecting the absence of 
external validation (auditor’s report), the inconsistencies in classification 
(short-term provisions turning into long-term liabilities, change in definition 
of cost of sales) and the contradictions between balance sheets, income 
statements and notes (e.g. on the issue of salaries, depreciation or interest 
paid, with the IS amount differing from the amount in the notes).  
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Figure 12.2 – Accounting opacity scoring sheet for Wec07 
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The intrinsic quality score was affected by a large number of perturbing 
observations or inconsistencies, especially the following: 
• The carrying value of fixed assets and their depreciation pattern were 
unclear; in particular, the Income Statement operates an unconvincing 
distinction between administrative assets and operating assets: the 
carrying value of moulds or stands is too high to be either admin or 
operating; 
• The member’s salary appeared unusually high, reaching R461 063 in 
1998 or 185% of the pre-tax profit.  
• The accounts receivable and payable were far lower in 2000 than in 
previous years. That may reflect a seasonal effect, due to the change of 
balance sheet date; however, the difference amounts, R900 000 for AR 
and R700 000 for AP, are highly material and raise a 2-point penalty 
each. In addition, until 1997 the AP presumably include provisions and a 
R100 000 liability which is later rebooked as a long-term loan. On the 
opposite, the inventory value is far higher in June 2000 than in December 
1998, similarly raising a 2-points penalty.  
• The interest earned seems low compared with the year-end cash balances; 
• Operating expenses are perturbing, especially the change in the definition 
of cost of sales, which notes do not comment on. Analysing comparative 
values reveals that for December 1998, the change of method had the 
effects of reducing the cost of sales by 27%. Similarly, other cost items 
present diverging values: there are three different figures for the salaries 
paid in 1998, ranging from R497 000 (in the 2000 income statement’s 
comparative column) to R958 000 (in the 1998 income statement). The 
same applies to debt and finance charges. This classification-related issue 
creates opacity as it becomes almost impossible to follow trends in costs, 
debt or financial charges across the period, or to track where the 
difference comes from.  
• There are inconsistencies on the amounts and cost of long-term liabilities: 
for example, the “other loan” is supposedly earning 15% but the 
calculation yields an interest rate of only 5% in 2000. Hire-purchase 
charges, which amount to R80 000 p.a., seem a bit high compared with 
the principal, and do not appear in the income statement. 
• The business did not pay tax or build a tax liability on several years, in 
spite of its profit ; while this seems correct for 2000, it appears to be a 
mistake in previous years; 
• There is a risk of error in the valuation of the property, which in 2000 
represents 36% of total assets. Due to the materiality of the amount and 
the absence of documents backing the valuation, a penalty was raised.  
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Figure 12.3 – Accounting opacity scoring sheet for PWC01 
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Annexure 13 – Results of accounting transparency 
scoring: Balance sheet sample 
Company 
ID 
Quantity 
Score  
(/ 20) 
Formal 
Quality 
Score (/ 25) 
Intrinsic 
Quality Score  
(/ 55) 
Manipulation 
Total score 
(/100) 
Ned01 14.5 11.5 28.5 * 54.5* 
Ned02 6.0 1.5 6.4 * 13.9* 
Ned03 17.0 15.0 29.0  61.0 
Ned04 14.0 20.0 18.1 * 52.1* 
Ned05 20.0 25.0 33.0  78.0 
Ned06 13.0 7.0 3.6 # 23.6# 
Ned08 11.0 18.5 29.1  58.6 
Ned10 11.0 23.0 45.4  79.4 
Ned11 5.0 17.0 25.7  47.7 
Ned12 9.0 15.5 38.5 * 63.0* 
Ned13 16.0 17.5 37.9  71.4 
Ned14 6.0 13.5 44.9  64.4 
Ned15 19.5 22.0 39.5  81.0 
Ned16 8.0 11.5 31.9 * 51.4* 
Ned18 9.4 17.5 45.1  72.0 
PWC 001 14.0 13.0 28.6 * 55.6* 
WECB01 8.5 14.5 33.2 * 56.2* 
WECB02 10.0 5.5 21.2 # 36.7# 
WECB03 5.0 7.0 10.2 * 22.2* 
WECB04 11.4 21.0 42.5  74.9 
WECB05 9.0 17.5 5.6 * 32.1* 
WECB06 12.0 10.5 22.8  45.3 
WECB07 15.0 20.5 41.5   77.0 
WEC08 14.0 11.0 15.0 # 40.0# 
WEC09 10.0 5.0 16.9   31.9 
DIR 001 19.5 23.0 36.1  78.6 
DIR 002 17.5 19.5 49.6  86.6 
DIR 003 15.0 22.5 35.1  72.6 
CS1 10.5 -0.5 -3.5 # 6.5# 
CS2 12.0 17.5 36.0 * 66.0* 
CS3 13.5 16.0 17.0 * 46.5* 
CS5 14.0 21.5 38.9  74.4 
CS6 13.0 20.5 37.4 # 70.9# 
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Annexure 14 – Main issues of accounting opacity  
1. Among case study firms 
Table 14.1 – Main opacity issues among case study firms 
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Comments 
CS1 X       Accounts are very irregular, with gaps and 
overlappings 
CS1  X      no comparative column, many negative 
liabilities 
CS1   X     Turnover figures seem to be falsified 
CS1    X    
no depreciations, no tax, inappropriate 
treatment of finance charges: all these tend to 
“inflate” the profits 
CS1     X   apparent falsification of members' loans and 
retained income to hide negative equity 
CS1      X  no stock adjustments in IS; contradictions on 
Accounts Receivable  
CS1       X Lack of clarity on member’s loan and 
member’s remuneration  
CS2    (x)   X 
The performance figures contradict interview 
data (probably correct though); 
owner may have drawn hidden remuneration 
CS3    X    2004 accounts are clearly done to convey the 
bank an impression of high profit 
CS3      X  Accounts receivable and payable, stock and 
cash balance contradict interview data 
CS5   X      
In the absence of sales records, the turnover 
figure is uncertain, especially given the high 
growth 
CS5      (x)  Accounts do not give a clear idea of working 
capital and cash (seasonal) 
CS6    X   (x) 
In 2004 some costs related to brother's new 
venture were booked under this business, 
reducing taxable income. 
Total 1 1 1 4 1 3 3  
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2. Among balance sheet sample  
Quantity and formal quality of data could only be assessed for the thirty 
businesses for which copies of accounts were available. Among those thirty, 
problems occurred with the frequency as described in Table 14.2.  
Intrinsic quality was assessed for all 64 businesses in the sample. For each group 
of items, problems were listed and classified as negligible, material or highly 
material, as visible on Table 14.3.  
Table 14.2 – Frequency of problems w.r.t. quantity and formal quality  
 
Item # Area Criteria 
Number of 
occurences  
(/ 30) 
Further comments 
4 CF Statements Score of 0 or 1 22 often no cash flow 
statements 
Q
u
an
ti
ty
 
5-6 Notes Score in #5: 0 or 
score in #6 < -0,5 
22 (explanations were 
often missed on: gross 
asset values and 
depreciation rates; 
long-term loans, 
including loans 
to/from members or 
related parties; 
goodwill; general 
expenses, interest paid; 
tax calculation) 
7 Internal 
validation 
Score < 3 17 Accounts not signed or 
drafts 
8-9 External 
validation 
Sum of scores < 4 17 no report of 
accounting officer or 
auditor, or qualified 
audit opinion 
F
o
rm
al
 q
u
al
it
y
 
19 Inconsistencies 
BS/IS/Notes 
Score < 0 11 (e.g. the book value of 
assets in BS is reduced 
by an amount different 
from the depreciation 
booked in the IS) 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 14 Page 289 
 
 
Table 14.3 – Frequency and materiality of problems w.r.t. intrinsic quality 
Issues 
regarding 
intrinsic 
quality 
Negligible  
(<5% of profit or 
equity) 
Material  
(5-25% of profit or 
equity) 
Highly material  
(>25% of profit or 
equity) 
1) long-term assets and 
liabilities 
    
 
Fixed assets / 
depreciation 
Ned1,12,13, 
BD2, Gob1, 
BB10 
6 
Ned3, 6mini, 16, 
Wec1, 3,5,6,7, 
CS2,3, BD9, 
Gob3, Gob13 
13 
Ned2,4,5,6max,8,1
3, Wec2,8,9, CS1, 
BD5, Gob1,2,6, 
BB1 15 
intangibles / 
amortisation 
Ned6, Wec1, 
BB3,5 
4 
Ned3,10,16,Dir3, 
CS1, Gob8, BB6 
7 Ned5,4,13, Gob7 
4 
equity / retained 
income 
BD9, Gob1, 
BB10 
3 Ned16,Wec5,6 3 
Ned1,3,6max,13, 
Wec1 (tax liab), 
Wec9, CS1,3, BD2 9 
bank debt     Dir3,CS5,BB10 3 CS1,CS5,Gob13 3 
non-bank loans, 
including 
related party 
loans 
CS5 1 Ned3,10,15 3 
Ned4,13,PWC1, 
Wec2 (AR), 
Wec4,5, BD6, 
Gob13, BB8 9 
2) short-term assets and 
liabilities 
    
 
stock none: BB1 1 Ned6mini 1 
Ned2,15,PWC1, 
Wec5 4 
AR / AP     Wec7,8,BB8 3 
Ned3,4,13,15, 
PWC1, Wec3,5,8,9, 
Dir1, CS1, 
CS3(bad debts) 
BS5, BD2,9 15 
cash Ned1 1 CS2 1 
Ned2,4,6max,CS5,
BD2, Wec6,8 7 
3) Costs and revenues      
Turnover / costs Ned4 1 Ned2, Wec5, CS1 3 
Ned4, 
Wec2,6,8,CS2,5, 
BD9, Gob8 8 
financial 
charges & 
interest paid & 
received 
Ned8,16, 
CS1(interest), 
BD5(Fin Chg) 
4 
Ned2,15, Wec2,6, 
BB1,BB10 
6 
Ned18,Wec9, 
CS1(FC),  
BD5(int received), 
Gob14,BB2,4,5,9 9 
member's salary 
none: 
BD5,BB1 
2     Ned8,1,12,3 
4 
tax CS1 1 
Ned2,16,Wec3,5, 
BB2,7 
6 
Ned6,8,3, Pwc1, 
Wec6, Dir3, CS1,3, 
BB1,8,10 11 
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Table 14.3 calls for following remarks: 
a) Fixed and intangible assets 
Fixed assets led to a numerous penalties in the scoring process, with 23% of all 
sets of financials believed to be misleading due to improper accounting for fixed 
assets. Generally this came from non-existent or insufficient depreciation. 
Intangible assets were also an area of concern, especially for franchise firms 
whose initial capitalised franchise fee frequently represented a large portion of 
the balance sheet total. In most cases it was possible to restore an adequate 
picture of the carrying value of the firm’s assets through homogenous 
depreciation and amortisation rates.  
b) Financing structure  
23% of firms were affected by a non-transparent equity, often due to 
inconsistencies between the profit history in income statements and retained 
income in the balance sheets. Most members’ loans were fluctuating and often 
difficult to follow, as even the owners did not always keep track of the 
transactions between themselves and their business. In some cases (notably CS1 
and possibly CS3-2004), the member’s loan seemed to be calculated as the 
amount balancing total assets and total liabilities and equity – hence bearing all 
the contradictions, errors and omissions from the balance sheet and income 
statements. 
While bank debt was usually accounted for in a transparent manner, non-bank 
loans often raised questions (actual conditions of the loan; terms of repayment). 
Financial charges often did not match the existing debt patterns (30% of firms).  
c) Current assets and current liabilities; cash  
It was more difficult to ascertain the reliability of figures on debtors and 
creditors, which may fluctuate strongly from year to year. In some cases the 
impression emerged that accounts receivable and payable acted as a buffer in 
which all accounting contradictions were hidden.  
• In some cases, the balance sheet values on stock, accounts receivable 
(AR) and payable (AP) were significantly lower than suggested by other 
evidence (e.g. CS3, AP CS1 Feb-97, AR CS1 Jan-98). These 
contradictions seemed to be linked to improper accounting, possibly 
caused by a lack of records on invoice payment and/or a cost-related 
omission of procedures like stock valuation.  
• The opposite applied in other cases, such as CS6, where the balance 
sheets suggested far higher credit periods than indicated by the owners in 
the interviews. Considering CS6’s apparently sound accounting 
procedures, the contradiction probably resulted from the owner’s lack of 
awareness on the credit collection problem. In other cases from the 
balance sheet sample, supplier and creditor control accounts seemed to 
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have been used to make up for gross structural mistakes, as in Wec03.  
• An additional complication came from short-term fluctuations. In 
addition to the monthly oscillation of cash levels (accounting figures 
always refer to month-end, when cash is generally tight), the cash 
position was difficult to assess in seasonal businesses (CS5 and CS6) and 
in the occurrence of investments and disinvestments (CS5-2003 and CS6-
2004).  
d) Performance and profit 
The profit figures written in the financial statements were generally difficult to 
interpret. Indeed, since profit is technically the balance of all income and 
expense items, any error or anomaly in the income statement will affect it. 
Furthermore, there may be contradictory interests in reporting either a low, or a 
high profit figure. The case studies came to the finding that: 
• In most cases (CS2, CS3, CS6), profit figures found in the financial 
statements appeared more credible than statements made by the owners in 
their interviews (for example, CS2’s insinuation that the operating 
margins were high, or CS6’s suggestion that the business had always 
been profitable, were invalidated by accounting data). Even the very 
rudimentary simulation of income statement undertaken for CS4a, based 
on interview evidence, was more informative than the members’ 
statement that “we never do any profit”. 
• Opportunistic accounting often led to omissions or underestimation of 
non-operating costs (financial charges; depreciation; extraordinary losses; 
tax; notably in CS1 and CS3). These could easily be detected and 
corrected. 
• The truth of operating income and expenses was often more difficult to 
establish, especially when turnover figures themselves were questionable 
(CS1), but manipulations could occasionally be traced through data 
inconsistencies (e.g. overstated cost of sales in CS6).  
• The bottom line could also be strongly affected by the members’ salaries, 
which was often problematic: some businesses were suspected to 
overstate salaries in order to convey the impression of success (CS1, CS3 
2004), while financial statements showed no compensation, raising 
suspicions about possible hidden remunerations (CS2). 
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Annexure 15 – Suspicions of manipulation  
Item affected Apparent Impact 
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 Detailed comments 
Distortion for 
unsuspecting user 
Adjustable by 
scrupulous 
researcher 
Ned1 * 
Applying for 
overdraft in 2001 
X X X   
Possible understatement of 
depreciation in 1999? => profit 
smoothed 
(Incomplete disclosure of 
drawings)  
1999 omitted 
depreciation is 
highly material on 
profit (26%) 
Yes 
Ned2 * 
Applying for finance 
for new business 
 X    
Profit raised, many costs 
omitted  
very material 
(depreciation alone 
> 25% of profit) 
Yes  
Ned4 * 
Applying for ISA in 
2001 
 X X   
Profit raised in 2000 (profit on 
sale of asset), but some costs 
possibly inflated 
Member’s remuneration raised 
Material (overall 
without XO-profit, 
+18% of profit) 
Difficult 
Ned6 # 
Asking for short-term 
finance in August 
2001 
X X  X  
Assets valued high and profit 
raised through insufficient 
depreciation 
Equity or LT debt raised ? 
Picture is blurred Difficult 
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Item affected Apparent Impact 
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 Detailed comments 
Distortion for 
unsuspecting user 
Adjustable by 
scrupulous 
researcher 
Ned12 * 
Probably applying for 
finance 
 X    
Profit possibly raised in Sept. 
01 through lower operating 
costs 
Material (profit 
instead of loss) 
Yes but not sure 
(lower costs could 
be efficiency gains / 
economies of scale) 
Ned16 * Unknown  X    
Profit raised in 2000 through 
lower depreciation 
Material (9% of 
profit) 
Yes  
Ned19/ 
CS3 
* 
applying for major LT 
loan 
 X    
Profit raised in 2004 through 
lower depreciation and 
ommission of bad debts 
Highly material 
(42% of profit) 
Yes  
Ned20 / 
CS1 
# 
Struggling to repay 
debt  
 X  X  
Profit consistently raised 
through falsified turnover and 
costs  
Equity and member’s loan 
raised 
Picture is blurred;  
turnover is 
falsified by 61%; 
costs are 
absolutely unclear 
Difficult  
Wec1 * 
Start-up, in need of 
funds 
 X  X  
Profit possibly raised by 
insufficient depreciation (14%) 
Equity raised (45%) by double 
calculation of tax liablity; cash 
balance possibly also (91%) 
Very Material  Yes 
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Item affected Apparent Impact 
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 Detailed comments 
Distortion for 
unsuspecting user 
Adjustable by 
scrupulous 
researcher 
Wec2 * 
Start-up, in need of 
funds 
 X   X 
Profit raised by 32% (no 
depreciation), equity similarly 
Turnover possibly lowered  
Picture somewhat 
blurred 
Partly  
Wec3 * Unknown      X Turnover possibly understated? Blurred  Difficult  
Wec5 * Unknown  X X   X 
Depreciation too low, raising 
profit  
Sales to related parties ? 
Blurred  Difficult  
Wec8 # 
Acquired new 
property in 2000, 
financing unknown 
   X X 
Very high LT loan, AP and 
cash, linked to some related 
party business - unexplained 
Very material  Partly 
CS2 * 
Holds major private 
loan  
  X   
Possibly hidden member’s 
remuneration 
Not material Yes 
CS6 # In breach of overdraft  X    
Profit decreased (for tax 
purposes) 
Not material  Yes 
Total 
4 # 
12 * 
  12  5   NM:3, M:9, PB: 4 
Yes:8, Partly:2 , 
Diff: 6 
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Annexure 16 – Adjustment of financial statements  
This Annexure discusses the principles adopted for adjusting data, lists all 
adjustments undertaken, and presents a specific case to show in detail how items 
were adjusted.  
As Chapter IV has discussed, the adjustment process was guided by the 
principles of relevance, transparency, consistency and balance. More 
specifically, the following situations were encountered: 
• when an entry has obviously been omitted (e.g. assets have not been 
depreciated), an adjustment is required [subject to materiality thresholds]; 
• when there is a clear mistake in the balance sheet (e.g. the tax liability 
appears twice, once in retained income and once again in liabilities), an 
adjustment is required [subject to materiality thresholds]; 
• when a depreciation rate is acceptable in isolation but significantly lower 
than the default rates applied for adjustments (usually, 33% for 
computers, 20% for vehicles, 16,7% for machinery, equipment and 
furniture), an adjustment is performed to ensure comparability [subject to 
materiality thresholds]; 
• when a balance sheet item is (temporarily) abnormally high and the 
balancing item is clearly visible (e.g. very high accounts payable and 
cash): no adjustment, but the year-end figures must be interpreted with 
caution. 
• When several adjusting options are available, the method which interferes 
least with other balance sheet items was preferred (e.g. when retained 
income was lower than the sum of profits, it was preferred to assume an 
unrecorded distribution of a part of profit, rather than to revise profit 
downwards or retained income upwards).  
 
The following adjustments were performed as a routine operation: 
• adjustments of depreciation (if depreciation was either omitted, or 
seemed to follow insufficient depreciation rates) 
• amortisation of intangibles (a linear amortisation rate of 6.7% p.a. was 
applied uniformly, except for cases below the materiality threshold) 
• adjustment of tax, if it was either omitted or insufficient (tax would be 
calculated with the tax rate for the relevant year with due consideration of 
small business rebates, tax losses carried forward, and non-deductible 
expenses). (some firms, like Dir03 and PWC01, have applied personal 
income tax thresholds although they do not apply to company tax). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 16 Page 296 
The following items were also corrected when omitted or unexplainably low: 
• Financial charges on term debt would be estimated based on the amount 
of outstanding debt and the conditions (in the absence of more detailed 
information, the default interest rate applied would be Prime + 2 basis 
points). 
• Interest charges on overdraft would only be adjusted if there were strong 
reasons to believe that the average value of overdraft during the year was 
close to the year-end value and that the interest charge proposed in the 
income statement was insufficient; 
• (interest earned, by contrast, was not normally adjusted as some 
businesses were assumed to keep large portion of their cash balances 
away from the bank). 
• Member’s salary and/or drawings/dividends were added when there 
was a clear pattern of members’ remuneration in previous years, which 
had not yet been booked for the last year.  
Adjustments to retained income followed the following logic: 
• Where retained income in a year was lower than the sum of previous 
year’s retained income and current year’s profit, it was necessary to 
assess the likelihood of the previous year’s retained income.  
o If the profit history / business profile cast doubts on the previous 
year’s retained income, the latter was adjusted downwards (Ned3, 
Wec9, CS1); 
o If the profits seemed high indeed, and if there was a history of 
distribution of profits to the members, the excess profit was 
deemed to have been distributed (Ned16, BD2); 
• Where retained income in a year was higher than the sum of previous 
year’s retained income and current year’s profit, the retained income was 
usually lowered and booked against a control account (Ned13, BB4);  
• Where retained income for several consecutive years was out of touch 
with the profit history, it would be entirely re-accrued from year to year, 
with control accounts and possibly dividends acting to balance the 
adjusting entries (Wec6, Ned6).  
 
Other balance sheet or income statement items were only corrected in specific 
cases where this appeared necessary, for example: 
• Turnover was revised for Wec8 to deduct discounts granted from the 
sales; 
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• Bad debts, as indicated in interviews, were added to costs for CS3; 
• For Gob7 and Gob8, franchise fees were rebooked in a way similar to 
other franchise firms, i.e. initial franchise fee as an intangible asset and 
annual royalties as a cost item; etc. 
 
For illustration purposes, Table 16.1 presents the adjustments done for Ned3.  
Assessment of success: all the highly material issues have been addressed. 
Among the issues that remain, half seem to be valuation errors (values of assets 
and stock), which are difficult to adjust from the outside, and half seem to be 
more unusual / unexplained issues (non-bank loans, deposits).  
Overall the adjustments are regarded as relatively successful.  
The following exhibit shows summarised accounts pre- and post-adjustment 
(Ned3, 28 Feb. 2001): 
 
 
Balance Sheet pre-
adjustment 
Fix.Assets:   56K 
Intang.Asst:  375K 
Cash: 166K 
Equity:  226K 
Term debt: 185K 
Tax liab:    29K 
Net currt liab: 158K 
Balance Sheet post-
adjustment 
Fix.Assets:   56K 
Intang.Asst:  333K 
Cash: 166K 
Equity:  158K 
Term debt: 185K 
Tax liab:  55K 
Net currt liab: 158K 
Income Statement 
pre-adjustment 
Turnover: 15 945K 
Costs:   15 824K 
Tax:          0K  
Net Profit:     121K 
Income Statement 
post-adjustment 
Turnover: 15 945K 
Costs:   15 886K 
Tax:        26K  
Net profit:       33K 
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Table 16.1 - Adjustments for Ned3– Cape Petroleum CC  
(Accounting Transparency Score:  63/100  
    Intrinsic Quality Score:    29/55) 
materiality 
Item 
Details of 
problem 
Potential 
error 
in % of 
equity or 
profit m hm 
adjustment? methodology 
carrying 
value of 
assets 
mismatch in 2000 
(new bicycle racks 
seem to have been 
depreciated by 
87,5% in first year, 
but this does not 
appear in the 
income 
statement…?) 
30K 
16% of 
equity 
x  
no, for difficult – may be 
that gross value is too 
high? 
 
goodwill 
value high and not 
amortised, except 
in 2001 
6.7% * 
400K = 
26K 
22% of 
profit 
x  yes 
add linear amortisation of goodwill 
6.7% * 400000 = 26680 
members' 
equity 
mismatch 1999-00 
(profit in draft 99 
statement turns to a 
loss carried 
forward in 2000 
statement) 
55K 
30% of 
equity 
 x yes 
change profit to loss: add 28K to 
"increase of provision for costs" 
(difference between 55K and 27K of 
amortisation) 
loan 
accounts 
unexplained 43K 
23% of 
equity 
x  no  
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materiality 
Item 
Details of 
problem 
Potential 
error 
in % of 
equity or 
profit m hm 
adjustment? methodology 
member's 
salary 
not recorded in 
2001 (was over 
R100K in previous 
year, and was 
regularly 62% of 
pre-salary profit) 
75K 
62% of 
profit 
 x yes 
assume salary still at 62% of profit 
book against member's loan and tax 
liability 
accounts 
receivable 
petrol deposits: 
170K in 2001- 
very significant 
amount; cannot be 
verified 
difficult 
to 
quantify 
   no  
inventory 
inventory end of 
1999: 89K 
inventory 
beginning of 2000: 
112K 
23K 
10% of 
equity 
x  
no: don’t know which 
value is wrong 
 
tax 
liability 
missing in 2001, 
would be 48K (as 
per notes) 
48K 
40% of 
profit 
 x yes 
Add tax liability (book against retained 
income) 
 
m: material; hm: highly material 
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Table 16.2 - List of adjustments undertaken  
Firm code name AT Score IQ Score Items adjusted Success 
Ned01 53 29 Depreciation Successful 
     Drawings   
Ned02 12 6 Depreciation Successful on IS 
     Financial expenses   
     Tax  
Ned03 63 29 retained income successful 
     member's salary   
     tax liability  
     goodwill amortisation  
Ned04 53 18 interest paid Unsuccessful 
Ned05 81 37 depreciation successful 
     amortisation  
Ned06 mini     depreciation & amortisation Unsuccessful 
Ned06 maxi 21 4 depreciation  
     Equity: retained income   
     tax  
Ned08 59 29 Depreciation successful 
     Financial expenses   
     Tax  
Ned 10 79 45 goodwill amortisation neutral (was good anyway) 
Ned11 48 26 none n/a 
Ned12 63 39 director's remuneration Successful  
     member's loan  
Ned13 64 38 Retained income mostly successful 
     amortisation franchise fee  
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Firm code name AT Score IQ Score Items adjusted Success 
Ned14 65 45 none n/a 
Ned15 79 38 none n/a 
Ned16 52 32 depreciation successful 
     retained income / cash   
     tax  
Ned18 65 38 financial expenses relatively successful (good anyway) 
     franchise fee  
PWC01 56 29 tax calculation UNsuccessful 
Wec01 56 33 depreciation rates successful 
     retained income   
Wec02 37 21 fixed assets / depreciation partly successful > T30 
     current liabilities (rebook)  
Wec03 17 9 Fixed assets / depreciation partly successful > T30 
     Equity & member's loan   
     AP   
     tax calculation    
Wec04 75 43 none n/a 
Wec05 26 0 Depreciation Unsuccessful 
Wec06 45 23 Depreciation partly successful > T30 
     retained income   
     LT liabilities   
     Finance charges / deferred charges   
     tax   
Wec07 78 38 depreciation successful 
    L T liabilities (booking)  
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Firm code name AT Score IQ Score Items adjusted Success 
Wec08 40 15 Depreciations partly successful (IS but not BS) 
     Discounts granted   
Wec09 34 17 Fixed assets / depreciation partly successful > T30 
     Members’ equity   
     
Interest paid on O/D and Financial 
charges on ISA 
  
Dir01 79 36 none n/a 
Dir02 87 50 none n/a 
Dir03 73 35 goodwill amortisation neutral (good anyway) 
CS1 7 -4 depreciation Unsuccessful 
     finance charges   
     tax   
     goodwill amortisation  
CS2 66 36 depreciations  neutral (was good anyway) 
CS3 49 20 depreciations  successful on IS 
     Retained income / Operating expenses  
     tax   
     bad debts  
CS3b     AR / AP / stock successful 
CS3b     cash balance  
CS5 74 39 none n/a 
CS6 71 37 none n/a 
BD2     Retained income / dividend successful 
BD5     Fixed assets / depreciation successful 
BD6     none n/a 
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Firm code name AT Score IQ Score Items adjusted Success 
BD9     Fixed assets  successful 
     ISA (rebook)  
Gob1     Depreciation successful 
Gob2     Depreciation successful 
Gob3     Depreciation successful 
Gob5     none n/a 
Gob6     Depreciation successful 
Gob6     Interest / finance charges  
Gob7      franchise fee successful 
Gob8     goodwill amortisation successful 
Gob8     franchise royalties   
Gob9 & 10     none n/a 
Gob11     none n/a 
Gob12     none n/a 
Gob13     ISAs partly successful > T30 
Gob14     none n/a 
Gob15     none n/a 
Gob16     none n/a 
Gob18     none n/a 
Gob19     none n/a 
BB1   depreciation partly successful (IS) 
     finance charges   
     tax   
BB2     equity successful 
     tax   
BB3     none n/a 
BB4     retained profit relatively successful 
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Firm code name AT Score IQ Score Items adjusted Success 
BB5     none n/a 
BB6     amortisation patents successful 
BB7     inventory, AR (add estimates) successful 
BB8     tax relatively successful 
BB9     cash / interest relatively (T30) 
BB10     ISA / interest paid Unsuccessful 
     tax   
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Annexure 17 – Layering the balance sheet sample 
Prior to adjustments, the sample was layered as follows: 
Tier 
Businesses 
(code 
names) 
Accounting 
transparency 
Intrinsic 
quality 
Comments (non-
scored) 
A) “robust” 
(IQ>30/55 and CS2 66.0 36.0 
 
AT>60) CS5 74.4 38.9  
32 businesses CS6 70.9 37.4  
 Dir1 78.6 36.1  
  Dir2 86.6 49.6  
  Dir3 72.6 35.1  
 Ned5 78.0 33.0  
  Ned10 79.4 45.4  
  Ned12 63.0 38.5  
  Ned13 64.0 32.5  
  Ned14 64.4 44.9  
  Ned15 81.0 39.5  
  Ned18 72.0 45.1  
  Wec4 74.9 42.5  
  Wec7 77.0 41.5  
Accountant’s 
data BD2     
no major problems 
  
Gob1-3, 5-
6, 9-12, 14-
16, 18-19     
no major problems 
  BD9  
  accounts are draft, but 
no problems 
other BB7  
  3 yrs, no major 
problems 
         
       
CS3 46.5 17.0  
Wec1 56.2 33.2  
PWC01 55.6 28.6  
Ned1 54.5 28.5  
B) “workable” 
(IQ: 20-29.5) 
or IQ>30 but 
AT<60 
or IQ<20 but rich 
additional data 
15 businesses Ned3 61.0 29.0  
  Ned8 58.6 29.1  
  Ned11 47.7 25.7  
  Ned16 51.4 31.9  
  Wec2 36.7 21.2  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 17 Page 306 
Tier 
Businesses 
(code 
names) 
Accounting 
transparency 
Intrinsic 
quality 
Comments (non-
scored) 
Accountants BD5  
  qualified audit opinion 
(going concern? Fire 
destroyed records) 
  BD6  
  start-up (only 1 yr + 2 
months) 
  Gob13  
  qualified audit opinion 
in 1998 and 1999 (bec. 
litigation with Islamic 
Bank?) 
Other BB2    2 yrs 
  BB5    
1 yr, AFS with AO’s 
statement  
  BB6    
2 years but 
summarised  
         
C) Larger CS1 6.5 -3.5  
(IQ: <20/55) Ned 2 13.9 6.4  
17 businesses Ned 4 52.1 18.1  
  Ned 6 23.6 3.6  
 Wec3 22.2 10.2  
 Wec5 32.1 5.6  
  Wec6 40.8 18.3  
  Wec8 40.0 15.0  
  Wec9 31.9 16.9  
  BB1    1 yr 
  BB3    1 yr (start-up) 
  BB4    
3 yrs IS but only 
summarised BS 
  BB8    
2 years but only 
summarised IS in F00 
  BB9    2 yrs 
  BB10    only 1 year  
  Gob7-8  
  little info (Gob7: 1 yr, 
Gob8: 2 months) 
         
Excluded Ned7, 9 very poor   
 
BD1, 
Ned17, 
Gob4, 17 large 
 
 
 CS4 no accounting   
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After adjustments, the businesses could be reclassified as follows: 
 
Tier A) Robust or 
successfully 
adjusted 
Tier B) Workable 
or Adjustments 
partly successful 
Tier C) Serious doubts or only partly 
usable 
1. CS2 41. PWC01 57. Ned 2 Oct BS not usable 
2. CS5 42. Wec6 58. Ned 6 2 sets (mini/maxi) 
3. CS6 43. Wec9 59. Wec3 bold adjustments on BS  
4. Dir1 44. Ned 4 60. Wec5 remains very unstable  
5. Dir2 45. Ned11 61. Wec8 AP, LT loans and cash? 
6. Dir3 46. Wec2 62. BB1 BS not usable  
7. Ned1 47. BD5 63. BB10 BS not usable 
8. Ned3 48. BD6 64. CS1 BS not usable (exc cash) 
9. Ned5 49. Gob7 65. CS4  
10. Ned8 50. Gob8 66. Ned6mini  
11. Ned10 51. Gob13 67. CS3b  
12. Ned12 52. BB3   
13. Ned13 53. BB4   
14. Ned14 54. BB8   
15. Ned15 55. BB9   
16. Ned16 56. CS3   
17. Ned18    
18. Wec1    
19. Wec4    
20. Wec7    
21. BD2    
22. BD9    
23. Gob1    
24. Gob2    
25. Gob3    
26. Gob5    
27. Gob6    
28. Gob9    
29. Gob10    
30. Gob11    
31. Gob12    
32. Gob14    
33. Gob15    
34. Gob16    
35. Gob18    
36. Gob19    
37. BB2    
38. BB5    
39. BB6    
40. BB7    
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Tier A) Robust or successfully adjusted  
(T>30/55 and AO>60): 40 businesses 
Business 
code name 
Accounting 
Transparency 
Intrinsic 
quality 
Adjustments 
      stan spe details  Result 
1. CS2 66.0 36.0 x   depreciation 
N 
2. CS5 74.4 38.9       
  
3. CS6 70.9 37.4       
  
4. Dir1 78.6 36.1       
  
5. Dir2 86.6 49.6       
  
6. Dir3 72.6 35.1 x   amortisation 
S 
7. Ned1 54.5 28.5 x x 
depr, tax, 
drawings 
S 
8. Ned3 61.0 29.0 x x 
tax, amort, 
provision for 
costs (99), mb 
salary 
S 
9. Ned5 78.0 33.0 x   
depreciation, 
amortisation 
S 
10. Ned8 58.6 29.1 x   
depr, fin 
charg, tax 
S 
11. Ned10 79.4 45.4 x   amortisation 
S 
12. Ned12 63.0 38.5     
(Sept.01 not 
usable) 
MS 
13. Ned13 64.0 32.5 x x 
deprec, 
amortisation, 
retained 
income 
MS 
14. Ned14 64.4 44.9       
  
15. Ned15 81.0 39.5       
  
16. Ned16 51.4 31.9 x x 
depr, tax, 
dividend 
S 
17. Ned18 72.0 45.1 x   
amortisation, 
fin charges 
MS 
18. Wec1 56.2 33.2 x   
depr, 
amortisation, 
tax, retained 
income 
S 
19. Wec4 74.9 42.5       
  
20. Wec7 77.0 41.5 x x deprec, DFC 
S 
21. BD2       x add dividend 
S 
22. BD9 draft     x fixed assets 
S 
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Business 
code name 
Accounting 
Transparency 
Intrinsic 
quality 
Adjustments 
      stan spe details  Result 
23. Gob1     x   depreciation 
S 
24. Gob2     x   depreciation 
S 
25. Gob3     x   depreciation 
S 
26. Gob5           
  
27. Gob6     x   depreciation 
S 
28. Gob9           
  
29. Gob10           
  
30. Gob11           
  
31. Gob12           
  
32. Gob14           
  
33. Gob15           
  
34. Gob16           
  
35. Gob18           
  
36. Gob19           
  
37. BB2 2 yrs   x x 
tax, mb 
contribution 
S 
38. BB5 1 yr, AFS        none 
S 
39. BB6 2 years        amortisation 
S 
40. BB7 3 yrs 
    
x 
add estimate 
of inventory 
and AR for 
F'99 
S 
 
Stan = standard adjustments; spe = specific adjustments 
Result of adjustments: S: successful; MS: mostly successful 
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Tier B) Workable or Adjustments partly successful 
Business code 
name 
Accounting 
Transparency 
Intrinsic 
quality 
Adjustments 
      stan spe details  Result 
              
41. PWC01 55.6 28.6 x   tax 
U 
42. Wec6 40.8 18.3 x x 
tax, deprec, 
retained 
income, 
negative liab, 
fin charges, 
tax liab 
IQU 
43. Wec9 31.9 16.9 x x 
depr, retained 
income (loss), 
interest 
IQU 
44. Ned 4 52.1 18.1 x   
financial 
charges 
U 
45. Ned11 47.7 25.7       
I 
46. Wec2 36.7 21.2 x   
tax, deprec, 
ctrl account 
IQU 
47. BD5 
qualified audit 
opinion  
    
x 
net carrying 
value of assets 
S 
48. BD6 start-up         
  
49. Gob7 start-up     x franchise fee 
IQU 
50. Gob8 start-up     x franchise fee 
IQU 
51. Gob13 
qualified audit 
opinion  
    
x add ISA 
IQU 
52. BB3 1 yr       
none (but 
start-up) 
 
53. BB4 
only summarised 
BS     x 
retained 
income 
IQU 
54. BB8 
IS in F00 is 
summarised   x   tax 
IQU 
55. BB9 2 yrs   x   
financial 
charges 
IQU 
56. CS3 46.5 17.0 x x 
depr., costs 
Dec00, tax, 
bad debts, ---
AP/AR/cash 
PS 
Stan = standard adjustments; spe = specific adjustments 
Result of adjustments: S: successful; U: unsuccessful; IQU: sufficient to enable 
an upgrade of intrinsic quality score; PS: partly successful 
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Tier C) Serious doubts or only partly usable 
Business 
code 
name 
AT 
score 
Intrinsic 
quality 
score 
Adjustments 
Comments / parts 
usable 
      stan spe details  Res   
                
57. Ned 2 13.9 6.4 x   
depreciation, 
amortisation 
PS 
Oct BS not usable 
58. Ned 6 23.6 3.6 x x 
deprec, tax, 
retained 
income 
U 
2 sets (mini/maxi) 
59. Wec3 22.2 10.2 x x 
depr., tax, 
AP, equity 
PS 
bold adjustments on BS 
(AP / negative equity) 
60. Wec5 32.1 5.6 x   depreciation 
U 
remains very unstable / 
non-transparent with lots 
of group transactions 
61. Wec8 40.0 15.0 x x 
depr, fin 
charg, tax, 
TO 
(discounts) 
PS 
not clear why AP, LT 
loans and cash are so high 
62. BB1 1 yr   x   
depr, fin 
charges, tax 
PS 
BS not usable (negative 
liab, carrying values of 
assets) 
63. BB10 
only 1 
year     x negative ISA 
U 
 BS not usable (negative 
liab) 
64. CS1 6.5 -3.5 x   
depr, fin 
charges, tax, 
amortisation 
U 
BS not usable (exc cash) 
Stan = standard adjustments; spe = specific adjustments 
Res = Result of adjustments: S: successful; U: unsuccessful; IQU: sufficient to 
enable an upgrade of intrinsic quality score; PS: partly successful 
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Annexure 18 – Detailed ratio methodology  
This Annexure presents, for each topic of the sequence, the way that ratios were 
defined and refined throughout the iterative model-shaping process, the rationale 
behind the choice of ratio formulas, the selection of thresholds, as well as the 
way that the data difficulties were handled in a case by case manner. The results 
of the ratio analysis are presented in Annexure 19.  
 
1. Market and Pricing  
The first fundamental requirement for a business to be worthy of finance is a 
sufficient market, either presently (last annual turnover), or in terms of growth 
potential, coupled with a selling price that covers the operating costs. 
Initially it was attempted to assess market and pricing separately, with the first 
one relating to the quantity of sales while the second one referred to the 
profitability, i.e. the ability of turnover to cover the costs. This would have 
enabled to identify mispricing caused by management mistakes, as opposed to 
deficient market potential. 
However, a separate assessment was not practical, firstly because the turnover 
figures found in financial statements are not usually broken down between 
quantity and unit price, and secondly because the only benchmark for turnover 
that would apply across the types of SMMEs assessed was the breakeven point – 
which conceptually included the profitability of operations. Therefore, it was 
decided to assess these two issues jointly, based on the following ratios.  
 
i) MARGIN OVER BREAKEVEN 
The estimated breakeven point is derived from the firm’s cost structure – the 
rationale being that a firm which has heavy fixed costs needs a higher turnover 
than a firm whose costs are usually variable. The normal formula for a breakeven 
calculation is as follows: 
Breakeven = 
Turnover
stsVariableCo
FixedCosts
−1
 
Applying this formula to the data from the case studies and balance sheet sample, 
it was found that the breakeven point was, in some cases, stable over time, but in 
other cases, prone to fluctuations. To avoid distortion, it was decided to use an 
average value of breakeven over the relevant period, which is explained below.  
The margin over beakeven (later MBE) is therefore calculated as follows: 
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Margin over breakeven = 1−
reakevenEstimatedB
overLatestTurn
  
Estimated breakeven = Average 
periodTurnover
stsVariableCo
ixedCostsCorrectedF












−1
 
Period = the last years during which the fixed costs have been relatively 
stable in real terms (from -10% to +25% p.a. nominal 
growth), or, if fixed costs have fluctuated more 
strongly, the last year only 
Variable costs =       Σ  (Cost of sales + Salaries and related costs +  
 Franchise costs + Electricity, gas and water +  
Transport and vehicle expenses)  
Adjusted fixed costs = Σ [Rent, Depreciation & amortisation, Other 
operating costs, Interest and finance charges] (as 
adjusted) but prior to extraordinary costs, 
member’s salary and tax 
 
ii) TURNOVER GROWTH  
To assess the potential of market growth, the current turnover growth was 
observed (where data were available). It was calculated as: 
G = 1
Pr
−
overeviousTurn
overLatestTurn
 
 
 
The following technical decisions were made to solve dilemmas in 
implementation: 
1. Owing to evidence that members’ remuneration is usually determined 
according to expected profits (see Annexure 7), the members’ salaries are 
kept out of consideration in the breakeven calculation. 
2. The level of detail of cost data was not always sufficient to operate a 
correct distinction between fixed and variable costs (electricity and water 
are sometimes included in the rent; motor vehicle expenses sometimes 
include repairs on vehicles). The impact on the result is expected to be 
minor. In the case of BB08, the analysis could not be undertaken at all for 
lack of distinction in the cost items.  
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3. The cost and turnover data referring to reporting periods different from 
12 months had to be manually corrected. In one case the reporting period 
was officially 12 months but the accountant explained that the business 
owner had been absent for approximately 6 months on pilgrimage, 
causing a drop in turnover and costs; this year was therefore treated as a 6 
months period, but marked with a * to signal possible distortions.  
4. In some rare cases from the “larger” sample (Ned06, Wec02 and Wec03, 
Wec08), there was uncertainty on the reliability of turnover figures. In 
these cases the ratios were nevertheless calculated on the basis of 
reported figures, but a * was used to mark the result as possibly biased. 
Except for Ned6, all these cases were cases of a turnover deficit.  
5. The ratios were distorted each time a firm’s variable costs exceeded 
100% of the same year’s turnover. In most cases, this happened in the 
start-up year, when the turnover is too low to show significant results 
(occasionally even on two consecutive years). To avoid negative 
breakeven values, it was proceeded as follows: 
- For the same year’s calculation purposes, the rate of variable costs to 
turnover was brought back to 99%, resulting in very high, but positive 
breakeven values. 
- For the purpose of calculating an average breakeven point to be 
compared with the latest turnover, outliers were ignored whenever 
possible. The average was therefore built on other years’ values, to the 
effect that they were possibly too optimistic. In that case the distortion on 
the margin was again marked with a * 
- When there was no other value to compare turnover to, the very high 
value resulting from a 99% cost rate was used, but the result was 
similarly marked with a *. 
6. Fixed costs and the ratio of variable costs to turnover were not always 
stable, affecting the breakeven calculation. This deserves more extensive 
comments, below.  
 
THE APPLICABILITY OF FIXED AND VARIABLE COSTS  
The breakeven calculation is based on the premise that a firm’s costs are either 
fixed (i.e. independent of the volume of activity that takes place), or variable. In 
mathematical terms, the costs are either constant on each period, or proportional 
to small changes in sales, so that profit becomes a linear function of sales, with 
breakeven being the critical turnover at which profit is exactly zero.  
This representation of costs is built on the assumption of a static enterprise 
structure, whereas many SMMEs, especially when young and growing, are 
effectively in a dynamic process, building themselves up through gradual 
investments – so that turnover growth is often accompanied by an increase in 
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fixed costs. Even a phased breakeven model is not practical in those SMMEs 
where the frequency of investments is higher than that of accounting reports. 
Indeed, the cost analysis of the businesses from the case studies and balance 
sheet sample showed that, among the 64 firms, only half could be described as 
having proper fixed costs. Although these fixed costs were generally increasing, 
it was found possible to identify a period of two or more years during which 
fixed costs had been, in real terms, relatively stable.  
The applicability of the fixed costs assumption to the other half of the sample 
was found problematic for the following reasons: 
• In 11 cases data were insufficient, either because the lack of breakdown 
made a tentative cost classification impossible (BB8) or because they had 
provided only one period report (10 cases); 
• 21 had strongly fluctuating fixed costs, with 4 (all in the ‘larger sample’) 
experiencing a significant decrease (by more than 10% p.a. in nominal 
terms) and 17 facing significant increases of fixed costs throughout the 
period (over 25% p.a. in nominal terms).  
Also, in 9 cases, the standard deviation of the ‘variable costs to turnover’ ratio 
was higher than 10%.  
This explains why, to make the most sense out of the breakeven analysis, an 
average breakeven point was estimated based on a period with stable fixed costs. 
Even then, the breakeven point was sometimes very unstable. In most cases, it 
was growing, possibly due to a tightening in variable costs (as for Ned3). In 
other cases, it was decreasing, reflecting either an improper reporting of costs in 
the latest period (suspected for Ned6 and Ned2), or an improvement in the 
margin on variable costs, possibly due to improved sourcing (especially BD2). In 
these cases for more conservative results the earlier (higher) values of breakeven 
were included in the average calculation. 
 
 
THRESHOLDS  
The model-testing based on the balance sheet sample showed that it is important 
to distinguish between young and older firms. For firms that had been in 
existence for less than 24 months at the time of their last balance sheet, turnover 
growth either cannot be calculated or is unlikely to be predictive of future 
growth. However, there is a hope that the young firm will grow its turnover 
significantly and neutralise its deficit against breakeven – unless the deficit is 
large (see below).  
For older businesses, a negative margin over breakeven is a problem, since it 
means that the business has not achieved sufficient turnover to cover its fixed 
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costs. However, such problem is only not necessarily serious.  
To determine the threshold considered ‘serious’, it was argued that a firm which 
is more than 2 years away from breakeven is at serious risk. Indeed, businesses 
in the sample are already at least 18 months old and, as the literature has shown, 
their equity basis is likely to be slim. In a period of two years beyond their 
current age (bringing them to, at least, the age of 3,5 years), losses can erode 
their equity and their financial structure to such a point, that financial costs 
inflate and make it impossible for the firm to ever reach profitability.  
However, rather than using a complex algorithm, which which would not be 
justified in the data context, the ‘seriousness’ of the turnover problem, for 
businesses older than 2 years, was operationalised as follows: 
• Firms with a negative MBE and a negative (past) turnover growth were 
deemed as having a serious turnover insufficiency; indeed it is likely that 
their failure to grow will remain in future, so that they will not reach their 
breakeven point; 
• This applies also to firms whose (nominal) turnover growth is below 
inflation, as it means that the business is declining in real terms – while 
the fixed costs are likely to follow the inflation.  
• Firms with a (past) turnover growth higher than inflation, were deemed as 
having a serious turnover insufficiency if their MBE was under -40%, 
which corresponds to the sample’s median growth rate compounded over 
a period of 2,5 years. (All businesses of the sample achieved, over their 
life or over the period covered by the data, a median growth of 14% p.a.; 
1.14 ^ 2.5 – 1 = 40%). 
 
2. Working capital 
Even a firm which has a sufficient market and profitable operations may 
experience difficulties if its operations require much working capital, or if its 
debtor quality is poor. Unfortunately, the data accuracy proved insufficient for a 
sample-wide evaluation of bad debts, so that the issue of working capital is only 
studied through ratios representing the turnover of current assets and current 
liability items. 
 
i) NEED FOR WORKING CAPITAL 
The need for working capital corresponds to the time that elapses between 
payments made and payments received for a product or service. Contributing 
factors are the need to keep stock (raw materials, work in progress and finished 
products) and the credit granted to customers; on the other hand the need for 
working capital is reduced by the credit granted by suppliers as well as deposits 
paid by customers.  
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The need for working capital hence is very dependent on the nature of the 
business, with some businesses requiring high levels of stock (especially in 
specialised retail and manufacturing) and/or credit to customers (especially in 
‘business to business’), which cannot always be matched by supplier credits. For 
a clear and comprehensive picture of the working capital situation, the rotation of 
each item is considered, in days of turnover: 
 
 
Need for Working Capital = Inventory Turnover + Customer credit  
- Supplier credit – Customer advances  
  (In days of turnover) 
With:  Inventory Turnover = 360×
Turnover
Inventory
   (if applicable) 
 Customer credit = 360×
Turnover
vableTradeRecei
   (if applicable) 
  Supplier credit = 360×
Turnover
leTradePayab
   (if applicable) 
 Customer advances = 360×
Turnover
Deposits
  (if applicable) 
Note: For the purpose of summing, all ratios are calculated with the 
annual sales as denominator – although correctly trade payables and the 
stock turnover for raw materials should be related to the cost of sales.  
 
A positive need for working capital is not a problem: it is frequent in certain 
industries. Assuming that SMMEs’ cash cycle tends to follow a monthly cycle 
(which is the case when salaries are paid at the end of each month and represent 
a significant portion of cash outflows), the need for working capital can become 
a problem when it exceeds 30 days of turnover. Indeed, it means that if a firm 
experiences a cash shortage at the end of a month, it may not be able to recover 
before the end of the following month. The problem is likely to be serious if the 
need for working capital exceeds 60 days.  
These thresholds apply across industries, even though they are more likely to be 
reached in some sectors than in others. For example, restaurants do not normally 
grant credits to their customers and most food stocks cannot be kept for more 
than a few days; therefore a restaurant with a need for working capital of 20 days 
can be regarded as performing badly, but such a ratio does not per se constitute a 
financial risk, so the ratio value would not trigger a poor creditworthiness score. 
Conversely, although it is probably inevitable for a jewellery business to have a 
very high need for working capital because of the high value of stock that it must 
keep, this high ratio will be entered in the creditworthiness score, since it does 
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represent a genuine vulnerability of all firms in this sector.  
 
The case studies (specifically case study 6) further shed light on the need to 
consider the duration of supplier credit in addition to the overall working capital 
cycle. Indeed, firms like CS6 which make up for their slow collection of 
accounts receivable and/or slow inventory turnover by considerably delaying the 
settlement of their trade debts, may have a reasonably balanced working capital 
cycle, but are dependent on their suppliers’ goodwill. A deterioration in the 
debtors collection or in the rotation of stock can be critical as the supplier credit 
may not stretch any further.    
Therefore, the final framework opted for the following combination of 
thresholds: 
benign problem serious problem 
a) 30 < NWC < 60 days 
Or b) 
     SC > 60  
     0 < NWC < 30  
Or c) 
     SC > 75  
     NWC > -15 
 
d) NWC > 60 days  
Or e) 
     SC > 60 
     30 < NWC < 60 
 
In compiling the ratios, a few data reliability aspects may have affected the the 
results:  
• The working capital may have seasonal or cyclical character, and 
studying it on the basis of an annual balance sheet may not reflect the 
average situation throughout the year; 
• Some accounts in the larger sample may not reflect debtors and creditors 
properly, possibly because businesses do not keep proper records. 
Especially there is a suspicion that firms with very rudimentary 
accounting systems do not account for their debtors and creditors at all 
(this problem had been suspected in case study CS3 as well).   
For 23 of the 59 businesses (39%), the accounts receivable are either zero 
or less than 4 days of turnover, which in some cases is justified by the 
activity (restaurants, supermarkets), but in other times looks suspicious. 
For example, the balance sheets of Wec01, a catering and cleaning 
business, show no accounts receivable, although it would be surprising if 
the firm were always paid in cash by its corporate clients. On the other 
hand the opposite effect may happen, as in the case of Wec9 which, when 
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handing over his accounts to me, warned that “there is a mistake in these 
accounts, I told my accountant that I don’t have debtors, they have all 
paid me, but she wrote this figure in the accounts” (R 274 000, almost 
25% of annual turnover). 
• An additional problem is that the accounts receivable and payable may 
not distinguish between trade and other accounts. In particular, accounts 
payable may include tax, city, telephone or other creditors, possibly even 
the short-term portion of term loans. (Among accounts receivable the 
distinction between trade and other receivables was more frequent, 
although not systematic.) This could cause an over-estimation of supplier 
credit, and accordingly an under-estimation of the need for working 
capital.  
 
 
3. Equity  
When assessing the creditworthiness of a business, it is essential to consider the 
capital structure, especially the level of equity – which measures the 
committment of the owner as well as the firm’s buffer in case of losses. This 
enables identifying whether the business can sustain additional debt.  
For small and very small firms which start with a very thin equity base, profits or 
losses can cause great fluctuations of the equity ratio from one year to the next. 
Therefore, since the purpose of this ratio is to assess the quality of the long-term 
capital base, the assessment shall be based on (a) the mean equity ratio over the 
period, (b) the last equity ratio and (c) the evolution of equity over time. The 
emphasis is on the evolution of equity itself and not the evolution of the equity 
ratio, since investments in a particular year can cause the equity ratio to 
temporarily plunge, even if the equity itself follows a steady growth pattern 
which is likely to be sustained in future.  
 
i) EQUITY RATIO  
The equity ratio is calculated as follows: 
Equity ratio = 
Assets Total Adjusted
loans Members' Equity  Adjusted +
  
Mean equity ratio = Average (ER (t), ER (t-1), etc) 
Adjusted Equity = Equity as adjusted 
Adjusted Total Assets = Total assets as adjusted  
 
The members’ loans were included in the equity ratio as they are used in SMEs 
as quasi-equity.  
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ii) EQUITY GROWTH  
Since the aim is mainly to identify the existence of a growth pattern, the focus is 
not so much on the rate of compound equity growth from the first to the last year 
available, as the direction of equity change from year to year throughout the 
period. Thereby the following firms would be considered as having a clear equity 
growth pattern: 
• a firm whose (corrected) equity was initially negative, then becomes and 
stays positive,  
• a firm which has had uninterrupted growth of equity over the period – 
with interruption of growth being understood as a decline by more than 
2% in a single year; 
• a firm which has had more years of growth than of decline, and whose 
compound equity growth over the period exceeds 15% p.a. 
In firms for which less than 3 years of data were available, this test could not be 
undertaken.  
 
THRESHOLDS  
A negative equity ratio, which would result from accumulated losses and the 
member’s inability to cover them, is doubtless a serious problem, since the firm 
is technically insolvent. Financial institutions will probably be reluctant to 
support an SME with a negative equity, unless the owners provide sufficient 
collateral.  
A ‘benign problem’ with regard to equity could be defined as the risk that a loss 
erodes the capital base – that is, the absence of a clear equity growth pattern, 
combined with a low equity ratio.  
To determine an appropriate value for a “low” equity ratio, international 
comparisons were sought. Wagenvoort (2003b p. 26-28) shows that in a 
European sample of small manufacturing and construction businesses, 
shareholder funds represent 34% of total assets on average. Hommel & 
Schneider (2003 p. 59; p. 84) show that German firms with a turnover of less 
than EUR 1 million have an average equity ratio of 13.5% in 2001, with more 
than 50% of them having a negative equity (typically secured by personal assets 
of company owners). Dietsch (2003 p. 97) suggests that 25% of French SMEs 
with a turnover below EUR 2,5 million have an equity ratio below 20%, while 
the median equity ratio in that size category is 32%. Guiso (2003:124) indicates 
that Italian [manufacturing] firms employing less than 30 employees have an 
average equity ratio of 19.8% (median of 23.9%).  
From these sources it would seem that average SMMEs have an equity ratio in 
the range of 20% to 35%, while ratios under 20% can be regarded as low. 
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The equity base was therefore deemed problematic when the mean equity ratio 
was below 20% and the equity was either decreasing, stable, followed an erratic 
pattern, or if the data were insufficient to recognise a pattern.  
 
PRACTICAL CALCULATION ISSUES 
As in the case studies, the equity ratios incorporate the members’ loans, even 
when they are interest-bearing.  
• The equity of sole proprietors is not very meaningful since they have no 
separate existence from their members (Ned13, Gob15, Gob18, Ned1, 
Ned11, Wec8, Ned2) 
• Among firms with a weak accounting, the member’s loan figure is 
subject to uncertainty: it is suspected that member’s loan is determined 
“by difference” rather than positively established from transactions with 
member...  
• Also included were loans from directors (PWC01; Ned12) or other 
individuals or groups for whom a direct link to the members was 
recognisable (e.g. Ned5: wives of members, Gob13: owner’s family trust; 
Ned4: same surname as the member).  
• Loans whose provider was unknown (other loan in PWC1-99, Gob16, 
Ned3, Wec5, Dir01, BD6, Wec04) and loans from affiliated companies 
(for Gob10 it is the major source of LT finance!; for Wec5 and Gob13 it 
is less significant), were not considered as quasi-equity.  
• The calculation of the equity ratio was waived in BB1, Wec3 and Ned2, 
where equity was presented as positive and all liabilities are negative – 
these balance sheets had obviously been balanced in an artificial way 
which made any calculations highly hypothetical.  
 
Equity is compared with total assets, which may be distorted  
• if the carrying value of assets is wrong (e.g. fixed assets are not 
depreciated) 
• if the accounts receivable are not properly recorded.  
• If there are high loans receivable, e.g. to owner or affiliated companies 
(Ned10, 15, 1, Gob1, 6, Wec3, WEC05) 
• If there are high intangible assets (setup costs in BB3),  
• If there are high deferred charges (Wec6, Wec5, also BB10 in “other 
receivables”) 
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4. Debt maturity structure 
In addition to the equity ratios, the debt maturity structure deserves attention, 
since an excessive reliance on short-term debt, especially when combined with a 
high proportion of long-term assets, causes vulnerability.  
The literature frequently uses the current ratio (short-term assets divided by 
short-term liabilities), which gives a view of a business’ ability to meet short-
term commitments without having to rely on operating income or outside 
financing. However, the current ratio can take any value from 0 to infinite, and is 
highly sensitive to errors in accounting of the current position. In addition, the 
ratio is difficult to interpret: indeed, a low current ratio does not necessarily 
indicate an over-reliance on short-debt; it may also stem from a low value of 
inventory or accounts receivable.  
Therefore, we rather opted for a combination of two easy-to-interpret ratios 
whose values remain in a limited range: the current debt ratio and the net current 
debt ratio. The latter is the most decisive, since it indicates maturity mismatches 
between assets and liabilities. The current debt ratio is used to place the 
mismatch into its context and judge about its seriousness.  
 
CURRENT DEBT RATIOS  
 
Net current debt ratio = 
 assets Total
assets) Short term -debt  m(Short ter
 
Current Debt Ratio = 
 assets Total
debt  Short term
 
Short term debt = Trade and other accounts payable, Tax payable, Bank 
overdraft, and Other current liabilities (except current portion of long-
term debt or provisions for costs) 
Short term assets = Inventory, Trade and other accounts payable (but 
exclude cash and cash equivalents) 
 
THRESHOLDS  
Again, to define a threshold for a “high” current debt ratio, international 
benchmarks were sought. Hommel & Schneider (2003 p. 85) suggest that in 
Germany, firms with a turnover lower than EUR 2.5 million have a ratio of 
short-term bank loan to total assets of between 11% (East German 
maunfacturing) and 23% (West German retail). This does not include trade debt 
and other short-term debt. Wagenvoort (2003b, p. 28) shows that trade debt 
represents app. 22% of balance sheet total among European small businesses – 
consistent with the findings of Dietsch (2003:96) and Guisi (2003:124) who 
report trade credit ratios of 25% and 19.8% respectively for French and Italian 
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small firms. Hence, assuming average levels of 17% for short-term bank debt, 
22% for trade credit and 6% for other short-term debt (various accounts payable, 
including tax), the benchmark for a ‘normal’ average short-term debt would be 
45% of total assets. 50% and 75% can then be accepted as high and very high 
ratios.  
The framework therefore selected the levels of 50% and 75% of total assets as 
thresholds for benign or serious over-reliance on short-term debt. However, the 
current debt ratio is widely dependent on the industry, and a high current debt 
ratio may not be a problem if the maturity structure of liabilities should match 
the structure of assets. 
The net curent debt ratio is unlikely to be industry-specific, because the asset 
maturity structure should vary in the same way as the debt structure. Therefore, 
there is no problem as long as the Net current debt ratio is negative or reasonably 
balanced (<10%). A ratio higher than 10% may be a problem if the current debt 
ratio is also high.  
Therefore, the thresholds are set at a current debt ratio over 50% and 75% 
respectively, combined with a net current debt ratio over 10%.  
 
5. Liquidity reserves 
While it should not be the focus of an SME to maintain large liquidity surpluses, 
their presence does constitute a buffer against odds and hence should contribute 
to a better creditworthiness assessment. On the other hand, continuous cash 
deficits may be a sign of vulnerability, especially if they seem unlikely to be 
covered by future cash flows.  
Unlike the previous analysis of the working capital cycle, which purported to 
review the effect of operations on the firm’s liquidity situation, this ratio aims to 
recognise firms which structurally have low liquidity reserves. Therefore the 
emphasis is on the mean ratio over the period. 
There are several caveats in basing a creditworthiness assessment on the liquidity 
figure found on a balance sheet: 
• The liquidity figure can be affected by short-term variations (e.g. 
investment or major sale) and not be representative of the firm’s usual 
liquidity situation.  
• Seasonal fluctuations are not reflected in the accounts.  
• Ideally, a study of liquidity reserves should be based on slack, i.e. the 
sum of cash and unused line of credit (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997:188) 
rather than cash and equivalents. Indeed, a negative liquidity situation 
may correspond to an authorised overdraft (which may be sustained over 
a long period) or to a crisis situation. Unfortunately, quantitative data on 
overdraft limits were often unavailable.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 18 Page 324 
• These problems apply to static as well as dynamic liquidity reviews: 
year-end liquidity figures from the balance sheet are unlikely to follow a 
meaningful pattern, as each figure is prone to short-term fluctuations. 
For these reasons, the judgment on liquidity was based on the following 
approach: 
 
Mean liquidity ratio = mean [ LR(year t); LR (year t-1); etc] 
Liquidity ratio =  
assets Total
Overdraft Bank  - sequivalentCash Cash +
 
 
and for firms with structural cash deficits: 
Cash flow to Overdraft = 
overdraft net Mean 
  flowcash  operatingLast 
  (if applicable) 
       Where Operating cash flow = Net Profit after tax + Depreciation +  
  Amortisation + Change in provisions  
         Mean net overdraft6 =  Mean (Bank overdraft – Cash and equivalents) 
  (if positive) 
 
THRESHOLDS 
SMMEs sometimes voluntarily keep their liquidity ratio low, for various reasons. 
Some businesses have invisible cash reserves for emergencies, such as an 
overdraft facility or the ability of the owner to inject additional funds as required. 
In addition, productive investment opportunities may be more promising than 
keeping liquid assets in the bank, which do not usually earn a good return. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this scheme, the mean liquidity ratio will only be 
presumed problematic if negative.  
The lack of liquidity will be deemed a serious problem if the cash deficit is 
significant and unlikely to be covered by cash flow. Since the liquidity figures, 
for the reasons exposed above, are affected by short-term fluctuations which may 
be in the range of +/- 5% of total assets, a significant cash deficit is understood 
as a mean liquidity ratio below -5% of total assets. Asssuming future cash flows 
equal to past values, the overdraft is deemed unlikely to be covered by cash flow 
                                                 
6 It may seem illogical to relate the “last” cash flow to the “mean” overdraft. The preference for 
the mean overdraft was motivated by the short-term variability of overdraft figures. To 
control for distortions the same analysis was repeated, using the last overdraft instead of the 
mean overdraft figure. The results are only marginally different, with Dir3, Gob15 and Ned15 
being then classified as having a serious problem instead of a benign problem, and Ned13 
being classified as having a benign instead of serious problem. Wec6’s problem becomes 
unsignificant but Gob6 joins the list of firms with a benign problem.  
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when the cash flow to overdraft ratio is below 1 (including a negative cash flow 
to overdraft, which would stem from a negative cash flow). 
 
6. Financial costs  
The model has, so far, devised ratios to assess the quality of operations and the 
soundness of the firm’s financial structure. It remains to link the two areas in 
order to identify possible problems resulting from a combination of mediocre 
scores in both areas.  
Indeed, some firms classified as borderline both with regard to the success of 
their operations and the soundness of their financial structure, may experience 
significant difficulties if their financing costs consume most of the operating 
profits. This is measured by the interest coverage, which indicates the number of 
times that operating earnings cover the total interest costs. From the two interest 
coverage measures available (using either operating profit or operating cash 
flows as a numerator), the first one was preferred, since a firm with high fixed 
assets are likely to have substantial depreciation charges, which would neutralise 
the positive cash flow interest coverage. On the other hand, the member’s salary 
was excluded from the coverage calculation as it was found to be frequently used 
as profit distribution, rather than being a fixed cost. 
We therefore calculate interest coverage as follows: 
 
Interest coverage = 
Interest
ofitOperating Pr
 
Operating Profit = Profit before interest, tax, exceptional items and 
members’ salaries  
 Adjusted Interest = Interest and Financial Charges Paid (incl. lease) 
    after adjustments 
 
THRESHOLDS 
Undoubtedly, SMMEs have a serious problem if their coverage ratio is lower 
than 1. The threshold for the mild problem is more difficult to define as the 
operating profit, as defined, must cover financial costs and the member’s salary – 
which are not related in terms of proportions. Therefore the threshold is 
arbitrarily set at 2,5. This value is higher than the threshold of financial 
vulnerability used by Guiso (2003), viz. 1,4.  
The pilot testing of the framework revealed that interest coverage ratios are very 
unstable; therefore they are best reviewed according to lowest, highest and mean 
value for the period. 
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TECHNICAL ISSUES 
Again, a few technical issues arose when compiling the ratios: 
• Adjustments to financial charges may have affected some ratios.  
• Some businesses do not indicate their members’ salary separately from 
other salaries; in those cases the profit calculation was post members’ 
salaries, but this is not necessarily a problem, as the firms which are 
concerned are more likely to be those for which members’ salaries are a 
fixed cost rather than a profit distribution;  
• As in the case studies, the interest ratio was sometimes very volatile from 
year to year, justifying the use of a mean value for assessment purposes. 
However, the number of years available to build an average varied from 
one to four, so that “the values are unequally smoothed”.  
• A few firms had no interest charges, either throughout the period, or only 
on specific years. In this latter case (four firms), it was feared that 
excluding the error values from the average calculations might cause an 
under-estimation of the overall coverage. To control for this risk, an 
alternative mean value was calculated by adding the operating profits 
from all years and dividing this value by the sum of finance charges for 
the period. There was only one case in which this alternative calculation 
method resulted in re-allocating the firm to the higher category (Ned12), 
while in another case, surprisingly, the result was to downrate the firm to 
the lower category (Gob16)7.  
• Similarly, there was a frequent occurrence of negative operating profits, 
which might distort the average calculations. Again, to control for this 
risk, alternative mean values were estimated as above, leading to three 
cases of reclassification (Dir02, Wec04 and BD9).  
 
7. Owner’s commitment  
This area was not initially part of the framework, but was added after the pilot 
test, for it was found to strongly improve the predictive value of the ratio 
framework, when applied to CS1’s 1999 financials. (In 1998, CS1’s ratio values 
were as mediocre as for other young firms, which recovered as they grew – 
whereas CS1 had to be liquidated two years later, in 2000. Closer scrutiny of that 
particular case suggested that the absence of recovery might have been 
anticipated in light of the owner’s lack of commitment, visible in particular from 
his remuneration pattern).  
                                                 
7 This reclassification was caused not by the single occurrence of a zero-interest, but the 
occurrence of another year with very low interest, leading to a coverage ratio above 300% for 
that year, which was smoothed out by the new mean calculation procedure.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, members’ reward is not always easily detected from 
the financial statements, as different businesses choose different ways of 
remunerating their owners. Apart from fringe benefits (use of company car, etc), 
most SMME owners are rewarded primarily by means of a salary, which acts as 
both a retribution for the work done and a return on the capital invested. In most 
cases the member’s salary is explicitly indicated in income statements, but in 
some cases it may be comprised under general salaries. The members’ salary is 
often determined at year-end according to the profit, in similarity to a dividend. 
Some entrepreneurs choose to reinvest their salary in the business by increasing 
their members’ loans, while others de facto increase their cash pay by reducing 
their member’s loans. Sole Proprietors, meanwhile, tend to use drawings rather 
than salaries, while the larger companies are more likely to combine salaries and 
dividends.  
Under these circumstances, the most consistent approach is to consider the total 
amount of cash that flow from the business to the member, as the sum of salaries, 
dividends and drawings minus the variation in member’s loan, as the best proxy 
for the owner’s cash reward. 
A high member’s salary under a poor business performance suggests poor 
commitment, contrary to a low salary in a context of good performance. But 
since even the owners of poorly performing firms have a right to a decent living, 
the ratio must be assessed in conjunction with the absolute salary per month and 
per owner. Both values must be read in light of the phase of the firm in its 
lifecycle, as young or growing businesses are likely to need substantial additional 
resources in future.  
As Case study 1 shows, the owner’s commitment can fluctuate significantly from 
one year to the next, and a single year of moral hazard can draw a firm into 
difficulties. Therefore, unlike the previous criteria, the attention is not on average 
values but on the year with the highest remuneration.  
This leads to the following indicators: 
 
MEMBERS’ CASH REWARD  
 
Monthly member’s cash reward = 
months ofnumber   members ofnumber 
rewardcash    Members'
×
 
Reward to Cash Flow (RCF) = 
FlowCash   Adjusted
reward Members'
  
Where  Adjusted Cash Flow = Pre-tax Profit + Amortisation and 
Depreciation + Members’ salaries 
and  Members’ cash reward = Members’ salaries + Dividends  
  & drawings – ∆ member’s loan 
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THRESHOLDS 
Two cases can be interpreted as a lack of commitment of the owner to his 
business: (1) the situation where the salaries deplete the firm’s value by 
significantly exceeding the operating profits and (2) the situation where a 
business is in a growth phase, hence is likely to need substantial additional 
resources in future, but is precluded from accumulating such resources by high 
salaries, both in the absolute and in proportion of the profits. Since “squandering 
a firm’s current resources away”, as it were, is more damaging that hindering its 
growth, the former situation is deemed to represent a serious, the latter a more 
benign problem. 
Acknowledging that the operating profit must cover not only the member’s 
remuneration, but also financial and other costs, a (highest) ROP ratio 
(Remuneration on operating profit) of 100% suggests that the firm is distributing 
part of its value to the owner. However, if such high ratio comes from a very low 
operating profit while the salary is very modest in the absolute, it should not be 
interpreted as a lack of commitment. Only when the monthly salary exceeds R 
7000 per member (32% above Stats SA average) does it represent a (serious) 
problem.  
In addition, a mild threshold was defined for growing businesses. To simplify, 
any firm aged less than 3 years, or a firm for which there is other (qualitative) 
evidence that it is in a growth phase, were regarded as growing. The thresholds 
were set at an absolute monthly salary per member of R7000 coupled with a 
salary-to-performance ratio of at least 75%.  
 
TECHNICAL / DATA RELATED PROBLEMS 
Again, the implementation of this assessment is not without problems, as 
members’ salaries are one of the area identified as most affected by accounting 
opacity. More specifically, the following issues are worth noting: 
• The operating profit may be affected by improper reporting of costs, as 
discussed above, and is therefore subjected to some corrections; When 
the operating profit is very low, the ratio of remuneration to operating 
profit will automatically be high. Similarly, when operating profits are 
negative, the ratio becomes meaningless, as it would be inadequate to 
blame the problems on a lack of commitment by the owner when the 
most visible issue is a lack of profitability. In such a case, only the 
absolute salaries can give further clues.  
• The number of members receiving remuneration is not always known, so 
that the absolute monthly salary per member could not always be 
calculated. This concerns 23 of the 64 SMMEs. The analysis is therefore 
based on the 41 remaining firms.  
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• Some draft statements either do not show any remuneration, or show a 
high salary which is then revised down. Another possibility is that 
members’ remuneration be included in “salaries” (i.e. with the 
remuneration of employees) instead of being disclosed separately. 
Because of these effects, a number of zero-values may hint at incomplete 
disclosure rather than absence of remuneration; 
• Some components of members’ remuneration are difficult to capture 
systematically, such as interest payments or “drawings by loan provider” 
(Gob19) – not always properly recorded (in CS it was not included 
anyway, cf CS2) 
• While the evolution of member’s loan is relevant to the concept of 
member’s cash reward, it can introduce distortions as the year-end 
members’ loan may be subject to short-term fluctuations.  
• It may be relevant to distinguish between SPs (remunerated mainly 
through drawings, except Gob19 who uses both salary and drawings), 
CCs (members’ salaries), and Ptys (where there is a directors’ 
remuneration and possibly a remuneration of shareholders through 
dividends). In such a case, members’ salaries and dividends were added 
to show the total remuneration of related parties in relation to the 
operating profit –See BD2. 
 
 
8. Variability  
NB: This analysis was performed on all firms which had provided at least two 
sets of financials. 
In accordance with literature, the instability of a business was identified as a 
factor affecting creditworthiness, as it makes predictions hazardous – but it is the 
most difficult to operationalise, since instability can materialise in a considerable 
diversity of ways.  
The most straightforward method was to consider the standard deviation of all 
the ratios calculated, over the period covered by the data. The volatility analysis 
however was limited to the static annual ratios, ignoring all growth rates as well 
as the margin over breakeven (since breakeven was calculated as an average 
across the period). The standard deviations considered therefore referred to: the 
need for working capital, the equity ratio, the current debt ratio, the liquidity 
ratio and the interest coverage. In addition, to replace the margin over breakeven 
which could not be calculated each year, and obtain an estimation of the stability 
of operations, the operating margin was calculated for each year nad its standard 
deviation was added to the ones cited above. The operating margin was 
calculated as follows: 
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Operating Margin = 
Turnover
Profit Operating
 
Operating Profit   =  Sales – (Cost of sales + Staff  costs + Rent and 
charges + Transport and vehicle expenses + Repairs & 
maintenance + Advertising + Franchise costs + Other 
operating expenses) 
 
Although the period varied from one business to the next, this did not seem to 
distort the results, as there was no consistent correlation between the number of 
years provided and the standard deviation of the various ratios.  
Defining thresholds or comparing the businesses was difficult, though, as there 
were six standard deviations, corresponding to ratios which were technically 
very different (some confined within boundaries, e.g. between 0 and 100%, 
others where any positive or negative value was possible) – so that from one 
ratio to the next, the range of possible standard deviations was greatly variable.  
Therefore, for this particular dimension of creditworthiness, the methodology 
adopted a comparative judgement rather than absolute thresholds. Standard 
deviations were compared between firms and the values that were relatively 
higher were identified as indicators of instability – the lower values conversely 
were identified as indicators of stability. The firms that presented a high number 
of high volatility ratios and a low number of low volatility ratios were regarded 
as at risk.  
Specifically, the procedure was as follows: out of the 37 firms (including case 
studies) for which a volatility analysis was possible, the 5 with the lowest 
standard deviations and the 5 with the highest were isolated. This analysis was 
repeated for each ratio.  
Then each firm was reviewed to establish how often they had been identified as 
one of the most or least stable. Firms which had never been classified among the 
most stable, but had been 3 or more times among the least stable, were regarded 
as having a serious volatility problem. Firms which had been 3 or more times 
among the least stable, but 1 or 2 times among the most stable, were considered 
as having a potential volatility problem.  
 
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS 
In studying the firms’ volatility the following problems were encountered: 
First, the varying number of years available distorts volatility calculations; while 
for case studies this problem could be mitigated by further knowledge of the 
single cases, it becomes more difficult to undertake case-by-case controls in a 
larger sample. Therefore, the analysis of volatility was restricted to firms which 
have provided at least 3 consecutive annual statements. 
Volatility is a concept which can be applied to different measures and for a 
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single entity it may be found that some ratios are volatile while others are not. 
Any “compound measure of volatility” would seem artificial and inappropriate.  
The purely statistical nature of the measure of standard deviation makes it 
difficult to define benchmarks to determine what is high, medium, or low 
volatility.  
For these reasons, it was proceeded as follow: 
1. Two profile indicators were computed for all 32 firms which had 
provided at least three sets of financial statements: the compound 
turnover growth rate p.a. and the ratio of investment in fixed assets to 
turnover over the period. This was done because the case studies had led 
to the expectation that a high turnover growth combined with high 
investments tended to destabilise firms, whereas low growth combined 
with low investments seemed to cause very stable firms; 
2. The standard deviation was calculated on each of the 7 relevant ratios. In 
each case the 5 highest and the 5 lowest values were singled out by 
means of colour marking. (If the 6th or 7th values were very close to the 
5th value, they were included in the special analysis).  
3. The 32 businesses were reviewed one by one to establish which one had 
the highest number of “highest” or “lowest volatility values”. This 
enabled to identify extreme firms which appeared as  
• “very volatile” (having scored at least 3 times among the highest 
and never among the lowest, or 4 times among the highest and 
once among the lowest) 
• “volatile with contradictions” (having scored at least 3 times 
among the highest, but 1 or 2 times among the lowest) 
• “very stable” (having scored at least 3 times among the lowest 
and never among the highest)  
• “stable” (having scored twice among the lowest and never among 
the highest) 
• “stable with contradictions” (having scored at least twice among 
the highest, but once among the lowest) 
 
The firms thus classified were then compared with the initially established 
growth- and investment profile to verify the applicability of the hypotheses from 
the cases studies.  
(Then the firms which had provided only 2 sets of financials were also reviewed: 
if they scored at least 4 times among the 13 highest [out of 49] they were 
considered as highly volatile, or volatile if 3 times).  
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Annexure 19 – Detailed results of ratio analysis  
This annexure presents detailed results of the ratio calculations and an analysis of 
the values obtained. In its last section, the annexure includes a synthetic list of 
ratios for all 64 businesses analysed.  
NB: In general, the ratio methodology was applied to 64 businesses, which had 
provided usable financial statements. In addition, four tentative ratios were 
estimated for case study micro enterprise CS4, although it did not have financial 
statements: the breakeven calculation, the working capital cycle, the interest 
coverage and the remuneration to cash flow were estimated using precise 
interview data. This is why these tables refer to 65 instead of 64 businesses.  
 
1. Turnover sufficiency  
Turnover deficiencies were encountered in fourteen out of 65 firms; nine were in 
the lower tiers of accounting transparency.  
Table 19.1 – Distribution of Margin over Breakeven (MBE) 
 
Severe lack of sales 
(MBE < - 40%) 
Mild lack of sales 
(-40%< MBE < 0) 
Sufficient sales 
MBE > 0  
Total 
Tier A 2 3 34 40 
Tier B 3 3 9 16 
Tier C 2 1 8 11 
Total 7 7 51 65 
 
Firms with turnover deficiencies can be further classified into three categories, 
depending on their real growth and the size of their deficits.  
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Table 19.2 – Firms whose turnover is below breakeven 
 
serious deficit  
(MBE < - 40% or  
no real growth) 
mild deficit  
(-40% < MBE < 0, 
growth > inflation) 
problematic 
growth pattern (BE 
growth > TO 
growth) 
Start-ups and  
Very young 
firms 
BB6; BB3 (start-
ups), BD6 (young),  
BB5 (recently 
bought) 
Gob8: start-up  
(growth expected) 
 
Older firms 
MBE<-40%:  
Gob16*8, CS4, 
Wec3, BB9  
No real growth:  
CS1, CS2 
 
MBE<0: 
Dir01, BD5, Wec2 
0<MBE<15%: 
Gob5, Wec8, PWC1 
 
2. Need for working capital  
The working capital cycle was studied for a sample of 65 sets of financials. This 
includes interview evidence for CS4 (Tier C) as well as two contradictory sets of 
data for case study firm CS3 (Tier B) and sandal manufacturer Ned6 (Tier C). 
BB1 and BB10 (both Tier C) were excluded from the analysis due to unreliable 
data. 
The results of the working capital analyses are subject to accounting accuracy, as 
cash-based accounting may cause an underestimation of current assets and debts, 
while the excessive use of control accounts and the lack of distinction between 
trade and other debt may artificially inflate them, as in Wec3 (see more extensive 
discussion in Annexure 18).  
Table 19.3 summarises the situations with regard to working capital problems. 
                                                 
8 Gob16 was a special case as the owner had spent half of the last year on a pilgrimage, leaving 
the business dormant. 
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Table 19.3 – Reasons for working capital problems 
serious need for 
working capital  
(>60 days) 
mild need for working capital  
(>30 days) 
 
 
long 
customer 
credit 
(>60) 
slow 
stock 
rotation 
(>60) 
long 
customer 
credit 
(>45) 
slow 
stock 
rotation 
(>45) 
low 
supplier 
credit or 
else 
excessive 
use of 
supplier 
credit (>30 
days with 
0<NWC<30) 
 
Tier 
A 
Wec7, 
Gob16 
BB7 
CS6, 
Ned10, 
Ned13, 
Ned15, 
BD9 
Ned15, 
Gob2 
Ned1 
BD2, Gob1, 
Gob6 
13/40 
(33%) 
Tier 
B 
BD6 
BD6, 
BB9 
Wec6, 
Wec9, 
PWC1 
 Gob13  
6/17 
(35%) 
Tier 
C 
Ned6mini    
Ned2, 
Ned6max 
Wec5 
4/7 
(57%) 
 
3. Equity  
The equity ratio was studied for a sample of 63 sets of financials. This includes 
two contradictory sets of data for case study firm CS3 (Tier B) and sandal 
manufacturer Ned6 (Tier C). Interview evidence for CS4 was insufficient. BB1, 
BB10 and CS1 (all Tier C) were excluded from the analysis due to unreliable 
data. 
A specific review of the 19 firms with low mean equity ratios (below 20%) 
reveals that, surprisingly, young and black SMMEs are not more likely to be 
undercapitalised than white and older businesses. Although many black owners 
had restricted personal funds to invest, several of them have devised strategies to 
balance the capital equation, either by starting small against initial ambitions 
(Wec6, for example, operated for several years as a specialised retailer instead of 
directly starting manufacturing operations), or by pooling resources (as in Wec7, 
a partnership between 6 members). This relatively good capitalisation of black 
businesses may be a result of the sample’s bias, as a large number of black 
businesses were excluded from the sample for lack of proper accounts.  
Table 19.4 shows, however, that capital intensive firms (i.e. manufacturing, 
construction or transport firms), are more likely than service or trade firms to 
have a low equity ratio, as they tend to contract more debt to fund their assets. 
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Table 19.4 – Lack of equity, race, age of the business and type of activity 
 Serious lack of equity 
(MER<0) 
Lack of equity 
(MER<20%) 
Sample size 
and % 
Black 
4 (Dir2, Wec4, Gob18, 
Wec3) 
4 (Gob3, Wec5, CS3b, 
CS5) 
8 / 31 (25%) 
Young 
4 (Dir2, Wec4, Gob18, 
BB2) 
4 (Ned14, Ned8, BB3, 
BB4) 
8 / 31 (25%) 
White  
>3 yrs 
2 (BD9, BD5) 
3 (Gob1, PWC1, 
Ned6) 
5 / 14 (36%) 
trade & 
services 
3 (Gob18, BD5, 
Wec3) 
7 (Ned14, Gob1, 
Gob3, BB4, Ned8, 
BB3, BB8) 
10 / 43 (23%) 
capital 
intensive 
4 (Dir2, Wec4, BD9, 
BB2) 
5 (PWC1, Ned6, 
Wec5, CS3b, CS5) 
9 / 20 (45%) 
Overall 7 12 19 / 63 (30%) 
Figures do not add up to totals as the owner of BB8 has not indicated his race. 
Black and young categories may overlap. 
The way that these firms coped with a low equity ranged from sister company 
loans to bank debt; almost all had important non-financial debt, especially trade 
credit.  
 
4. Dependence on short-term debt  
The current debt and net current debt ratios were studied for a sample of 63 sets 
of financials. This includes two contradictory sets of data for case study firm 
CS3 (Tier B) and sandal manufacturer Ned6 (Tier C). Interview evidence for 
CS4 was insufficient. BB1, BB10 and CS1 (all Tier C) were excluded from the 
analysis due to unreliable data. 
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Table 19.5 – Current debt ratio (CDR) of firms with a high NCDR 
 
NCDR >10% 
CDR ≤ 50% 
NCDR >10% 
50% < CDR ≤ 75% 
(mild problem) 
NCDR >10% 
CDR > 75% 
(severe problem) 
Tier A 8 
6  
(Ned8, BD2 , Gob1, 
Gob11, Gob19, BB2) 
3 
 (Wec4, BD9, 
Gob18) 
Tier B 3 2 (BB4, BB8) 1 (BD5) 
Tier C 1 0 1 (Wec3) 
Total 12 8 5 
 
The sample analysis revealed that: 
• High current debt ratios often occured in firms with a negative equity, 
especially when operating in the trade and services sector. Table 19.6 
shows that firms in capital-intensive industries were less likely to depend 
on short-term debt, possibly as a result of their easier access to asset 
finance as well as scale effects (see Annexure 24). 
• Again, the data showed no clear evidence of the relevance of firm age or 
owner’s race for firms’ dependence on short-term debt. 
Table 19.6 – Excessive reliance on short-term debt, by industry  
 50% < CDR ≤ 75% CDR > 75% 
Problem 
firms 
trade & 
services 
7  
(Ned8, BD2, Gob1, Gob11, 
Gob19, BB4, BB8) 
3 
 (Gob18, BD5, 
Wec3) 
10 / 43 (23%) 
capital 
intensive 
1 
 (BB2) 
2  
(Wec4, BD9) 
3 / 20 (15%) 
Overall 8 5 13 / 63 (21%) 
 
 
5. Lack of liquidity reserves 
The liquidity ratio was studied for a sample of 64 sets of financials. This includes 
two contradictory sets of data for case study firm CS3 (Tier B) and sandal 
manufacturer Ned6 (Tier C). Interview evidence for CS4 was insufficient. BB1 
and BB10 (both Tier C) were excluded from the analysis due to unreliable data. 
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The 23 firms whose mean net overdraft exceeds 5% of total assets are diverse in 
terms of age but, as Table 19.7 shows, tend to be over-represented in the ‘very 
small’ size category: 55% of very small firms had liquidity problems, compared 
with 29% of small and medium-sized firms.  
Table 19.7 – Firms lacking liquidity reserves 
 mild problem severe problem 
 
MLR < 0 
CFOD < 1 
MLR<5% 
CFOD>1 
MLR < -5% 
CFOD < 1 
micro (n=4) 0 0 0 
very small (n=31) 
2 (6%) 
(Wec6, CS1) 
6 (19%) 
Dir1, Ned10, 
Gob9, Gob10, 
Gob15, Ned6 
9 (29%) 
(Ned13, BD5, BD6, , 
Gob12, Gob14, BB5, 
BB7, BB9, Wec9) 
small (n=18) 0 
4 (22%) 
CS6, Dir3, 
Ned15, BB2 
2 (11%) 
(Gob1, Gob13) 
medium (n=11) 1  (9%) (Ned8) 0 
2 (18%) 
(Gob3, BD9) 
Total sample 
(n=64) 
3 (5%) 10 (16%) 13 (20%) 
 
6. Interest coverage  
The interest coverage was studied for a sample of 67 sets of financials. This 
includes two contradictory sets of data for case study firm CS3 (Tier B) and 
sandal manufacturer Ned6 (Tier C), as well as interview evidence for CS4  
Coverage problems typically occur among SMMEs which combine high debt 
and low profit, approximately 30% of the sample. However, Table 19.8 shows 
that less than 55% of low-profit firms have an interest coverage problem; the 
remaining 45% are not endangered, because they carry little debt. Similarly, 
high-debt firms do not have a coverage problem when their profits are sufficient.  
Very young firms are also slightly more likely to have coverage problems, 
indicating either a transitional stage until they reach profitability and repay their 
debt, or better survival rates among firms with a high coverage. 
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Table 19.8 – Propensity for low interest coverage among some types of firms 
 
Mean interest 
coverage < 1 
(serious 
problem) 
1 < Mean 
interest coverage 
< 2,5 (mild 
problem) 
Mean 
interest 
coverage > 
2,5 
Proportion 
with low 
interest 
coverage 
very young firms 
(less than 3 years) 
9 (CS2, BB5, 
Wec2, BD6, 
Gob8, BB3, 
BB9, Wec3, 
CS4) 
4 
(Ned14, Wec9, 
Ned4, Ned11) 
20 39.4% 
high debt firms  
(mean ER <20%)* 
2 [4] 
(BB3, Wec3) 
[CS1, CS4]  
5 [6] 
(Ned14, Gob1, 
Gob3, BD5, 
Wec5) [BB1] 
11 [12] 
[BB10] 
38.9% 
[45.5%] 
low profitability 
firms (mean OM< 
10%) 
8  
(CS2, CS1, 
BB6, Gob8, 
BB3, BB9, 
Wec2, Wec3) 
7 
(Ned14, BD5, 
Gob1, Gob3, 
Ned4, Ned11, 
Wec5)  
13 53.6% 
Full sample 11 11 45 31.3% 
OM: Operating Margin, calculated as operating profit to turnover 
* The statistics in [square brackets] on high debt firms include those whose 
balance sheet figures were considered too unreliable for an equity ratio 
calculation, yet appeared likely to have a low equity. 
 
7. Owner’s remuneration  
The owners’ remuneration could only be studied for a sample of 43 sets of 
financials. 21 firms were excluded because of insufficient data either on the 
amount paid to members or on the number of members.  
 
The cases identified in Table 19.9 suggest a problem of over-remuneration of the 
member(s), which can be interpreted as a lack of commitment of the members to 
their business. In three cases, additional information corroborated this 
interpretation (exceptionally low equity in construction business BD9; sale of 
Wec09’s panelbeating business in the months following the review; resignation 
of two members of marketing firm Ned8 during the last year of the study). 
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Table 19.9 – Firms with high members’ remuneration 
 young or growing; 
maxRCF>75% and 
R>7000 (mild problem) 
maxRCF>100% and R>7000  
(serious problem) 
 
one year 
several 
years 
one year 
several 
years 
possible 
member 
loan effect
9
 
Tier A 2 
(Ned3, 
Ned8) 
3 
(BD9, 
Gob3, 
Gob11) 
4 
(Gob6, 
Gob18, 
Ned1, BB7) 
0 3 
(Ned5, 
Ned13, 
Gob12) 
Tier B 3 
(BB8, BD6, 
Wec2) 
1 (Wec9) 0 0  
Tier C 0 0 0 1 (CS1)  
Total 5 4 4 1 3 
  
 
8. Volatility  
The volatility analysis could only be performed on firms which had provided at 
least two sets of balance sheets and income statements: this applied to 37 
enterprises.  
Detailed results of the volatility analysis are presented in the following tables. 
For illustration purposes, Table 19.12 presents exemplary standard deviations of 
a cross sample of SMMEs, as well as their growth rate and investment pattern. 
                                                 
9 These are firms whose RCF exceeds 100% and monthly pay exceeds R7000 at one point in their 
history when including the decrease in members’ loan; but the values go back below 
thresholds when the variation in members’ loan is ignored. Their classification as problem 
firms is conditional on the assumption that the decrease in members’ loan represents a trend 
and not a short-term fluctuation.  
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Table 19.10 – Most volatile and most stable firms among those with at least 3 
annual accounts 
“very volatile” (having scored at least 3 times among 
the highest and never among the lowest, or 4 times 
among the highest and once among the lowest)  
4: Dir1, BD9, Gob9 
BD6 
“volatile with contradictions” (having scored at least 3 
times among the highest, but 1 or 2 times among the 
lowest)  
7: Wec8, Ned15, 
Gob18 (Wec4, Gob16, 
Ned2, BB4) 
average or no dominant pattern emerging 18: 18 other firms 
“very stable” (having scored at least 3 times among the 
lowest and never among the highest)  
1: Gob1 
“stable” (having scored twice among the lowest and 
never among the highest) 
4: Dir3, Ned13, Ned1, 
PWC1 
“stable with contradictions” (having scored at least 2 
times among the lowest, but once among the highest) 
3: Gob3, BB7, Gob19 
NB: Firms in (brackets) are those which have provided only 2 sets of financials. 
Table 19.11 – Volatility and turnover growth 
Growth category number of firms 
very stable, 
stable or stable 
with 
contradictions 
very volatile or 
volatile with 
contradictions 
no real growth 
(nominal growth 
rate < 3% p.a.) 
8 
(Ned1, BD2, Gob2, 
Gob13, Gob19, Ned5, 
Gob15, Gob18) 
2 (25%) 
(Ned1: stable, 
Gob19: stable with 
contradictions) 
1 (12.5%) 
(Gob15: volatile) 
low growth 
(nominal growth 
rate < 13% p.a.) 
11 
(Dir3, Gob9, PWC1, 
Gob1, CS2, Ned13, 
Gob3, Gob6, Gob12, 
Gob14, BD5) 
5 (45%) 
(Ned1: stable, 
Gob19: stable with 
contradictions) 
1 (9%) 
(Gob9: very 
volatile) 
relatively high 
growth (>25%) 
5 
(Wec5, Ned4, CS3, 
CS1, CS6) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
very high growth 
(>40% p.a.) 
7 
(Wec7, Wec6, Dir1, 
Ned15, CS5, Wec2, 
Wec8) 
0 (0%) 
3 (43%) 
(Dir1: very volatile 
Ned15, Wec8: 
volatile) 
full sample 37 8 (22%) 11 (30%) 
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Table 19.12 – Volatility and investment pattern 
Investment to 
turnover 
category 
number of firms 
very stable, 
stable or stable 
with 
contradictions 
very volatile or 
volatile with 
contradictions 
no or negative 
investments  
(I/TO < 0) 
7 
(Gob6, BD5, Ned10, 
Gob14, Gob15, 
Gob18, Gob19) 
1 (14%) 
(Gob19: stable 
with 
contradictions) 
1 (14%) 
(Gob18: volatile) 
low investments 
(I/TO < 0.5%) 
9 
(Ned3, Gob2, CS2, 
CS3, Wec5, Ned13, 
Ned1, BD2, Gob3) 
3 (33%) 
(Ned1, Ned13: 
stable, Gob3: 
stable with 
contradictions) 
0 (0%) 
relatively high 
investments  
(3-15%) 
7 
(Ned5, Gob12, Wec6, 
BB7, Gob13, CS6, 
PWC1) 
2 (29%) 
(BB7: stable with 
contradictions, 
PWC1: stable) 
0 (0%) 
very high 
investments 
(>15% of TO) 
7 
(Ned4, CS5, Wec8, 
Wec7, Dir1, Gob9, 
Gob10) 
0 (0%) 
3 (43%) 
(Dir1, Gob9: very 
volatile; Wec8: 
volatile) 
full sample 37 8 (22%) 11 (30%) 
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Table 19.13 –Growth rate, investment rate and standard deviation of key ratios for selected firms 
 
Very volatile 
Volatile with 
contradictions 
Relatively volatile  
case studies 
Stable Very stable 
 Dir1 BD9 Wec8 Gob18 CS1 CS5 CS6 Dir3 Ned13 Gob1 CS2 
Number of years included 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 
Growth-Investment profile: 
• Turnover growth p.a. 
65% 17% 42% 2% 4.4% 57.5% 37.2% 6% 11% 10% 10.4% 
• Investment to turnover 20% 1% 16% 0% 2% 16% 9% 1% 0% 3% 0% 
Standard deviation of: 
• Operating margin  13.0% 8.6% 2.6% 1.3% 7% 5% 4% 2.0% 0.6% 0.5% 1% 
• Equity ratio 
31.0% 55.8% 3.5% 86.9% 21% 18% 19% 10.2% 13.8% 4.3% 7% 
• Current Debt Ratio 
27.5% 55.7% 3.5% 86.9% 19% 13% 6% 10.0% 13.8% 6.7% 7% 
• Liquidity Ratio 
11.9% 39.2% 14.3% 44.0% 8% 16% 18% 10.7% 11.7% 15.3% 4% 
• Owner’s remuneration 
in % of operating 
margin 
21.5% 125.1% 105.3% 55.8% 34% 6% 9% 15.4% 7.5% 4.4% 0% 
• Interest coverage  
72.6 3.0 124.4 0.0 2.39 2.54 5.88 0.37 0.2 0.1 0.50 
• Need for working 
capital 
23.8 19.6 37.3 14.9 15.73 15.49 24.55 1.6 12.9 9.5 2.32 
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9. Full List of Ratios for the Balance Sheet Sample (post adjustment) 
Business 
code 
name 
Margin or 
deficit 
over 
breakeven 
Need for 
working 
capital (in 
days of 
TO) 
Supplier 
credit (in 
days of 
TO) 
Mean 
equity 
ratio  
Mean 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean net 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean 
liquidity 
ratio  
Last cash 
flow to 
overdraft 
ratio 
Mean 
interest 
coverage 
ratio 
Max 
remune-
ration to 
cash flow 
Max 
monthly 
remune-
ration per 
member 
Tier A) Robust or successfully adjusted 
CS2 -8.8% 3.0 2.2 92.7% 7.3% 0% -4.1% 5.1 0.2 128.1% R 6,063 
CS5 111.6% -28.7 39.7 10.1% 30.9% 23% 15%   32.2 88.8% R 15,000 
CS6 216.9% 44.1 22.4 30.2% 55.5% -11% -40.2% 1.7 5.0 87.0% R 4,196 
DIR 001 73.3% -16.8 31.9 55.6% 40.9% 31% -16.1% 1.7 5.8 75.6% R 5,571 
DIR 002 -6.3% 20.1 29.8 -8.8% 39.4% -18% 12.1%   0.2 109.6% R 15,000 
DIR 003 -54.7% -3.3 7.0 51.2% 34.6% 24% -7.3% 2.7 0.8 0% n/a 
Ned01 -6.0% 32.7 11.9 77.2% 5.0% -15% 2.3%   -0.4 43.1% R 667 
Ned03 105.1% 3.0 6.2 21.0% 42.9% 7% 11.1%   5.0 94.1% R 1,417 
Ned05 14.9% -5.9 10.7 71.3% 19.7% 13% -3.0% 2.9 2.7 114.3% R 3,989 
Ned08 67.4% -26.3 85.4 11.0% 71.7% 22% -0.3% -5.6 3.0 139.7% R 21,852 
Ned10 28.2% 37.4 18.5 58.5% 41.5% -14% -10.1% 4.0 6.3 102.5% R 12,248 
Ned12 169.8% 14.8 18.6 72.8% 19.0% -15% 64.2%   4.6 36.3% R 7,661 
Ned13 46.1% 37.0 16.9 29.3% 35.8% -38% -12.5% 0.6 406.7 68.8% R 4,388 
Ned14 87.7% -6.7 16.1 15.2% 18.9% 8% 7.8%   5.3 104.7% R 10,276 
Ned15 0.0% 46.4 71.7 37.0% 63.0% -18% -8.8% 1.06 1.0 0.0% R 0 
Ned16 51.8% -16.9 20.5 28.4% 29.6% 21% 62.9%   9.5 220.5% R 5,277 
Ned18 1.7% -8.9 13.1 51.6% 9.3% 6% 14.6%   3.1 33.7% R 2,301 
WEC01 66.6% -1.6 10.6 75.8% 14.9% 3% 43.9%   3.9 402.1% R 4,380 
WEC04 186.9% -32.6 115.1 -5.8% 98.5% 26% 15.4%   9.8 30.7% R 14,286 
WEC07 77.0% 123.3 30.1 53.5% 17.7% -17% 26.0%   66.3 112.0% R 62,742 
BD2 -10.7% 10.1 30.1 31.8% 60.6% 17% 40.6%   1.6 34.6% R 153 
BD9 -54.3% 31.6 37.3 -53.6% 144.3% 55% -85.2% 0.1 -33.8 -10.8% R 7,500 
GOB 01 61.6% 3.2 53.8 16.3% 67.6% 18% -20.2% 0.3 3.4 98.4% R 10,677 
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Business 
code 
name 
Margin or 
deficit 
over 
breakeven 
Need for 
working 
capital (in 
days of 
TO) 
Supplier 
credit (in 
days of 
TO) 
Mean 
equity 
ratio  
Mean 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean net 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean 
liquidity 
ratio  
Last cash 
flow to 
overdraft 
ratio 
Mean 
interest 
coverage 
ratio 
Max 
remune-
ration to 
cash flow 
Max 
monthly 
remune-
ration per 
member 
GOB 02 -7.7% 45.4 61.3 47.4% 52.6% -39% 5.1%   1.0 77.0% n/a 
GOB 03 41.4% 14.5 23.7 18.2% 73.2% -12% -20.2% 0.5 216.7 97.8% n/a 
GOB 05 22.6% -5.2 38.0 27.0% 48.3% -3% 2.9%   2.3 94.7% n/a 
GOB 06 10.7% 12.2 36.4 38.9% 59.7% -15% 11.0%   2.9 66.7% n/a 
GOB 09 53.0% -0.5 0.5 77.2% 22.8% 23% -18.5% 3.8 68.7 160.0% n/a 
GOB 10 111.1% -2.1 2.1 85.5% 14.5% 14% -10.3% 19.3 #DIV/0! 3.7% n/a 
GOB 11 -8.5% -2.0 16.9 30.2% 69.8% 17% 8.3%   -3309.3 -94.0% n/a 
GOB 12 9.3% 29.4 29.3 33.6% 66.4% 4% -31.3% 0.4 1.8 47.6% n/a 
GOB 14 28.2% 29.1 30.0 36.1% 49.9% -29% -9.6% 0.4 7.5 6.6% n/a 
GOB 15 178.5% 16.3 20.0 34.7% 65.3% -33% -9.4% 11.3 13436.2 94.7% n/a 
GOB 16 39.8% 74.7 27.7 39.0% 13.0% -32% 0.7%   5.7 161.8% n/a 
GOB 18 16.9% -11.6 16.9 -163.1% 263.1% 206% 24.5%   1.7 23.5% n/a 
GOB 19 89.9% -1.6 5.8 43.7% 56.3% 18% 14.6%   16.1 98.2% n/a 
BB 02 59.5% 0.1 10.1 -25.4% 50.2% 30% -16.9% 5.9 1485.7 148.2% R 2,165 
BB 05 -63.7% 27.4 1.0 58.7% 16.9% 12% -14.5% -0.3 365.8 183.7% R 2,571 
BB 06 51.4% 24.3 22.4 90.2% 9.8% -10% 13.9%   7148.4 109.5% R 8,479 
BB 07 14.8% 119.1 76.9 31.1% 68.9% -25% -31.7% 0.1 2980.4 124.5% n/a 
Tier B: Workable or Adjustments partly successful 
PWC01 12.0% 55.1 58.4 14.4% 46.5% -29% -0.9% 6.3 3.8 76.0% R 31,551 
WEC06 53.2% 47.9 9.9 52.1% 29.0% -39% -2.9% -8.4 5.5 107.5% R 35,058 
WEC09 11.4% 32.7 33.2 20.2% 48.7% 2% -15.0% 0.1 2.1 38.6% R 10,000 
Ned04 140.3% -15.4 33.7 29.8% 21.0% 9% 18.3%   16.2 99.4% R 7,126 
Ned11 0.9% -7.5 7.5 75.1% 18.3% 17% -0.5% 57.0 1.5 0.0% R 0 
WEC02 98.5% 14.0 0.0 67.9% #VALUE! #VALUE! 0.8%   8.6 47.3% R 25,365 
BD5 435.6% -5.9 28.7 -52.4% 129.1% 77% -62.0% 0.2 #DIV/0! 70.7% R 5,773 
BD6 69.1% 163.0 66.5 29.2% 54.6% -22% -5.5% -12.5 19.8 60.8% R 15,458 
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Business 
code 
name 
Margin or 
deficit 
over 
breakeven 
Need for 
working 
capital (in 
days of 
TO) 
Supplier 
credit (in 
days of 
TO) 
Mean 
equity 
ratio  
Mean 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean net 
current 
debt ratio  
Mean 
liquidity 
ratio  
Last cash 
flow to 
overdraft 
ratio 
Mean 
interest 
coverage 
ratio 
Max 
remune-
ration to 
cash flow 
Max 
monthly 
remune-
ration per 
member 
GOB07 10.6% -10.7 24.6 91.6% 8.4% 6% 10.0%   248.0 0.0% n/a 
GOB08 52.3% -28.6 42.6 73.1% 26.9% 18% 5.9%   5.8 0.0% n/a 
GOB 13 46.4% 35.1 27.2 37.2% 42.2% 6% -25.5% 0.6 7.8 #DIV/0! n/a 
BB 03 36.9% -3.3 88.4 17.6% 30.3% 2% 2.3%   2.1 0.0% n/a 
BB 04 62.4% 8.2 17.6 10.2% 58.8% 21% 4.4%   7.8 118.4% n/a 
BB 08 -96.8% -2.9 2.9 17.0% 74.5% 75% 65.2%   -6.8 0.0% n/a 
BB 09 160.2% 174.4 42.6 24.7% 71.1% -9% -55.5% -0.3 45.4 85.0% R 9,496 
CS3 -55.3% 9.2 12.2 64.3% 25.3% -17% 18%   -0.5 0.0% R 0 
Tier C) Serious doubts or only partly usable 
Ned02 47.8% 50.6 0.0 36.4% 2.7% -20% 0.0%  #DIV/0! 103.6% R 4,000 
Ned06 51.9% 39.1 7.7 19.6% 36.8% 1% -8.7% 3.5 4.4 103.1% n/a 
WEC03 -44.3% -52.5 120.7 -45.1% 128.5% 69% 3.7%   70.6 85.0% n/a 
WEC05 -44.8% 11.6 43.8 11.7% 47.5% 9% 2.0%   -3.8 0.0% R 1,862 
WEC08 144.2% -99.5 163.4 52.2% 47.6% 28% 12.9%   1281.2 22.4% R 6,975 
BB 01 -20.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   -23.9 523.6% R 7,959 
BB 10 -44.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   -112.8 0.0% R 0 
CS1 35.7% -4.7 27.6 n/a n/a n/a -1.1% -14.4 1.6 0.0% R 15 000 
CS4 23.7% 50.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   2.3 127.0% R 14,506 
 
n/a indicates that data were insufficient (in quantity or quality) to perform the ratio calculation.    
#DIV/0! indicates that the denominator was 0.  
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Annexure 20 – International comparisons of various ratios  
1. Trade credit terms 
 Our sample (South African SMMEs, 1997-2002)  Fafchamps’ sample (Zimbabwean industrial firms, 1997-98) 
Duration of 
supplier 
credit 
All 
(62) 
black* 
(32) 
white* 
(24) 
micro   
& very 
small 
(33) 
Small  
(18) 
Medium 
(11) 
 
All 
(167) 
African 
(19) 
White 
(81) 
Micro 
(13) 
Small 
(56) 
Medium 
(49) 
Large 
(46) 
1-15 days 29% 31% 29% 33% 39% 0%   13% 11% 10% 15% 7% 18% 13% 
16-30 days 31% 34% 29% 42% 11% 27%   41% 42% 40% 62% 43% 31% 41% 
31-45 days 19% 22% 17% 15% 17% 36%   23% 16% 28% 15% 25% 27% 22% 
46-60 days 3% 0% 8% 0% 6% 9%   13% 11% 11% 8% 12% 12% 7% 
over 60 days 18% 13% 17% 9% 28% 27%   11% 21% 11% 0% 12% 12% 17% 
average delay 
(days) 
32 34 31 24 41 49 
 
45 50 42 30 42 42 60 
* Sum of black and white does not correspond to 'all' as some have not indicated their race 
Source: Fafchamps 1999 for Zimbabwe / Balance sheet sample for South Africa - (based on firms which do receive supplier credit, 
i.e. all firms in the sample except Ned02 and Wec02) 
Compared with Fafchamps, our sample shows a stronger representation of very short credit (probably due to greater representation of 
micro- and very small businesses, which do not receive much trade credit), and of very long credit (over 60 days). The sample's 
proportion of very long trade credit is in line with Fafchamps' statistics for African businesses. Compared with Fafchamps, there is no 
significant difference between black and white (but black in the South African sample is mainly composed of Indian and coloured, 
unlike in Zimbabwe).  
As in Fafchamps, there are significant differences between size classes. Small and Medium firms are much more likely to use very 
long credit (over 60 days).  
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 Our sample (South African SMMEs, 1997-2002)  Fafchamps’ sample (Zimbabwean industrial firms, 1997-98) 
Duration of 
customer credit 
All 
(47) 
black* 
(21) 
white* 
(19) 
micro & 
very 
small 
(25) 
Small  
(12) 
Medium 
(10) 
 
All 
(164) 
African 
(35) 
White 
(71) 
Micro 
(20) 
Small 
(50) 
Medium 
(43) 
Large 
(47) 
1-15 days 34% 33% 32% 40% 33% 20%   11% 26% 4% 30% 16% 2% 4% 
16-30 days 15% 10% 21% 24% 8% 0%   38% 37% 37% 30% 42% 49% 26% 
31-45 days 9% 10% 11% 0% 25% 10%   21% 9% 23% 10% 14% 30% 23% 
46-60 days 19% 29% 5% 28% 8% 10%   15% 14% 23% 15% 14% 9% 23% 
over 60 days 23% 19% 32% 8% 25% 60%   15 14% 14% 15% 14% 9% 23% 
average delay (days) 40 42 40 33 36 61  50 41 57 46 54 41 58 
* Sum of black and white does not correspond to 'all' as some have not indicated their race 
Source: Fafchamps 1999 for Zimbabwe / Balance sheet sample for South Africa (based on firms which do grant their customers credit) 
Again, our sample shows a stronger propensity of firms to grant their customers either very short credit terms (less than 15 days) or 
very long (over 45 and even over 60 days). With the exception of medium-sized firms, the average duration of credit is usually not 
higher than in Fafchamps, but nevertheless relatively high considering the stronger representation of retail and food suppliers in our 
sample.  
Part of the difference may be a consequence of accounting opacity, with some South African firms omitting to account for their trade 
payables or receivables, and others inflating them by amalgamating them with other short-term assets or liabilities, including control 
accounts 
Comparisons with developed economies: 
According to Fafchamps 1999, the credit terms he found for Zimbabwe do not differ substantially from those observed in developed 
economies (cf. Dun & Bradstreet). The conclusions above would therefore most probably also apply in a comparison of our sample 
with similar samples from developed countries. 
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2. Equity ratios 
 
micro 
very 
small 
small medium large 
very 
large 
South Africa: our sample       
mean 52% 44% 20% 28% n/a n/a 
median 52% 35% 24% 31%   
       
EU manufacturing and 
construction firms 
(Wagenvoort 2003b:28) 
n/a n/a 34% 35% 36% 37% 
German SMEs 2000 
(Hommel & Schneider 
2003:84) 
n/a n/a 13% 17% 21% 24% 
French SMEs (Dietsch 
2003:97) 
      
first quartile n/a n/a 18% 21% 21% 20% 
median   32% 33% 33% 34% 
fourth quartile   47% 47% 47% 46% 
Italian manufacturing 
firms: median (Guiso 
2003:124) 
n/a n/a 20% 23% 24% 24% 
Notes: 
The definitions of size categories may differ from one study to the next. 
Hommel & Schneider (2003:58) indicate that over 50% of the smallest German firms 
have operated with a non-positive equity capitalisation over the last few years; even 
medium-sized firms often had an equity ratio below 10%. However, the equity ratio has 
slightly improved since 2000. 
Dietsch (2003) notes that in France, SMEs’ median equity ratio has improved from 
around 15% in the mid-1980s to 30% at the end of the 1990s. 
 
3. Coverage ratios 
 South African sample Italian sample 
 
All 
builders and  
manufacturers 
manufacturing 
firms with less 
than 30 employees 
Median inverse coverage ratio 0.13 0.19 0.312 
Percentage of firms with inverse 
coverage >0.7 
6.3%  
0.0% 
27.7% 
Source for the Italian statistics: Guiso 2003:127 
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Annexure 21 – Creditworthiness of case studies: 
Quantitative and qualitative scores 
 Ratio score (0 to 16) Qualitative score Verdict 
CS1 Fundamental: 0.0 
Financial (/4): 2.0 
Stability: n/a  
Total (/10):                2.0 
0,0 / 2  
(missing data) 
Distressed 
CS2 Fundamental: 4.0 
Financial: 8.0 
Stability: 2.0 
Total:                       14.0 
8,5 / 15 Creeping 
CS3 Fundamental: 6.0 
Financial: 8.0 
Stability: 2.0 
Total:                       16.0 
12,5 / 15 Cruising 
CS4 Fundamental: 2.0 
Financial (/2):  0.0 
Stability: missing  
Total (/8):                 2.0 
4,0 / 15 Distressed 
CS5 Fundamental: 6.0 
Financial: 7.0 
Stability: 2.0 
Total:                       15.0 
12,0 / 15 Cruising 
CS6 Fundamental: 6.0 
Financial: 6.0 
Stability: 1.0 
Total:                       13.0 
9,5 / 15 Uncertain 
 
Due to missing data, the scores for CS1 and CS4 are based on an incomplete 
scale (quantitative score out of 10 for CS1 and 8 for CS4, qualitative score out of 
2 for CS1).   
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Annexure 22 – Balanced creditworthiness appraisal of balance sheet sample  
Category Cruising Uncertain Limping Creeping Drowning Distressed 
Criteria Total score ≥ 15 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score > 4 
Fin-score > 5 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score > 4 
Fin-score ≤ 5 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score ≤ 4 
Fin-score > 5 
8 ≤Total score <15 
Fund-score ≤ 4 
Fin-score ≤ 5 
Total score < 8 
Case 
studies 
CS3, CS5 CS6 (CS5_2001) CS2 (CS1_Dec99) CS1, CS4 
Tier A 
13 
CS5, Dir3, Ned3, 
Ned5, Ned12, Ned16, 
Ned18, Wecc1, Gob2, 
Gob5, Gob10, Gob15, 
Gob19 
11 
CS6, Dir2, Ned10, 
Ned14, Ned15, Wec7, 
BD2, Gob9, Gob11, 
Gob12, Gob14 
6 
Ned8, Ned13, Wec4, 
Gob1, Gob3, BB2 
5 
CS2, Ned1, Gob6, 
Gob16, BB6 
4 
Dir1, Gob18, BB5, 
BB7 
1 
BD9 
Tier B 
3 
Ned4, Gob7, CS3 
5 
PWC1, Wec6, Ned11, 
BB4, BB8 
2 
Wec9, Gob13 
2 
Wec2, Gob8 
2 
BD5, BB3 
2 
BD6, BB9 
Tier C 
1 
Wec8 
4 
Ned2, BB1, BB10, 
Ned6mini 
2 
Ned6, Wec5 
/ / 
3 
Wec3, CS1, CS4 
Total  17 20 10 7 6 6 
In %  
27% 30% 15% 10% 9% 9% 
 
This table is based on a sample of 66, composed of the 64 firms constituting the balance sheet sample, as well as case study CS4 
(which was assessed according to interview data) and an additional entry for footwear manufacturer Ned6. Indeed, due to uncertainty 
on Ned6’s data, two sets of financial statements were assessed separately (Ned6 and Ned6mini), leading to diverging creditworthiness 
assessments.  
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Cruising businesses: 
Business 
ID 
SIC 
Sector 
(detailed) 
Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last AFS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
CS3 /  
CS3b 
314 
Manufacture of 
safety wear 11 2,856,588 126,570 
very small 5 cc Coloured B&M 
Manufacturing and wholesale of 
safety wear  
CS5 712 Tourism 15 1,271,290 434,114 small 4 cc coloured HDSE Safaris and sightseeing bus tours 
DIR03 64 Restaurant 36 4149424 351707 small 29 pty white franchise franchise family restaurant 
Ned03 63 Trade in fuel 15 93,197 332,680 small 3 cc white franchise petrol station 
Ned05 64 Restaurant 40 223,110 394,733 small 9 pty white franchise restaurant 
Ned12 61 
Specialised 
wholesale 
3 4,472,161 190,886 very small 5 pty white LDSE 
Copy shop, printing and office 
supplies 
Ned16 64 Restaurant 15 865,014 1,050,408 medium 2 pty white franchise fastfood 
Ned18 64 Restaurant 8 3,009,774 4,150,251 small 3 Cc white franchise restaurant 
Wec01 642 catering 2 2,231,682 688,858 micro 1 cc African LDSE 
catering, cleaning, stationery, 
clerical jobs and others 
GOB 002 62 
Retail - 
specialised 
4 - 381,716 very small 7 cc Indian LDSE Retail - men outfitters 
GOB05 623 
Other specialised 
retail 
10-
15 
4,380,172 2,053,973 small 1 Cc Indian LDSE 
Sales and service of cell phones and 
accessories 
GOB10 853 
Renting of 
personal goods 
4 51,527,636 483,691 very small 2 Cc Indian LDSE Hire of video films 
GOB15 62 Retail – general 7 476,361 566,787 very small 20 SP Indian LDSE General dealer 
GOB19 62 Retail – food  7 2,423,849 21,190 very small 9 cc Indian LDSE Butchery 
Ned04 62 Retail – general 10 849,730 91,137 small 3 cc white franchise Supermarket 
GOB 007 64 Restaurant 5 13,025,433 1,638,018 small 1 cc Indian franchise Chicken fast food outlet 
WECB08 632 
Maintenance & 
repair of vehicles 
22 13,626,490 234,388 small 30 SP Coloured LDSE Panelbeating and spraypainting 
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Two case studies were categorised as cruising: safety wear firm CS3 and tour operator CS5. However, both were different from the 
typical profile of cruising firms that emerged from the balance sheet sample, as represented in Table 22.1.  
Table 22.1 – Profile of cruising firms (n=17) 
Type of activity: Cruising All 
 
Enterprise size: Cruising All 
Builders & Manufacturers 6% 23%  Micro 6% 8% 
HDSE 6% 20%  Very small 35% 45% 
LDSE 47% 36%  Small 53% 30% 
franchise 41% 18%  Medium 6% 17% 
Art 0% 5%     
HDSE = High Differentiation Service Enterprise 
LDSE = Low differentiation service enterprise 
 
The table reveals that cruising businesses are more often franchises and low-differentiation service firms (wholesale, retail and 
restaurants). Once their premises and equipment are financed, the majority of these businesses are relatively low-risk, often following 
a set model (family business or franchise framework), serving a stable market and implying little need for working capital. 
However, the examples of CS3 and CS5 show that manufacturing or transport businesses, which are typically more asset-intensive, 
may fall into the cruising category if, after a few years of steady growth, they are able to reap comfortable operating profits, repay 
their debt and build up their equity. Both case study firms were successful in this regard, and the commitment of their founding 
owners seemed to have been essential in this success.  
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Uncertain businesses 
Business 
ID 
SIC Sector (detailed) Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last AFS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
CS6 889 Packing services 11 1,429,327 594,166 small 12 cc White HDSE Packing goods into crates 
DIR02 32 Printing 6 447061 75261 very small 3 cc coloured B&M 
printing of sheets, lytho, 
stationary 
Ned10 36 
Manufacturing – 
machinery & chem 
4 1,306,432 441,773 very small 5 cc coloured B&M Cleaning machines 
Ned14 64 Restaurant 50 1,801,811 2,861,906 medium 1 cc white franchise Restaurant 
Ned15 62 Retail & Training 3 6,225,823 707,649 small 3 Pty white HDSE retail of safety equipment 
WEC07 324 Publishing  18 3,514,318 2,556,892 medium 2 cc mixed B&M 
Desktop publishing & 
reproduction 
BD02 96 Film production 6 - - medium 4 Pty  white Art 
Commercial film 
producers 
GOB09 853 
Renting of personal 
goods 
4 598,577 124,502 very small 14 cc Indian LDSE Hire of video films 
Gob11 62 retail 11 66,276,282 184,966 very small 6 cc african LDSE superette 
GOB12 304 
Food 
manufacturing 
9 648,206 172,576 very small 8 cc Indian B&M Manufacturing of sauces  
GOB14 623 Pharmacy  3 419,160 - very small 6 cc Indian LDSE Pharmacy 
PWC01 392 
Manufacturer of 
DIY/sport products 
25 - 2,542,017 medium 18 pty white B&M 
Supply of sporting / DIY 
products  
WEC06 615 
Contractor for 
HVAC 
14 1,510,116 264,591 very small 10 Cc Coloured HDSE 
Supplier/contractor of 
Heating, Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning 
Ned11 61 
Commission trade – 
food 
3 851,452 289,891 micro 1 SP coloured LDSE Bread supplies 
BB04 63 
Maintenance of 
transport equipment 
2 12,620,608 4,411,733 very small 3 Cc White HDSE 
Aircraft repairs and 
maintenance  
BB08 86 IT services ? 941,779 89,663 very small n/a Cc  HDSE 
IT-based inventory 
control services 
Ned02 32 Photographic 2 - - very small 1 SP white franchise Photo development 
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Business 
ID 
SIC Sector (detailed) Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last AFS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
BB01 625
9 
renting of 
equipment 6      3,009,129  #REF!  small  4 cc   LDSE 
operator of 88 vending 
machines (snack and cool 
drinks) 
BB10 623 Specialised retail 4 1,752,079 46,546 small 1 pty ltd  HDSE 
Sale of TV surveillance 
equipment 
Ned06 
mini 
31 Footwear 5 755,979 983,132 very small 4 Cc white B&M Footwear 
 
The ratio framework classified 20 businesses as uncertain, including case study crating business CS6.  
A closer scrutiny revealed that uncertain businesses tended to respond to one of the following three profiles: (1) very young 
conventional firms, like franchise restaurants or retailers; (2) high-differentiation service enterprises, such as aircraft repairs and IT-
based inventory control services, or (3) firms with higher capital needs, both for equipment and working capital (builders, 
manufacturers).  
Each of these categories tended to experience specific sets of problems. The first category was often affected by a combination of 
insufficient turnover (which is not surprising in a start-up) and a few financing problems, such as insufficient coverage or low equity. 
These problems may however be transitory. Firms in the second group, including crating firm CS6, tended to suffer from volatility as 
well as working capital problems, which probably result from dealing with corporate clients. The firms in the third group, considering 
their needs for capital, were more likely to suffer from high debt, tense liquidity or a high need for working capital.  
Compared with the cruising businesses above, uncertain businesses are typically confronted with a more complex and demanding 
type of activity, which often costs cash. Since the risks are higher, and the firms’ managers may not be sufficiently skilled, the 
granting of credits may have to be tied to conditions, in particular with regard to financial management. For example, given CS6’s 
particular problem with its working capital cycle, which put a strain on its liquidity although other ratios were generally good, CS6’s 
bank would be entitled to request the rollout of a debt collection plan to balance out the working capital cycle. Granting creditors 
surveillance and enforcement rights to ensure good practices would appear to be a meaningful compromise, in the shared interest of 
the owner and the creditor. 
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Limping businesses 
Business 
ID 
SIC 
Sector 
(detailed) 
Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last AFS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
Ned08 88 Business services 8 4,088,549 700,423 medium 2 Cc white HDSE marketing services 
Ned13 75 Communication 2 6,644,566 1,079,101 very small 5 SP white LDSE courier services 
WEC04 5 Construction 32 15,945,125 198,152 medium 3 Cc Coloured B&M Construction 
GOB01 62 Specialised retail  8 - 94,483 small 11 Cc White LDSE Sale / service of lawn mowers  
GOB03 61 Wholesale  12 - 1,215,704 medium 10 Cc Indian LDSE wholesale - general dealer 
BB02 96 Art 25 1,004,554 62,901 small 2 Cc  Art foundry for bronze sculptures 
WEC09 632 
Maintenance & 
repair of vehicles 
8 1,488,621 262,991 very small 3 Cc coloured LDSE 
panelbeating and 
spraypainting 
GOB13 304 
Food 
manufacturing 
16 406,235 165,405 small 26 
cc  
(prev. Pty) 
Indian B&M packing / blending of spices 
Ned06 31 Footwear 5 755,979 983,132 very small 4 Cc white B&M Footwear 
WEC05 338 
PVC 
manufacturing  
51.5 235,918 232,386 medium 31 pty ltd Coloured B&M 
Manufacture of PVC fitting 
for civil engineering and 
industry 
 
The category of limping businesses in the sample is heterogeneous, yet it includes at least two types of businesses: on one hand, young and 
capital intensive businesses, which have a low equity and sometimes problems of interest coverage or liquidity (printing business Dir02, 
construction business Wec04); on the other hand, firms which have a naturally high need for working capital and therefore a high overdraft 
(jeweller BB07, food manufacturer Gob13 or safety training business Ned15).  
The combination of liquidity problems (all but two limping businesses) with a low equity ratio (8 cases), a poor interest coverage (7 cases) 
and/or working capital problems (6 cases), indicates true vulnerability. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that most of these businesses are 
relatively stable (only 2 are classified as moderately volatile), which means that a creditor should have enough time to react to a deterioration. 
Under these circumstances, we would venture that these firms could be accepted as creditworthy – provided that they are monitored closely. 
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This may require providing financial management support. This belief that limping businesses, in spite of vulnerability, deserve bank support 
under a condition of close monitoring, is discussed in Chapter III, Section 4.4 on the dynamics of creditworthiness.  
 
Creeping businesses 
Business 
ID 
SIC 
Sector 
(detailed) 
Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last FS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
CS2 64 Restaurant 47 3,028,317 529,489 small 2 cc White franchise Restaurant and take aways 
Ned01 71 Transport 8 - - small 10 SP coloured LDSE Transportation 
BB06 63 sale of car parts 1 293,066 2,984,794 micro 2 cc  HDSE Distributing 4*4 spare wheel carriers  
Gob06 62 
Retail - 
specialised 
3 1,439,557 194,497 very small 27 
cc 
(prev. 
Pty) 
Indian LDSE 
Retail of crockery and domestic 
hardware 
GOB16 5 construction 38 618,848 1,402,601 very small 2 Cc Indian B&M Construction 
WEC02 623 Retail 0 377,585 2,486,224 micro 2 cc Coloured LDSE 
Supplying sports equipment and 
clothing  
GOB08 64 Restaurant 5 5,157,346 1,485,953 small 0.5 cc Indian franchise Chicken fast food outlet 
 
A creeping business is one in which fundamental problems are visible, but not accompanied by financial deficiencies. The sample 
yielded only few businesses in this category, which could be grouped into three types: (1) cases with poor accounting reliability, 
where the apparant sound financial structure may be deceptive, (2) young firms whose poor potential has not yet affected the financial 
structure, and (3) ‘passionate ventures’, which their relatively wealthy owners seem to carry on against economic rationality.  
An example of creeping firm is franchise restaurant CS2. Its financial structure is robust, with hardly any debt, a balanced working 
capital cycle, and hardly any overdraft. However, in spite of aggressive marketing and tight cost management, its market potential is 
too limited, impeding turnover growth, so that the business is neither generating profits nor remunerating its member.  
Although creeping firms’ bankruptcy risks are almost inexistent, their chances of success appear just as slim. Hence, the economic 
benefit of lending to this business is debatable.  
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Overall, although rare, creeping businesses present a challenge to creditworthiness assessments, as they may not be economically 
worthy of credit – although their immediate risk of failure is limited.  
 
Drowning businesses 
Business 
ID 
SIC 
Sector 
(detailed) 
Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last 
FS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
DIR01 64 Catering 5 8,211,798 58,792 very small 4 cc White LDSE Catering services for upper end of market 
GOB18 62 retail 6 1,395,578 211,818 very small 2 SP Indian LDSE Butchery 
BB05 342 pottery 5 - 985,009 very small 1 cc  Art bisque and painted pottery 
BB07 62392 Jewellery 2 4,060,569 - very small 52 Cc  B&M jewellery design and manufacture  
BD5 88 
training 
and 
consulting 
3 - - very small 5 Pty LTd white HDSE courses and energy-related consulting  
BB03 88 
Business 
services 
39 208,933 111,668 medium 1 pty ltd  HDSE shop-fitting  
 
Most drowning businesses in our sample are young or very young SMMEs (their average age is 2.2 years), which seem unlikely to 
reach breakeven, and sometimes even have variable costs exceeding the turnover (as BB3). Furthermore, in spite of their young age, 
these firms suffer from various financial deficiencies, often related to a slim equity, high current debt and/or an insufficient interest 
coverage.  
Unless they radically improve their financial profile, these firms seem unlikely to survive beyond a few years. As such, they illustrate 
how the combination of unconvincing business idea (lack of market or improper pricing) and fragile initial financial structure (lack of 
start-up capital, unsustainable debt) causes the high early mortality of SMMEs.  
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Distressed businesses 
Business 
ID 
SIC 
Sector 
(detailed) 
Staff Turnover 
Gross 
Assets 
size 
category 
Age at 
last FS 
Legal 
form 
Race 
Type of 
business 
Product or service 
CS1 391 
Furniture 
manufacturing 
   very small 4 CC White Franchise 
Manufacturing and retail of 
wardrobe furniture  
CS4 
88 / 
5 
Business 
services and 
construction  
   Micro  5 / 0.5 Cc African  LDSE 
Cleaning services, catering, 
construction, painting, renovation 
and other 
BD6 93 health 6 - - very small 1 Pty Ltd white B&M 
wheelchair manufacturing and 
services  
BD9 5 construction 2 - - medium 9 cc white B&M construction  
BB09 62 
specialised 
retail 
 4,242,894 2,697,720 very small 3 cc  HDSE 
retail and assemblance of cam 
buckle  
WEC03 86 
Computer 
related 
activities 
11 - 451,417 small 3 pty ltd Coloured HDSE 
Supply, install and maintain PABX 
equipment, data cabling and fibre 
optical cabling 
 
There were only few distressed businesses in the sample, probably because of the sample’s inherent bias. As a result, it is difficult to 
draw a profile of the distressed businesses. But, with the exception of construction business BD9, they are young, undercapitalised 
and share a fundamental deficiency with regard to their turnover and/or cost structure.  
Case study firms CS1 (franchise furniture business) and CS4a and b (township businesses), were categorised as distressed because of 
their poor scoring on nearly all fronts: lack of competitive advantage in a highly competitive environment, excessive owner’s 
remuneration, insufficient capitalisation, heavy dependence on short-term debt, alarming interest coverage and lack of liquidity. 
Under these circumstances, the businesses can be regarded as failed. CS1 was liquidated later in the year. As to CS4a, as argued 
earlier, it could be regarded as ‘failed in the way of survivalist businesses’, i.e. merely suspended to avoid liquidation costs, and re-
emerged in a different form through the creation of CS4b, whose chances of success are just as slim.  
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Some profile indications of cruising, uncertain, limping, creeping, drowning and 
distressed firms  
  
cruising uncertain limping creeping 
drowning / 
distressed 
total 
LDSE 8 5 4 3 2 22 
  36% 23% 18% 14% 9% 100% 
Franchise 7 2 0 2 1 12 
  58% 17% 0% 17% 8% 100% 
Builders and 
manuf 1 5 4 1 3 11 
  9% 45% 36% 9% 27% 100% 
HDSE 1 6 1 1 4 9 
  11% 67% 11% 11% 44% 100% 
              
Less than 3 
years 8 8 4 5 6 31 
  26% 26% 13% 16% 19% 100% 
3 + years 10 11 6 2 5 34 
  29% 32% 18% 6% 15% 100% 
              
white-owned 7 7 4 1 5 24 
  29% 29% 17% 4% 21% 100% 
Indian-
owned 7 3 2 3 1 16 
  44% 19% 13% 19% 6% 100% 
coloured-
owned 2 4 3 2 1 12 
  17% 33% 25% 17% 8% 100% 
African-
owned 1 1 0 0 1 3 
  33% 33% 0% 0% 33% 100% 
              
Micro 1 1 0 2 1 5 
  20% 20% 0% 40% 20% 100% 
Very small 6 11 3 2 8 30 
  20% 37% 10% 7% 27% 100% 
Small 9 4 3 3 1 20 
  45% 20% 15% 15% 5% 100% 
Medium 1 4 4 0 2 11 
  9% 36% 36% 0% 18% 100% 
              
total 18 20 10 7 12 67 
  27% 30% 15% 10% 18% 100% 
Note: The categories drowning and distressed have been merged for a wider 
statistical base. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 23 Page 360 
 
Annexure 23 – Creditworthiness dynamics for CS1 and CS5 
To unable a dynamic recognition of small changes, the model adopts interim 
thresholds (threatening problems). In Tables 23.1 and 23.2 the values must be 
interpreted as follows: 
• 0.5 represents a ‘threatening problem” (value below the ‘interim’ 
threshold) 
• 1 represents a ‘mild problem’ 
• 2 represents a ‘serious problem’ 
Table 23.1 – Evolution of CS1’s creditworthiness assessment, Jan99 to Jun 00 
  
Period until  
Jan 1998 
Period until  
Dec 1999 
Period until  
Jun 2000 
Breakeven deficiency  0.5 2  2 
Deficit to breakeven 16% 4.6% 6.5% 
Turnover growth  
Young,  
high growth 
Below  
inflation 
Below  
inflation 
Excessive member remuneration 0 1 2 
Salary to operating profit 14% 86% 99% 
Monthly member’s salary  R1667 R15 000 R15 000 
Excessive financing costs 2  2  2 
Interest coverage 0.7 0.9 0.5 
Fundamental score (out of 6) 3.5 1 0 
Lack of working capital     
Excessive debt 0.5 1 1 
Mean equity ratio 7.9% 3.9% 3.1% 
Equity growth pattern Yes Unclear No 
Excessive short-term debt      
Lack of liquidity reserves 0 0 1 
Liquidity ratio 4.5% 2.6% -1.2% 
Cash Flow to Overdraft   -14.8 
Financial score (out of 8) 7.5 7 6 
Instability (out of 2) 1 1 1 
Total score (out of 16) 12 9 7 
Category Creeping Creeping Distressed 
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Table 23.2 – Evolution of CS5’s creditworthiness assessment, Feb01 to Feb03 
  
Period until  
Feb 2001 
Period until  
Feb 2002 
Period until  
Feb 2003 
Breakeven deficiency    
Excessive member remuneration    
Excessive financing costs    
Fundamental score (out of 6) 6 6 6 
Lack of working capital     
Excessive debt 2 1 0.5 
Mean equity ratio -2% 2,6% 10,1% 
Equity growth pattern Declining Unclear Clear growth 
Excessive short-term debt    
Lack of liquidity reserves  1 0.5 0.5  
Liquidity ratio 6% 8% 15% 
Seasonal effect tight winter tight winter tight winter 
Financial score (out of 8) 5 6.5 7 
Instability (out of 2) 2 2 2 
Total score (out of 16) 13 14.5 15 
Category Limping Uncertain Cruising  
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Annexure 24 – Transaction costs  
and scale effects 
Market frictions are probably the most widely accepted explanation for SMMEs’ 
financing constraints, as their existence cannot be contested, and they are proven 
to affect more strongly the smaller agents.  
The question therefore is not whether market frictions exist, but how serious 
their effect is on financing constraints: are they a marginal factor which means 
that a small portion of demand and supply will always be unsatisfied? Or do they 
have such importance that a policy aiming to enable smoother market 
adjustments would significantly relieve SMMEs’ financial constraints? 
 
1. Literature on market frictions  
The existence of market frictions is the simplest neoclassic assumption to explain 
why the classic or neoclassic model of supply-demand-matching (Smith 1789, 
Walras 1874) does not hold in practice. In imperfect capital markets, a mismatch 
can occur because markets involve a potentially costly or ineffective search for 
the matching partner. The risk of frictional mismatch is then a function of the 
inefficiency of information platforms and market mechanisms. 
Concretely, unallocated funds can then result from suppliers’ failure to identify 
suitable investment opportunities, or the time needed until efforts bear fruits, as 
well as their inadequate deal-generating networks. In South Africa, DTI/UNOPS 
(1999) identify delivery and communication issues to explain the high surpluses 
in government enterprise funds. Unmatched demand can also be explained by 
borrowers’ inappropriate approach to financiers, the skill and behaviour gap 
mentioned by Bates & Hally (1982).  
Another obstacle to good market functions is the situation in which interest rates 
are inflexible. There can be many reasons for this: legally enforced interest rate 
ceilings, especially in developing countries (Gonzalez-Vega 1984), collusive 
oligopolistic agreements between financial institutions (Jaffee, 1971); implicit 
loan price contracts (Fried & Howitt, 1980). A neoclassic policy 
recommendation would therefore be to remove obstacles to interest rate 
flexibility and improve market efficiency in order to ease the automatic matching 
process.   
By contrast, the Keynesian model emphasises unequal treatment of various types 
of borrowers. Keynes (1930/1971:327) argues that some borrowers have first 
claims on a bank’s favours, while others, who lack influence with the bank, are 
“on the fringe”. Depending on banks’ liquidity preference, they may access 
credit at certain times and be denied it at other times.  
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In a neo-Keynesian model, North (1990) describes markets as institutions which, 
in line with the increasing specialisation of labour, have historically evolved 
from personal to impersonal exchange. He contends that the impersonal exchange 
of modern economies typically increases transaction costs to address the need for 
institutional enforcement systems.  
Similarly, development economists, inspired by works of sociologists and 
anthropologists, have studied the difficulties of applying classic financial market 
models to third world communities, considering in particular transaction costs and 
contract enforcement issues (Kimball 1988, Coate & Ravallion 1993, Fafchamps 
1992, 1994, Bardhan 1993). 
As Nissanke & Aryeetey (1999) show, North’s theories are useful to 
conceptualise Sub-Saharan Africa’s fragmentation between formal and informal 
lenders, who apply distinct methods for financial risk management and have 
widely different transaction cost structures, to serve two distinct ends of the 
market. The lack of institutional linkages between formal and informal financial 
markets results in a gap in the middle range of the clientele spectrum. To the 
extent that South African formal SMMEs are regarded as the middle range in the 
finance spectrum, this fragmentation model explains their difficulties in raising 
finance.  
Tucker (2000) confirms, through a cost simulation, that very small loans would 
be unsustainable for the banking sector (screening and monitoring costs 
amounted to 50% of the loan principal in a start-up micro enterprise loan and to 
10% in a very small start-up business loan). Transaction costs have also been 
showed to apply to equity finance (Cruickshank 2000:172-173; Falkena et al 
2002:58).  
To summarise, economic theory suggests that market frictions, especially 
transaction costs, may hinder the allocation of finance. The formal financial 
sector tends to be unable to serve cost-effectively the smallest firms.  
2. Findings 
To investigate whether firms applying for a high amount of finance are more 
likely to access finance (the Scale Effect hypothesis), the success rate of finance 
applications of GEM respondents was studied as a function of the amount raised. 
Tables 24.1 and 24.2 illustrate the findings.  
These tables show that the success of term loan applications was strongly 
correlated with the amount requested. Applications for amounts under R250 000 
had slimmer chances of success than those for larger amounts. For overdraft 
applications, scale effects are less obvious. While the success rate is higher for 
desired overdrafts of R50 000-150 000 than for lower amounts, it is lowest for 
amounts higher than R150 000 – possibly because of the higher risk involved or 
the difficulties of entrepreneurs to provide sufficient security.  
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Table 24.1 – Success rate according to amount demanded (term finance) 
 Amount of term finance raised 
 
up to 100K 101-250K 251-500K > 501K 
Not 
specified 
Total 
total number 32 25 18 16 16 107 
Successful 14 10 15 13 15 67 
Success rate 44% 40% 83% 81% 94% 63% 
Source: Analysis of GEM 2003 data  
 
Table 24.2 – Success rate according to amount demanded (overdraft) 
 Amount of overdraft ‘desired’ 
 
under 50K 50-99K 100-149K ≥ 150K 
Not 
specified  
or 0 
Total 
total number 15 12 11 16 29 83 
Successful 7 8 7 4 14 40 
Success rate 47% 67% 64% 25% 48% 48% 
Source: Analysis of GEM 2003 data  
 
These results confirm the scale effect hypothesis for long-term finance, but are 
inconclusive as far as short-term finance is concerned. Apart from the data 
ambiguity on the interpretation of “desired overdraft”, the absence of a visible 
scale effect for overdraft may indicate that transaction costs are less substantial 
for overdraft applications. 
To conclude, the data support the theory that transaction costs, being 
proportionately higher in smaller firms, create a disadvantage in their access to 
term finance. For this particular product, market frictions would appear to be 
significant, and in Keynesian terms, SMMEs can be described as borrowers on 
the fringe, unable to find a market platform suitable to their needs on the 
fragmented South African financial market.   
The fit is less convincing as far as overdraft finance is concerned. SMMEs 
liquidity constraints, hence, may need to be explained by different hypotheses.  
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Annexure 25 – Information substitutes: Credit history, 
network and relationship banking 
 
1. Literature on information substitutes  
Under the information hypothesis, a logical mitigation strategy is the recourse to 
information substitutes, i.e. behaviour or data which, without giving the lender 
direct insights into the business, help to categorise the risks along rules of thumb 
(Hawkins 2001).  
One information substitute is the SMMEs’ credit history, which the bank often 
acquires from external sources such as credit bureaux (see Balasuriya, 1999:11). 
Use of credit bureau data is an internationally accepted practice aiming to verify 
the firm’s existence, its sound fundamentals and ruling out the existence of 
heavy debt. However, in South Africa the emphasis has been mainly on blacklist 
checks; the common language of being “listed by a credit bureau” (e.g. in ABSA 
2004) has a clear negative connotation.  
This approach is controversial for several reasons. It may penalise those firms 
too young to have a credit record. However, Levy (1996) found that South 
African young firms do have an access to loans, even though they are more 
financially constrained. The use of credit history for lending decisions has also 
been criticised on the basis that past defaults are not necessarily telling about the 
future (the argument that credit bureaus blacklist people for failing to pay rent 
during apartheid (SACP 2004) does not hold though, as information is only held 
by credit bureaux for a maximum of 5 years). More seriously, there have been 
many reports of irregularities or inaccuracy in credit bureau data (the DTI Credit 
Law Review 2003; Falkena & al 2002:5) 
A further mitigation strategy against information asymmetry is for SMMEs and 
banks to exchange privileged information through their own channels, such as 
relationship banking (Boot 2000:10, Wagenvoort 2003a:12) and network effects 
(Loury 1998; Fafchamps 1996-99).  
Relationship banking is present when the following factors are met: (i) the 
intermediary gathers information beyond readily available public information; 
(ii) information gathering takes place over time through multiple interactions 
with the borrower, often through the provision of multiple financial services, and 
(iii) the information remains confidential (proprietary). (Boot, 2000:10). The 
success of depends on firms’ participative behaviour (Binks & Ennew 1997), but 
can have macro-economic benefits, as the bank’s resulting quasi-monopolistic 
situation reduces the constraints on the interest rate (Petersen & Rajan 1995). In 
South Africa, ABSA (2004) openly invites its business customers to using 
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relationship banking for their advantage.  
Network effects (Loury 1998; Fafchamps 1996-99) consist of socialisation and 
information sharing; Fafchamps specifically mentions connections with the 
business establishment, and efforts of business owners to distinguish themselves 
from the mass of small, inexperienced micro enterprises (Fafchamps 1996-
99:17). The relevance of network effects in South Africa is confirmed by 
Karungu et al (2000), who caution that this tends to exclude black businesses 
from access to venture capital.  
 
2. Findings 
The combined effect of credit history, network and relationship banking is 
illustrated in Table 25.1 (next page). The table does not provide clear evidence 
that start-ups with no credit record are less likely to obtain funding. However, the 
cases of CS1, CS2 and CS3 do support the hypothesis that start-ups’ access to 
facilities is eased by networks. Franchisor, partner and chartered accountant were 
found to play a role. On the other hand, entrepreneurs with no connection to the 
business establishment (CS4, CS5 initially) felt helpless in the search for capital 
in their early years – but for CS4 blacklisting appears to have been a more severe 
obstacle than the lack of networks, whereas CS5 was actually a case of self-
rationing.  
For older firms or serial entrepreneurs, evidence on the effect of credit history is 
mixed. The owner of CS4, having defaulted on a housing loan and electricity 
bills, has a negative credit record, which has evidently impeded the firm’s access 
to any formal loan. As to CS2 and CS6, while interviewees did not expressly 
mention defaults, their history (failure of the potato factory started by CS2’s 
owner; near-bankruptcy of CS6 a few years ago) suggest that their credit records 
may not be impeccable. This may explain CS6’s difficulty in accessing some 
special types of finance, but CS2’s owner seems to have circumvented the 
problem by using his networks. He openly admitted the role of this factor: 
“There is a very easy way to get finance. You must have a Chartered 
Accountant, that you know well, and get him to write a letter to the bank, stating 
that you earn sufficient income” (source: CS2 first full interview). 
On the other hand, CS5’s spotless credit record does seem to be the main reason 
why the firm now has an easy access to vehicle finance. Unfortunately at the 
time of the study it was too early to verify whether this would also apply to CS3.  
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Table 25.1 – Credit record, networks, bank relationship and access to finance  
Firm Age; Credit history Network Relation with bank Access to finance Conditions 
CS1 start-up; no history franchisor 
franchisor was a good 
client of the bank 
comprehensive start-up 
package 
OD limit of R25K, 
1,15% of reported 
turnover: low 
CS2 
start-up;  
previous bankruptcy 
chartered accountant 
(also franchisor) 
n/i substantial personal loan good 
CS3 – at 
registration 
start-up  
(one partner had been 
operating informally) 
new partner comes  
on board 
change of bank, as new 
partner had a good 
connection to them 
high overdraft;  
term loan 
(high collateral) 
CS3 – time 
of study 
good credit record   
pending; expect that bank 
will support them 
 
CS4 blacklisted none in ‘formal sector’ none in ‘formal sector’ rejected  
CS5 – 
initially 
start-up none 
poor “did not know any 
bank people” 
(did not apply)  
CS5 – time 
of study 
6 years – has bought 8 
vehicles on credit 
chartered accountant 
good “our children play 
cricket together” 
easy: mere formality good  
CS6 
13 years with the same 
bank, but a few years ago 
firm was close to 
bankruptcy 
n/i 
poor 
 “they don’t know who 
we are” 
high overdraft, but 
struggles to increase it 
application for property 
finance rejected 
OD limit of R100K, 
8,3% of turnover: high 
 
See case study narratives (Annexures 31-36) for more details.   n/i: no information. 
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CS5’s good relationship with his bank manager may be another factor of his 
success, which would support the theory of relationship banking, as compared 
with CS6’s experience of the bank as an anonymous institution. However, rather 
than being exogenous, these experiences may reflect the bank’s consciously 
differential treatment of clients of different quality. 
As to the age of businesses at the time of the first bank loan, the data suggested a 
significiant difference between franchise enterprises and stand alone. Among the 
case studies, only franchise firms CS1 and CS2 obtained bank loans at start-up, 
as opposed to 1 year for CS5, 3 years for CS3, apparently 6 years for CS610. 
Among young firms from the balance sheet sample (less than 3 years), the 
probability of using term loans was significantly higher for franchise firms 
(78%) than for independent businesses (44%). While this could be interpreted as 
a support for the network hypothesis, demand factors also play a role, since 
franchise businesses need funds early on to acquire fixed assets and settle the 
initial franchise fee.  
 
Overall, this review suggests that credit history, networks and relationship 
banking are strongly intertwined and may compensate each other – but a 
combination of these factors does seem to play a role in access to finance. The 
role of networks should not be exaggerated, though:  
• Several examples of non-access hint at self-rationing rather than supply-
driven rationing;  
• Access to finance is multidimensional and occasionally difficult to 
interpret. For example, in spite of its comprehensive start-up package, 
CS1’s overdraft limit was rather modest; conversely, CS6 had a sizeable 
overdraft facility, but was unable to access the required non-standard 
facilities, such as specialised equipment finance, industrial property 
finance and factoring.  
These observations illustrate the fact that credit history, networking and bank 
relationship may ease SMEs’ access to facilities, especially non-standard 
facilities, but their effect is also psychological in strengthening the 
entrepreneur’s confidence and his feeling of being fairly treated. The relative 
importance of these aspects would need to be assessed by further research.  
 
3. Further details 
This section gives more tangible evidence from the case studies about the 
relevance of the business’s history, and more specifically its credit record with 
                                                 
10 For CS6, earlier vehicle finance is not excluded. In the case of CS3, the facilities were granted 
in 2000, just after the CC had been founded, but the operations had been running informally 
for 3 years prior to this.  
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the bank, as well as its networks, for its access to finance. In this regard, the case 
studies generated three observations: 
 
3.1- Franchises are more likely to obtain credit facilities 
immediately at start-up  
The two franchise case studies (CS1 and CS2) obtained long-term credit 
facilities at inception, especially to finance the acquisition of fixed assets and the 
settlement of the initial franchise fee. In addition, CS2 was granted an overdraft 
facility immediately (CS1 obtained its overdraft after 1 year of operation).  
All other businesses have taken their first bank credit at some later stage in their 
life. CS5 was still very young when it signed the first contract for vehicle finance 
(1 year), while the other cases of vehicle finance took place at a more advanced 
stage of the businesses’ life (3 years for CS3, apparently 6 years for CS611). The 
overdraft facilities were contracted after 3 to 6 years of operation12. 
3.2 - The length and ‘smoothness’ of credit history affect 
demand and supply  
On the demand-side, the case studies provided significant evidence that (a) the 
number of years accumulated and (b) the compliance with repayment schedules 
gave the entrepreneurs confidence when their next finance application 
approached:  
• The number of years was relevant for CS5: Having initially refrained 
from applying for finance because “at the time, it would have been 
crazy”, the owner indicated in his first interview that he could now ask 
for an overdraft, emphasising that “now it is easier, because we have been 
around for a while”. 
• The impeccable repayment record was decisive for CS3: 
Having promptly repaid its vehicle finance and makes little use of its 
overdraft, the management announced that it was preparing its next 
move, suggesting that they were confident about the bank’s support 
because “we have a good standing with the bank”. 
 
However, it makes little doubt that the business’s age and its credit record also 
influenced the supply behaviour:  
                                                 
11 although there is a possibility that the crating business had bought another vehicle on credit 
earlier. 
12 In the case of CS3, the facilities were granted in 2000, just after the CC had been founded, but 
the operations had been running informally for 3 years prior to this.  
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• In particular, the higher overdraft limit granted to CS6 (100 thousand 
Rand or 8,3% of turnover) is probably explained by the business’s longer 
history (it has already been running, and a client of the same bank, for 13 
years), which gave the bank some confidence that the business would 
resist to difficulties. 
3.3 - Negative credit records bar the access to finance 
Conversely, the negative credit record which affected the township entrepreneurs 
CS4 a+b (being listed with credit bureaus for their default on a previous home 
loan) barred them an access to formal short-term finance, although access 
restrictions depended on the type of institution approached. 
• For formal micro-lenders (supposedly those registered with the MFRC 
and adhering to the legal framework), access was subject to a credit 
history free of judgements and defaults. Unfortunately this did not apply 
to the two township entrepreneurs reviewed, so that they could not 
qualify for this type of finance.  
 
• On the other hand, informal township-based money-lenders (supposedly 
not registered with the MFRC) were less restrictive, granting funds even 
to “blacklisted” individuals. CS4b could not provide details about the 
procedure to access such loans, other than “filling in the forms” (sic).  
 
To conclude this section, there is some evidence that personal networks, length 
and quality of the credit record ease the firms’ access to finance, suggesting that 
these constructs may be used as substitutes for the insufficient accounting 
information. However, the methodology followed in these case studies per 
construction provided more support for a demand-side effect than for a supply-
side influence of these issues.  
 
3.4 - Effect of external recommendations  
Although this was not a focus of the data collection and analysis, case studies did 
provide possible anecdotal evidence of the importance of recommendations for 
the access to credit: 
• The strongest case (almost provocative) was provided by CS2, who, in 
his first interview, declared casually: “There is a very easy way to get 
credit – you must just get a letter from your Chartered Accountant who 
certifies that you are earning enough to sustain the amount of loan that 
you are asking for. If you have such a letter, the bank will not even 
realise that you will not actually earn anything from your business when 
you start – they will give you the loan”.  
It was not possible to obtain further precisions or verify the actual 
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relevance of such a recommendation on CS2’s access to finance: on the 
follow-up interview, the business owner softened his initial statement and 
denied having used this tactic.  
• Another possible case was provided by CS1. The bank file suggested that 
the good credit relationship which the bank entertained with CS1’s 
franchisor contributed at least partially to the franchisee’s access to 
significant finance. In this sense, the franchisee was indirectly 
“recommended” by the franchisor. However, the case of CS1 also 
showed that the bank does not blindly follow recommendations for ever: 
if the recommended business does not seem worthy, the bank will 
become more restrictive.  
 
Such recommendations may put specific categories of entrepreneurs at a 
disadvantage (young and possibly black entrepreneurs may be less well 
connected). However, the evidence was too slim to enable a strong conclusion on 
this point.   
3.5 - Personal relationship between entrepreneur and 
bank staff 
The case studies did not provide conclusive evidence on the effect of a good 
relationship between the entrepreneur and its bank, on the access to overdraft.  
• A case where it may have played a role is CS3, which has been able to 
secure a high overdraft and more facilities as soon as it registered as a 
CC, presumably because of the partner’s history and good standing with 
the bank.  
• Another example may be provided by CS5, whose relationship with his 
bank manager extends to the family (‘our sons play cricket together’). 
CS5 was also easily granted an overdraft facility. However, at this stage, 
there is no proof of causality.  
• A counter-example is CS6, which complained about a very bad contact 
with their bankers (“Ha! [laugh] Our relationship with the bank? There is 
none! We have been banking with them for 13 years, but when we took 
these premises we have been moved to a new branch. So, you see, 
nobody knows us and we know nobody, it is completely anonymous… 
Agh, you know, the bank only knows you if you have lots of investments 
with them”). 
This absence of a personal relationship did not prevent them from being 
able to increase their overdraft limit to a rather high amount.   
 
While there was no clear evidence of causality between networking and supply 
of finance, the case studies did suggest that cultural problems could cause 
demand-side constraints:  
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• CS5 initially refrained from asking for bank finance because he felt that 
he would have needed personal contacts:  “I knew nobody and nobody 
knew me” – adding that this networking constraint, especially for 
entrepreneurs from non-white backgrounds, may have been relaxed since 
then (“in these days, black entrepreneurship was such a crazy thing”). 
• In a different context, CS4 showed a preference for township 
moneylenders, among other reasons because of the cultural proximity 
(“they understand me, they know where I come from”).  
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Annexure 26 – The relevance of collateral  
for access to finance 
1. Literature 
Collateral is a widely used, but controversial, information substitute. However, 
basing a bank’s credit decision on collateral poses problem. Based on an 
international study, Jenkins argues that banks that rely on collateral tend to 
neglect borrower evaluation and follow up (2000:21). In South Africa collateral 
is a particularly sensitive issue since, as Tucker (2000) notes, Blacks were not 
allowed to own immovable property until the 1980s.  
This situation is less serious if collateral is used flexibly, which Levy (1996) 
found to apply to South Africa, as banks tend to accept various types of assets as 
collateral, apart from property. Also, Levy found that the quantitative collateral 
requirements, measured by the ratio of collateral to loan amount, were 
reasonable, with a third of his SMME sample obtaining a loan by providing 50% 
collateral, while only 26% of SMMEs had to provide more than 100% collateral.  
 
2. Findings 
Following the literature, collateral is expected to be especially important for 
riskier facilities, with frequency of use acting as a guide to judge the level of 
risk. To test this hypothesis, the main facilities used by SMMEs were organised 
in three classes. 
Although they are not the most frequent (they were used by 45 to 48% of the 
balance sheet sample), asset-backed facilities such as equipment finance or 
instalment sale agreements are deemed least risky for the bank thanks to the 
lender’s rights on the asset concerned. Due to this ‘intrinsic security’, collateral 
is expected to be of little importance for these facilities.  
Overdraft facilities are deemed to be a medium risk: their short-term character 
reduces the risk but they tend to be rolled over from one year to the next, hence 
effectively assuming medium term character. Evidence confirms that this is the 
facility most frequently used by small businesses (used by 64% of GEM 
respondents and 52 to 68% of businesses in the balance sheet sample and case 
studies). Collateral is expected to play a moderate role in this class of finance.  
(Non-asset backed) term loans were used by 17% of GEM respondents and 17 to 
18% of the balance sheet sample. Due to their longer maturity and the absence of 
intrinsic security, these loans are riskier, and collateral is expected to play a 
significant role there.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
n
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 26 Page 374 
a) Installment sale agreements: no collateral/collateral 
Data from the case studies and balance sheet sample did not fully confirm the 
irrelevance of collateral for instalment sale facilities or equipment finance. 
Tourism business CS5 and crating business CS6 bought vehicles on credit 
without having to pledge personal assets, but counter-examples were Repro 
house Wec07 or Bread Deliveries firm Ned11, which had to provide substantial 
personal securities to buy printing equipment, vehicles and computers on credit.  
However, due to the small number of firms where collateral could be specifically 
allocated to the ISA, further going analyses were left out for this type of finance.  
b) Overdraft facilities: guarantees vs. tangible assets 
Evidence shows that overdraft facilities may be secured either by a member’s 
guarantee, or by more tangible collateral. In the balance sheet sample, two of the 
five firms with only an overdraft facility had secured their overdraft simply 
through letters of guarantee or cession of member’s loans. The other three firms 
for which data were available had to provide more tangible assets such as 
investments (as for CS6), insurance policies, or house (see detailed table in 
Annexure 28).  
The GEM survey, in spite of a low response rate, tends to confirm a slight 
advantage of firms with collateral over those without collateral in their 
applications for overdraft (see Table 26.1).  
Due to the small number of firms with only an overdraft facility, and the 
important role of letters of guarantee as collateral, whose value cannot be 
ascertained precisely, no review of collateral amounts was undertaken for this 
facility.  
c) Term loans: the need for tangible securities  
As to term loans, the evidence suggests that collateral plays a more significant 
role. In the balance sheet sample and the case studies, there was only one case 
(Ned3) of a firm obtaining a term loan without pledging tangible assets (the 
members’ personal guarantees apparently being sufficient). All others had to 
provide tangible collateral, and CS6 confirmed that, if he were to apply for a 
term loan, he would need to take a second bond on his house.  
GEM data also confirmed the stronger relevance of collateral for term loans as 
opposed to collateral, with a strong differential in the success rate of applications 
for finance, as illustrated in Table 26.1.  
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Table 26.1 – Success rate of finance applications according to collateral  
 Applications for overdraft Applications for term finance 
 
Number successful 
success 
rate 
Number successful 
success 
rate 
No collateral available 9 3 33% 15 3 20% 
Some collateral  13 7 54% 45 34 76% 
No data on collateral  61 30 49% 52 35 67% 
Overall 83 40 48% 112 67 60% 
Source: analysis of GEM data 
d) Overdraft and term loans: coverage level 
The next step focused on studying the level of coverage, i.e. the ratio of the value 
of collateral pledged to the amount of the facilities secured, for the balance sheet 
sample and GEM data.  
Since ISAs are primarily secured by the asset purchased, the coverage ratio was 
calculated excluding this facility. Unlimited personal guarantees were also 
excluded from the calculation as their value is not capped. Due to the low 
response rates, the analysis of GEM data was limited to applications for term 
finance. Further, owing to data uncertainty the coverage level is expressed as a 
range rather than a precise value. These factors constitute limitations to the 
validity of the following analysis. 
Table 26.2 shows the coverage calculation for case studies, Table 26.3 shows the 
coverage levels for the full balance sheet sample (subject to sufficient data) and 
Table 26.4 for the GEM sample. The study of these three tables raises several 
observations.  
In the case studies and balance sheet sample, in spite of sizeable variations, the 
coverage levels were generally higher than suggested by Lewis (1996), often at 
100 to 300% of the facilities amount. There are however some outliers, 
suggesting that a firm’s long history, franchise networks and bargaining may 
help to lower collateral requirements. In the case of partnerships, banks seem to 
be reluctant to add the securities provided by members, possibly because of 
doubts about the durability of such partnership.  
Unlike for case studies and the balance sheet sample, coverage levels above 
100% were rare in the GEM sample (6 cases) and their success rate appeared to 
be no better than those with lower ratios. It is not clear what caused this 
divergence in results, but there is a possibility that the more exhaustive data of 
the bank files (balance sheet sample) led to a more complete capture of all 
securities, while survey answers possibly focused on the main asset pledged.  
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Table 26.2 – Coverage level of facilities – case studies  
 CS1 CS2 CS3  CS6 
Value of assets pledged  188K 2 600 K 756K  
“much 
higher than 
100K” 
Amount of Instalment sale (ISA) 228K  40K 149K 
Amount of other long-term loans 60K 1 800 K 0 0 
Overdraft limit granted 25K 80K 100K 100K 
Coverage level (including ISA) 
50 to 
100% 
100% to 
200% 
Over 
500% 
Assumed  
50 to 100% 
Coverage level (excluding ISA) 
200% to 
300% 
100% to 
200% 
Over 
500% 
Assumed 
100 to 200% 
Source: bank files (CS1 and CS3), interviews, financial statements  
 
Table 26.3 – Coverage level – balance sheet sample  
 (Estimated) Coverage ratio 
 No 
collateral 
under 
50% 
50-99% 100% 
101-
200% 
201-
500% 
Over 
500% 
Firms with term 
loan and 
overdraft 
Wec5 (Ned3)  Wec7 
CS2, 
(CS6), 
BD2, 
Ned4, 
(Dir2) 
CS1, 
Ned1, 
Ned5 
CS3 
(Wec7_i) 
Firms with 
overdraft but no 
term loan 
   
 Ned11, 
Ned13, 
Wec6, 
(Gob1) 
Ned15, 
(Dir3), 
PWC1 
 
A firm code name in (brackets) indicates that the coverage ratio is assumed; 
Wec7_i refers to the initial bank requirement for Wec7 (later reduced) 
Table excludes ISAs and personal guarantees given by members or third parties 
(such as Khula) 
Notes: 
• Wec5, a PVC manufacturer, has been in existence for 30 years;  
• Ned3 is a franchise petrol station owned by a white family which 
provided unlimited personal guarantees; 
• For Wec7 the initial bank requirement was for 600% coverage, which the 
owners negotiated down to 100%.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 26 Page 377 
 
• Wec7 and CS3 are partnerships. It is possible that banks may have raised 
their collateral requirements due to worries on the durability of the 
partnerships. 
 
Table 26.4 – Coverage level and success of term loan applications (GEM) 
Applications for term finance Number successful 
success 
rate 
Firms with no collateral 15 3 20.0% 
All firms with collateral 45 34 75.6% 
Coverage ratio    
• less than 50%  19 13 68.4% 
• 50 to 100% 11 10 90.9% 
• over 100% (of amount raised) 6 3 50.0% 
Collateral amount available, in Rand    
• up to 100K 18 12 66.7% 
• 101-500K 16 13 81.3% 
• > 501K 7 6 85.7% 
NB: the total differs from the sum of the categories, since in some cases, the amount of 
collateral or the ratio is unknown. 
Another possible explanation is the fact that very high coverage ratios tend to 
appear in the smallest enterprises (raising the lowest amounts), where success 
rates have been seen to be lower. To test for this possibility, the success of 
applications among GEM respondents was studied again, this time according to 
the absolute amount of collateral available. Table 26.5 shows that the success 
rate increases linearly with the amount of security. This seems to suggest that the 
nominal amount of collateral is more relevant than the coverage ratio in the 
bank’s lending decision – a consequence of the scale effect already discussed. 
Table 26.5 – Collateral amount and success of term loan applications (GEM) 
Applications for term finance Number successful 
success 
rate 
Firms with no collateral 15 3 20.0% 
All firms with collateral 45 34 75.6% 
Collateral amount available, in Rand    
• up to 100K 18 12 66.7% 
• 101-500K 16 13 81.3% 
• > 501K 7 6 85.7% 
NB: the total differs from the sum of the categories, since in some cases, the amount of 
collateral or the ratio is unknown. 
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e) Conclusions on the relevance of collateral  
With the exception of the coverage levels, the three sources of data are consistent 
on the relevance of collateral for access to various types of facilities; they show 
that collateral is not always required for instalment sale facilities, but that it is the 
rule for overdrafts – although there is a good chance that personal guarantees 
will suffice without a need for tangible assets. As to term loans, in most cases 
tangible assets are required and the coverage level often has to exceed 100%.  
 
Figure 26.1 – Positioning of the three main facilities according to the type and 
level of security required 
 
level of coverage (balance sheet sample) 
Relevance 
for access 
(GEM) 
ISAs 
no 
collateral 
personal 
guarantees 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio ≤ 150% 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio > 150% 
not tested 
(insufficient 
data) 
OD 
no 
collateral personal 
guarantees 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio ≤ 150% 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio > 150% 
moderately 
relevant 
Term 
loans 
no 
collateral 
personal 
guarantees 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio ≤ 150% 
tangible 
assets; 
coverage 
ratio > 150% 
very 
relevant 
 
Distribution of balance sheet sample firms using a particular facility, 
according to the level of coverage available to the firm. (The shapes 
are indicative).  
 
Source: results presented above.  
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Annexure 27 – The signalling effect of collateral 
1. Literature  
Apart from its value in the case of liquidation, collateral helps banks select their 
borrowers through signalling, as an entrepreneur who is confident in his chances 
of success will be more inclined to pledge his assets, than a risky one (Bester 
1985). In addition, collateral reduces the risk of moral hazard on the part of the 
borrower (Bester & Hellwig 1989). 
2. Findings  
According to literature, the expectation would be that firms with a lower credit 
risk are more willing to pledge their personal assets as collateral, thereby giving 
potential lenders a signal that they are (intrinsically) worthy of credit 
The case studies and other interviews showed variable attitudes of business 
owners with regard to providing collateral, the dominant one being resignation 
and mixed feelings. Most business owners took banks’ collateral requirements as 
a given, that cannot be questioned. Failure to provide collateral generally caused 
self-rationing. However, there were also several cases of glad acceptance and 
one case of bargaining: the six Wec07 owners, being shocked at the first bank’s 
collateral requirements, defined their own terms, agreeing to pledge one sixth of 
the amount of security requested by the first bank, and found a lender that 
accepted their terms. 
The motives for these various attitudes are often difficult to etablish. However, 
the anecdotal evidence listed in Table 27.1 would suggest that the project risk 
(fear to fail) is only one of the factors influencing the willingness of an owner to 
pledge his assets. In an environment of uncertainty, no entrepreneur, whatever 
his quality, is able to exclude entirely the prospect of failure; hence the 
willingness to pledge collateral is also a function of the entrepreneur’s personal 
risk aversion as well as the share of his assets which are not at risk (which in turn 
depends on the entrepreneur’s total asset value).  
This more complex framework explains why restaurant owner CS2, in spite of its 
low chances of success in a highly competitive environment, is happy to pledge 
his house, while the owners of ACSe, Wec7 and CS4, who have less ‘fall back’ 
assets, are reluctant to meet the banks’ requirements. The evidence, hence, 
suggests that the owner’s net worth may be more decisive than project risk in 
predicting their acceptance of collateral requirements – in rupture with the theory 
of signalling.  
More research would be required to confirm the tentative results above.  
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Table 27.1 – Attitudes of small business owners on pledging collateral 
Attitude Business  Owner situation Business situation Quote Assumed motives 
Glad 
acceptance 
CS2  owns a R2,6 
million house;  
previous business 
failure 
franchise in highly 
competitive 
environment 
“Why would I be worried? the value of my house 
is much higher than the credit line” 
value of assets 
Resignation  CS4 blacklisted service firm with huge 
working capital 
problems 
“we are poor” (fear of failure) 
value of assets 
 ACSe n/a growing service firm 
with only intangible 
assets 
“How will it work? I have no assets” value of assets 
Mixed feelings CS6 mother has 
investments; sons 
hardly have 
savings 
growing service firm 
with serious working 
capital problems 
“The value of my mother’s investments is much 
higher anyway!” 
“I could take a second bond on my house, but I am 
not keen on that”. 
value of assets  
(fear of failure) 
Bargain Wec7 6 owners, of 
which 5 are black  
young growing 
business 
“We had to sign our lives away (…), so we decided 
to go and shop around”   
=> reduced the requirements by 1/6 
(risk aversion) 
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Annexure 28 – Type of collateral in balance sheet sample 
Type of collateral used to secure different facilities 
 
Race Type of facility Type of collateral  
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BD2 White   x   x  ML       x   3 
BD5 White   x x x           1 
BD6 White   x   x           1 
BD9 White   x x x           1 
CS2 White x x   x   x       2 
CS3 Black  x x x x   x (x) x   4 
CS6 White   x x x   (c)   x   2 
Dir1 White   x   x           1 
Dir2 Black x x x   x      x   2 
Dir3 White   x x     (x) (x)     2 
Gob1 White   x x x     (x)   D 3 
Gob5 Black x x x   x          1 
Ned1 Black unc x x       x     1 
Ned10 Black x x   x  x x   x x 5 
Ned11 Black     x x  x     x D 4 
Ned13 White   x   x  x x       3 
Ned15 White   x   x  x     x D 4 
Ned3 White x x x ML           1 
Ned4 
White 
x x x 3rd 
  
x       
2 
Ned5 White x x x x       x x 3 
Ned8 White unc x x       x     1 
PWC1 White   x x           D 1 
Wec6 Black x x x ML x (x)       3 
Count   9 22 16 12 7 7 3 8 6 3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 28 Page 382 
 
 
 
Unc: unclear ML: member’s loan 
D: Debtors’ book 3
rd:
 third party guarantee 
(x): assumed  (c) under consideration  
 
 
Notes: Firms that are not mentioned here are those for which no data on the type 
of collateral were available. For the SMMEs listed here, the list of collateral 
types is not necessarily exhaustive.   
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Annexure 29 – Type of collateral by facility and race 
Type of collateral used to secure different facilities 
 
LG or 
Member's loan 
only 
LG/ML and 
tangible security 
Tangible 
security without 
LG/ML 
Total 
 White Black White Black White Black White Black 
2 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 
Overdraft 
only 
BD6, 
Dir1 
  
BD2, 
Ned13, 
Ned15 
          
2 0 2 0 3 1 7 1 
Overdraft and 
ISA 
BD5, 
BD9 
  CS6,Gob1   
Dir3, 
PWC1, 
Ned8 
Ned1     
1 0 3 3 0 2 4 5 Overdraft and 
Term loan, 
with or 
without ISA 
Ned3   
Ned4, 
Ned5, CS2 
CS3, 
Wec6, 
Ned10 
  
Dir2, 
Gob5 
    
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
ISA only 
      Ned11         
Total 5 0 8 4 3 3 16 7 
Source: analysis of balance sheet sample 
LG: Letter of Guarantee; ML: Member’s loan 
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Annexure 30 – Case study design 
 
This annexure comments on the choice of case study objects and the 
methodology that was used to collect and evaluate data. The methodology 
choices were particularly guided by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994). 
 
1. The advantages of a case study approach  
Unlike the review of the balance sheet sample and GEM survey among 224 
‘black’ SMEs, case studies allowed for multiple sources of evidence and tracing 
the boundaries between the phenomenon (the complaints about financial 
constraints) and its context, that is, the internal management of the firm, the 
behaviour of financial institutions and other partners, market and political 
environment. By working with “more variables of interest than data points”, case 
studies had a greater explanatory potential and a lower risk of being misled by 
spurious effects.  
The case study approach was meant as a complement to the more systematic 
data, much in the spirit of Mintzberg (1979, p. 587): “For while systematic data 
create the foundation for our theories, it is the anecdotal data that enable us to do 
the building. Theory building seems to require rich description”. 
In terms of the classification proposed by Yin, the case study investigation was 
essentially explanatory, aimed at tracing operational links between the existence 
of financial constraints within small businesses, and the possible external (e.g. 
supply-driven) and internal (demand-related) factors identified in the theoretical 
work.  
The following paragraphs give more operational links to connect the empirical 
data with the initial research question.  
2. Case study design choices 
2.1 - Study’s questions 
The research was concerned with assessing the prevalence and amplitude of 
financial constraints for small businesses, as well as seeking explanations for 
them. In particular, two broad explanatory hypotheses needed to be tested, 
namely (1) the possibility of dysfunction in the market, especially with regard to 
informational opacity and (2) the lack of creditworthiness of small enterprises.  
 
Transferred to a micro-economic approach, the study’s questions could be 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness?  
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 30: Case study design Page 385 
 
 
restated as follows:   
(1) What are the typical needs and financial resources of various types of 
small businesses, and what are their experiences with regard to access to 
finance? 
(2) Within each type, how opaque is the financial communication provided 
by the SMME?  
(3) How intrinsically sound are those SMMEs? 
(4) What can be the role of informational opacity on one hand, lack of 
creditworthiness on the other hand, in explaining these SMMEs’ lack of 
access to the finance they require? 
 
To operationalise the questions into a case study design, the following steps were 
required: 
- select the case study objects in such a way that they would cover the 
variety of situations at hand and allow for a typology to emerge; 
- within each “type” of firm, investigate  
- the total need for finance and the resources available, in order to 
identify possible gaps;   
- the intrinsic financial quality of the firm (in terms of financial 
ratios and financial management); 
- the quality of the firm’s financial management and, in particular, 
its accounting transparency; 
- and aspects related to what has been called ‘information 
substitutes’, such as availability of collateral, existence of a credit 
record and network effects.  
- connect the elements above to verify whether a general pattern emerges 
which holds true across the types of businesses.  
 
2.2 - Units of analysis and sources of evidence 
Due to the variability of situations, it was decided to opt for a multiple case study 
design, with individual businesses representing single units of analysis.  
The time boundaries were sometimes restricted by the availability of data, but in 
general the aim was to cover the history of a business from start-up to the time of 
data collection, i.e. between March and June 2004.  
In some unanticipated cases the history of the business selected required an 
enlargement of the unit of analysis, to include another business entity, which has 
either been merged into the main business studied (CS3a) or has taken over the 
activities of the first business (CS4b).  
  
The firms were studied within their context, including in particular (a) the 
partners associated in financial management, such as external bookkeeper or  
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accountant, and (b) the potential or actual providers of funds, such as family and 
friends, banks, suppliers, micro-lenders.  
In order to combine the strengths of various types of data, the general case study 
design was organised around three main sources of evidence:  
- interviews, especially of the business owners, which have the advantage 
of being targeted and insightful (Yin p. 80),  
- direct observations, in the form of on-site visits, which are real and 
contextual, and  
- archival records, namely the historic financial statements, which 
compensate the weaknesses of the other sources of evidence by being 
stable, unobtrusive, exact, precise and quantitative.  
- Occasionally, some documentation (business brochure offered by the 
business owners; cash flow forecast; excerpts from bank file) was used as 
an additional source of evidence.  
 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative data was used for synergistic 
purposes (Eisenhardt 1989 p. 538). In particular, in contrast to previous 
empirical undertakings, rich qualitative data were used for their usefulness in 
hypothesis-shaping, in explaining why emergent relationships hold or do not 
hold (Eisenhardt p. 542) 
 
3. The selection of case study units 
3.1. Initial plan 
It was decided to select case study units according to a “theoretical sampling” 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967), i.e. responding to theoretical rather than statistical 
requirements. For this, categories were built which were thought to be most 
relevant in investigating the questions at stake. The categories chosen to ensure 
that the case studies were representative were the following:  
- (1) franchise, (2) manufacturing and construction enterprises, (3) low-
skill service enterprises and (4) high-skill service enterprises; 
- (1) white-owned, (2) coloured or Asian and (3) black-owned businesses, 
and  
- businesses which have had various experiences with regard to access to 
finance (successful/unsuccessful initially and at a later stage).  
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3.2. Difficulties and necessary compromise 
As described in the thesis, Chapter 1 section 4.4, in the process of selecting 
enterprises and gathering the data for the case studies, two problems surfaced: 
(1) it appeared that there was a strong correlation between low-skill and 
black-owned businesses; unfortunately, no black-owned business was 
found that fulfilled the conditions regarding to accounting quality; 
(2) in addition, the case study design was leading to a self-selection bias: the 
firms able and willing to provide both strong accounting data and time 
for interviews appeared to be all reasonably well-managed and 
reasonably successful with access to finance.  
 
These two problems were unsatisfying because it was feared that they would 
lead to distorted (over-optimistic) conclusions. The case studies would neither 
provide a profound understanding for the black businesses’ plea on the 
insufficiency of finance, nor would it reflect the financial institutions’ claim that 
their funds are at risk due to bad management practices in most small businesses.  
To obtain sufficient insights into those two issues, it was necessary to adjust the 
methodology. To deal with township micro-businesses, accounting data 
requirements had to be strongly loosened – with the core of the analysis being 
based on a critical analysis of interview data. On the other hand, it was felt that 
the best illustration of badly-managed SMEs and their consequence on the use of 
bank funds would come from the analysis of a failed business – but obtaining 
both detailed accounting information and qualitative interview-based data from a 
failed entrepreneur seemed almost impossible.  
Therefore, the study design was revised based on the following compromise:  
- Four regular case studies would be carried out, based on a combination of 
strong accounting data and interview data. However, the low-skilled and 
black businesses would not be represented, nor would there be any 
extreme cases with regard to management quality or access to finance; 
- To reflect on low-skilled black businesses and their disastrous 
relationship to finance, two (related) cases would be studied, following 
an atypical methodology based primarily on interview data, and 
- To reflect on firms squandering the generous finance granted through 
apparently dishonest practices, a failed business would be examined, 
again based on an atypical methodology using primarily accounting data, 
with no interview available. 
 
This compromise was a way to maximise the two advantages of multiple case 
study designs for the building of theory, namely replication and extension 
(Eisenhardt 1991 p. 620): the choice of a relatively controlled sample for the four 
regular case studies enabled to “reduce extraneous variations” (Eisenhardt 1989 
p. 535), hence easing the replication of emerging theoretical concepts. On the 
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other hand, the addition of two polarised cases (Pettigrew 1988), enabled 
extending theory (Eisenhardt 1989 p. 537) 
3.3. Synopsis of the case studies undertaken 
Table 30.1 summarises the six case studies undertaken: 
Table 30.1 – Synopsis of case studies undertaken  
Business 
“code 
name” 
Size 
category 
Age 
(yrs) 
Type of 
business 
Sector / 
activity  
Race  Methodology  
CS2 small 3 franchise restaurant white “regular” 
CS3 small 6 
manufacturing 
(and retail) 
safety wear coloured  “regular” 
CS5 small 6 
high-skilled 
services 
tourism coloured “regular” 
CS6 small 13 
high-skilled 
services 
packaging  white “regular” 
CS4 a+b micro 
8 & 
0.5 
low-skilled 
services 
cleaning African interviews only 
CS1 
very 
small 
4 
failed business; 
franchise & 
manufacturing 
furniture 
(manuf and 
retail) 
white 
desk study only 
(bank file) 
 
In the data collection process, several small businesses had been considered as 
possible case study objects, but the case studies have not been completed either 
because of the businesses’ inability to provide the data required, or because they 
were eventually found not to match the profile required.  
In some cases, though, a substantial part of the data collection had happened 
prior to the case being abandoned, occasionally providing interesting insights. 
Therefore, on occasions, this report will mention these cases.  
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Table 30.2 – Case studies abandoned 
Business 
“code 
name” 
Size 
category 
Age 
(yrs) 
Type of 
business 
Sector / 
activity  
Race  
Reason(s) for 
being 
abandoned  
ACS a 
very 
small  14 
high-skilled 
services 
Heating/Air 
Conditioning 
Systems 
coloured 
owner has 
become 
unavailable 
for second 
interview 
ACS b micro 6 
low-skilled 
services 
sport supplies coloured  
accounting 
quality 
insufficient 
ACS c 
(Dir02) 
very 
small 5 
manufacturing  printing coloured 
not actually 
struggling 
ACS d micro 5 manufacturing Furniture African 
no financial 
records 
ACS e 
very 
small 
missing 
high-skilled 
services 
security 
services 
white 
eventually 
refused to 
provide 
financials 
(ACS f) 
(Dir03) 
small 13 restaurant 
franchise 
family 
restaurant 
white 
too similar to 
CS2 
 
4. Operational case study procedure  
Each of the six case study units selected was studied according to the following 
sequence. Following the advice of Eisenhardt (1989:533), the choice was made 
to overlap data collection and analysis, in order to allow helpful adjustments to 
data collection.  
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5. Logic for the data analysis and interpretation  
The logic used for a targeted data collection (interview guides), and for linking 
data to the concepts studied (Qualitative Analytical Protocols) was as developed 
in the conceptual framework. In particular,  
• A review of the existing assets (as recorded in balance sheets), investing 
activities (as described in interviews and constructed in pro forma cash 
flow statements), and the ambitions disclosed by the business owner in 
PREPARATION 
1. Pre-selection telephonic interview (in some cases two interviews) 
2. Case study protocol / investigation plan  
3. Confidentiality agreement  
 
DATA COLLECTION AND PRE-ANALYSIS 
4. First interview on-site (following a general semi-structured interview 
guide) 
5. Study of financial statements and possible other documentation  
6. Preparation of a case-specific interview guide (Lillis, 1999 p. 84) for 
second interview  
7. Second interview 
8. Additional analysis  
9. Occasionally additional interviews, telephonic or written correspondence, 
with either individuals internal to the business, or external partners 
(accountant, client, franchisor) 
 
WITHIN-CASE DATA ANALYSIS 
10. Documentation of collected data, especially on the firm’s history and 
management characteristics, following a Qualitative Analytical Protocol 
(Lillis)  
11. Evaluation of financial statements quality  
12. Analysis of financial ratios  
13. Interpretation of results and verification according to an “audit trail” 
(Lillis) 
14. Single case study final report  
 
SYNTHESIS 
15. Cross case pattern search  
16. Shaping hypotheses (iterative process to verify the fit) 
17. Building internal validity 
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his interviews, enabled to get a sense for each firm’s need for finance. In 
addition to long-term finance needs resulting from fixed assets, the need 
for working capital also had to be considered. 
• The present resources available, as read in the balance sheet and the 
future resources, as estimated from the operational cash flow potential, 
were triangulated by interviews.  
• The transparency of the firm’s financial communication was evaluated 
according to the scoring model developed (see chapter 3), whereby a 
score of less than 50 was considered weak and a score over 70 was 
deemed good.  
• The intrinsic soundness of the firm was interpreted according to the ratio-
based creditworthiness model developed (see chapter 4), with the ratio-
based suspicions being further linked to interview-based evidence. In 
addition to a pure quantitative view of creditworthiness, findings on 
management quality, especially financial management, as gathered from 
the interviews, completed the judgement.  
• The availability of collateral as well as the existence of a credit record 
would usually be derived from the interviews, with the bank file (when 
available) occasionally providing more precise quantitative data. 
In general, the interpretation of data was always based on comparing patterns 
from various case studies and probing the initial apparent frames from qualitative 
data through scale representation coming from quantitative data (as per 
Eisenhardt 1989:540) 
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Annexure 31 – Narrative on Case Study 1  
Liquidated franchise in furniture  
(manufacturing and retailing) 
 
Case Study CS1 was an atypical case study, added to the conventional case 
studies in order to avoid the self-selection bias. It is the only case that was 
studiied without direct contact with the owner. It serves as an illustration of 
undeserved access to finance, improper accounting practices, and financial 
distress.  
1. Business Short Portrait: 
Business Code Name: CS1 
Member’s initials: Mr. J. v.d.M. 
Member owns 100% of capital 
Member’s ethnic background: White 
Member is also manager 
Form of registration: not clear  
(some documents quote it as a 
Pty Ltd, others as a CC) 
Sector of activity: 
- Primary activity: SIC 3910 
- Primary activity: SIC 6233 
 
Manufacture of furniture 
Retail of furniture 
Product or Service: built-in cupboards for kitchen and bedroom 
Business concept: franchise Market: Private domestic 
Start-up date: 1996 
Current status: liquidated 
 
Staff members: 6 
(further details on staff were not 
available) 
Annual turnover: R 2.2 million  
Gross fixed assets : R 357 thousand  
 
=> Size category: very small  
               (tending to “small”) 
Main sources of finance:  
 
Member’s loan 
Instalment sale 
Long-term bank loan 
Trade credit 
Bank Overdraft 
Credit Card 
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2. The case study procedure 
Unlike other case studies, the study of CS1 was based exclusively on archival 
data, derived from the following sources: 
- Basic profile information on form provided by researcher and filled-in by 
the bank (e.g. number of employees etc) 
- All financial data and reports of analysis that could be found in the bank 
file (the bank file in Cape Town is probably just partial, because Cape 
Town staff is presumably essentially a commercial agency, while the 
credit decisions are taken in a credit committee at the Head Office 
(Jhb/Pretoria); they may have been more attentive to the financial data.) 
- franchisor’s financial statements (without notes), 1994-95 
- « application for franchisor approval », submitted by franchisor to bank, 
1996 
- financial statements: the bank file contained only very irregular accounts 
for the periods between 1996 and June 2000 
o full financial statements for Feb 1997 (incl. AO report),  
o Balance sheet, income statement and rudimentary notes for Jan 
1998,  
o monthly balance sheets for July 1999 till January 2000, as well as 
April to July 2000,  
o monthly income statements for January 2000, June 2000, July 
2000 
o and income statements for the 10 months ended 31 December 
1999, the 7 months ended 31 January 2000, and the 12 months 
ended 30 June 2000.  
- Cash-Flow forecast for Apr-Sept 1998 
- Statement of the bank’s exposure on: 1996, May 1998, 1999  
- Excerpt of the liquidator’s report (March 2001) showing the Assets and 
Liabilities as well as the cause of the company’s failure  
- “Franchising”, brochure from ABSA Bank Ltd, Ref 980660 GITAM SA 
 
 
 
3. Profile of the business owner and history of the 
business 
Unlike the other case studies, which were for going-concerns, this one refered to 
a liquidated business, and was based solely on written documentation – no 
interviews were available. For this reason, data on the business owner were 
scarce. The history of the business could mainly be deduced from the successive 
accounting documents, however these frequently contradict each other and there 
is an extreme confusion about some fundamental values.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this section, the business history will be described 
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in a mainly verbal way, mentioning figures only if there is a reasonable 
assurance that these figures are real, otherwise restricting itself to orders of 
magnitude. The following, more analytical sections, will concentrate on reported 
figures and tackle the contradictions implied by these figures.  
 
a) The business owner 
From its start-up date in 1996 until its liquidation in 2000, the business has had 
only one member, “Mr. van der Merwe” (not his real name). The bank indicated 
that he came from a “white Afrikaans” background.  
Unfortunately, there was no further data available about the entrepreneur, his 
previous experiences and qualifications, his personal assets, his possible 
relationship to the franchisor, etc.  
My attempts to establish a personal contact with him have been vain, he may 
have left the Cape Town area or he is not listed in the telephone directory.  
 
b) Establishment of the franchise: 
Mr. S. Parker, the franchisor (not his real name), started operations as an 
independent business in Pretoria in 1992, as a manufacturer and retailer of 
kitchen and wardrobe furniture. According to an evaluation by the bank, the 
“secret” of the business was said to be the material used, fibre-board, which was 
cheaper, convenient and for which the business had an “exclusive supply 
agreement” with a “large national concern”.  
The accounts showed that the Pretoria business was growing well and profitable, 
and started a second shop. It is probable that the bank has provided high 
commitments for the financing of this second shop: the 1995 balance sheet 
showed long-term debt amounting to R770 000, up from R270 000 the year 
before, but no note was available for further details. 
Mr. Parker then decided to engage into nationwide franchising. Early 1996 he 
approached his bank for approval of a franchisor scheme, which foresaw sizeable 
franchise fees. The notes indicate that Mr. Parker’s expectation was that 
franchisees’ turnover should be in the region of R250 000/month, i.e. R 3 million 
/ year. 
The application for approval does not mention any amounts or facilities involved 
on the part of the bank. The bank’s Credit Committee approved the scheme, 
based on 2 main reasons, which were handwritten next to the signature: 
exclusive supply agreement and the fact that the franchise fees were paid in full 
upfront. A further element that came up from the bank file was that Mr. Parker 
seemed to have a good credit record with the bank (the exact wording says: “The 
franchisor is highly considered by the Commercial Manager responsible for the 
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account”). 
c) Start-up of Cape Town business: 
Mr. van der Merwe (not his real name) started his business in Cape Town in 
1996, supposedly as one of the first franchisees, with exclusive rights for the 
Cape Peninsula.  
There is a first ambiguity as to the type of registration which Mr. van der Merwe 
chose for his business. The most probable is that he registered as a CC, since the 
accounting officer, in his report for February 1997, refers to the business as a 
Close Corporation and even mentions the registration number, which has the 
format of the register of Close Corporations. However, the firm’s letterheads, the 
bank’s file and even the liquidator’s report bear the mention “(Pty) Ltd”. It is not 
clear whether the liquidator has been confused by a false mention on the firm’s 
stationery, or whether the initial Close Corporation has later been converted into 
a private company.  
Starting up a franchised business always represents a heavy initial investment, 
especially when the activity includes manufacturing, which requires substantial 
equipment. The initial investment was in the region of R 390 000. For start-up 
finance, Mr. van der Merwe naturally turned to the bank of the franchisor, which 
had agreed in principle to support the franchise.  
Consistent with their approval of the franchise scheme, the bank supported Mr. 
van der Merwe’s venture with a term loan and an instalment sale agreement, 
jointly covering approximately three quarters of the total initial investment.  
The business could then start to manufacture and sell its furniture in the course 
of 1996.  
d) First few years of operation  
In a way that is not unusual for small businesses, the first few years of operation 
have been difficult, as Mr. van der Merwe did not immediately establish himself 
on the market and build up a customer base.  
During those first two years, the firm apparently did not provide its main creditor 
any report on performance – the first official financial statements, for the period 
up to February 1997, only reached the bank almost 2 years later in December 
1998. 
There is conflicting evidence as to the annual turnover figures that the business 
reached in the first and second years, but it makes no doubt that they were 
significantly under the R 3 million mentioned by the franchisor. Considering this 
turnover gap, one would expect that the first two years have not been profitable, 
but there are again contradictions in evidence in this regard.  
Not surprisingly, there is also some evidence that the pressure on the bank 
balance increased, and that by January 1998 the bank balance was negative. 
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However, the business seemed to be reasonably up-to-date with the repayment of 
its long-term facilities, so the bank obviously decided to support Mr. v.d.M. 
further. In 1998 he was granted an overdraft facility of R 25 000. On this basis 
Mr. van der Merwe pursued his business.  
At the end of 1998 or early in 1999 the business acquired a new vehicle for an 
amount of R131K. To finance this investment, Mr. van der Merwe obtained a 
new long-term financing facility from a different bank, for approximately 
R100K.  
e) 1999: increasing tension on cash   
At the latest in July 1999, the “home bank” of Mr. van der Merwe’s business 
supposedly became pessimistic about its evolution (although the bank file did not 
contain any analysis or written note to document this).  
The persistence of high balances in the long-term liabilities strongly suggests 
that the SME was no longer able to adhere to the initial repayment schedules for 
the Instalment Sale and the term loan. In addition, the cash balances were 
significantly beyond the overdraft limit granted.  
The only bank reaction that was visible from the file, is that the financial 
institution decided to monitor its client more closely, insisting on monthly 
reporting. (In principle monthly reporting is compulsory for all clients, but the 
bank SME manager for Cape Town admitted in an interview that they are 
especially insisting about it when they suspect that the business is in difficulty). 
The monthly reports for July to December 1999 lead to mitigated impressions. 
On one hand, the cash balance at month-end has temporarily improved from –43 
000 R in July to a positive value of R 92 000. This may have raised hopes of 
recovery. Also, the income statement for the 10 months ended 31/12/1999 
showed a continued turnover growth, which would now bring the business close 
to the initial target set by the franchisor, at R 250 million per month (although 
this initial target would require to be inflation-adjusted). Furthermore, the costs 
as reported were under control.  
f) 2000: Distress and liquidation  
It is probable that any hopes of recovery vanished in the following year, when 
the business’s bank balances reached unprecedented negative levels. Adding up 
the current account and the credit card, the deficit reached R43 000 in January 
2000, R51 500 in April and R66 500 in June. Meanwhile, the operations also 
turned not to be profitable, with the income statements for the 7 months ended 31 
January 2000 as well as the 12 months ended 30 June 2000 showing high losses. 
A liquidation procedure was initiated during the course of 2000. By March 2001, 
when the liquidator sent his report to the creditors, the movable assets had 
already been liquidated and the proceeds were to be shared among the creditors.  
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In its section on the “causes of the company’s failure”, the liquidator’s report 
quotes from the director of the company the following reason: “the downturn in 
the economy and the lack of orders as well as working capital”. Hence, even 
after 4 years of operation, Mr. van der Merwe still felt that he had not reached 
sufficient volumes of turnover, and admits that it had not had sufficient working 
capital. This interpretation of the causes of failure will be further discussed later. 
 
4. Business model and operations 
a) Franchise scheme 
Financially, franchise schemes are usually described according to the following 
criteria: initial franchise fee required, total initial investment required (including 
a breakdown between franchise fee, stock, equipment and working capital), 
minimum amount of cash (i.e. minimum share of the initial investment which 
must be self-financed), and monthly fees for management services, advertising 
and possibly training.  
Mr. Parker’s franchise scheme could be summarised as follows: 
Table 31.1 – Franchise scheme in 1996 
Total investment  
(upfront fee, fixed assets, stock 
& wrkg capital) 
Upfront fee 
Amount of 
cash required. 
Management Services 
Fee (“royalty”) and  
Advertising Fund 
 
Upfront fee:  120 K to 320 K 
Equipment:      198  K 
Stock:           30 K 
Wking capital:     30  K 
           ------------ 
   378 K to 578K 
 
 
120 K to 
320 K, 
depending 
on location 
and size of 
territory  
 
not specified 
 
R 9 000 per month, 
broken down as: 
 
R 5 000 for “royalty” 
R 4 000 for “national 
advertising and 
promotions” 
Source: « application for franchisor approval », as submitted by franchisor to bank, 
1996; K means R1 000, so 120 K means R120 000, etc. 
 
As far as fees are concerned, Mr. van der Merwe was lucky to pay only the 
lowest upfront fee of R120 000. As to monthly royalties and “advertising levy”, 
it is interesting to note that, instead of being proportional to sales as is usual, they 
were fixed at a total of R9 000 per month, or R108 000 per year. Assuming that 
the business would reach the targeted turnover of R 3 million per year, this fee 
would represent 3.6% of turnover, but this proportion would increase if the 
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business was underperforming. Of course, the fixed fees were subject to an 
inflation adjustment – for example the accounts show that the “royalty” was up 
to R5 600 in January 1998. 
The scheme of the franchise which Mr. van der Merwe joined is difficult to 
assess, since there is hardly any known example of furniture franchises in South 
Africa to which it could compare. To have some general elements of comparison 
nevertheless, 51 members of the Franchise Association of South Africa (FASA) 
were reviewed, out of which 39 gave financial details about their fee structure 
and the investment sums that they require. 
By general standards, the franchise scheme as designed by Mr. van der Merwe’s 
franchisor seemed relatively heavy and risky for the franchisee. Of the 39 FASA 
members reviewed, only 6 ask for upfront franchise fee equal to or higher than 
R120 000 and these are either “big names” (Nando’s), or foreign US franchises 
(Minuteman), or building franchises. This is in spite of the inflation that has 
taken place between 1996 and 2004.  
Since it seemed that the building industry had generally heavier franchise fees 
than the average, a sectoral comparison seemed more accurate. Several FASA 
members from the “building, office and home” sector were reviewed to the 
extent that they were disclosing their franchise schemes. This sector included 
franchises in the areas of tiling, plumbing, timber, or signaling, as well as one 
furniture business. The only furniture franchise found was “Easylife Kitchens”, 
which describes itself as a supplier of DIY and fully installed storage solutions 
(kitchen/bic/study/office). Table 31.2 compares the franchise schemes of those 
businesses with the Parker scheme.  
Table 31.2 – Some examples of franchise schemes in the building and home 
industry  
 
Total investment Upfront fee 
Cash 
required 
Monthly Fees  
Ceramic Tile 
Market (CTM) 
R1 000 000 
minimum 
R500 000+ R500 000  
Easylife Kitchens  R400 000 R40 000  
5% on purchases 
reducing to 2% 
after R70 000 
Mend-A-Bath 
International (Pty) 
Ltd 
R60 000+ 
 
   
On-Tap R500 000  R65 000 R200 000 1,5% purchases 
SIGN-A-RAMA  R265 000 R330 000 6%. 
Timbercity 
subject to location 
and size of the outlet 
R100 000  
R10 000 per 
month fixed VAT 
excl 
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Total investment Upfront fee 
Cash 
required 
Monthly Fees  
“Parker Furniture”  
R378 000 to 
R578 000 
   R120 000 
to R320 000 
not 
specified 
R9 000 per month 
Sources: elaborated from FASA Website (2004) as well as “Parker” Franchisor 
approval (1996) 
The table shows that, compared with other franchise schemes, many of which 
have a well established name on the market, the little franchise of Mr. Parker was 
quite expensive. Of course, costs must be measured in proportion to the quality 
of support provided, but it is doubtful that Mr. Parker, who was himself still an 
SME owner, would be able to provide an advertising strength and management 
services of comparable quality to larger established networks. Hence, it is 
probable that the franchise scheme itself, even with the lowest upfront fee of 
R120 000, was excessively expensive for the franchisee.  
 
b) Assets 
Although not absolutely necessary, it is a typical feature of franchising that the 
initial investment is high, because new franchisees immediately acquire a fully 
functional business able to perform all operations required, instead of building 
up their asset base as they grow. After this initial investment, there is usually 
little need for further investments, except to upgrade the equipment from time to 
time.  
Accordingly, Mr. van der Merwe started his business with the full equipment 
recommended by the franchise scheme, for a value of nearly R200 000. 
According to the note to the first financial statements, this amount breaks down 
as follows: 
Plant and Machinery R 100 641 
Motor vehicle  R  80 025 
Office equipment R  17 281 
In the following year, Mr. van der Merwe only undertook marginal upgrades of 
his asset base, investing approximately R25 000 in furniture, office and computer 
equipment (source: January 1998 management accounts). This brought the total 
(gross) value of its fixed assets to approximately R223 000. 
Whether this investment was indeed sufficient for the business envisaged, is 
worth asking. For comparison, it was noted that in 1994, Mr. Parker, who was 
running only one shop supposedly comparable to the one that Mr. van der 
Merwe would need to run, had fixed assets of R492 387,86, and was generating a 
turnover of just below R2,5 million. In the next year, after opening its second 
store, Mr. Parker’s fixed assets amounted to R1,15 million (Source: Franchisor’s 
Financial statements; the carrying value of assets is net of depreciation).  
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In light of this information, one may wonder how his franchisee should have 
been able to generate a higher turnover with less than half the assets that the 
franchisor used in his own business. A possible explanation could be that the 
franchisor would take care of some parts of the manufacturing process on behalf 
of its franchisees, so that some pieces of equipment would be needed only in the 
head office. Unfortunately there was generally too little information to verify this 
possibility, but the fact that for his second shop Mr. Parker has invested even 
higher amounts than for the first one would tend to suggest that each shop would 
need full assets in order to be fully functional.  
If this reflection is correct, it would mean that Mr. van der Merwe’s business was 
under-equipped to deal with the amounts of business envisaged. This may be the 
reason why he decided in 1999 to invest in a new vehicle, for a value of 
R131 000. Even with this additional vehicle, the asset base remains significantly 
slimmer than for the franchisor.  
c) Marketing policy  
In the absence of interview data or specific evidence, the analysis is limited to a 
discussion.  
As a supplier of kitchen and wardrobe furniture, the business was selling to the 
public, hence having a potentially wide market. It is difficult to know exactly the 
market segment that the business was intending to serve. Although it prides itself 
to offer “ultra-competitively priced products” (source: Application for franchisor 
approval), it is unlikely that it was targeting the bottom end of the market. 
Indeed, it appeared to have no shop other than his factory shop located in 
Montague Gardens, an area hardly accessible for non-motorised low-income 
South Africans. It is therefore more probable that he was targeting middle-
income customers – a market segment where competition is high, since it 
involves both small operators and large retailers.  
Since the business’s shop was not in a prominent shopping location, it must have 
had other ways of reaching its customers. Indeed, the advertising expenses and 
promotions have been relatively high (approximately R150 000 per year, of 
which R48 000 to 50 000 were for the head office) but no data were available as 
to the methods employed or the extent of support provided by the Head Office. 
With only five employees in the entire business, including manufacturing and 
delivering, it is probable that the business had only a limited capacity to promote 
sales: the business owner himself probably had to share his time between sales, 
manufacturing and the firm’s general management.  
There were, hence, difficult circumstances for selling: “industrial” location, lack 
of knowledge of the business name, hard competition, lack of capacity to 
promote sales. This may explain why Mr. van der Merwe has not been able to 
build up his customer base as quickly as he hoped.  
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d) Credit policy  
To push turnover up in spite of the competition, many furniture businesses in the 
late 1990s have engaged into a sometimes hazardous credit policy.  
There is contradictory evidence as to whether, when and to what extent Mr. van 
der Merwe followed this path. The official financial statements for the first year 
(ended February 1997) indicate, in a note, that there are no debtors because “the 
Close Corporation undertakes work on a Cash on Delivery Basis”.  
However, the management accounts for the previous month (January 1997) 
displayed trade receivables amounting to R 89 807. Compared with the annual 
turnover found in the Annual Financial statements, the trade debtors hence 
corresponded to an average credit period of about 32,5 days (the effective credit 
periods may however be longer since the business has only been trading for a 
few months).  In addition, the cash flow forecast provided in the early months of 
1998 was built on the assumption that approximately 50% of sales were credit 
sales. Both these indicators would suggest that there was a substantial credit 
activity taking place.  
In the following balance sheets, the trade debtors have continued increasing in 
the absolute, reaching their maximum (R 186 345) in November 1999. However, 
relative to turnover – to the extent that turnover figures can be considered as 
reliable -, there was no escalation of trade receivables, which remained in the 
region of 4.5 to 7% of turnover, or 17 to 25 days. For comparison purposes, the 
franchisor in February 1994 and 1995 had trade receivables oscillating between 
2% and 8% of turnover. It seems thus that the SME has generally refrained from 
granting 12 to 24 months credit periods to customers as is usual in the furniture 
industry.   
In addition, the balance sheets suggest that the business has been able in some 
cases to obtain deposits from clients, sometimes for a long period. In particular, 
the February 1997 statements show a substantial amount of deposit (almost 10% 
of the year’s turnover). In addition, the balance sheets for the second half of 1999 
indicate a more modest deposit, but which has been on the business’s balance 
sheet for at least 6 months (July to December 1999; previous balance sheets were 
not available to verify whether it may have been paid prior to July 1999). 
Although not systematic, these deposits supposedly helped the business deal with 
working capital constraints.  
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Table 31.3 - Trade receivables in 1997 to 2000 
 Jan 1997 
(manag. 
accounts) 
Feb 1997  
(official 
accounts) 
Jan 1998 
July 
1999 
Nov 
1999 
July 
2000 
Trade Debtors 89,807 0 100 646 128 481 186 345 126 389 
in days of turnover 32.5 0 16.8 16.9 24.5 17.4 
Deposits 0 88 806 0 30 932 30 932 0 
in days of turnover 0 32 0 4 4 0 
Source: Annual Financial Statements for February 1997; management accounts for all 
other dates.  
NB: The average credit period in January 1997 has been calculated by comparing the 
trade receivables from the management accounts with the turnover from the annual 
financial statements for February 1997.  
Bad debt 
There is evidence that the franchisor had an unpleasant experience with bad debt: 
in 1995 the Pretoria company wrote off bad debts amounting to 15% of turnover. 
Luckily Mr. Parker had strong and profitable operations, which enabled him to 
overcome these bad debts, unlike other examples of the furntiure industry where 
improperly monitored bad debts have caused serious business failures (see for 
example “Furniture Credit Sales”, in Business Day, 29 Jan. 02). 
If, as the accounts suggest, Mr. van der Merwe has only allowed short credit 
periods to a small number of customers, he will have avoided excessive bad 
debts, whose default he would not have been able to sustain. 
The bad debts recorded for CS1 are rather low. The very first accounts made 
available to the bank, for January 1997, were the only ones to include a provision 
for bad debt for 34.8K (app. 4% of the turnover that year), which is reflected in 
the income statement as well as in the balance sheet. The following balance 
sheets, until Dec. 1999, still show a provision for bad debt in the region of 35K, 
which is then written off in January 2000. However, considering that the 
business’s accounting is relatively rudimentary and essentially cash-based, it is 
not certain that provisions for bad debt have been appropriately reflected in the 
accounts.  
e) Sales performance  
The evidence on the performance of Mr. van der Merwe’s business in terms of 
sales is highly contradictory, and there is a strong suspicion that accounts have 
been misrepresented to cater for the various purposes of the successive 
accounting reports.  
In general, the management accounts – which were supposedly prepared by the 
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business for the purpose of reporting to the bank – displayed rather high turnover 
figures. The only official financial statements, dated February 1997 and possibly 
prepared for tax purposes, were significantly less optimistic.  
It is somewhat disturbing that the only official accounts carrying the signature of 
an accounting officer have recorded sales of just under R 1 million for the period 
up to February 1997, while the management accounts for the same period 
without the last month, had declared a turnover of R 1,4 million. After correcting 
for the shorter reporting period, this corresponds to a discrepancy of over 60%.  
A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the management accounts 
have significantly overstated the fist year’s sales in order to declare a profit – at 
least on the paper – and thus gain the bank’s favour. If so, there is some reason to 
fear that the sales figures from other years are similarly overstated. All cost ratios 
and profit calculations are therefore likely to be false.  
Another possible assumption is that the business has, in the official statements, 
strongly understated its turnover figures. Indeed, falsifying turnover in the 
accounts to be sent to the Receiver of Revenue was the easiest way to reduce 
profit and therefore companies tax. If this was the reason, Mr. van der Merwe 
probably had the complicity of the accounting officer. Another equally probable 
hypothesis is that a number of sales transactions were not recorded in the books, 
or were captured only in a parallel VAT-free record, which was not made 
available to the Accounting Officer – but was considered when preparing the 
management accounts. This practice of concluding a part of business “off the 
record” is known as a frequent and hardly controllable fraud among SMEs, 
generally aiming to save on VAT and eventually on companies’ tax. 
In whatever direction the misrepresentations have taken place, it is certain that 
the business has never really reached the initial target turnover of R 3 million per 
year, especially not if this figure is to be inflation-adjusted. In fact, in spite of the 
high advertising expenses and the use of customer credit, after the first two 
years, the growth rate has been limited and hardly above inflation.  
Table 31.4 – Sales performance, 1997-2000 
  *“official”    
 
start-up to 
Jan-97 
start-up to 
Feb-97 
Mar 97 to 
Jan-98 
Mar 99 to 
Dec-99 
Jul 99 to 
Jun-00 
 (11 months) (12 months) (11 months) (10 months) (12 months) 
Sales  1,463,089 993,359 2,162,236 2,051,605 2,614,059 
Sales (12 months 
equivalent) 
1,596,097 993,359 2,358,803 2,461,926 2,614,059 
Nominal year-to-year 
growth rate in % p.a. 
n/a n/a 48% 2% 13% 
Real turnover growth  (p.a.)  32% -5% 5% 
*Note: the statements dated start-up to February 1997 are the only formal financial 
statements signed by the accounting officer.  
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f) Profitability of operations  
The question of profitability of operations is closely related to the correct level of 
turnover, and therefore just as blurred. All management accounts display a 
modest but positive operating profit, varying between 12.5% and 15% of 
turnover – down to 6.7% of turnover in June 2000. However, the “official” 
financial statements for the first year are closed with an operating loss. Such loss 
is essentially caused by the lack of turnover, while most other costs are 
unchanged.  
For comparison purposes, the operating profit of Mr. Parker’s business in 1994-
1995 was in the region of 21 to 24% of turnover. The difference came mainly 
from the cost of sales, which was at least 10% lower than in the Cape Town 
franchise. The reasons for this may be that the Cape Town franchisee had to 
source its wood through an intermediary (either the franchisor himself, or a local 
Cape Town agent of the national supplier), or that it did not have the same 
bargaining power as Mr. Parker.  
Table 31.5 – Operating profit: Comparison of income statements, 1997-2000 
  * “official”    
 
start-up to 
Jan-97 
start-up to 
Feb-97 
Mar 97 to 
Jan-98 
Mar 99 to 
Dec-99 
Jul 99 to 
Jun-00 
 (11 months) (12 months) (11 months) (10 months) (12 months) 
Turnover      
Turnover  1 463 089 993 359 2 162 236 2 051 605 2 614 059 
      
Variable costs      
cost of sales (materials) 793 291 519 082 1 016 002 1 054 809 1 593 897 
in % of TO 54,2% 52,3% 47,0% 51,4% 61,0% 
labour 202 061 169 725 450 080 277 557 381 018 
Other variable costs 15 369 23 031 13 021 34 208 37 335 
Total variable costs 1 010 721 711 838 1 479 103 1 366 574 1 438 514 
in % of TO 69,1% 71,7% 68,4% 66,6% 55,0% 
      
Fixed costs      
Fixed operating costs 
(rent, advertising,  
royalties, repairs, equip. 
hire) 269 398 302 041 369 204 373 320 427 123 
      
Operating profit 182 970 -20 520 313 929 311 711 174 686 
in % of TO 12,5% -2,1% 14,5% 15,2% 6,7% 
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g) Administration, finance and additional costs 
If the operating profit recorded in the management accounts is real, it is more 
modest than the franchisor’s profit but – according to the accounts – sufficient to 
cover the administrative and financial costs and pay the owner a reasonable 
member’s salary. Except for the last year (closed on 30 June 2000), the 
management accounts were closed with a modest but positive profit. 
However, again, caution is required because it appears that at least financial costs 
and depreciations have been incorrectly accounted for. Finance charges owed to 
the main bank for the provision of the term loan and equipment finance have 
been entirely omitted in several accounts, and seem surprisingly low in other 
years. As to depreciations, they have not been recorded at all in the management 
accounts.  
The accounts were therefore recalculated with a new estimation of these two cost 
items. As Table 31.6 shows, after correction of finance charges and depreciation, 
the business is hardly profitable. As long as it pays (virtually) no salary to its 
member, it ends with a slightly positive bottom-line (provided that the operating 
profit from the management accounts is real); but when the owner started paying 
himself a more substantial remuneration, the business effectively made losses 
(although the accounts still show profits until June 2000). 
Table 31.6 – Final profit calculation – correcting for finance charges and 
depreciation  
 
start-up to 
Jan-97 
start-up to 
Feb-97 
Mar 97 to 
Jan-98 
Feb 98 to 
Feb 99 
Mar 99 to 
Dec-99 
Jul 99 to 
Jun-00 
       
Operating profit 182,970 -20,520 313,929  311,711 174,686 
Administrative costs 
(telephone, insurance, 
bank charges, accounting 
fees, etc) 98,155 77,655 117,508 
 
106,439 169,692 
Financial costs 8,218 50,146 38,208  19,217 39,743 
Corrected financial costs 45,688 50,146 51,293  63,974 80,619 
Depreciation 0 39589 0  0 0 
Corrected depreciation 36,290 39,589 36,290  46,750 62,333 
Member's salary   20,000  120,000 64,000 
       
Profit or loss  76,597 -187,910 138,213  66,056 -98,749 
Corrected Profit or loss 2,837 -187,910 88,838  -25,451 -201,958 
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An additional note is due on the year 1998-1999, for which no data were 
available. A comparison of the “accumulated profits or losses” which appear in 
the balance sheets dated January 1998 and December 1999 suggest that, if the 
slight profit for January 1998 was real, the following financial year has been 
closed with a considerable loss.  
Table 31.7 – Profit calculation for Feb 1998 to Feb 1999 – from accumulated 
losses 
 
start-up 
to Feb-97 
Mar 97 
to Jan-98 
Feb 98 to 
Feb 99 
(calculated) 
Mar 99 
to Dec-99 
Jul 99 to 
Jun-00 
Profit for the year 
(as per IS) 
-186,823 136,228 -702 691 66,135 -98,655 
Accumulated profits 
or losses at end of 
period (as in BS) 
-186 823 221 671 -480 920 -414 785 -433 672 
Source: Income statements and balance sheets for the dates indicated; the Feb 98 to Feb 
99 column is calculated by difference. 
If the profit figures are correct, the loss for the 13 months missing would have 
been over R 700 000, a remarkably poor performance for a company with an 
annual turnover of R2,5 million. This considerable loss may have come, in part, 
from the member paying himself a grossly inappropriate salary (see next 
section).  
An alternative explanation is that the figures from the income statement up to 
January 1998 are grossly misrepresented, and accordingly that the analyses on 
operating and other costs are distorted.  
 
h) Member’s remuneration  
The management accounts suggest that the business has not paid its member a 
salary for the first 22 months. This is not unusual in SMEs.  
It is more surprising that the first monthly salary taken by Mr. van der Merwe, in 
January 1998, was R20 000, a fairly high amount for a young business in the 
growth phase (corresponding to almost 10% of sales).  
The cash flow forecast for April to September 1998 suggests that the director’s 
intention was to draw this amount every month out of the business. 
Unfortunately, the data available do not cover the year 1998 (i.e. March 1998 to 
February 1999), so it is not possible to verify whether Mr. van der Merwe did 
actually draw R 240 000 out of his business in that year – but the considerable 
loss which the business seems to have incurred during that year (see Table 31.7 
above) may point at a considerable drawing during that year.  
A triangulation of the various income statements available for different 
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overlapping periods in 1999 and 2000 suggests that from March 1999 onwards, 
the monthly salary has been progressively reduced, to R15 000 per month 
between March and June 1999, R10 000 per month from July to December 1999, 
then on average R1000 per month between January and June 2000 (with an 
anomaly in January 2000 where the monthly income statement indicates a salary 
of R45 000), and eventually R 2 846 in July 2000.  
To find out whether these salaries have been paid out in cash, a look at the 
member’s loan is necessary. However, the balance sheet figures in this respect 
must be taken with caution – as they do not seem to be very transparent13.  
From R 146 720 at the end of the first financial year, the member’s loan went 
down to a negative amount in January 1998, suggesting that, although the 
business has not granted his member a salary, the owner has actually borrowed 
significant amounts of cash from his business. Unfortunately there is no data as 
to what happened in the following 1,5 years, but it is possible that, although Mr. 
van der Merwe officially “earned” a salary, he kept it in the business, for his 
member’s loan has increased significantly to over R500 000 at the end of July 
1999. This amount has remained relatively stable until December 1999.  
January 2000 shows surprising figures in every respect. The monthly salary as 
indicated in the monthly income statement reached a high of R45 000, while the 
member’s loan was suddenly reduced by more than R300 000, to just under 
R250 000. At the same time, the carrying value of fixed assets suddenly dropped 
from over R270 000 in December 1999 to R 25 336 in January 2000. If these 
figures are true, they indicate a considerable withdrawal of cash out of the 
business in this particular month. Unfortunately, there were no data for the 
following months – but in April 2000 the member’s loan was back to the level of 
the previous year. 
It is probable that there have been a series of mistakes in the January 2000 
statements. In the balance sheet, the suspicion is that a zero was forgotten in the 
carrying value of fixed assets and that the member’s loan, calculated by 
difference, was accordingly reduced – although other balance sheet items, such 
as long-term borrowings and accumulated deficits, are equally strange. In the 
income statement, on the other hand, a zero may have been accidentally added to 
the member’s salaries; indeed, the total member’s salaries as indicated in the July 
1999 to June 2000 income statement were lower than the sum of the salaries for 
July to January.  
Table 31.8 illustrates the evolution of member’s loans in relation to the evolution 
of salaries. 
                                                 
13 In SMEs, the member’s loan is usually very difficult to determine “positively”, due to lack of 
records of the transactions occurring between an SME and its member(s). Therefore, it 
probably happens regularly that the member’s loan is simply calculated by difference, as the 
amount balancing the assets, equity and liabilities. This means that any errors occurring in the 
accounting (whether in the valuation of assets and liabilities or in the determination of the 
income or loss for the year) will impact on the member’s loan.  
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Table 31.8 – Member’s salaries and member’s loan, 1996-2000 
 Member's salary for 
the period (cumul) 
Member’s salary 
per month 
Member’s loan 
at end of period 
Start-up to Jan 1997 0  0 R 67 820 
Feb-97 0 0 R 146,720 
Mar 97 to Dec 97 0 0 n/a 
Jan-98 R 20 000 R 20 000 R -44,866 
Feb 98 to Feb 99 (assumed) R 260 000 R 20 000 n/a 
Mar99 to Jun99  
(calculated by difference) 
R 60 000 R 15 000 n/a 
Jul 99  R 10 000 R 10 000 R 531 662 
Aug 99 to Dec 99 R 50 000 R 10 000 R 551 170 
Jan 2000 R 45 000 R 45 000 R 248 887 
Feb to Jun 00 
(calculated by difference) 
R -41 000 R –8 200 R 549 890 
Jul-00 R 2 846 R 2 846 R 544 478 
 
The evolution of the member’s loan will not be further discussed here as it is 
highly likely that the figures are not reliable.  
Meanwhile, the evolution of the salary figures is symptomatic. While it is 
frequent that entrepreneurs refrain from taking a salary for their work in the first 
year or two, one usually finds three types of possible behaviour beyond this 
period. Some business owners still don’t take a salary, although it can generally 
be expected that they do not run their business entirely graciously – they rather 
satisfy themselves with non-monetary benefits such as the private use of business 
vehicles and other assets; earning a rent on their home premises, etc. This 
behaviour of not taking a salary tends to pose a problem of discipline, since the 
separation between business and owner is blurred. On the other hand, many 
entrepreneurs pay themselves a salary, but keep it modest, partly for tax reasons, 
and partly because they are mainly interested in keeping the capital in their 
enterprises in order to ensure their long-term viability. Finally, a third category 
of entrepreneurs use their venture to earn disproportionate salaries, thereby 
depriving the businesses from the opportunity to build up its capital base. This 
behaviour can generally be interpreted as a lack of long-term commitment to the 
business. Mr. van der Merwe, it seems, fell into this third category in 1998 and 
early 1999, and was only compelled to revise his salary ambitions by the firm’s 
cash difficulties at the beginning of 1999 and later again in 2000.  
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5. Financial management  
Again, there were no interview or qualitative data to judge of the various aspects 
of financial management; the only sources of clues are the accounts provided to 
the bank. They are usually of poor quality. The section will therefore start with 
the specific accounting issue before turning to other aspects of financial 
management.  
a) Accounting and quality of financial statements  
The quality of financial statements understandably depends on the type of 
registration, with requirements being lower in Close Corporations, where there is 
no need for an audit of accounts.  
A disturbing element however is that there is no conclusive evidence as to 
whether the business was registered as a CC or as a company. Most likely, it has 
registered as a CC but has labelled itself “Pty Ltd” for prestige reasons – unless it 
has registered as a company but refused to subject his company to a full audit of 
the financials.  
To assess the quality of accounting and financial statements, a distinction must 
be made between the management accounts which have been regularly provided 
to the bank, and the official financial statements drawn up by the Accounting 
Officer, which have been provided only for the first year of operation, until 
February 1997. The latter are better in all respects, i.e. quantity of information 
enclosed, quality of presentation and formal correctness, as well as credibility of 
most figures – while the management accounts, apart from being less legible and 
containing less detailed information, reflect to some extent inappropriate 
accounting practices, such as the omission of depreciations and incorrect capture 
of financial charges.  
The most flagrant indicator of reliability problems in the financial statements is 
the discrepancy between the management accounts for the period up to January 
1997, and the official financial statements dated 28 February 1997. The 
differences in the income statement, especially the issue of turnover, have 
already been discussed. There are also significant deviations in almost all items 
of the balance sheets.  
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Table 31.9 – Discrepancies between management accounts and official 
statements, 1997 
in Rand February 1997  
(“official” 
statements) 
January 1997 
(management 
accounts) 
   
Turnover 993 359 1 463 089 
Profit before tax - 186 823 76 05614 
   
Member’s interest - 40 103 143 876 
of which Member’s loan 146 720 67 820 
Long-term liabilities towards the bank 380 654 226 808 
“Deferred finance charges” (in current 
assets) 
 122 629   
   
Trade Debtors 0 89 807 
Creditors and Deposits received 142 868 77 807 
Cash balance  35 142 21 518 
 
A first area of divergence between the two balance sheets is the obvious change 
in equity resulting from the loss as opposed to a profit. One may also understand 
the increase in member’s loan as a result of the loss and the member’s need to 
maintain a certain level of capital in the business – although the difference 
amount of R78 900 cannot be directly understood or related to another figure in 
the accounts15.  
Another significant area of divergence is the amount of long-term debt. 
According to notes made from the bank file, the (main) bank’s commitment 
toward Mr. van der Merwe’s business initially was approximately R288 000, 
comprised of about R228 000 for instalment sale (ISA) over 48 months 
(covering the purchase of equipment and initial stock), as well as a term loan for 
R60 000.  
Assuming that the term loan was to be repaid in equal monthly instalments over 
5 years, 20% of it and 25% of the ISA should have been repaid by the end of the 
first year, bringing the theoretic debt level for February 1997 to R219 000, and 
approximately R6 000 more in January 1997. The liability amount found in the 
January 1997 management accounts therefore seems to be correct.  
 
The higher amount in the February 1997 statements seems to be related to the 
                                                 
14 The Retained Income calculation suggests that the profit after tax for the whole year 1997 was 
R85 443.  
15 There may be an approximate coincidence between the total member’s interest in the January 
accounts (R144 000) and the member’s loan in the February accounts 1997 (R146 000). 
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treatment of finance charges. Table 31.10 shows the approximate 
correspondence between the amounts. 
Table 31.10 – Accounting for finance charges and the long-term debt 
in Rand January 1997 
(management 
accounts) 
February 1997  
(“official” 
statements) 
   
Long-term debt towards the bank (“gross 
amount”) 
 380 654 
Minus   
“Deferred finance charges” (in current assets) 0  122 629  
Finance charges (in income statement) 0 40 876 
   
Long-term debt towards the bank (“net 
amount”) 
226 808 217 149 
 
It seems that the accounting officer has capitalised finance charges related to the 
four years until the expiry of the Instalment sale contract (overall, R163 500). He 
thus created a current asset, which was balanced by an equal augmentation of the 
instalment sale liability. At the end of the first year, the asset was reduced by the 
amount of the current year’s finance charges (R40 876, as recorded in the income 
statement), leaving a current asset of R122 62916, which is the figure appearing 
under the label “Deferred finance charges” in the current assets in February 
1997. 
Although incorrect according to GAAP, such capitalisation of future finance 
charges seems to be a relatively frequent practice among small businesses using 
Instalment Sale, and requires a gradual amortisation over the following years. 
However, the management accounts for the following years (1999-2000), have 
kept the item unchanged, simply “shifting it around” (in 1999 it appeared as a 
negative current liability, in 2000 as a negative long-term borrowing). 
Incidentally, the presence of this capitalised expense may be related to the 
omission of finance charges in the following income statements – although the 
cost should have been reflected if not directly, then by means of an amortisation 
of the capitalised item.  
A further area of contradiction is the current assets and liabilities. The ambiguity 
on trade receivables, with the 1997 financial statements indicating that  “the 
Close Corporation undertakes work on a Cash on Delivery Basis” while other 
correspondence of the business suggested that approximately half of the sales are 
on credit, has already been discussed.  
                                                 
16 Considering that the Instalment Sale Agreement expires in three years and relating that finance 
charge to the initial amount of the facility, the amount of R 122 629 would correspond to an 
interest rate of 17.9% p.a., not unlikely for 1997 which was a period of high interest rates. 
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On the other hand, the “creditors and deposits received” in February 1997 are 
almost double the amount indicated in the previous month’s accounts. Again, it 
is not clear how to interpret this contradiction.  
Accounting transparency score 
Quantitative score 10.5 / 20  
Formal Quality Score -0.5 / 25  
Transparency Score -3.5 / 55  
Suspicion of manipulation #  (strong suspicion) 
     
Total score 6.5# / 100  
 
    
Main issues:  
Accounts are irregular, there is no yearly rhythm, gaps and overlappings. The 
formal quality is bad (no comparative column, many negative liabilities).  
Many figures are contradictory or not credible:   
- there is a major ambiguity on the turnover; hence it is difficult to believe in the 
profit figures from the management accounts; 
- no depreciations, no tax, giving the appearance of a reasonable profit 
- inappropriate treatment of finance charges 
- the financing structure is not clear; apparent falsification of members' loans and 
retained income to hide negative equity. 
Altogether the accounts create a considerable confusion and do not allow a good 
insight into the real performance and financial situation.  
 
b) Quality of communication with the bank 
Beyond the analysis of the accounting figures themselves, the financials 
delivered to the bank, as well as the dates at which the accounts were made 
available, provide some clues on Mr. van der Merwe’s strategy in 
communicating with his main creditor. 
If the file is complete, there has been no financial information exchanged 
between the business and the bank during the course of 1996-1997. During the 
first two years of operation, hence, the bank apparently had no means to know 
how the business was performing, other than oral statements and the monitoring 
of the bank account balances.  
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April 1998: First management accounts 
The first financial correspondence between bank and business appears to have 
taken place more than two years after the initial facilities had been granted, 
namely at the end of April 1998, when Mr. van der Merwe approached the bank 
to negotiate an overdraft facility. In fact, it is probable that the provision of 
financial statements was motivated by the overdraft application.  
The accounts provided were ‘interim’ and not formal annual statements – but the 
bank accepted them, supposedly as a means to deal with the application for 
overdraft rapidly. The accounts refer to the periods from start-up to January 1997 
and from March 1997 to January 1998. Since the business closes its financial 
year at the end of February, it is surprising that CS1 chose to report on the period 
up to January 1997, leaving a gap for the month of February 1997. While this 
may be for comparison purposes (since it may be argued that the February 1998 
figures were not yet available in April), the argument is not very convincing 
since the start of the first period probably differed from the start of the second 
period anyway (the exact month of start-up is not available).   
As discussed in sections 4 and 5, the accounts provided to the bank at that stage, 
as well as the cash flow forecasts, were optimistic. Table 31.11 summarises the 
figures which are likely to have received the most attention from the bank:  
Table 31.11 – Main figures communicated to the bank in April 1998 
 
start-up to 
January 1997 
March 1997 to 
January 1998 
Forecast  
Apr-Sep 1998 
(6 months) 
Turnover 1 463 089 2 162 236 1 345 771 
turnover growth in % p.a.   48% 14% 
Gross Profit 669 798 1 146 234 672 562 
Gross margin in % of turnover  53% 50% 
Profit before tax 76 05617 136 228 175 422 
    
Cash balance @ end of period 21 518 697  
of which current bank account 8 865 -8 523 +48 610 
of which savings and petty cash 12 643 9 220 n/a 
 
It is probable that these figures reassured the bank on the following issues:  
- Turnover growth was substantial and brought the business reasonably 
close to the target of R 3 million p.a.; 
- Gross margin was similar to the franchisor’s margin (over 50% in 1998); 
                                                 
17 The Retained Income calculation suggests that the profit after tax for the whole year 1997 was 
R85,443.  
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- The business was profitable already in the year of inception, and profits 
were increasing (even after accounting for the owner’s monthly drawings 
of R20 000); 
- The negative bank balance was compensated by sufficient petty cash. In 
addition, the current account would come back to a positive balance 
within a few months while loan repayments would take place in due time.  
 
The bank then judged the overdraft request positively – although the limit 
granted was relatively low, at R25 000 or 1,15% of the turnover reported. This 
relatively low limit may betray some suspicion on the part of the bank, and the 
will to avoid an escalation of commitments.  
17 December 1998: First “official” financial statements  
The first official annual financial statements, dated February 1997, were – as 
noted – significantly less favourable for the business than the management 
accounts. Interestingly, those annual statements were only provided to the bank 8 
months after the provision of the first (‘interim’) accounts, on 17 December 
1998. 
 
The date of 17 December is unlikely to be the result of chance. Indeed, the data 
show that the accounts had been finalized and signed by the Accounting Officer 
in September 1998. It seems therefore that Mr. van der Merwe deliberately 
waited another three months, until the beginning of the summer holiday period, 
to deliver them to his creditor. 
It is also worth noting that the business chose to report only about the first year 
of operation (Feb 1997), although one may expect that by September 1998 the 
second year of operation, (closed February 1998) could have been included in 
the statements.  
One can easily imagine how the accounts have been treated within the bank. 
They have arrived at a date when most bank employees were either having their 
summer break, or hastily finishing year-end business. A quick look at the date of 
the report would suggest to a bank officer that the statements contained no new 
information compared with previously delivered accounts. It is hence quite 
possible that the statements were filed without being reviewed.  
Indeed, even a superficial review would have sufficed to send alert signals within 
the organisation, since there was a gross contradiction between these final 
figures and the previous reports – suggesting a possibility of misreporting which 
may have caused the bank to step out of its loan agreements immediately. 
However, our data show no sign that the bank undertook particular measures 
until the middle of 1999. 
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Absence of reporting on the year March 1998 to February 1999 
From December 1998 to July 1999, no further financial communication took 
place between the parties, with the result that the bank holds no single 
accounting record of the financial year closed 28 February 1999.  
It probably is no coincidence that that particular year saw several unusual 
occurrences. Firstly, it seems that during that year the owner has drawn the 
highest amounts of capital out of the business, supposedly granting himself a 
member’s salary as high as R240 000 for the year (i.e. R20 000 per month). 
Secondly, the financial year seems to have been closed with a considerable loss, 
which (if all other figures are true) has been estimated at over R700 000 (see 
Table 31.7 above). Thirdly, this was the period during which the business 
realised a new substantial investment, contracting an instalment sale agreement 
with one of the bank’s competitors for the acquisition of a new vehicle.  
Fourthly, possibly related to these various occurrences is the fact that, at the 
beginning of the following financial year, the cash levels had plummeted down 
to extremely low levels: the average level of overdraft during the four months 
from March to June 1999 was estimated at -R80 000. It is likely that this 
considerable overdraft figure had its roots in the previous financial year, for 
which we have no data.  
July 1999 to June 2000: Close monitoring  
It is probable that by July 1999 the bank has been alerted by persistent breaches 
of overdraft limits and delays in loan repayments, and has insisted on more 
regular reporting. Mr. van der Merwe complied by supplying balance sheets 
virtually every month, as well as several income statements covering varying 
periods of time. However, it is striking that, from all the reports that have been 
provided during those 12 months, none was related to the actual financial year-
end (February 2000); especially, the income statements covered periods varying 
between 1, 9, and 12 months, making comparisons and monitoring almost 
impossible.  
It is also perturbing that the only missing balance sheets (February and March 
2000) are those following the considerable drop in member’s loan recorded 
between December 1999 and January 2000 (from over R550 000 to under R250 
000), and the unusually high salary amount granted to the member for the sole 
month of January 2000 (R45 000).  
Supposedly, during these months, Mr. van der Merwe was filtering financial 
information, forwarding to the bank only the favourable reports. To some extent 
the bank may have been comforted by the improvement of liquidity in October 
and November 1999, as well as the profit recorded in the income statement for 
the 10 months ended 31/12/1999 – and have overseen the perturbing evolutions 
of January 2000.  
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Concluding words 
This review suggests that Mr. van der Merwe has skilfully filtered and timed the 
information sent to the bank as a means to keep his creditor’s favour for as long 
as possible. It also suggests that the bank has failed not only to enforce a regular 
reporting schedule, but also to pay sufficient attention to the official financial 
statements.  
 
c) Financing scheme and ongoing access to finance 
As a result of the accounting confusion, there is no clear picture of how the 
business was financed throughout its lifespan.  
Initial financing scheme 
Table 31.12 summarises the various “versions” of long-term finance available to 
the business: 
Table 31.12 – Initial financing scheme: comparison of sources 
 Notes from the bank 
file, 1996 
January 1997 
management accounts 
February 1997  
financial statements 
Bank debt 
- term loan  R60K  
- Instalment Sale 
228K  
Total: R288 K 
long-term liabilities 
R226.8K 
Long term loans (“gross”) 
              R380,6K 
“Deferred finance 
charges” R122.6K 
Owner’s 
contribution 
supposedly R 90 K 
(by difference) 
no paid-in capital  
retained income R 76K 
member’s loan of R 68K 
 
Total               R 144K 
paid-in capital R100 
Accumulated loss  
                      –R186,8K 
member’s loan R 146,7K 
Total               –R40K 
Total assets 
supposedly R 378 K 
(as in franchise 
scheme, with lowest 
franchise fee) 
  
 
A first remark is that the bank’s instalment sale exceeds the value of tangible 
fixed assets acquired by the business. This is rather unusual, since financial 
institutions normally insist that equipment finance can only cover a portion of 
the total asset value, the balance being the entrepreneur’s own risk participation.  
A possible explanation is that the Instalment Sale refers not only to the 
equipment itself, but also to the franchise fee (intangible asset), in which case the 
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bank’s participation would be app. 72%. The disadvantage of this practice is that 
the bank can only count on fixed asset to provide collateral for the event of a 
default, especially in a situation as this one, where the franchise network is only 
starting and the franchisor may have difficulties finding a new franchisee to take 
over the failing franchisee’s fee.  
A second remark is that it is not clear to what extent the bank has insisted on a 
certain level of personal risk participation of the owner. Generally, Mr. van der 
Merwe’s initial capital contribution (including member’s loan) remains unclear.  
Unlike for the debt amounts, the discrepancy on the owner’s capital between the 
two sets of accounts available for 1997 remains unexplained. Of course the 
financial records available are influenced by the results of the first year of 
operation.  
Repayment of long-term facilities  
It seems that initially, the business has been repaying its long-term facilities on 
schedule. However, after the first two years, evidence suggests that the 
repayments have been slacker and slacker – although the evidence is difficult to 
interpret since the accounting for the long-term liabilities does not comply with 
GAAP18.  
Table 31.13 shows the gradual increase of repayment delays experienced on the 
long-term facilities (instalment credit and long-term loan) provided by the main 
bank.  
Table 31.13 – Adherence to repayment schedule 
Date 1996 Jan-97 Feb-97 Jan-98 
Agreed repayment schedule 288 000 224 750 219 000 155 750 
('gross")   380 654 304 262 Actual debt amount  
('net")  226 808 217 149 ? 140 757  
Repayment Shortfall   2 058 -1 851 ? -14 993 
 
                                                 
18 In particular, from February 1997 onwards, the liability is recorded on a “gross” basis – for the 
purpose of the table the Jan 1998 liability was “netted” as in the February 1997 statements 
(see table ); while for the accounts between July 1999 and June 2000, the “net” amount was 
calculated on the basis of a negative item labelled “instalment sale creditors” recorded next to 
the liability figure for an amount of app. 41K. It is not clear whether this item corresponds to 
the finance charges for the year. In any case, the “net debt amount” thus calculated for July 
1999 seems to correspond to the amount found in the internal bank file for May 1998. In 
addition the November 1999 “net amount” is roughly corroborated by another internal bank 
note from 1999 that estimates the amounts due to R153K. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 31: Narrative on case study 1 Page 418 
 
 
Date  May-98 Jul-99 Nov-99 Jun-00 
Agreed repayment schedule 138 500 52 250 29 250 8 000 
Actual debt amount  ('gross")  232 394 191 767 124 776 
 ('net") 191 000 191 006 150 379 83 388 
Repayment Shortfall   52 500 138 756 121 129 75 388 
Sources: Balance sheets for the dates mentioned, except for 1996 and May 1998 where 
the data were sourced from bank internal notes.  
Additional credit lines and security  
In spite of a delay in repaying the long-term loans, the bank in 1998 agreed to 
additional credit lines for Mr. van der Merwe’s business, especially an overdraft 
facility as well as a bank guarantee. The bank’s total commitment hence was as 
follows: 
Table 31.14 – Bank’s total commitments towards the business, 1996-1999 (in 
Rand) 
 March 1996 May 1998 ? 1999 
Overdraft facility 0 25 000 25 000  
Long-term loan   60 000 35 000 46 000 
Installment Sale 228 000 156 000 107 000 
Guarantee  0   15 000 15 000 
 Total 288 000 231 000 193 000 
Secured by assets  188 000 
(81%) 
171 000 
(88.6%) 
Source: notes from the bank file, from May 1998 and 1999 (month unknown) 
Interestingly, this internal note from the bank mentions securities held by the 
bank for an amount of R188 000. It is not exactly clear what this amount refers 
to. In theory, the Instalment sale agreement gave the bank a right on the 
equipment acquired by the business in 1996 (and financed by the bank), for a 
total value at the time of R198 000. In subsequent years, the business has omitted 
to depreciate these assets, which therefore still appear at their gross value in the 
subsequent balance sheets. It is possible that the author of the internal note has 
intuitively slightly depreciated the gross value of assets – the intuitive 
depreciation being far lower than what current accounting practice would have 
required.  
In any case, the bank’s acceptance of a 81% security coverage is also rather 
unusual. In most other SME files from the same bank, the tangible securities 
granted exceeded the value of the bank’s commitments, and were complemented 
by unlimited personal suretyships from the members. This was not found in this 
particular case. It may also be that the reluctance of the owner to provide a 
personal suretyship has caused the bank to keep the overdraft limit to a relatively 
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low amount (R25 000 represents only about 1% of the turnover reported for the 
year closed in January 1998).  
Another remark is that the total commitment as displayed in Table 31.14 is based 
on the limits of facilities granted – and do not take into account breaches of limit 
in particular with regard to the overdraft. The balance sheets show that the 
month-end utilisation of overdraft during the last 6 months of 1999 was 
generally over R30 000, adding R5 000 to the bank’s total exposure in case of a 
default.  
Additional vehicle finance  
In 1999, the business acquired a new vehicle (Hyundai) for an amount of 
R131 000, of which approximately three quarters were financed through a new 
long-term financing facility (the balance of the new instalment sale facility is 
R97 000 in July 1999). Further details about this investment are not available.  
It is interesting that the vehicle finance has been granted by a different bank than 
the one which had provided the main facilities initially. Mr. van der Merwe may 
have requested the finance from its main bank in the first place, which may have 
refused to carry the additional exposure – although no record was found in the 
bank file of such application and rejection. It seems more probable, therefore, 
that it has been the entrepreneur’s strategy to approach a different lender, 
possibly for fear of a rejection, or to spread its debt among several creditors in 
order to limit its dependence on the goodwill of one institution. 
Debt levels and securities at liquidation 
From the excerpts of the liquidator’s report available to us, it seems that CS1’s 
debt at the time of liquidation (towards the end of 2000) was just over R450 000. 
This is lower than the debt on the latest available balance sheet (July 2000), 
which indicated at least R150 000 of long-term debt and over R400 000 of 
current liabilities.  
On the other hand, the assets are also considerably lower than suggested by the 
balance sheet. This is partly explained by the fact that the accumulated 
depreciation in the July 2000 balance sheet is far too low (it should be in the 
region of R212 000 instead of the R83 582 recorded). Another surprising 
element is that, while the institution that financed the latest vehicle acquisition is 
listed under “Secured Creditors”, the main bank is not. 
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Table 31.15 – Main tangible assets and external liabilities in July 2000 and at 
date of liquidation  
 value in 
thousand Rand 
 value in 
thousand Rand 
Assets Jul 00 Liqui-
dation 
Liabilities Jul 00 Liqui-
dation 
Fixed assets 274,0 27,5 Long term debt – main 
bank (net)19 
77,6  
(corrected for insuffi-
cient depreciation) 
145,0  ISA for Hyundai 76,1 33,0 
Stock 39,5 Short-term bank debt20  33,3 
Debtors 133,7 
85,2 
Trade creditors 295,6 
400,0 
   Public creditors (SARS, 
UIF, etc) 
77,3 18,5 
Source: Balance sheet July 2000 and Liquidator’s report  
A possible explanation for these findings is that an amicable agreement has been 
concluded between the main bank and the business prior to liquidation, whereby 
the bank has repossessed the securities that it was holding (essentially, the initial 
equipment and vehicle) and written off its long-term debt. If this is the case, the 
bank’s exposure at the time of liquidation would have been limited to short-term 
balances, which may have been in the region of 25 to 50 thousand Rand. 
However, there is no evidence to confirm this speculation.  
If no settlement has taken place prior to liquidation, the bank’s commitment to 
the business at the time of liquidation is more likely to have been in the region of 
150 to 200 thousand Rand. If this is the case, and if indeed for some reason the 
bank could not validate its securities in the liquidation process, then this high 
liability was subsumed under “Concurrent Creditors” and only ‘served’ after the 
secured debt and the arrears of the “Preferent Creditors” (SARS, UIF and the 
Industrial Council for the Furniture Industry). If so, the outcome for the bank 
may have been approximately asshown in Table 31.16. 
d) Management of working capital and cash  
Although the business has been reasonably successful in obtaining long-term 
finance for start-up and expansion, there are indications of shortcomings in its 
short-term financial management.  
 
                                                 
19 “net” debt amount calculated as the difference between “long-term liability” and “instalment 
sale creditors”, with no consideration of deferred finance charges.  
20 calculated as the sum of the current bank account balance and the credit card balance (both 
negative), minus the positive balance of the savings account 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 31: Narrative on case study 1 Page 421 
 
 
Table 31.16 – Estimated outcome of liquidation for various creditors (assuming 
no previous settlement by the main bank) 
Status of creditors Details 
Amount owed to 
creditors 
Bankfin R 33 000 
Secured Creditors 
Motor vehicle R 27 500 
arrears from SARS, UIF and Industrial 
Council for the Furniture Industry 
R 18 500 
Preferent Creditors 
Presumably served in priority from the 
proceeds of the sale of movable assets 
R 85 180 
Cumulative Amount of debt (of which 
the bank supposedly represents app. R 
175 000) 
R 400 000 
Available proceeds from movable assets R 85 180 - 18 500  
= R 66 680 
Concurrent 
creditors 
Recovery rate 16,7% 
Source: elaborated after the data contained in the Liquidation’s report, 2001 
Cash flow forecasting  
An important aspect of cash flow management is to be able to anticipate possible 
tensions on the liquidity. The data available from the bank file did not allow to 
conclude whether the business had maintained regular forecasts of sales, costs or 
cash flows. The only evidence of a forecasting comes from the year 1998, when 
Mr. van der Merwe sent the bank a cash flow forecast for the next 6 months. It is 
more likely that this forecast was especially prepared for the purpose of the 
application for a bank overdraft than a regular planning exercise.  
In any case, a rough analysis of the 1998 forecasts indicates several weaknesses: 
- The turnover growth previsions are rather optimistic, since the increase in 
sales between April and September 1998 corresponds to a growth rate of 
51% p.a., even higher than the rate observed in the first year, between 
January 1997 and 1998. 
- The cost previsions seem to be based on an operating margin of 13% of 
turnover, similar to the one experienced in the 2 previous years; however 
it does not take into account administrative fixed costs (bank charges, 
accounting fees, telephone, etc), which in previous years have amounted 
to further 6,7% of turnover.  
- Most of all, the cash flow forecast is built on a conceptual error since the 
cash flow was built as the difference between total sales and costs, taking 
no consideration of the delay in customers’ settlements of their invoices. 
 
Table 31.17 illustrates this by selected months and items of the cash flow 
forecast: 
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Table 31.17 – Analysis of 1998 Cash Flow forecast 
 
Forecast  
April 1998 
Forecast  
June 1998 
Forecast  
Sept 1998 
Sales 201,000 225,307 247,221 
of which cash sales 101,242 120,307 139,567 
in % of turnover 50% 53% 56% 
Purchases = Payments to suppliers 123,369 112,653 123,610 
in % of turnover 61% 50% 50% 
Variable expenses 3,919 3,919 5,729 
in % of turnover 1.9% 1.7% 2.3% 
Fixed costs (prior to finance costs 
and owner’s salary) 
78,282 78,282 78,282 
Operating margin in % of turnover -2% 14% 16% 
Loan repayments and owner 
drawings 
29,448 29,448 29,448 
Cash flow  -34,018 1,005 10,152 
Source: Cash flow forecast provided to the bank, April 1998 
Unfortunately we have no balance sheet data for the period between April 1998 
and July 1999 so it is not possible to compare actual achievements with the 
initial forecasts.  
Supplier credit  
The 1998 cash flow forecast is built on the assumption that all purchases 
necessary for the business will be made on trade accounts – there shall be no 
cash purchases. However, except for the first month, the payments to suppliers 
are always strictly equal to the purchases made in the month, suggesting that 
either the author of the cash flow forecast has not correctly reflected the supplier 
credit planned, or the credit period extended only to the end of the running 
month. This seems correct for January 1998, when the trade payables represented 
app. 11 days of turnover.  
But, as Table 31.18 shows, in almost all other months the trade payables have 
been closer to 30 days of turnover (with the highest values being 34 days in 
November 1999 and 41 to 43 days in June-July 2000). These calculations are 
subject to the reliability of Mr. van der Merwe’s management accounts.  
If one assumes that a portion of purchases actually had to be paid in cash, it 
would mean that when suppliers offered credit, Mr. van der Merwe has probably 
used it up to the usual limit of 30 days, in order to provide additional liquidity. 
Up to the latest months, he seems to have been able to settle the invoices as they 
were due (at the expense of the overdraft); only in June 2000 did he become a 
bad payer, holding cash back due to uncertainties in his own business.  
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Table 31.18 – Evolution of trade payables in relation to turnover, 1997-2000 
 Jan-97 Feb-97 Jan-98 Jul-99 Aug-99 Sep-99 Oct-99 
Trade creditors 63 597 54 062 73 775 194 983 162 731 201 144 132 095 
in days of turnover 14,3 19,6 11,3 25,7 21,4 26,5 17,4 
 
 Nov-99 Dec-99 Jan-00 Apr-00 May-00 Jun-00 Jul-00 
Trade creditors 258 009 199 639 25 980 209 542 186 175 310 061 295 610 
in days of turnover 34,0 26,3 3,6 28,9 25,6 42,7 40,7 
Source: corresponding balance sheets and income statements  
Looking at a month-to-month evolution, it appears that the extent of use of 
supplier credit has been related to the rythm of payment of customers. For 
example, in November 1999, customers were paying more slowly (trade 
receivables amount to 25 days of turnover), which caused the business to stretch 
the settlement of its invoices to 34 days. Subsequently, in January 2000, 
customers paid more promptly (7 days of turnover), and supplier credit was 
strongly reduced.  
Stock management  
Except for the month of January 1998, which is an unexplained exception in the 
history of the business, all balance sheets available indicate a stock value of R30 
000 to R 45 000. In July 2000 the business has supposedly undertaken a detailed 
valuation of its inventory and arrived at a value of just under R39 500, consistent 
with history. 
Table 31.19 – Stock on hand 1997-2000 
 Feb-97 Jan-98 July 99 Dec-99 Jun-00 Jul-00 
Stock on hand 40 550 93 448 45 000 30 000 45 000 39 474 
(in % of turnover) 4,1% 4,3% 1,8% 1,5% 1,7% 1,5% 
Source: Balance sheets 
Use of bank overdraft and credit card  
Instead of relying more and more heavily on trade credit, Mr. van der Merwe has 
apparently preferred to use initially its cash resources, then the overdraft, as well 
as the credit card.  
According to the initial franchise scheme, the business should have started in 
1996 with a working capital of R30 000. It seems that this initial cash has eroded 
rapidly. The credit card commission indicates that this instrument was, from the 
start, heavily used to provide additional liquidity. 
Shortly after it was granted in May 1998, the overdraft limit of R25 000 was 
exceeded. As to the credit card, although the balances on the balance sheet 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 31: Narrative on case study 1 Page 424 
 
 
appear as positive until December 1999, the high amounts of credit card 
commissions reflected in the income statements suggest that that account was 
also frequently in deficit. Table 31.20 illustrates this. 
Table 31.20 – Use of current account and credit card, 1996-2000 
 1996 Feb 97 Jan 98 Dec 99 Jun 2000 
End-of-month Balances       
Current Bank Account 30K ? 35K21 -8.5K -35K -60K 
Credit Card  n/a n/a 18.6K -6.5K 
Finance charges    (10 months)  
Interest paid  97 31 6123  2340 
Credit card commission  9173 13792 13093 18603 
 
The difference between the high interest charges in the period March-December 
1999 and the more modest costs in the period July 1999-June 2000 suggests that 
the largest part of the interest charges have been incurred during the first half of 
1999 (March to June). Unfortunately, no balance sheet data were available for 
that period, but cross-calculations including the January 2000 data led to an 
estimation of the interest charge in the 4 months from March to June 1999, of 
R5 328. Even assuming a high interest rate of 20% p.a. to reflect penalties for 
breach of overdraft, this high interest charge would mean that the average bank 
balance in these 4 months was approximately - R80 000: far beyond the 
overdraft limit of R25 000. This has probably caused the bank to start a closer 
monitoring of its client as from July 1999. 
One can only speculate about the reasons that have caused this apparently 
dramatic drop in cash. Early 1999 is the time when the business acquired a new 
vehicle for a value of R131 000, of which only app. 75% was financed by the 
Instalment sale Agreement. This means that the business had to finance 
approximately R33 000 in cash. It appears that the cash portion of this 
investment has actually been paid on the overdraft.  
In addition, we have speculated that between March 1998 and February 1999 
Mr. van der Merwe has drawn a fixed salary of R20 000 per month out of the 
business (as foreseen in the cash flow forecast), later reduced to R15 000 per 
month until June 1999. As discussed, it is not entirely clear whether these 
salaries have been retained as member’s loan, or paid out in cash – in which case 
the tension on the overdraft would be exacerbated.  
Luckily, the cash situation improved remarkably in the following months of 
1999, as shown in Table 31.21. The interest charges were accordingly strongly 
reduced. Supposedly, this improvement, as well as the positive credit card 
                                                 
21 The statements only give one figure for “bank and cash”, possibly significantly higher than the 
balance on the current account.  
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balances at month-end, caused the bank to tolerate the continued breach of 
overdraft limit until September 1999. In October and November, the liquidity 
even temporarily came back to positive levels, and this may have raised hopes of 
recovery.  
Unfortunately, the data available gave no clues on how to explain this recovery, 
except that the owner’s drawings have been reduced: between July 1999 and 
December 1999, the member’s salaries have amounted to R60 000, i.e. only 
R10 000 per month.  
Table 31.21 – Monthly evolution of bank balances, 1999-2000 
 Mar-Jun 99 
(estimated 
average) 
Jul 99 Aug Sep Oct Nov 99 
Current Bank Account app. -80K -43K -30K -33K -4K +92K 
Credit Card  16K 16K 16K 18K 18K 
 
 Dec 99 Jan 2000 Apr May Jun Jul 2000 
Current Bank Account -35K -40K -45K -61K -60K -28K 
Credit Card 18.6K -3K -6.5K -4.5K -6.5K -7.5K 
Sources: Balance sheets July 1999-July 2000. The estimation for Mar-Jun 99 is based 
on the interest charges incurred in that period, assuming an effective rate on overdraft 
balances of 20% p.a.  
As the second part of Table 31.21 shows, the temporary recovery of liquidity in 
the second half of 1999 did not last until 2000. From December 1999 onwards, 
the current balance went back to negative values, while even the credit card 
account, which up to now had been showing positive balances, turned negative. 
This turn of events is again difficult to explain with the data available, but seems 
to coincide with the sudden considerable cash withdrawal of January 2000 
(salary of R45 000 and reduction of member’s loan by more than R300 000) 
discussed earlier.  
In July, the business did reduce its deficit on the current bank account, but this 
was probably too late to make a difference.  
Summary and conclusion on cash management  
To summarise this review, it is striking that the considerable fluctuations in the 
cash balance were not related to working capital considerations, since supplier 
credit and customers’ payments have been balancing each other and have usually 
been favourable to the business22.  
                                                 
22 In fact, the highest cash balances (Nov 1999) were found at a time when customers were 
paying more slowly (trade receivables amount to 25 days of turnover), while the subsequent 
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This means that the fluctuations in cash have been caused by other activities. For 
one, investment activities have strongly impacted on the overdraft (especially the 
acquisition of a new vehicle early 1999); on the other hand, Mr. van der Merwe’s 
own salary (to the extent that the salary was actually paid out in cash, which 
could not be conclusively verified) was heavy for the firm. Generally, the 
evidence suggests htat the owner has tended to draw more cash than the business 
could generate, restraining himself only late, possibly following admonishing 
from creditors.  
 
6. Financial structure, ratios 
Turnover growth  
To the extent that the turnover figures found in the management accounts can be 
trusted, turnover growth, as presented in section 4 above, has been rather modest.  
The high growth figure in the first year (48% p.a. between January 1997 and 
January 1998) was caused by an understandably low turnover in the year of start-
up.  
During the two following years (1998-1999), the annual nominal growth rate has 
been 8% p.a., hardly above the South African core inflation rate during this 
period23.  
In the last 6 months (January to June 2000), sales even went down by a nominal 
rate of –9% p.a., probably as a result of a price decrease decided to reduce stock 
and provide liquidity.  
These figures hint at a first obvious weakness of the business: it has not managed 
the expected breakthrough on the market – probably because of competition, 
failure to deliver the promised value for money, general marketing insufficiency 
and inability of the franchisor to support the brand nationally. This is consistent 
with the verdict on the liquidator’s report, citing “the downturn in the economy 
and the lack of orders” as main reasons for the firm’s failure.  
Cost structure  
At first sight, the operating cost structure (as presented in Tables 31.5 and 31.6 
above) seems relatively normal for a business of this type, with a gross margin of 
about 50 to 55%, further variable costs amounting to 15% to 20% of turnover, 
                                                                                                                                    
drop in cash happened at a time when customers paid more promptly (7 days of turnover in 
January 2000). 
23 During the year 1999 the overall CPI fell sharply as a result of falling interest rates, but core 
inflation (which excludes the cost of mortgages and other goods and services with 
exceptionally unstable prices) remained high. The South African core inflation rate fluctuated 
between 8.75% in January 1998 and 6.9% in December 1999. 
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and fixed costs of about R600 000 per year for the rent, operations and 
administration. In this case, the royalties paid to the franchisor were considered 
as fixed costs, since they are not proportional to turnover.  
The gross margin however has been significantly less favourable in the last year 
(July 1999 to June 2000), supposedly because the manager has decided to 
decrease its prices in order to reduce its stock and provide some liquidity. 
Although this last year may not be representative of the life of the business, its 
higher variable cost ratio has been included as a pessimistic scenario in the 
breakeven analysis.  
As discussed previously, though, the fixed costs displayed in the income 
statements are incomplete since at least depreciations and the finance charges 
related to the main Instalment sale agreement and long-term loan have been 
omitted.  
Furthermore, a major cost item was the member’s salary. This item has 
fluctuated over the lifetime of the business, and Mr. van der Merwe’s ambition to 
earn R20 000/month was certainly not sustainable. If one therefore works on a 
target salary of R15 000/month, i.e. R180 000 per year, the fixed costs are 
augmented by 30%, which has a strong impact on the breakeven calculation.  
Table 31.22 therefore shows three versions of the breakeven calculation, “Break-
even 1” based on the costs disclosed in the management accounts and prior to the 
member’s salary; “Break-even 2” after correcting for the missing fixed charges, 
and “Break-even 3” after taking into account a target salary of R180 000 per 
year. 
Table 31.22 – Cost structure and breakeven calculation  
 low high mean
variable costs in % of turnover 67% 77% 
fixed costs 1 (as disclosed in income statements) 598 770 636 558 
fixed costs 2 (after correcting for finance charges 
and depreciations) 708 578 739 767 
fixed costs 3 (corrected and including member's 
salary) 888 578 919 767 
breakeven 1 (before correction) 1 793 262 2 764 997 2 279 130
breakeven 2 (to cover corrected costs) 2 122 127 3 213 303 2 667 715
breakeven 3 (to cover member's salary) 2 661 211 3 995 163 3 328 187
latest known turnover 2 614 059 2 614 059 2 614 059
surplus or deficit 1 46% -5% 15%
surplus or deficit 2 23% -19% -2%
deficit 3 -2% -35% -21%
 Sources: own calculations 
The significant variation in the ratio of variable costs between December 1999 
(low) and June 2000 (high), presumably explained by a price decrease towards 
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the end of the business’s life, causes a strong difference between the high and 
low estimations of the breakeven point.  
The table shows that even if the business had not paid its owner any salary, the 
turnover necessary to cover corrected costs (i.e. including all finance charges and 
depreciations) would have been above R2,6 million in the mean scenario (over 
R3,2 million in the highest scenario), meaning that after four years of operation, 
the business had still not reached its breakeven point.  
The gap to breakeven is even more significant if one takes into account the target 
member’s remuneration of R180 000 per year, in which case the latest annual 
turnover is more than 20% below breakeven, and even 35% in the higher 
scenario.  
This analysis confirms the previous conclusion on sales insufficiency, but also 
points at a cost problem specifically with regard to the member’s salary, which 
has been kept too high for the business to sustain.  
Interest coverage ratio 
Again, two versions of the interest coverage ratio had to be calculated to reflect 
two sets of figures for financial costs: before and after correction of financial 
charges.  
The ratios as shown in Table 31.22 show that the operating profits (prior to 
depreciation) have either been just too low, or just sufficient to cover (corrected) 
financial costs over the business’s lifetime.  
This hints at two problems: the general insufficiency of operating profit as 
already discussed, and a high level of financial costs caused by a combination of 
high long-term debt (especially after the conclusion of a new instalment sale 
agreement in 1999) and intensive use of overdraft and credit card. 
Table 31.23 – Interest coverage analysis 
 Feb-97 Jan-98 Dec-99 Jun-00 
EBITDA -97 088 174 436 85 352 -77 712 
Financial costs (as indicated) 50 146 38 208 19 217 20 943 
Financial costs (corrected) 50 146 51 293 63 974 80 619 
coverage ratio 1 (as indicated) -1,94 4,57 4,44 -3,71 
coverage ratio 2 (corrected) -1,94 3,40 1,33 -0,96 
NB: Financial costs are calculated as the sum of interest paid, finance charges and 
credit card commission 
Equity 
Again, the ratio calculations are to be taken with caution since it is highly 
questionable whether the balance sheet data related to equity, including 
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accumulated profits or losses and member's loan, are reliable.  
Table 31.24 – Equity ratio 
1/ Technical equity 
at start up  
(presumed) 
Feb-97 Jan-98 Dec-99 Jun-00 
Member's interest24 100 100 0 0 0
Accumulated profits or 
losses -186 823 221 671 -414 785 -433 672
Equity stricto sensu 100 -186 723 221 671 -414 785 -433 672
Total Assets 378 000 483 519 424 488 497 542 595 881
Equity ratio (1) 0.02% -39% 52% -83% -73%
 
2/ Member’s capital 
at start up  
(presumed) 
Feb-97 Jan-98 Dec-99 Jun-00 
Member's interest 100 100 0 0 0
Accumulated profits or 
losses 
0
-186 823 221 671 -414 785 -433 672
Quasi-equity (mb loan) 89 900 146 720 -44 866 551 170 549 890
Equity stricto sensu 90 000 -40 003 176 805 136 385 116 218
Total Assets 378 000 483 519 424 488 497 542 595 881
Equity ratio (2) 23.8% -8% 42% 27% 20%
Source: Financial statements for February 1997 and management accounts for the 
following years. The figures for start-up are as in Table 31.1. 
Although data are imprecise, it makes no doubt that the debt ratio has been high 
from the start, supposedly more than 75%. It is even surprising that the bank 
provided an Instalment Sale Agreement for more than 100% of tangible fixed 
assets, (or for 100% of the sum of fixed assets and stock), apparently not 
insisting on a minimal risk participation by the member. The member hence only 
needed to finance half of the franchise fee and the working capital – hence 
contributing to less than 25% of the firm’s total assets.  
In further years, as losses accumulated, the (strict) equity ratio plummeted to 
negative levels, compelling Mr. van der Merwe to increase its member’s loan. 
However, even if he did lend R550 000 to the business as reported, this did not 
increase the initial low equity ratio of app. 25%.  
 
                                                 
24 The figures in the table are presented as in the balance sheets provided by the member. 
Naturally, if the business is registered either as a CC or as a Private Company, it needs to 
have a member’s interest so the “0” are not correct. Also, as already discussed, the positive 
profit and negative member’s loan for January 1998 are highly questionable.  
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Debt maturity 
In the first few years, before the overdraft facility was granted, the debt was 
essentially long-term debt, thanks to the support received from the bank. 
Liabilities towards suppliers and customers who paid a deposit complemented 
this long-term finance.  
However, as time went, current liabilities became more heavy and the use of 
overdraft increased, so that the business became more and more dependent on 
short-term debt, which financed 45% of assets in 1999 and almost 63% in June 
2000.  
Unlike other SMEs which are unable to secure long-term finance and have to use 
short-term funding to back their long-term assets, Mr. van der Merwe was lucky 
to obtain substantial long-term credits to get started. However, by accepting such 
high amounts of long-term debt, he was already at his maximum capacity so that, 
apart from the additional instalment sale facility which he managed to obtain 
from another institution, all other financing needs had to be covered by short-
term credit.  
Table 31.25 – Debt maturity 1997-2000 
 Feb-97 Jan-98 Jul-99 Dec-99 Jun-00
current liabilities 142 868 77 807 210 319 221 280 310 061
overdraft 0 0 43 214 5 206 64 206
total assets 483 519 424 488 559 319 497 542 595 881
Current debt / Total Assets 29,5% 18,3% 45,3% 45,5% 62,8%
Source: from balance sheets. 
Unfortunately, the way he managed his business did generate significant 
financing needs, which therefore impacted on the short-term liquidity. This also 
apparently caused him to use his overdraft to finance a part of his fixed 
investments, notably the cash portion of the vehicle bought in early 1999, as well 
as the small additions to fixed assets that took place between July 1999 and April 
2000 (for approximately R15 000).  
Working capital cycle  
Because of this particular case being a manufacturing operation, we modified the 
ratio framework to incorporate the average production cycle, which was assumed 
at 5 days. Even then, the working capital analysis suggests that, thanks to 
supplier credit and the occasional deposits paid by clients, there was virtually no 
need for working capital. In July 1999, the working capital need was positive, 
but limited to less than 2 days of turnover, i.e. less than R 12 000. This should 
have been largely covered by the bank overdraft facility of R 45 000.  
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Table 31.26 – Working capital cycle 
(In days of turnover) Feb-97 Jul-99 Dec-99 Jun-00
Purchases: Supplier Credit (average) 19,6 25,7 26,3 42,7
Deposits 32,2 4,1 4,1 0,0
Inventory  11,1 6,6 4,4 6,2
Production cycle (assumed) 5,0 5 5 5
Sales: Customer credit 0,0 19,8 10,2 21,6
Total need for working capital (in days) -35,7 1,6 -10,8 -9,9
Corresponding need for working capital 
(in Rand) 11 191  
Source: Balance sheets; production cycle is assumed. The balance sheet for 
January 1998 was not included because there seemed to be inconsistencies in the 
figures (the stock was high and the supplier credit seems abnormally low). 
Variability of ratios 
The accounting data available suggest that ratios for this business were 
extremely volatile. For part, this is likely to be a consequence of low-quality 
accounting, mistakes and even wilful misrepresentation of certain figures. On the 
other hand, there was probably a lack of commitment on the part of the owner, 
which caused fluctuations in the business (especially with regard to drawings). 
 
7. Final Reflections 
In spite of the lack of qualitative and interview evidence, the review of this case 
study has revealed a number of weaknesses, both in its business concept, its 
financial structure and the quality and honesty of its management. It is 
interesting that, from all the case studies, this business was the one that received, 
relatively to its size, the most substantial amount of bank finance, from the start, 
and on a long-term basis.  
The fact that this business was operating as a franchise supposedly contributed to 
its success in securing start-up, expansion and working capital finance.  
The advantage of being part of a franchise  
Commercial banks in South Africa, as well as internationally, tend to be more 
comfortable lending to franchise businesses than to independent enterprises. The 
rationale, as exposed for example by ABSA (2002), rests on the pre-existence of 
a successful business format, which reduces the risks of error by the business 
owner, as well as the comparatively easier establishment of a presence in the 
market, both factors arguably leading to improved predictability and reduced 
risk.  
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The statistical evidence on franchise firms’ lower rates of failure, however, is 
controversial in the academic literature, with Stanworth et al (1998) arguing that 
such past results were affected by problems of definition and measurement, 
while in reality there is hardly a significant difference in the rates of failure 
between franchise and conventional businesses.  
In addition, it is important to take into consideration the reputation and expertise 
of the franchise scheme – and accordingly the appropriateness of franchise costs. 
In the case of Mr. Parker’s franchise, the cost appeared excessive considering the 
lack of expertise of the franchise scheme (and even of the franchisor’s businesses 
themselves). It is not clear to what extent support services have been put in place 
to justify such high fees.  
In addition, there is evidence that Mr. van der Merwe’s access to finance has 
been facilitated by the good relationship of the bank to the franchisor, and the 
fact that the bank had approved the franchisor’s scheme. However, a motivation 
for the bank’s approval of the franchise scheme seemed to be the fact that it was 
favourable to the franchisor, with “franchise fee being paid in full upfront”. 
However, de facto, this comparatively high franchise fee was ultimately paid by 
the bank on behalf of the franchisee (as part of the start-up loan), and the bank’s 
exposure on both sides of the scheme strongly reduced the benefit of the existing 
scheme for the bank as a whole25.  
The bank’s mistakes 
The bank granted its support to CS1 on the basis of the “exclusive supply 
agreement” which the franchisor had with its fibre-board supplier. The 
credibility of this competitive advantage in a highly competitive furniture market 
would appear to have been overstated. It is possible that the exclusivity of the 
supply agreement applied to Mr. Parker in Pretoria, but not to the Cape area, 
where CS1 operated.  
More seriously, the bank can be blamed for having been negligent on the 
management of this account. While the initial facilities were granted at start-up, 
at a time where no financial analysis was possible, a monitoring should have 
taken place. Instead, the bank has ignored considerable accounting flaws and has 
tolerated long periods without any financial reporting. 
In addition, a new overdraft facility was granted after a few years of operations. 
At this stage of the firm’s lifecycle, the possibility of a more rigorous analysis of 
creditworthiness and of cash flow forecasts existed; instead, the bank seems to 
have limited itself to verifying that repayments were taking place on time, as 
well as reviewing, in a supposedly superficial manner, reports which had visibly 
been falsified.  
 
                                                 
25 It may however have benefited the Pretoria branch at the expense of the Cape Town branch. 
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Annexure 32 – Narrative on Case Study 2 
White-owned franchise restaurant 
 
An illustration of   
(a) the importance of personal wealth, character and relationships to obtain 
finance, (b) the difficulty of being profitable as a franchise, and   
(c) the difficult interpretation of profit and equity figures. 
 
1. Business Short Portrait  
Business Code Name: CS2 
Member’s initials: Mr. H.W.. 
Member owns 100% of capital 
Member’s ethnic background: White 
Member employs a general manager 
Form of registration: CC  
 
Sector of activity: 
Primary activity: SIC 64201 (restaurant) 
Secondary activity: SIC 64203 (take-away counter) 
Product or Service: Family restaurant, take-aways and food deliveries  
Business concept: franchise Market: Private domestic 
Start-up date: 2001 (acquired existing business)  
Current status: active 
Staff members: 47 
Managers: 2 
Permanent employees: 16 
Casual staff: 29 
Annual turnover: R 3 million  
Gross fixed assets : R 752 thousand  
=> Size category: small  
               (tending to “medium”) 
Main sources of finance:  
• Member’s loan (backed by personal bank credit) 
• Bank Overdraft 
 
2. Case study procedure 
The case study plan was to include a (running) franchise business. For this 
purpose, a few of the major restaurant and retail franchise schemes were 
contacted and agreed to send a list of their franchisees in Cape Town. This 
restaurant, which was first contacted telephonically, agreed to provide financial 
statements and interviews. 
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The case study rests on the following sources: 
• 2 on-site interviews of the business owner 
• financial statements for the years ended February 2002 and February 
2003.  
• franchisor’s website, yielding information on the history of the franchise 
scheme,  
• answers of the franchisor on a written questionnaire  
• written documentation provided by the franchisor, including 
o Set up costs and budgets for two types of restaurants: take aways 
outlet and “combo” outlet, dated January to May 2004 
o Disclosure document 
o Franchise brochure 
o List of franchisees  
 
3. The business owner 
Background 
A qualified dentist, Mr. HW (not his real initials) owned a dental laboratory for 7 
years, until he decided to start a new career. He underwent training as a 
Microsoft Systems Engineer, but did not follow this route any further, preferring 
to start, as he called it, a potato factory. Although this first project did not work, 
it helped Mr. HW cut his entrepreneurial teeth. Following this, he decided to try 
a restaurant. Having lived in Gardens for about 16 years, he had a fair idea of the 
market potential, and decided to buy a franchise restaurant and take-away. At 
present, two years after having bought this restaurant, he is starting up a new 
shop specialising in DVD and entertainment. 
In spite of a somewhat sinuous curriculum, Mr. HW could be called a serial 
entrepreneur – and indeed there were many indications during the interviews, 
that he would not own this restaurant business for the rest of his life: Quite early 
in the first interview he indicated that he may, at some stage, want to sell this 
business again, although he wasn’t too talkative about it. In any case, the 
franchise agreements with this franchisor are limited to 10 years, although this is 
renewable.  
Prior to starting up as a new franchisee, Mr. HW gained some background 
through the 45-days corporate training organized by the franchise’s head office. 
Specifically, the training involved going through every single section in the 
restaurant and learning to perform all the tasks that his future staff members 
would have to perform. In addition, the training included a small section on 
administrative matters, but this, according to Mr. HW, did not go beyond the 
usual food cost calculation and profit calculation. There was little on accounting 
and finance, but he had had accounting as a major at school and he “was quite 
good at it”. 
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Character  
Mr. HW’s character has certainly been decisive in bringing him to where he was 
– in the first place to “pass” the franchisor’s selection process, which consisted 
in an extensive psychological test. Asked about what else was in the selection 
process, Mr. HW says “that was it – and we had to provide additional sureties”.  
Mr. HW’s character could be described with the word charismatic. In our 
interviews he was always casual, relaxed and charming, yet there was a 
particular natural authority in his tone. It felt like he was confident of his power 
and his effect. Although some interview questions took him quite far into the 
details of accounting figures or of possible ‘tricks’ used, he never showed 
embarassment at these questions and acted as someone who knows his figures 
well. Contradictions did come up, though, between his assertions and the 
accounts – on which he would comment with a “I wonder why?”. 
Mr. HW’s openness about his financial matters has varied during the course of 
the case study. When I first contacted him telephonically to ask him about his 
readiness to participate in the project (indicating from the start that I needed to 
collect financial statements), he agreed friendly. By my second call, meant at 
confirming the time for the first appointment, he suddenly was reluctant to give 
me an access to the business’ official financial statements, suggesting that he 
may at best show me his monthly accounts. As I insisted that I was working with 
annual statements, he declined participation in the project. I called him again the 
following week, and he eventually accepted to show me his financials. During 
our first interview, he was even relatively opened about some “jiggling” that he 
would use to achieve his goals, but in the second interview, noticing that I had 
studied his figures in some detail, he withdrew significantly. Overall, he proved 
surprisingly frank, although I could never fully convince myself whether or not 
he was “cheating” in some of his answers.  
Undoubtedly, some of the tactics used suggested that he was a clever and 
pragmatic person. His pragmatism had another consequence: he did not have the 
same emotional attachment to the business as most of the other entrepreneurs 
interviewed: in fact, he was probably contemplating to sell the restaurant.  
Personal Finance  
From all the case study entrepreneurs Mr. HW had the highest living standard. 
He owns a house, valued at 2.6 million Rand, 3 motor vehicles, savings and 
investments, this restaurant, as well as two other businesses: a property trust and 
a new video and entertainment business.  
Asked whether he has personal debts, he replies “I suppose I do”, and mentions 
that his house and his car are not yet paid-up – “but, he adds, eventually, my debt 
is business-debt more than personal”. He did not mention whether he has had 
any debt related to the failure of the potato factory. 
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4. How the business started  
The franchise scheme has been in existence for more than 15 years. It has 
developed to a relatively big network, with currently over 50 stores nationwide 
and in some African countries, the Head Office being in Cape Town. In addition 
to seat-in restaurants, the business concept includes take-aways and food 
deliveries. The corporate website suggests that, more than the number of 
restaurants/stores26, their priority in building the franchise network has been 
quality in terms of service and performance. 
The particular restaurant that is the object of this case study was already running 
under a different franchisee, when it was bought by Mr. HW in March 2001. 
There was no information about the date when it was actually started.  
In order to acquire the restaurant, Mr. HW founded a Close Corporation in 
December 2000. The first months were used for the setup process, including the 
contractual relationship with the franchisor and a 45-days training organized by 
the franchisor’s head office. The CC effectively took possession of this 
restaurant approximately three months later. 
Initial investment  
Buying a franchise is always a big investment upfront. Therefore, unlike most 
other case study firms which could start small and grow progressively, this 
business has been relatively big from the start. The initial investment sum was 
approximately as follows: 
Purchase price for the assets R 585 000  
Stock R   35 000 
Franchise fee R   45 000 
Estimated initial working capital R   20 000? 
Total:  R 675 000 
Mr. HW did not disclose exactly the amount of his initial working capital. His 
only indication was that the Working capital: “was supposed to be R 80 00027, 
but in fact I did not have that much”.  
With an initial investment of, supposedly, under 700 thousand Rand, this 
business is the largest of our case studies. It was, however, significantly cheaper 
than creating a new franchise which, according to the franchisor, would have 
requested an investment of approximately 1,2 million Rand. Table 32.1 
                                                 
26 To simplify we occasionally use the word “restaurant” in this report with reference to the entire 
business, although the seat-in restaurant itself represents only about 25% of its turnover.  
27 This figure quoted by Mr. HW does not coincide with the indications from the Head Office.  
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compares the investment made by Mr. HW with the setup costs estimated by the 
franchisor. 
Table 32.1 – CS2 franchise setup costs compared with franchisor’s estimation 
 Actual Investment  
(Mr. HW, 2000) 
Estimated setup costs 
(Franchisor, 2004) 
Franchise fee  45 000 50 000 
Assets 585 000 1 006 32028 
Stock 35 000 30 000 
Working Capital – excluding 
stock 
Supposedly 20 000 24 500 
Training and Uniforms 1.1.1.1 Not mentioned 27 000 
Total Supposedly 675 000 1 137 820 
Sources: Actual investment figures from interview evidence, setup costs from 
franchisor’s written documentation (2004) 
 
The fact that the assets in the restaurant had been depreciated over several years 
and that some expenses were not required (architects plans, labour for the entire 
construction, initial staff training, etc) explained the lower investment sum.  
It is posisble, though, that the figures provided in interviews were understated. 
This would explain why the alleged price was approximately 22% lower than the 
(gross) asset value capitalized in the 2001 balance sheet (R 747 893). In principle 
Mr. HW should have capitalised precisely the amount paid.  
I asked Mr. HW about the way that he made sure that the purchase price was 
right. He answered that he studied a number of aspects, including the books, as 
well as VAT returns. His answer showed that he was aware of the risk of 
overstatement of turnover in the management accounts, because he specifically 
indicated that “VAT returns were particularly important, because you don’t 
overpay VAT if you are underperforming”.  
Business Financing scheme 
In order to ensure sufficient viability of the businesses, the Head office rules, as 
published on the Franchisor’s website, require a 50% cash participation of the 
member. “We require 50% cash and allow 50% gearing”. 
In the case of Mr. HW’s business, apart from the bank overdraft, the balance 
sheet does not show any liabilities against financial institutions, only a member’s 
loan representing almost 98% of the liabilities at the end of the first year (the 
equity being negative). Insofar, Mr. HW was complying with the franchisor’s 
                                                 
28 This figure includes all costs incurred for the drafting and building of the kitchen and 
shopfittings 
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rule, although the funds that he made available to the business by means of his 
member’s loan ultimately came from a personal debt contracted by Mr. HW. 
To acquire the business, Mr. HW initially contracted a second bond on his house. 
But, once the transaction was over and the business well started, he modified the 
financial scheme by negotiating a flexible long-term credit line, amounting to 1.8 
million Rand, and still secured by the same house worth 2.6 million Rand. This 
personal credit line was, de facto, partly passed over to the business by means of 
a member’s loan.  
On the choice of a personal loan rather than business loan 
Asked whether he had considered taking the debt under the restaurant’s name 
rather than under his own, Mr. HW answered that he had, but this would have 
been more costly. He was indeed able to obtain a favourable interest rate on his 
private credit line, namely Prime – 2%.  
In addition, the personal loan gives him the possibility to use portions of the 
large credit line for other purposes as well. Mr. HW confirmed that the 
DVD/entertainment business was also benefiting from the credit.  
Chains of interest-bearing loans may lead to hidden transfers if the interest rates 
differ. Mr. H.W. indicated that his member’s loan to the restaurant carried the 
same interest rate as what he paid to his bank, Prime –2%, which, he said, is 
currently running at approximately 11%29. Asked whether the 
DVD/entertainment business was also paying the same interest rate, Mr. HW’s 
replied with a diplomatic “it would”, which may indicate that the business was 
not yet profitable enough to sustain interest payments.  
Still on the question of the choice of a personal rather than business loan, Mr. 
HW admitted that it sometimes “creates problems with the tax man”. He has had 
to prove several times that the loan was a real business loan, by providing 
documents for the payments he did in his own capacity for the benefit of the 
business. He added that while the “big chunks” (such as the direct investments 
into his various businesses) were easy to prove, other elements were not. 
However, the advantages of having the credit under his own name outweighed 
the disadvantage of the difficult tax treatment.  
Ultimately, the financial construction chosen means that, although the CC’s 
balance sheets do not show any long-term financial liabilities, the real source of 
the business finance is ABSA bank. The real initial equity participation was 
therefore limited to the member’s interest of R200. The financing scheme was 
hence technically compliant, but economically in contradiction with the Head 
office rules of a maximum gearing of 50% – an example of Mr. HW’s ability to 
‘use regulatory gaps’.  
                                                 
29 See following footnote on the inconsistency between interest rates and the possibility that Mr. 
HW was paying himself a premium on the interest rate due to the bank. 
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Subordination of the member’s loan 
The financial statements include a note regarding Mr. HW’s loan to the business. 
The note confirms that, as usual for SMEs, the member’s loan is unsecured, has 
no fixed terms of repayment and bears equity risk, as the member has deferred 
the right to claim or accept payment of the value of negative equity, currently at 
approximately R155 000, until the accumulated losses are covered. 
Mr. HW could not confirm whether such subordination agreement was required 
by other creditors or if it was indeed a technical requirement initiated by the 
accountant to give him the assurance that, in spite of the technically negative 
equity, he should set the accounts on a going-concern basis.  
On the question of what would happen to the business if he lost this particular 
credit line, Mr. HW replied that there was no reason why this should happen, 
since the value of the security (the house) was substantially higher than the 
amount of the credit line. He was probably right, unless he runs into difficulties 
paying up the house or with other uses made of this same security.  
Access to finance 
The personal assets of Mr. HW, as we have seen, were of great help in enabling 
his enterprise. He confirmed that he has had to provide them as securities “lots of 
time”, but he was happy to do that as this represented an economic springboard 
for him.  
In my first interview with Mr. HW, though, he unpromptedly mentioned another 
factor that eased his access to finance: “There is a very easy way to get finance. 
You must have a Chartered Accountant, that you know well, and get him to write 
you a letter stating that you earn sufficient income”. Asked for more details in 
the second interview, he was more cautious, saying that he had discovered this 
“recipe” as he went along, but adding that he had not used it for the purpose of 
financing this particular business, because “the earning potential of the business 
itself was sufficient to convince the bank”.  
Mr. HW was vague on the process that led him to the loan or the role that a letter 
from his CA may have played. When he initially asked for the loan, he has not 
been requested to provide a business plan for the restaurant, although he did 
provide management accounts for the past 6 months. Knowing that management 
accounts need not be audited, there is a possibility that the figures he provided 
were arranged to his advantage, a possibility that he almost confirmed by saying 
that “it is easy to jiggle”, adding that the bank was interested in his income and 
not in the expenses. Again, Mr. HW seems to have used a gap in the loan-
approval procedure, which was simpler than usual due to the loan formally being 
a personal credit line.   
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5. Business model and operations 
Business model and franchise scheme 
The business model for Mr. HW’s business is strongly determined by the 
franchise rules. The three activities are, by order of importance, (1) deliveries 
(representing approximately 45% of turnover), (2) take-aways (about 30% of 
sales) and (3) the seat-in restaurant, which contributed the remaining 25%.  
Mr. HW mentioned that he was also using his other business (entertainment and 
DVD/video) to create additional value – although he did not give details, hence 
not making it very clear for which business the synergies were creating value. 
(He may have screened videos in the restaurant, which had a TV screen, and 
possibly the take-aways facility).  
Apart from the initial fee of 45 thousand Rand, the franchise scheme requires the 
payment of a Management Services Fee (often called “royalty”) of 5% of sales, 
and an additional Advertising fee of a further 5%, as well as a 0.3% fee to pay 
for the staff training. Overall, then, more than 10% of the business’ turnover is 
paid to the head office. This does not include the purchase of food items that are 
obligatorily sourced from the franchisor, which represent approximately 10% of 
all purchases.  
Assets 
According to the balance sheet, the gross value of fixed assets (excluding the 
franchise fee), amounts to R753 000, for a net carrying value of R456 000.  
As usual in a restaurant with a demanding corporate image, the “furniture and 
fittings” represent a high portion of the assets, namely about two thirds of the 
assets in the accounts. Mr. HW suggested that at least half of the assets were 
shop-fitting, such as walls, pillars, bar, artwork, benches, furniture etc. The 
interior décor was indeed quite onerous to fit to the corporate image.  
Of course, another important part of the assets came from the equipment, 
kitchen, coldroom, ovens, as well as the dishes, cutlery etc.  
Management style and philosophy 
Unlike some other food franchises where a person can own several restaurants, 
which are run by external managers or directors, the present franchise rests on 
the principle of owner-managed businesses. According to the franchisor’s 
corporate website, it is a “primary requirement in selecting and approving a 
franchisee” that “the franchisee both owns and operates the business. This 
ensures total commitment as well as personalised service to customers.”  
In spite of this, Mr. HW’s business is actually operated by two employed 
managers, who co-ordinate the team of 16 permanent staff and currently 29 
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casual workers. The owner himself used to work in the restaurant six days a 
week, or an average of 65 to 70 hours per week. But currently his involvement 
has been reduced to approximately 10 hours per week. He admits that this is “not 
good” but he has “other things that require his attention”. Specifically, Mr. HW 
is spending his days working in his DVD/entertainment business, having only 
the evenings/nights left for the food business. He adds, though, that he has a 
“very competent General Manager”.  
Once again, then, Mr. HW is not complying with a central rule of the franchise – 
apparently because his motivation has declined: he was apparently considering to 
sell the business. 
Mr. HW describes his management style as “60% aggressive”, adding that 
aggressiveness was necessary in order to ensure a good food and service quality 
in a context where the staff is partially made up of people who have been 
unemployed before and are not used to working under pressure. His marketing 
style is also “pro-active”, trying to constantly propose special offers and deals in 
order to remain attractive in the eyes of the clients. 
Market, Competition and Pricing 
The business is situated in a very busy street in a dense area of Cape Town, 
therefore has a very dynamic market. However, it is under constant and 
increasing pressure from the competition. In the last 1.5 years, a number of new 
restaurants and food delivery services opened in the area, making it difficult to 
maintain market shares.  
To Mr. HW, this competition is the main threat to the business, which has to 
keep a constant eye on food and service quality as well as special offers, in order 
to remain a favourite.  
The competition can be seen as threatening in two regards. On the downside, it 
requires constant effort from the restaurant’s management to maintain the 
customer base – so a decrease in the quality of food or service could be fatal for 
the restaurant which would lose its customer base, with the result that the 
decreased sales would no longer suffice to cover the fixed charges. The 
accumulation of losses could bring the business into insolvency.  
But the competition also limits the upside potential. Even with an aggressive 
marketing and high-quality service, there is little hope that the business may 
grow substantially beyond its current size – hence it is unlikely that the business 
will ever produce enough profits to both strengthen its equity base and enrich its 
owner. This realization may have contributed to the decrease in the owner’s 
motivation and his search for more lucrative business opportunities.  
Costing, Pricing and Credit Policy 
Most businesses can control their market share and their profit potential by using 
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several tools: reducing their prices on selected items to attract customers, 
sometimes even granting credit to their clients or, on the opposite, adjusting their 
prices to their costs.  
To a franchise restaurant, these options are not available. Granting credit to 
clients obviously does not apply to the food sector. As to the prices, they are set 
by the Head Office. They are revised from time to time to respond to inflation – 
according to Mr. HW, there has been only one increase in three years, in 2002.  
This means that, in order to become profitable or improve profit margins, Mr. 
HW has only two options: he must either increase the quantity of food sold, as 
this will raise the turnover above the breakeven point, or reduce costs.  
As far as food costs are concerned, the Head Office’s expectation is that 
franchisees should be able to work on a 36% food cost. This, according to Mr. 
HW, is not actually realistic. In spite of efforts to buy cheaply (they review price 
lists from suppliers on a weekly basis to select the cheapest) and to restrict 
wastage, he says, the average food cost ratio is 37 to 40%. (The income 
statement suggests that ‘cost of sales’ represents 43 to 46% of turnover, but this 
may include other cost items).  
Fixed costs are also difficult to control. A large part of them comes from the 
premises and equipment, which are dictated by the capital-intensive business 
concept (the rent, depreciations, repairs & maintenance altogether amount to 
12% of turnover). The rent is fixed on a 5-year-lease and reflects the quality of 
the location (although it remains lower than on the franchisor’s budget, see next 
section).  
Labour, on the other hand, is reasonably cheap but, since the restaurant needs 
much staff to ensure prompt service, salaries do add up to 20% of turnover. Mr. 
HW suggested that it would be dangerous to cut costs there. (Indeed, during my 
interviews with Mr. HW, which both took place in the restaurant before usual 
meal times, I saw four to five young people wearing the restaurant’s colours – in 
the first interview in the late morning they were working at a slow tempo to 
prepare deliveries, while during the second interview in the early evening, there 
were three young people in my back waiting for customers).  
In addition, the franchise fees at 10.3% of turnover represent a constant and 
significant cost factor.  
Profitability 
This business seems to be a good illustration of the fact that the profitability of a 
small business is always a question of perspective.  
When I asked Mr. HW in my first interview whether the business was profitable, 
he answered that he was satisfied with the profits and indicated that his profit 
margin before depreciation and member’s salary was fluctuating between 13 and 
17% of turnover.  
However, a review of the financial statements available showed that, for the 
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years ending February 2002 and 2003, the restaurant has not been profitable: the 
financial years were closed with losses of respectively 4% and 1% of turnover. 
There was no member’s salary at all and if one were to omit the depreciations 
and amortisation of the franchise fee, the business would just be profitable with, 
respectively, 1% and 3% margins on turnover – a gap of more than 10% 
compared with the stated margins.  
Supposedly, the difference between these figures was to some extent explained 
by accounting adjustments meant to save tax. Indeed, when handing out the 
financial statements to me, Mr. HW had made several allusions to such 
adjustments:  
“These accounts that I give you are done for tax purposes. These are not 
the accounts that I would show if I were to sell the business”. 
and “These accounts gave me a lot of headache. You need to understand 
how accountants think. You know, if you put something into your costs, 
you can reduce the profit, so you pay less tax”. 
In my second interview with him I tried to gain a better understanding of the 
business’s “real” profitability as opposed to the tax-driven accounting. However, 
Mr. HW’s responses were somewhat vague.  
His first reaction on my question was (simulated?) surprise: “oh… oh… maybe it 
was that low”. He did however mention several elements that could partially 
explain the gap of more than 10% between the stated profit margin, and the one 
derived from the accounts: 
1. He suggested that the profitability has improved in time. “The first two 
years were rough, but after 2003 it started happening”. “We now make 
margins of around 12-15%”. 
This statement could not be verified, since the financials for the year 
2003 (ending February 2004) were not available. It is also not clear what 
may have caused the improvement. It is unlikely to be an increase in 
turnover, since he had previously indicated that the last year had been the 
most difficult, with an increase in competition, so that he had just 
managed to keep his sales stable.  
2. Mr. HW also indicated that in the first two years he has invested a lot in 
repairs and improvements to bring the business back to standard, causing 
the losses. However, according to the financial statements, repairs and 
maintenance as well as small tools and equipment amounted to around 
1% of the turnover in both years. 
3. In addition, Mr. HW mentioned that in those two years, he has been 
concerned with “getting the loan down”. While a loan repayment has an 
impact on cash flow, it is not as such an expense item, so it does not 
really influence the profit, except to the extent that it helps reduce interest 
costs. Interest costs were in the region of 3% of turnover in the two years. 
Assuming that the decrease in nominal interest rates combined with a 
decrease of the value of the loan have enabled the business to reduce its 
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interest payments by half, this may have brought an additional 1.5% 
improvement in the profit margins.  
Taken together, the reduction of repair costs and interest savings after February 
2003 can explain that the business turned slightly profitable after writing losses, 
but it certainly does not explain the 10% gap between the profit margins.  
There may be two reasons for the contradiction between stated profitability and 
the performance reflected in the accounts:  
a) Mr. HW may have used tax-saving practices (This issue of accounting 
treatments to reduce the taxable income is raised again in the section about 
accounting.).  
b) Or he may have been unaware of the exact final profitability figures, working 
more with a focus on monthly operating-profit, i.e. ignoring the year-end or 
the more general expenses like bank charges, insurance, security, licenses 
and levies, telephone and computer expenses, etc. Mr. HW’s monthly profit 
reviews were more likely to have concentrated on basic costs, like cost of 
food, labour and rent. 
Performance compared with Head Office’s projections 
The restaurant, it seems, was not lucrative – at least not in the first two years 
after Mr. HW’s investment, and probably not in the third year. It is likely that the 
financial results were a disappointment to Mr. HW who had expected a better 
reward for the financial risks taken.  
In order to understand the reasons for the lack of profitability, the incomes and 
expenses were compared with the projections delivered by the head office for 
that kind of ‘combo-store’ (i.e. business combining sit-in restaurant, take aways 
and deliveries).  
The result (see Table 32.2) shows that in the first year, the restaurant’s sales were 
slightly under budget (5% below). However, this is not primarily what caused 
the loss, since the following year still brings a deficit, although the business has 
managed to increase its turnover to 5% above target.  
In fact, a major area where the business is underperforming against the budget is 
with regard to food costs. Mr. HW is aware of this deficiency, suggesting that the 
targets of 36% food costs are unrealistic. Unfortunately, there is little that the 
management can do since they cannot control the prices. With a gross margin 6-
9% below target, the business is already in a bad position to achieve the 15% net 
margin promised by the head office.  
The next area of bad performance is with certain variable costs. The first are the 
food delivery expenses, which amount to 1,4 to 2,6% of turnover but were not 
budgeted for in the Head Office’s target income statement. Another significant 
cost item are the bank charges, which are high in a context where many clients 
settle their bills with their credit card – the amount foreseen in the budget does 
not seem to take account of these costs. Beyond those relatively minor items, the 
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business also has more heavy staff costs than the head office suggested it would 
– this can be caused by the costs of the general manager, since the restaurant is 
not (no longer) owner-managed. 
These factors bring the margin on variable costs to 11 to 13% under budget.  
The fixed costs, on the other hand, are overall lower than in the budget – mainly 
due to a lower rent. Repairs and tool replacements on the other hand are 
significantly higher than in the budget, confirming Mr. HW.’s statement that he 
invested high amounts in upgrading in the first two years. In a way, this is not 
surprising since the budget is written for a new restaurant opening up, as 
opposed to an older restaurant which per definition requires more maintenance. 
However, these costs remain minor compared with turnover.  
Lastly, financial costs and depreciations were not properly budgeted for in the 
Head Office’s projected statements (nor was tax, in fact), but they are significant 
and use up the meager margin.  
Two possible interpretations emerge from this analysis. Either the business is 
being careless on variable costs such as food costs and salaries, where its costs 
should be significantly lower – this is however denied by Mr. HW. Or the 
franchisor’s budgets were too superficial, with a number of significant costs 
being omitted (such as delivery expenses, replacement of small tools, 
depreciations) or significantly understated (such as food costs, banking costs, 
financing costs). In this case, Mr. HW’s business has little chance to reach the 
profit levels promised by the franchisor.  
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Table 32.2 – Comparison of Actuals 2002 and 2003 to Budget  
 Head Office 
Target 
Actual 2002 Actual 2003 Comments 
Net sales 2 894 737 2 743 891 3 028 317 
Turnover is in the +/-5% 
range of target 
     
Food costs and 
packaging 
1 085 526 
38% of sales 
1 269 246 
46% of sales 
1 318 229 
44% of sales 
Business loses 6-8% 
margin on food costs! 
Gross margin 63% 54% 57%  
     
Franchise fee (incl. 
Advertising fee) 
289 474 
10% 
282 621 
10% 
311 917 
10% 
Per definition proportional 
to sales 
“Variable overheads I”  
like: cleaning, computer, 
electricity and gas, 
stationery, telephone  
126 553 
4% 
84 195 
3% 
93 884 
3% 
 
“Variable overheads II” 
like delivery expenses, 
entertainment, 
advertising, bank 
charges, uniforms 
18 526 
0,6% 
113 467 
4% 
133 174 
4% 
Some costs were grossly 
under-estimated in the 
Head Office’s projections 
Wages, salaries and other 
staff-related costs 
570 865 
20% 
593 580 
22% 
656 094 
22% 
Business loses 2% margin 
on staff costs  
Margin on variable 
costs 
28% 15% 17%  
     
“Fixed overheads I”  
rent, water, insurance 
316 800 
11% 
179 332 
7% 
224 889 
7% 
The restaurant saves a lot 
on the rent, which is far 
lower than projected 
“Fixed overheads II” like 
security, repairs, small 
tools, travel, accounting 
and legal costs 
29 558 
1% 
74 804 
3% 
78 083 
3% 
Some costs were under-
estimated in the Head 
Office’s projections 
Margin before interest, 
depreciation and tax 
16% 5% 7%  
     
Finance costs 20 500 
1% 
101 259 
4% 
98  480 
3% 
Depreciations and 
amortisation of franchise 
fee 
0 
165 081 
6% 
149 203 
5% 
Not considered in the 
Head Office’s 
projections 
Net Profit  436 935 -119 659 -35 624  
Net Margin  15,1% -4,4% -1,2%  
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Member’s remuneration 
Asked, during the first interview, whether he was taking a fixed salary from the 
business, Mr. HW said that he did not, but that, whenever the business generated 
some “excess capital”, he would “take it to put it into his bond”.  
The issue of remuneration, hence, is as equivocal as is the business’s 
performance – but it is probable that, if at all a remuneration took place, it has 
remained fairly modest. The financial statements available (for the years ending 
February 2002 and 2003) did not show any form of member’s salary or 
dividends. 
Asked for more details in the second interview, Mr. HW confirmed that the 
payment of dividends did not happen at all in the first two years since he had not 
made any profits. He added that he did pay himself a dividend out of the profit 
realized in the year ending February 2004. As to the amount of the dividend, he 
first replied that he did not know, and then added that it may have been in the 
region of R200 000.  
Again, this figure could not be verified by ‘hard’ accounting data, but 
considering the previous years’ figures and other information given by Mr. HW, 
it is unlikely to be true.   
Indeed, the subordination agreement already mentioned obliged Mr. HW to use 
any net profit first to cover accumulated losses, possibly even to build-up his 
equity. Only the balance (after tax) should have been paid out as dividend.  
Assuming that the owner paid out to himself as much as he could after just 
covering the losses accumulated in the previous years, and working with an 
effective tax rate of 30%, the pre-tax profit that would have been required to pay 
a dividend of 200 thousand Rand would be over 440 thousand Rand. Assuming 
that the turnover in 2004 was equal to the previous year’s turnover (as Mr. HW. 
suggested), and even assuming that the depreciations, amortisations and 
financing costs could be reduced to at 6,5% of turnover, the operating margin 
would have needed to be over 21%, which is almost impossible after the 5 to 7% 
of the previous years.  
At another stage of the interview, Mr. HW. had suggested that in 2003-04 he had 
reached operating margins of 12-15% before depreciation. 
If one assumes that the business has indeed been able to achieve the median 
operating margins of 13,5% in 2004, and to decrease financial costs, 
depreciations and amortisations to 7% of sales, the distributable profit – after 
covering accumulated losses – would have been only ZAR 29 090: a rather 
modest remuneration for a whole year. 
Finally, if one assumes that the business continued to perform as it has in the 
previous two years, only slightly improving its operating margin and slightly 
decreasing other costs, it would have just reached breakeven but, because of the 
obligation to settle accumulated costs, would not have been able to pay out any 
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dividend. Table 32.3 presents these three hypotheses and the dividend resulting 
from them. 
Table 32.3 – Simulation of profit and dividend calculation for 2003-04  
   2003-04 (simulated) 
 2001-02 2002-03 Pretended 
(unlikely) 
Middle 
scenario 
Continuity 
Turnover 2 743 891 3 028 317 3 028 317 3 028 317 3 028 317 
Operating margin  146 646 212 047 637 838 408 823 227 124 
 5,3% 7,0% 21,1% 13,5% 7,5% 
Depreciation, 
amortisation and 
financing costs 
266 340 247 683 196 841 211 982 227 124 
 9,7% 8,2% 6,5% 7,0% 7,5% 
Pre-tax profit -119 659 -35 624 440 997 196 841 0 
Past losses 0 -119 659 -155 283 -155 283 -155 283 
Net profit -119 659 -35 624 355 283 184 373 0 
Maximum possible 
dividend 
0 0 200 000 29 090 0 
 
Non-dividend remuneration 
Although he did not mention it, there is a possibility that Mr. HW found some 
other way of taking a gratification for his investment in the business. In theory, 
three main hypotheses are permitted: (a) he may have drawn personal benefits 
from some business assets, e.g. some travel and entertainment expenses may 
have been for his private use or he may have consumed meals for free for him 
and/or his family; (b) he may have used interest payments for his remuneration 
(i.e. earned a margin), or (c) he may have created or inflated some costs to mask 
cash drawings.  
a) Personal use of business assets 
This is a rather frequent and almost unverifiable scenario: the owner may use the 
business vehicle for private purposes, invite private friends and/or relatives to eat 
for free in his restaurant, treat private travel costs as business expenses. 
However, it is unlikely that these elements will have reached amounts 
comparable to the salary that a successful entrepreneur would pay himself. 
b) Margin on interest payments 
Mr. HW told me that the interest earned on his member’s loan to the business 
was just compensating the interest paid on his private loan. However, there is a 
small possibility that he earned a small margin on the interest paid30. In any case, 
                                                 
30 The notes to the February 2003 statements indicate that the member’s loan was bearing interest 
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even if there was a hidden margin, the amounts involved would not make it a 
real alternative to salaries or dividends. 
c) Creation or inflation of costs to mask cash drawings 
The next section considers possible manipulations of accounts, which may have 
been used to conceal cash drawings. Since Mr. HW was the sole owner, and his 
business was registered as a CC instead of a Pty Ltd, he did not need to worry 
about disclosure of his dealings with the business – except for tax-compliance 
purposes.  
The avoidance of audits may actually have influenced the choice of Mr. HW to 
register as a CC instead of opting for a Pty Ltd. However, again, the amounts if 
at all would be rather small. 
Conclusion 
From all these analyses, it seems that during the first two years of operation, the 
owner has invested effort and capital into starting the business, supposedly with 
the expectation of profit levels as budgeted by the Head Office (15%).  
Evidently, the business could not afford the remuneration expected. Even if he 
has been able to pay himself a first dividend in the third year, it appears that Mr. 
HW has become aware by then that the potential profits from this business would 
not be adequate to compensate for the work, the capital invested and the financial 
risk involved. This may be the main reason for the reduction of his involvement, 
at least in terms of time and maybe in terms of capital (if it is true that the 
member’s loan has been strongly reduced).  
The difficulties of Mr. HW in openly admitting this situation are not surprising, 
considering both his self-esteem and his position as seller of the business.  
6. Financial management  
At this stage, it seems necessary to seek better insights into the financial 
management processes, as well as the process of setting up the financial 
statements, with two questions in mind. First, one needs to understand to what 
extent the impression of a somewhat unsuccessful business, as conveyed by the 
accounts, may have been distorted for tax purposes. Also, it is interesting to see 
how stringent the financial management has been, and whether this can 
contribute to explaining the business’s (lack of) success. 
                                                                                                                                    
at 15% p.a. Since in February 2003, the prime overdraft rate was peaking at 17% (Source: 
Standard Bank Ecoserv), this rate does correspond to the prime – 2% paid by Mr. HW to his 
bank. Mr. HW does not seem to have drawn a margin during that year. On the other hand, in 
May 2004, according to Mr. HW, the loan was running at 11%, although the Prime rate had 
been steady at 11.5% since mid-December 2003. He may hence have earned a margin of 
1,5%. Assuming that the amount of member’s loan in 2004 was as in February 2003 (R621 
000), this would correspond to a remuneration of approximately R9320 for the year. 
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Sales and Cost Capture and Monitoring 
Mr H.W. was asked a number of questions related to financial planning and 
monitoring. Significantly, he appeared to have understood all of them as attempts 
to assess the risk for accounting errors or manipulations. 
When asked about how the business kept track of sales and costs, Mr. HW 
answered that the sales were fully captured on the computer, adding that he had 
“a very SARS-friendly software: once you’ve entered something you can’t take 
it out any more”. (Would he sometimes have wished that this was possible?). At 
the end of every day, the software generates totals of sales, stock utilization, and 
other control sheets that are reviewed on a daily basis.  
Food costs, he mentioned, are filed and monitored “religiously”, because “at the 
end of the month if there is a bill missing for thousand Rand or so it will never 
be possible to find what it was”. Other, larger expenses, are less critical because 
they are more easily recognizable.  
As to monitoring, Mr. HW does it himself: “I try to do a full income statement 
every month”. If “trying” means that he does indeed do it, then one can say that 
the quality of monitoring taking place is reasonably good, probably better than 
the average South African SME.  
Accounting and setting up of financial statements 
In the first interview, Mr. HW had suggested that working on the financial 
statements with the accountant had “given him a lot of headaches”. In the second 
interview, suspecting that there had been some tax-reducing accounting 
interventions, I tried to come back to this statement to understand what he had 
meant, and obtain a clearer understanding of the accounting process.  
At that stage, Mr. HW was rather evasive about his previous statement. He 
indicated that he had had accounting at school and in his early years at 
university, and that he was “quite good at it”, but when talking to the accountants 
on practical subjects, it all “sounded like Chinese” to him. But for the rest, the 
process that he depicted was (too) simple. 
Accounting processes 
Mr. HW mentioned two external persons involved in the accounting process. 
First, an external payroll administrative officer was coming in every month to 
prepare files and payments such as VAT, RSC levy, etc. In addition, at the end of 
the year, the chartered accountant would prepare the financial statements. 
To verify whether a close relationship between Mr. HW and his chartered 
accountant may have had an impact on the financial statements as well as access 
to finance (as suggested by the anecdote about the letter to the bank), I asked 
how close was the contact. But he suggested that he saw his accountant only 
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twice a year. First, when the accountant comes in to collect all the information. 
Mr. HW gives him “everything”, especially all the printouts from the computer 
software, as well as an update on certain matters and a declaration stating that, to 
the best of his knowledge, the information provided is “true and correct, which I 
believe it is”, adds Mr. HW.  
Then, at the end of the process, the accountant comes back to him, bringing the 
financials for signature.  
Mr. HW was probably aware that the description of the process he gave 
contradicted previous statement and was not credible, but he was not keen to 
give any further details.  
For example, he did not even mention any detailed discussions held to clarify 
certain matters. In particular, the amount of the member’s loan and the sum of 
interest paid are rarely easy to document, and it is unlikely that this would be 
part of the “printouts” – actually Mr. HW himself suggested that this particular 
issue always gave complications with the taxman.  
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of Mr. HW.’s statement 
regarding the headaches of the accounting process. Either there has been lengthy 
brainstorming about tax optimising operations, such as the inflation of certain 
costs. Or, the headaches were caused by the fact that Mr. HW had been under the 
impression that his business was well on track and profitable, hence he may have 
been shocked to find out that he was actually losing money: he may have had 
lengthy discussions with his accountant to convince himself that he had indeed 
failed to generate a profit. 
Possible tax-reducing practices 
Tackled on the opportunistic accounting practices, Mr. HW was somewhat 
evasive, indicating that he has just used all the helps that government gives you 
to reduce your tax. He mentioned the depreciation of his assets and the interest 
payments on his member’s loan. These tax incentives, as he termed them, were 
enough to reduce his taxable income so he “did not need to cheat”.  
• Depreciation: 
He did not make it entirely clear whether he considered the simple fact of 
depreciating his assets as a tax-reducing practice, or if he had chosen a particular 
pattern of depreciation to that effect. A scrutiny of the notes to the financial 
statements did, however, reveal interesting details.  
To start with, the gross value that was capitalised in the start-up statements, and 
which represents the basis on which depreciations are calculated, may have been 
pushed up. Indeed, when asked about his initial investment, Mr. HW had 
mentioned that he had purchased the assets at a discount because, in his words, 
they needed maintenance and repairs. He therefore paid only R585 000 for assets 
which had a book value of almost R748 000, a discount of approximately R 163 
000. A GAAP specialist consulted about this practice confirmed that, when 
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buying assets at a discount, it is incorrect to capitalise them at a higher value 
than the price paid – unless a negative goodwill, corresponding to the discount, is 
shown as a negative asset on the balance sheet – in which case this negative 
goodwill must be progressively released into the income statement according to a 
complicated formula.  
The notes to the financial statements give another possible explanation to the 
difference between the gross asset value and the initial purchase price of the 
assets. The note on asset valuation states that “Cost includes all costs directly 
attributable to bringing the assets to working condition for their intended use”. 
The data available do not enable to verify whether maintenance and repair 
expenses equivalent to the initial discount have indeed been occurred, in addition 
to the repair & maintenance expenses appearing in the income statement.  
There remains a strong possibility that Mr. HW, by omitting to reflect the 
discount obtained on his balance sheet, has increased his yearly potential for 
depreciation. At an average depreciation rate of 18.6%, this could bring 
approximately R 30,350 of additional expenses every year, more than 1% of 
turnover.  
There is also some uncertainty on the depreciation rates. The notes to the 
financial statements indicate that assets are depreciated on a straight-line basis, 
and the depreciation rates quoted there (see column 2 of Table 32.4) are 
consistent with usual practice. However, some actual depreciation amounts in the 
first year (2002, see column 3 of Table 32.4) differ.  
A possible explanation for this is that the first financial year includes 15 months, 
because CC was created 3 months prior to the acquisition of the business. It 
could be that in February 2002 the depreciation was calculated over a period of 
15 months instead of 12 months. If this were the case, a 4/5 pro-rata should bring 
us back to the ‘official’ depreciation rates. This, however, is not the case, so the 
explanation is not convincing, particularly since the mismatch applies only to a 
few items.  
Table 32.4 – Depreciation rates: comparison of notes with actual practice 
 Rates 
announced in 
notes 
calculated 
rates in Feb. 
2002 
calculated 
rates on a 4/5 
pro-rata 
monetary 
difference 
(R) 
Plant and equipment 20,0% 24,0% 19,2% 7 694 
Furniture and fittings 16,7% 17,9% 14,3% 5 598 
Kitchen equipment  20,0% 20,0% 16,0% 0 
Office equipment 20,0% 25,9% 20,7% 797 
Computer equipment 33,3% 33,3% 26,6% 0 
Total    14 088 
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It seems hence, that, in addition to the R30 350 extra-costs that may have come 
from the increased gross value of assets, the choice of depreciation rates in the 
first year brought additional costs of R14 088.  
Another element of discretion is the amortisation of the franchise fee. Unlike 
many businesses, which omit such amortisation, Mr. HW opted for a relatively 
rapid process, over 5 years (although the contract period is 10 years), generating 
expenses of R9 000 every year. These expenses, though, are not tax deductible. 
Altogether, the depreciation and amortisation process may have been used for 
income reduction with a possible impact of up to R53 thousand, or just under 2% 
of turnover.  
• Interest payments on member’s loan 
The matter of interest payments has already been discussed. Mr. HW regarded it 
as a tax incentive, although amounts to a real cost, since the interest was indeed 
owed to the bank. It could not be ascertained precisely whether the interest rate 
paid by the business to Mr. HW was higher than the rate he paid to the bank – if 
so, the choice of interest rate may indeed have had a tax-reducing effect.  
But even if it is the case, the amount would have been limited with 
approximately R9300, or 0,3% of turnover. 
• Other Expenses 
Naturally, the income statement still includes substantial cost items which could 
not be verified. There is hence a possibility that some of the costs were 
overstated. Examples include:  
• repairs and maintenance as well as replacement of small tools, which are 
significantly higher than foreseen in the Head Office’s budget. 
• the payment of fees for unspecified purposes. For example the 2002 
income statement includes “Professional fees” for over R15 000 – down 
to R9 700 in 2003. 
• the rent, which increased by over 30% between 2002 and 2003, from 
approximately R13 000 per month to over R17 000 per month, bringing a 
total cost increase of 47 700 for the year. Asked for the reason, Mr. HW 
answered: “It can’t be right. I wonder why”. While this is unexplained, 
the level of rent remains particularly low compared with the head office’s 
budget, so it is unlikely that any cheating has taken place there. 
 
• Conclusion  
Overall, only a mixed conclusion can be drawn. There is a possibility that the 
bottom-line showed on the income statement has been pushed down by a 
combination of several mechanisms, but there are no indications that this has 
been done on a large scale. The anomalies detected may have actual reasons, or 
they may be mistakes rather than intentional.  
Indeed, if opportunistic accounting had been used to reduce the firm’s tax 
burden, it is unlikely that it would have been used to the extent of generating 
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such losses. Although accentuating losses increases the tax benefit for the 
following years, it puts the business owner under some pressure since the 
business has negative equity – and the tax benefits will only materialize if he 
keeps the business long enough to neutralize his losses by subsequent profits.  
It is therefore more likely that the inconsistencies detected were due to a lack of 
care in the accounting process and/or an incomplete knowledge of business 
figures by Mr. HW, or his reluctance to admit the disappointing performance of 
his business. 
Recipients of the financial statements 
To close the investigation on the financial statements I asked Mr. HW who, apart 
from the revenue services, would normally receive a copy of these statements. 
He suggested that nobody else asked for them.  
On the question whether the bank asked for financials he replied with a 
“sometimes they do, but I will not add any comment to that”. He did later admit 
that the bank would usually receive “monthly management accounts” instead of 
the annual financial statements. There is little doubt that the profit figures 
showed on these management accounts would be significantly higher than the 
ones on the statements sent to the SARS.  
Working capital and Cash management  
Enterprises in the retail and catering sector usually suffer less than 
manufacturing businesses from too little working capital, since their sales are 
usually paid cash. However, there may be a need for important stock, which can 
be a strain.  
Mr. HW indicated that he usually kept approximately R45 000 of stock, adding 
that in theory he “could go as low as 25 000 but it becomes an administrative 
nightmare, you have to watch it all the time”. He therefore chose deliberately to 
keep a higher amount of stock, in order to have the peace of mind. This is 
confirmed by the accounts, where the inventories went up from R36 722 on 28 
February 2002 to R46 020 on 28 February 2003.  
Of course, keeping higher amounts of stock increases financial costs. Mr HW did 
not seem to be worried about that, obviously having enough liquidity.  
He also indicated that the business never bought any supplies on credit, with the 
exception of the food items that were sourced from the Head Office, since these 
were settled together with other payments on a monthly basis. He would, 
however, use his credit card or debit orders for major expenses.  
The liquidity situation in the business was reasonably relaxed, with an overdraft 
facility of R80 000, which was rarely used up (only “when something breaks”). 
According to Mr. HW, the average utilization of the overdraft was 5 to 10 
thousand Rand. The balance sheets for Feb 2002 and 2003 showed, respectively, 
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bank overdraft amounts of R6 722 and R37 999. Asked to comment on that later 
figure, Mr. HW showed some surprise and said “I don’t know what happened. 
Of course, it is silly to have such a high overdraft when one has a credit card”. 
He added that the business’ financial statements had to be reconciled with his 
personal tax returns and other personal financial documents, but did not give 
further details.  
A simulation of the cash flow statement for 2003 indicates that the increased 
utilisation of the overdraft resulted not from operations (they generated an 
operating cash–flow of 119 thousand Rand) or from investing activities (the only 
investment was in a computer for less than 5 thousand Rand), but from the 
repayment of a substantial portion (19%) of the member’s loan.  
In fact, Mr. HW seems to have chosen a repayment scheme for his member’s 
loan that roughly corresponds to the depreciation scheme of his assets 
(repayment of R145 500 as opposed to a depreciation of R140 200). 
Unfortunately, the operating performance is not sufficient to fully cover the 
depreciations, hence the need to increase the overdraft. 
Table 32.5 – CS2’s simulated cash flow statement for 2003 
 2003 
Cash-flow from operating activities  
Operating Cash-Flow (incl. finance costs) 113 579 
Change in Working Capital 5 505 
Cash-flow from operations 119 084 
  
Cash flow from investing activities  
Change in Gross Fixed Assets 4 860 
Cash-flow from Investing activities -4 860 
  
Cash-flow from financing activities  
Change in Members' contribution 0 
Change in Members' loan -145 501 
Change in LT Liabilities 0 
Cash-flow from Financing activities -145 501 
  
Change in Cash Resources -31 277 
 
On the cost of the overdraft, again, Mr. HW was relaxed. He did not know the 
rate he was paying but would not complain about it. The financial statements 
suggest that interest on overdraft has amounted to R1 226 in 2002 and R1 633 in 
2003 – small amounts when compared with the turnover of 3 million Rand. 
Assuming an average utilization of R8 000 to R10 000, this cost would suggest 
an effective interest rate of 16.3 to 20.4% in 2003, which – considering that the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 32: Narrative on case study 2 Page 456 
 
 
average prime rate during these 12 months was 16.1% p.a., was indeed not 
excessive.  
Ongoing access to finance and relationship with creditors  
For Mr. HW, the question of ongoing access to finance was not really applicable 
since the only financial debt contracted by his business was the overdraft, while 
the member’s loan – and the underlying personal credit line – have been secured 
early on and would not require further increases.  
Nevertheless, Mr. HW was striving to keep an active and positive contact with 
the staff at the bank, whom he saw “very regularly”, adding that “it helps to have 
good relations”. Referring to the amount of information that the bank requested 
from him, he did, however, mention that “nowadays the banks are more difficult 
than they used to be” – but he did not appear to be particularly worried about 
that. 
This is understandable if one considers that the bank’s only direct involvement in 
the business was through the overdraft facility. Compared with the levels found 
in other SMEs, that overdraft facility was relatively limited (less than 3% of 
turnover), and secured by the owner’s property. It seemed quite unlikely that the 
business would suffer from a liquidity crisis.  
Accounting transparency score 
Quantitative score 12 / 20 
Formal Quality Score 17,5 / 25 
Transparency Score 36 / 55 
Suspicion of manipulation *  
   
Total score 66 / 100 
   
Main issues 
Light suspicion that (1) carrying value of assets has been increased; (2) owner 
may have drawn hidden remuneration. 
The performance figures seem correct, but do not correspond to the statements 
made by the owner. 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 32: Narrative on Case study 2 Page 457 
 
 
7. Financial ratios 
The financial ratios calculated are further commented on below.  
Cost structure 
Table 32.6 – Breakeven calculation for CS2 
 low high mean 
variable costs in % of sales (vc) 83% 85%  
fixed costs (FC) 520 476 550 655  
breakeven = FC / (1-vc) 3 153 985 3 721 575 3 437 780 
latest known turnover 3 028 317 3 028 317 3 028 317 
deficit -4% -19% -12% 
 
Variable costs are unusually high. Indeed, the business is operating at a rather 
low gross margin of 55-56% (compared with the head office’s target of 63%). 
Staff costs (22%), delivery expenses, bank fees linked to the use of credit card, 
etc, add to the variable costs. In addition, the fees paid to the franchisor 
(management services fee and advertising fee) cost another 10% of turnover.  
Fixed costs are also relatively high, although the business has rather low 
overheads (especially the rent). But the business is relatively capital intensive, 
and the high asset value generates finance costs, high depreciation and repair & 
maintenance costs. The amortisation of the franchise fee is an additional element. 
The fixed costs hence go up to 55O thousand Rand. 
To cover these fixed costs with a margin on variable costs of 15%, a turnover of 
R3,7 million would be required – or, working on a more optimistic scenario of 
17% margin and 520 000 Rand of fixed costs, a R3,15 million turnover.  
With its R3,03 million turnover in 2003, the business was still 12% short of the 
mean breakeven resulting from this calculation. Such a 12% increase appeared 
hardly feasible in the context of harsh competition experienced by the restaurant. 
However, if one admits that the fixed costs have been decreased in 2004 (with a 
lower need for repairs and maintenance after the upgrade of the first two years, 
and lower financing costs due to the partial repayment of member’s loan), then 
the turnover increase required to break even would have been only 4% or less, 
which is possible.  
In any case, this calculation shows clearly the main problem of this business: it 
does not have enough sales. By comparison, another sample firm operating a 
similar business (franchise family restaurant) but in an area where competition is 
almost inexistent, managed to have far better sales figures with lower assets and 
staff members. Table 32.7 shows the difference between these two businesses: 
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Table 32.7 – Compared efficiency of staff and assets between two franchise 
family restaurants  
 
Area Staff 
Total 
Assets 
Turnover Staff
Turnover
 
(R/person) 
Assets
Turnover
 
CS2 
City (high 
competition) 
47 502 489 3 028 317 64 432 6,0 
Dir 03 
Suburb 
(quasi- 
monopole) 
36 351 707 4 149 424 115 262 11,8 
 
If one measures the efficiency of a firm by the turnover that it is able to generate 
divided by the “means of production” used (labour and capital), Mr. H. W.’s 
business is only about half as efficient as the other franchise restaurant from the 
sample, both in terms of labour force and capital. This does not mean that Mr. H. 
W.’s staff is sluggish or incapable, or that the expensive equipment is underused. 
Rather, it suggests that when competition is intense, entrepreneurs need to put 
much more effort (e.g. personal attention to clients, equipment ensuring the 
customer’s comfort, etc) to achieve the same result. It may not be worthwhile, 
though, since the resulting costs may not be covered by the turnover.  
Supposedly, Mr. H. W. has not considered this fact when studying the market 
prior to investing. He found that the food demand in this part of the city was 
buoyant but neglected the supply, which has a considerable impact on the firm’s 
capacity to generate sufficient turnover. 
Interest coverage 
Table 32.8 – Coverage ratio calculation 
 2002 2003 
EBIT -18 400 62 856 
EBITDA 146 681 212 059 
Interest paid (overdraft) 1 226 1 633 
Interest paid (overdraft and member's loan) 101 259 98 480 
coverage ratio (overdraft) 119,6 129,9 
coverage ratio (total interest) 1,4 2,2 
 
If one considers only interest on overdraft, the interest coverage ratio is very 
high (the operating margin, before depreciations and amortisations, covers the 
interest expenses 120 to 130 times). However, if one includes interest paid to the 
member (which is ultimately due to the owner’s bank), the ratio goes down to 
1,4 in 2002 and 2,2 in 2003. If calculated on the EBIT (net of depreciations and 
amortisation), the interest coverage would even be under 1 (2003) and negative 
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in 2002. 
This poor ratio reflects a combination of poor profitability and heavy financing 
costs due to the high level of investment required initially and the owner’s need 
for a substantial bank loan to cover it. 
Luckily for Mr. HW, the interest rate, at Prime – 2, is very low, especially when 
compared with all other businesses encountered, which had contracted business 
debt as opposed to Mr. HW’s personal debt. It seems that the financial 
construction found by Mr. HW has exempted him from the need to pay a risk 
premium on a business loan. 
Apart from the benefit of personal debt, it seems to be a consistent observation, 
that white franchisees pay less interest than the average small business. The four 
businesses that paid the lowest interest in the balance sheet sample are all white 
franchises, either in retail, petrol station, or restaurants (in 2001 respectively 
14,5%, 16,5% and Prime on instalment credit – while other businesses pay up to 
27% of interest for instalment credit).  
Equity ratio 
Mr. HW’s business was a good illustration of the limited meaningfulness of 
equity ratios in small businesses. Three versions of the equity ratio could be 
calculated:  
1/ Technically, i.e. not including the member’s loan, the CC’s equity was 
negative, reflecting accumulated losses for more than R155 thousand.  
2/ When considering the mermber’s loan as quasi-equity, the equity ratio would 
be very high at 97% in February 2002 and 88% in February 2003, since the 
business has hardly any debts.  
Table 32.9 – CS2’s equity ratio calculation (including member’s loan) 
 2002 2003 
Member's interest 200 200 
Accumulated losses -119 659 -155 283 
Quasi-equity (member’s loan) 766 819 621 318 
Member’s capital 647 360 466 235 
Total Assets 664 534 529 489 
Equity ratio (2) 97% 88% 
 
3/ These ratios however are still misleading, since the member’s loan is 
ultimately a bank credit, at least in part. To obtain an economically correct 
understanding of the equity ratio (i.e. the share of the owner’s own resources to 
the business), it would be necessary to study the assets and liabilities of Mr. HW 
himself, which was not available. Assuming that 20% of the member’s loan were 
ultimately financed by the owner’s personal resources, as opposed to bank 
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capital, the equity ratio would be as follows: 
Table 32.10 – CS2’s equity ratio calculation (excluding member’s personal debt) 
 2002 2003 
Member's interest 200 200 
Accumulated losses -119 659 -155 283 
Quasi-equity (assuming that 20% of    
mb loan is self-financed) 153 364 124 264 
Equity corrected 33 905 -30 819 
Total Assets 664 534 529 489 
Equity ratio (3)  
(based on a 20% self-finance assumption) 
5% -6% 
 
This tentative ratio rests on arbitrary assumptions, but serves to illustrate that it 
can potentially differ widely from the ratio derived from the financial statements 
themselves. 
Debt maturity  
Unlike many small businesses, Mr. HW’s restaurant does not suffer from an 
inadequate (too short-term based) financing structure. Short-term debt, although 
slightly higher in 2003 due to an increase in overdraft, remains marginal at less 
than 3% of total assets in 2002 and less than 12% in 2003. 
Table 32.11 – CS2’s Current Debt Ratio (CDR) 
 2002 2003 
Current liabilities 17 174 63 254 
Total assets 664 534 529 489 
Current debt / Total Assets 2,6% 11,9% 
 
Working capital cycle  
Working capital is not problematic for this business. The only aspect that creates 
a need for working capital is the need to keep some stock, but since the stock is 
made of mainly perishable food products, it has to turn overquickly. On average, 
Mr. HW’s inventory turns over on a 5 days cycle.  
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Table 32.12 – CS2’s need for working capital  
in days of turnover 2002 2003 
Purchases: Supplier Credit (average) 3,0 6,9 
Inventory  4,8 5,5 
Production cycle 0 0 
Sales: Customer credit 0 0 
Total need for working capital 1,9 -1,4 
 
The production cycle is almost instantaneous, i.e. orders are prepared 
immediately. As to payment, it is also in cash so there is no need to grant clients 
a credit.  
This need for working capital is easily covered, either by supplier credit or by a 
combination of supplier credit and overdraft. 
In fact, the only factor that caused the increase in overdraft in 2003 was 
unrelated to working capital: it was the need to repay a substantial part (almost 
20%) of the member’s loan.  
Variability of ratios  
The analysis of variability is limited since there are only two sets of financials 
(one statement including a comparative column).  
Table 32.13 – CS2’s volatility 
Ratio studied Volatility  
Turnover  growth +10,4%  
Operating margin from 5% to 7% (due to cost of sales) 
Net profit ratio from -4% to -1% (due to cost of sales, financing costs 
and depreciations) 
Equity ratio (1) from -18% to -29% (due to new accumulated losses and 
reduction of total assets) 
Short-term debt / Total assets from 2,6% to 11,9% (due to increase in overdraft and 
reduction of total assets) 
Total need for working 
capital 
from 1,9 days to -1,4 days  
 
Overall, in these two years, the franchise has remained relatively stable. There 
has been a reasonable growth of turnover, but not as high as one sometimes sees 
among new businesses. The profit margins have slightly improved as a result of 
the slight reduction of cost of sales, financing costs and depreciations.  
However, the inability of the business to stop the cycle of deficits, and the 
reduction of total assets resulting from the depreciation of fixed assets, have 
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caused a slight worsening of equity ratios. Meanwhile, the repayment of a part of 
the member’s loan forced the business to increase its use of overdraft, which 
caused the short-term debt ratio to go up. Nevertheless, all these changes, which 
are quite predictable, remain limited and do not change the fundamental 
interpretation of the business’s performance or financial status. 
8. Final reflections 
Overall, this case study represents a type of business which is both low-margin 
(as usual in the food industry) and capital intensive (with the assets being mostly 
image-related). The combination of these two aspects results in the necessity of a 
high turnover to cover fixed charges.  
Unfortunately, in spite of a buoyant location with many professionals coming for 
lunch and young people eating out in the evenings, the severe competition 
restricted the firm’s chances of reaching turnover targets – explaining its lack of 
success in terms of growth and profit.  
The business owner seemed quite capable, having notably been able to secure a 
low rent and low interest rate. Although there was probably some potential for 
more stringent management, e.g. running with a lower stock, these would have a 
limited impact on the bottom-line. More radical interventions like reducing staff 
to cut the labour costs would most likely result in lower customer satisfaction, 
hence more limited growth.  
The profit potential, hence, appeared to be limited by the firm’s context (intense 
competition) as well as the franchise scheme (cost and lack of flexibility).  
In spite of its low success, the business appeared to be well managed and did not 
suffer from financial constraints, as the owner’s personal loan covered most of 
the enterprise’s needs. It is ironical that the loan has been granted on the basis of 
the business’s earnings potential and the owner’s alleged high income, although 
the owner has been unable to take any remuneration from his business for the 
two years under review. 
The comparatively easy access to finance experienced by this franchise 
restaurant partly reflects the banks’ risk aversion. As discussed in relation to 
Case Study 1, banks are usually more prone to finance franchises than 
conventional businesses, because franchise businesses are less likely to fail. In 
this case, indeed, there is no imminent risk of bankruptcy. However, if business 
failure is defined as including the situation in which a business fails to generate 
profits and remunerate its shareholders, as is frequent in the failure prediction 
literature (see for example Altman 1983:6 or for South Africa, De la Rey 
1981:11), then the business can be considered failed. The most likely outcome of 
such failure is that Mr. HW will, in the near future, sell this business to 
concentrate on his DVD business and possibly seize other business opportunities.  
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Annexure 33 – Narrative of Case Study 3 
Manufacturer of Protective Clothing 
 
An illustration of a self-sufficient business benefiting from family and 
professional relationships, and choosing to accelerate its growth after breaking 
the founding partnership. 
 
1. Business Short Portrait: 
Business Code Name: CS3 
Member’s initials: Mr. R. A. 
Member owns 100% of capital (but only since 
2003) 
Previous co-owner: Mr. J.S., until Feb 2003 
Member’s ethnic background: Indian (Malay) 
Member is also manager  
Form of registration: CC  
 
 
Administrator’s initials: Mr. A. D. 
Previous subcontractors: Mr. and Mrs. v.d.S. 
 
Sector of activity: 
- Primary activity: SIC 6131 (Wholesale trade in clothing and footwear)  
- Secondary activity: SIC 3140 (Manufacture of safety wear) 
Product or Service: Safety wear: protective clothing, footwear, helmets, etc 
Business concept: independent  Market: Mainly corporate, a bit private  
Start-up date: 1998 
Current status: active 
 
Staff members: 10+1 
- Managers: 1 
- Permanent employees: 9 
- Casual staff: 1 
Annual turnover: R 2.2 million  
Gross fixed assets : R 126 thousand  
=> Size category: very small  
Main sources of finance:  
- Member’s loan (partnership) 
- Instalment sale for vehicle (now repaid) 
- (Trade credit and Bank Overdraft are minimal) 
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2. Case Study Procedure 
Initially, the business was part of the cohort provided by the bank for the balance 
sheet sample. It included only one set of financials, the income projection, and 
notes on the bank’s exposure.  
This business seemed appropriate for a case study because of its sector 
(manufacturing as well as trade) and the reasonable quality of financial 
information. The enterprise agreed to participate and offered me the possibility to 
interview the administrative officer (called ‘administrator’), the head of the 
manufacturing unit and later the owner. I also had the opportunity to talk to the 
external accountant. 
Overall, this case study was based on the following sources: 
- Financial statements for the years ending 28 February 2003, 28 February 
2002 and 31 December 2000; 
- Income Statement Projection for April 01 to March 02; 
- Notes from bank file on exposure in May 2001 and security 
requirements; 
- 2 interviews of the “administrator” (senior administrative employee) and 
1 interview of the owner; 
- interview of the former subcontractor, now merged into the main 
business; 
- telephonic conversation with the external accountant (he did not reply 
formally to my written questionnaire) 
 
3. The business owners  
Although the business is currently sole ownership of Mr. R.A., it can be seen as 
being the result of contributions from three entrepreneurs. Indeed, when Mr. 
R.A. decided to incorporate his business after having worked on a freelance 
basis, he started his CC in partnership with another member, Mr. J. S., who 
owned 50% of its capital. Since this second member quit the enterprise less than 
1 year before the interviews, he would certainly have influenced the business’s 
development up to now, so I attempted to collect some information on him as 
well. 
The third person, Mrs. v.d.S., used to run a little CMT business with her 
husband, which was later absorbed by Mr. R. A.’s business, so that a part of Mr. 
R. A.’s success is also due to her.  
The following sections therefore will review these three persons. 
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Mr. R. A. 
Background 
Mr. R.A., who is in his late 30s, has the background of a salesperson. He gained 
his first significant experience while working as branch manager in an audio-
visual retail chain, where he managed one shop (on behalf of the owner). This is 
when he met Mr. A.D., who, at the time, was branch manager of another shop in 
the same chain. They operated the shops for 5 years (1982-1987), until the 
company, confronted with increased competition from Asian countries, had to 
close down.  
Interestingly, when talking about this experience, Mr. A.D. labelled it as a 
“business management experience” while Mr. R. A. dismissed it as saying that it 
was a simple sales function.  
After this, Mr. R. A. worked for 10 years (until 1997) as a salesperson in his 
uncle’s business, which was involved in safety wear. Mr. R. A. indicated that, 
compared with his enterprise, his uncle’s was a big business (probably a 
“medium-sized enterprise”). After these 10 years, his uncle wished to retire and 
sold his business to a “big conglomerate” (sic). Mr. R. A. could have staid in the 
company, but he was not keen on working in a big structure and preferred to be 
independent. Therefore, he decided to start his own business in 1996 
Character 
The owner’s personality could be characterised by the adjectives: dynamic, 
affable, relaxed. He always appears doing several things at the same time, 
walking fast, helping a client while answering the phone and at the same time 
looking for some documents in his files, but always appearing perfectly relaxed 
with an inviting smile.  
This serenity also dominated his answers to my questions: he seemed full of 
confidence about his business and would not linger on commenting problems. It 
may be a salesperson’s habit, the natural inclination of someone used to selling, 
hence presenting things under their most favourable angle. His account of his 
partner’s past involvement (see below), which is at least partly inconsistent with 
the information contained in the balance sheets, shows that Mr. R.A. was also 
able to elegantly work his way out of embarrassing questions.  
Personal Finance 
Mr. R.A. owns a property, one motor vehicle, savings, a life insurance, but no 
debt except on the house.  
Notes from the bank file confirm that Mr. R.A. and his former partner had a 
modest, but sound personal financial situation. In June 2001, the members had 
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been granted personal facilities by the bank as follows: Bond, respectively 161 
and 175 thousand Rand, Personal overdraft, respectively 5000 and 8500 Rand, 
and Credit Card, respectively R500 and R1 600. (Unfortunately the data do not 
indicate which amount refers to which member).  
Asked whether Mr. R. A. had needed to provide his personal assets to the bank 
as a security to access external business finance, Mr. A. D. answered by “yes, 
initially”. He did not explicitly indicate whether the bank still held any collateral 
for the overdraft. This issue will be addressed again in the section on access to 
finance.  
Mr. J. S.  
Background and involvement with the business 
For three years, between 2000 and 2003, Mr. R. A. has shared ownership in his 
business with another member. However, this has not been mentioned to me in 
the early stages of the study, I only found indications of that in the financial 
statements. When I first asked Mr. A.D. about this, he seemed embarrassed and 
reluctant to give information about this second member. He limited his 
comments to the fact that both members had parted because they had “different 
ways of thinking about the business”. When I finally interviewed the owner, he 
dismissed it as something minor in the life of the business, and gave the 
following account.  
After Mr. R. A. had been in business as a sole proprietor for 3 years, he began to 
think of registering as a Close Corporation. At the same period, his neighbour, 
who was a schoolteacher, was looking for a new occupation. For several years he 
had been willing to leave the teaching profession but did not know what to do. 
He had first invested some capital into a franchise venture that did not get off the 
ground, and was now looking for an alternative opportunity. An attractive factor 
for Mr. R. A. at the time was that, since the failed franchise attempt, his 
neighbour still owned a Close Corporation, registered under his name, but 
inactive. The two neighbours decided to team up, using the registered CC as a 
framework for Mr. R. A.’s business, and Mr. J. S., although he did not know the 
business of safety gear well, offered to invest 50 thousand Rand in the CC in 
order to become a 50% member.  
However, according to Mr. R. A., the sum that he had proposed to invest was 
based on the expectation that he would recover enough from his previous 
franchise investment – an expectation that has never materialised. Mr. R.A. did 
not indicate precisely how much his partner effectively invested in the business, 
but he said it was very little (the balance sheets for the three consecutive years, 
however, show Mr. J.S.’s member’s loan as R74,8 thousand, higher than Mr. 
R.A.’s loan of 67,6 thousand Rand).  
Mr. R. A. said that he would not have had problems with the failure to provide 
capital, if his partner had brought enough sales in, to grow the business. 
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Unfortunately, still according to Mr. R.A., Mr. J. S. knew too little of the market 
to be as effective as Mr. R. A. The latter therefore felt that it was not appropriate 
to maintain a 50/50%-ownership split, when his partner was neither contributing 
in capital, nor in significantly growing the enterprise.  
Eventually, the partnership split during the course of 2003 and Mr. J. S. agreed 
to pay him out R100 thousand over a period of 10 months (this sum represented 
70% of the book value of the business’s equity, including both members’ loans). 
“Not that he had ever invested that much in the business, but agh, I did not want 
to have a dispute with him”, added Mr. R. A. He also indicated that Mr. J.S. was 
now starting a similar business of his own, and had taken a few customers with 
him.  
Character 
Mr. J.S. was not available for interview, nor did the comments of the other 
interviewees betray much about the previous partner’s character. Mr. R. A. 
insisted that there was “nothing personal” about the separation, which was a 
purely business-driven decision – adding that they remained “good neighbours” 
until Mr. J. S. moved to a new area. Mr. A.D., meanwhile, had suggested (with 
some embarrassment) that there had been divergent views on the business.  
The embarrassment of Mr. AD, the fact that Mr. J.S. failed on a franchise 
venture while still employed as a teacher, that he obtained a 50%-share in a 
business whose activity was foreign to him, and may have been unable to pay up 
his share, and his apparently too high compensation upon resignation, and finally 
his recent competition with his former partner, suggest that he may have been a 
difficult business person – but the data are too meagre and one-sided to confirm 
this impression.  
He may just have been an unlucky entrepreneur. And the high price paid at 
resignation may just indicate hidden reserves in the balance sheet (e.g. due to the 
rapid depreciation of assets) and a high goodwill to reflect the growth prospects 
of the business.  
Personal financial situation 
From the assets of Mr. J. S., which could have been used as collateral for the 
business, Mr. R.A. mentioned only a life insurance policy worth R15 000.  
Notes from the bank file, though, revealed that in 2001 the bank was securing its 
facilities through two life insurance policies worth R140 000 each (supposedly, 
one for each member) as well as two mortgage bonds, the smallest of them being 
for R161 000. This would suggest that, in terms of his assets, Mr. J. S. would fall 
in the same LSM category as Mr. R. A.  
However, the fact that he made heavy losses in his previous venture would also 
suggest that he had debts and his assets may have been encumbered, unlike Mr. 
R.A.’s assets. The bank file did not reflect this. 
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Final words 
Mr. R. A. tried to convince me that his partner’s resignation has not hurt the 
enterprise. Although this second owner is now starting a similar business of his 
own, and has indeed taken a few customers with him, his capacity as a start-up is 
still limited and in fact, he is buying from Mr. R. A.’s business, hence remaining 
a “friendly competitor”.  
When I asked whether the departure of Mr. J. S. had had an impact on the 
amount of collateral available and the opinion of the bank on the business, Mr. 
R. A. answered that there had been only complications of technical nature: it had 
taken two or three months for the bank to release the collateral that they were 
holding on Mr. J. S., but they had not reduced the overdraft facility. They had 
simply asked for new projection figures for the business, to satisfy themselves 
that the business would still go in the right direction.  
Mrs. and Mr. v. d. S.  
Mr. and Mrs. v.d.S. are the in-laws of Mr. R. A., and have, for 7 years, run a 
CMT31 business and worked as subcontractors for Mr. R. A.’s business. (Mr. R. 
A. and Mr. A. D. both referred to Mr. v.d.S. as the head of the manufacturing, 
although when I wanted to talk to him, he just referred me to his wife, who spoke 
as if the business had always been hers; the way that her husband was 
occasionally interrupting to ask for her advice seemed to confirm this).  
Mrs. v.d.S., a woman in her late fifties, keeping her head covered in the Muslim 
way, seemed to be driven by a sense of discipline as well as loyalty to the family.  
She has worked in the sewing sector for many years, and gave the impression of 
someone who has worked hard for all her life in order to come to where she was 
now. Indeed, she had not much understanding for what she perceived to be 
sluggishness or exaggerated ambitions of some of her staff. “Nowadays people 
are funny, everyone wants to be a boss”, she said with a smile. However she was 
extremely friendly and humble, apologising because what was left of her 
previous business was so small.  
She was not driven by any ambitions of size, though, preferring to keep good 
control of a small entity rather than enduring the stressful life of an SME 
manager, with labour regulations and marketing problems. Asked what she 
would do if her previous clients came back to her and asked her to work for them 
again, she answered that it had actually happened, but she was “not prepared” 
(“my husband is over sixty now, so he is becoming irritable”, she said with a 
smile). 
 
                                                 
31 “Cut, Make and Trim”, i.e. a micro-operation involved in standard textile manufacturing.  
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4. How the business started 
The start-up phase  
Unlike the franchises CS1 and CS2, Mr. R.A.’s business started very small, as a 
home activity, described as “cutting plastic sheets”. This required no equipment 
other than scissors and therefore there was no substantial investment done 
initially. Whenever Mr. R.A. was asked to provide items that he could not 
produce himself, he would outsource them.  
Understandably, the preferred subcontractor was the CMT business owned by his 
in-laws. By outsourcing his business within the family, Mr. R.A. was able to 
obtain preferential conditions especially regarding payment terms.  
The only financial constraint for Mr. R.A. initially was working capital, 
essentially to buy the materials he needed to carry out large orders, and to pay 
subcontractors. He estimated that in the first year he invested about R20 000 of 
personal resources into the business. To that effect, he mainly used his personal 
credit card, and he occasionally needed to stretch his credit card limit over up to 
six months. He commented: “It is surely not the way it stands in the textbooks, 
you should not use your personal credit card for the business, especially for such 
a long time. But I knew it was a good client, I knew I would make a good 
business out of it – and eventually one day my bank sent me a Gold credit card 
because I was using it so much”.  
He added that his wife had a permanent employment, which made it easier for 
him to use his personal savings for the business.  
The v.d.S. business also started small without any substantial initial investment. 
Before starting her CMT, Mrs. v.d.S. had been employed by a small textile 
manufacturer, which closed down in the 1990s. Her previous employer allowed 
her to use his equipment for her own purposes until she could afford to buy her 
own. She could therefore start without the financial burden of equipment finance. 
As time went, she could accumulate a bit of income and later invest in her own 
sewing machines and cutting table.  
The growth phase  
Little by little, Mr. R. A.’s business expanded and in 1998, after running from 
home for a year, he could afford to rent his first office, whose purpose was 
essentially to accommodate his phone/fax and answering machine, since he 
himself was “never there”, having to organise production, orders and deliveries. 
After another year, he moved again to bigger premises, bought his first sewing 
machine (a second-hand machine which he paid cash, obtaining a discount from 
a subcontractor who was not using it any more), and employed his first 
receptionist and machinist. At the time he was still doing most of the deliveries 
himself, with his personal vehicle, but he could also arrange with some of the 
clients, with whom he stood in a personal relationship, to send their own driver 
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to collect the goods from his premises.  
From then on, he gradually improved his manufacturing and delivery capacity. 
The move into the formal economy 
In 2000, Mr. R. A. entered a partnership with Mr. J.S. and started operating 
under his Close Corporation. This has enabled a new growth phase, with the 
employment of other staff members, as well as investments in other assets as 
follows: 
- a modest delivery vehicle, which is currently used as occasional extra 
delivery capacity – but stands still most of the time. The vehicle was 
bought cash and at a discount from another relative;  
- a delivery van, bought in 2000 and representing the business’s first 
longer-term debt32. The instalment credit facility (ISA) granted for this 
purpose amounted to R 40 000 and interest was charged at prime + 2% 
(source: bank file, May 2001). However, the facility seems to have been 
only partly used since the vehicle, bought on an auction, was paid 
R30 000 (source: interview with Mr. R. A., who however suggested that 
the vehicle’s real value was R45 000). The business repaid the credit in 
only 24 months, because “it was such a small amount”. The December 
2000 financial statements include an ISA liability for R11 762, secured 
over a vehicle with a book value of R22 332. The low amount of R11 
762 suggests that either a significant part of the vehicle’s price (R 30 
000) has been paid cash by the business, or the firm has been able to 
repay a large portion of the funds borrowed in a short time. 
- later, computers and printers to enable screen-printing on the 
manufactured goods; according to information given by Mr. A. D., that 
computer equipment was financed on hire-purchase; however, the only 
instalment sale agreement reflected in the financial statements concerns 
the delivery van (see below).  
A further investment happened when the business informally merged with the 
CMT business owned by Mr. and Mrs. v.d.S.: no price was paid, as the couple 
formally remained owners of the machinery, but they became employees of Mr. 
R.A.’s business.  
Although developing, the manufacturing unit was still modest and neither Mr. 
R.A. nor his usual subcontractors could technically manufacture the 
sophisticated products which customers were increasingly asking for. In order to 
satisfy the clients, Mr. R.A. had to provide these products nevertheless. This is 
how the share of retail increased gradually.  
                                                 
32 Apart from the computers and printers, which may have been bought on hire purchase, but are 
not reflected in the statements. 
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The new phase / strategic plans 
On my last interview with the business owner at the end of May 2004, he 
informed me that he had just bought new premises.  
He chose to buy an old house, i.e. residential property, rather than industrial 
property because the latter was too expensive. He would therefore need to 
reconvert the house in order to make it suitable for their purposes. Mr. R.A. 
declined to comment on the legal risk with regard to the rezoning of the property 
from residential to commercial. 
Although he had paid the deposit, he was still not entirely sure about the 
financing, as he was “still busy approaching the bank”.  
Mr. R. A.’s strategy is to use the new premises to expand the business into a 
medium-sized operation, with an extended manufacturing capacity as well as 
larger space for storage and offices. This is a bold move.  
 
5. Business model and operations 
Business model  
The business is involved both in manufacturing and in sourcing/retail, but the 
share of manufacturing has gone down to approximately 40% of turnover.  
Over its lifetime, the business has used various arrangements for its 
manufacturing, from the own cutting of the owner and the sewing by his first 
employee to the outsourcing, especially to the in-laws. At the end of 2003, the 
business has eventually absorbed his former subcontractor, thereby integrating a 
manufacturing capacity into its enterprise. Mr. R. A. is hence formally 
employing his in-laws and their staff. Manufactured goods are mainly aprons, as 
well as overalls, cuffs, and butcher caps. While these are relatively ordinary 
products, the screen-printing capacity enables the business to personalise these 
items and add value to them.  
Apart from those products, the business sources and supplies a considerable 
variety of safety gear, with a wide range of clothing and footwear, as well as 
protection for the eye, the head, the ear and the hands. According to the 
advertising printed on his delivery vehicle, he is also able to supply cleaning 
materials, packaging and tarpauline.  
The inclusion of manufacturing into the business has increased the staff count to 
10 employees (lower than the figure of 13 indicated initially by Mr. A. D.), of 
which 4 are in the “factory” (CMT), 2 are preparing the products (screen-
printing, packing and organising the stock), 1 works as a salesperson, 2 are 
responsible for the administration and books, and 1 is doing the deliveries.  
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Premises  
Premises have always been a problem for the business. According to Mr. A. D., 
the business has moved to new premises about 20 times in 8 years (this has not 
been confirmed by the owner). This happened especially in the early stages of 
the businesses, while in the last 3-4 years, the business has moved only once.  
These moves were mostly caused by the growth of the business requiring to 
frequently increase the space available, as well as the shortage of office space in 
Maitland. It is important for the business to remain in Maitland, close to their 
customers.  
At present, the business uses two units in an industrial park in Maitland: one unit 
contains the office (three people sitting on approximately 15 square meters) and 
the stock of finished goods, while the other unit accommodates the 
manufacturing department and an office. While the front unit is packed, the 
space in the factory is underused. Although the office space was tight, with much 
movement, the atmosphere in the business was methodical and organized. The 
office was neat and the filing looked tidy. In the warehouse behind the office, the 
stock was hanging neatly. 
There were signs of bustling business activity as people (supposedly the driver 
and customers) came in and out, presenting sheets at the main counter, walking 
through the office into the warehouse and back, loading merchandise into their 
vehicles. They were always greeted warmly and – it seemed – served efficiently.  
The dissatisfaction with the current premises has been a recurrent topic in 
interviews, with the rental, at R5700/month, being qualified as “killing” (source: 
first interview with Mr. A. D.). In addition, the location was in a rather low-
traffic zone, hence less exposed to potential clients as previously, when they 
occupied premises directly on Voortrekker Road. The plan was, as Mr. A. D. 
told me, to try and acquire industrial property in order to move to own premises 
towards the beginning of the following year. But according to Mr. A. D., this 
was not yet on the agenda, as they would need another six months or so to sound 
the market, compare various options, plan what would be required and approach 
the bank.  
I was therefore surprised to hear, on my last interview with the business owner at 
the end of May 2004, that he had just bought new premises – choosing to buy 
residential property, which was more affordable than industrial property but 
posed a legal risk in terms of rezoning. Since the financing of the acquisition was 
not yet arranged, the acquisition of these premises was still tentative (and 
reminiscent of CS6’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain loan finance for a purchase 
of property).  
Assets  
Owing to the previous subcontracting arrangements, the manufacturing 
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equipment (essentially one cutting machine and two sewing machines, as well as 
smaller tools) does not belong to Mr. R. A.’s business. After the dissolution of 
Mr. and Mrs. v. d. S.’s CMT business, the machines remained private ownership 
of the couple, who are now permanent employees of the business. They however 
decided to put the equipment at the disposal of Mr. R. A.’s business (for free). 
Other assets include the two delivery vehicles, the computers and printer, 
furniture and fittings.  
Management style and philosophy 
Mr. and Mrs. v.d.S. have run their CMT business defensively. Although they did 
not grow beyond their micro enterprise size, their cautious management 
approach has paid off, since they have been able to acquire machinery. 
As to Mr. R. A., he was more enterprising and ambitious. There were several 
indicators to show that he had a strong focus on turnover growth:  
- He would have forgiven his partner’s inability to bring in the necessary 
capital, if this partner had been able to bring clients.  
- He would not consider increasing his prices to become profitable, 
preferring a strategy of improving his margins by sourcing better. 
- If he had surplus cash, he would rather spend it in increasing stock (with 
a view to improve sales) rather than saving it in preparation for future 
larger investments.  
 
The priority placed on growth in 2003-4 may just come from a need to catch up, 
since turnover growth in 2001-2003 has been far lower than initially budgeted 
(possibly caused by a loss of focus during the last years of his partnership with 
Mr. J. S.). In addition, Mr. R. A. was certainly not trying to grow his turnover at 
any price – in particular, he was reluctant to contract debt to finance his growth. 
He referred to growth as a slow and steady process, which “takes time”, and he 
wanted to “keep it manageable”. He also repeatedly distanced himself from “the 
guys that start up and fall along the wayside”. 
However, he sounded unaware of the capital costs implied by his growth, and did 
not seem to appreciate that such growth (especially with the new investments 
envisaged) was likely to raise his fixed costs, requiring him to watch his gross 
margins carefully. Even the fact that he had, up to now, run at a zero-profit level, 
not being able to build up equity, was not a worry to him. He suggested that he 
was paying himself a salary and did not need profits beyond that: if he had a 
good month, he would rather use the cash surpluses to invest in stock.  
As to internal management style, Mr. R. A. was a ‘hands-on’ manager. Having 
initially run the business entirely by his own, he would still feel involved and 
concerned by every function within the enterprise. The fact that many of his 
employees are still new in the business accentuates the need for his multi-
disciplinary backing. However, he remains primarily a seller, seeing his main 
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role in the long run as negotiating prices with clients and suppliers as well as 
defending his business’s cause with the bank. 
Market and Competition  
The business’s market has been extended gradually. When the business started 
initially, it was specialising in protective clothing for the food industry, and had a 
rather small list of clients. But diversifying the client range has been an early 
priority of Mr. R. A. Therefore, the range of products supplied was widened to 
include boots, helmets etc. This enabled to attract new corporate clients and even 
some private clients who would just “walk in” for once-off purchases, for 
example boots. The business hence sustained some growth in the first 3-4 years.  
In spite of this diversification, the business until about 2003 was still depending 
on a few large customers. It even came to stagnation in 2002-03. It is only after 
engaging a sales representative in 2003 that the customer base could be really 
expanded and the dependence reduced. The business intends to grow further by 
accessing electronic trade databases (in 2003 the business acquired a license for 
“tradeworld sourcelink”), launching a new advertising campaign (advertising 
expenses 3000R in 2003-04 after 0 in previous year), and in future participating 
in tenders.  
The competition is quite intense. Mr. A. D. indicated that they are often asked 
for quotes, which do not lead to a contract, but they have not yet lost existing 
contracts to competitors. He believes that the quality of their service brings 
loyalty.  
Mr. R. A. confirmed that the positioning of his business against the competition 
is quite favourable. He perceives a split in the market, between “the other small 
guys” and “the bigger guys”, and tries to use it to his advantage. The “Safety 
Equipment and Clothing” section in the Cape Town Yellow Pages illustrates this 
split: it lists 27 enterprises, of which 7 have a “display advert”: they are probably 
generally the larger ones.  
Initially, Mr. R. A. used to rely on existing contacts, keeping a small list of 
preferred clients. But, from 2003, he has increased his ambition and tried to play 
“in the bigger guys’ yard”. He suggested that this was not as difficult, since 
clients tended to be unsatisfied with the larger companies, which could not give 
the level of service and personal relationship that a smaller business offers. He 
added that staff in the large companies was changing frequently, and the new 
employees felt often unable to cope with the big amounts of business coming in. 
Meanwhile, the smaller competitors were fragile and a number of them had 
failed recently. By placing himself “in-between”, Mr. R.A. hopes to be a more 
attractive alternative for customers. 
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Costing, Pricing and Credit Policy 
Costing and Pricing 
The pricing seems to be dictated by competitiveness considerations. Mr. A.D. 
says that, when the business started, it had to work with very low margins in 
order to gain an entry into the market. Mr. R. A. confirmed that he would 
initially work on a 20% margin, which was easy since he had no overhead costs.  
Since then, although they have established themselves as a credible player and 
have built up fixed costs, they have not significantly increased their margins: Mr. 
R. A. assumes that the average gross margin is approximately 30%, that is 15 to 
20% for retail and 50% for manufacturing. He is not planning to increase his 
prices any further, expecting that his clients would penalise him for that, but 
seeks to improve his margins by lowering his costs of materials (e.g. by taking 
larger orders). The financial statements confirm this evolution (although the 
gross margin in December 2000 seems to have been an outlier at almost 40%): 
the margin on the cost of materials improved from 24% of turnover in 2002 to 
29% in 2004.  
From Mr. A. D.’s comments, it seemed that there was an intention to 
strategically re-think the pricing and product offer. Up to now, everything has 
been intuitive and market-driven. But the growing activity creates a need to 
review the potential of the various lines of activity and concentrate on those that 
are most profitable – among other things, pushing the share of manufacturing up. 
This was one of the major tasks assigned to Mr. A. D. when he was employed 
early in 2004.  
When he gave me his second interview in May 2004, I asked him about the 
progress made in that analytical process. He was still unable to give any more 
details, except that the process was still “only starting” – and cited examples 
about the difficulty of doing costing exercises when the cost of materials itself is 
so volatile. There is a constant need to review suppliers and it often happens that 
new entrants on the market offer the same products at 30% discount from 
established suppliers.  
5 months after his start in this job, the apparent lack of progress of Mr. A.D., 
who pretended to have been employed to carry out strategic analyses, raises 
several questions. Has the “administrator” needed so much time to get to know 
and understand the business, although he pretends that he knew the enterprise 
well before joining as a result of his friendship with its owner? Has he been 
pulled into the everyday concerns of the business, like the review of supplier 
prices, hence having no time left for his analyses? Has he found some 
weaknesses which he preferred not to mention in the interview? Has he made 
some suggestions which did not meet the approval of the owner-manager? Only 
conjectures are possible.  
With the difficult birth of a management accounting system, the only costing that 
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I could notice during my visits was rudimentary, and concerned self-
manufactured products. Mr. v.d.S., at the factory, suggested that for each new 
product he has to indicate the time spent on the cutting and sewing of each item, 
which is used in the pricing. This effort to estimate material and labour costs is 
commendable but, if it is restricted to self-manufactured products, which 
represents only a small share of overall business, it would be insufficient to 
found a full management accounting system.  
Credit policy 
There is some contradiction in the data about customer credit. From the 
interviews it would seem that Mr. R. A. has had to grant credit to his customers 
“from day one”, although initially he tried to privilege clients whom he had (in 
his previous job at his uncle’s business) identified as paying promptly. He was 
therefore always concerned about having a number of clients paying COD in 
order to reduce his need for working capital. But even then, the majority of 
clients were buying on credit.  
However, the balance sheets (except for December 2000) do not reflect such 
significant customer credit. The balance sheets ended February 2002 and 2003 
did not mention any debtors / accounts receivables, while on the balance sheet 
for February 2004, the “Sundry debtors” represented only 1.1% of sales, 
corresponding to an average payment cycle of only 4 days. Neither Mr. R. A. nor 
Mr. A. D., nor the accountant, could explain this contradiction.  
While initially, Mr. R. A. granted credit only to clients that he knew well from 
his previous employment, he later had to expand this service to other customers 
as well. This decision did not come without a learning curve. In the last year, the 
business experienced two severe losses related to customer defaults, for amounts 
of R30K and R40K respectively (that is, taken together, 3% of the annual 
turnover for 2003).  
According to Mr. R. A., one of them was a client whom they trusted, because 
they “had been dealing with him for a while”; the client left the country without 
settling his last debts – there is little hope to recover anything. The other case is 
an enterprise that is still operating, and after intervention of the attorneys, an 
agreement has been reached by which the business would repay his debt in 
monthly instalments of R1000. So far, the business has recovered R5000, and 
Mr. R. A. hopes that the client will keep paying for the next 3 years.  
The business has learned lessons from these defaults and have now strengthened 
their credit application procedure, using forms and checking trade references. 
Profitability and Member's remuneration 
As for CS2, the profitability of this safety wear business was somewhat 
equivocal – with a contradiction between the owner’s apparent satisfaction and 
the accounting figures, which were not extraordinary.  
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Table 33.1 – CS3 summarised income statement 
 
Dec 2000  
(10 months) 
Feb-02 Feb-03 
Feb 2004  
(draft 
accounts) 
Turnover  1 163 955 1 759 219 2 272 423 2 856 588 
12-months equivalent 1 396 746 1 759 219 2 272 423 2 856 588 
     
cost of sales 704 578 1 344 101 1 656 902 2 042 439 
salaries 41 883 66 890 102 693 143 005 
rent 20 257 70 524 77 040 86 448 
motor vehicle expenses 67 890 40 904 64 728 76 240 
     
Interest earned 120 11 0 0 
Interest paid 1 728 5 932 6 181 6 606 
     
Members’ salaries* 140 000 110 000 105 000 180 000 
     
Profit for the year (before 
tax) 
69 918 / 
-1 698** -596 -1 492 179 483*** 
Tax (as reported) 0 0 0 0 
Profit after tax 
69 918 / 
-1 698** 
-596 -1 492 179 483*** 
 
Notes: 
*  The members' salaries are shared between two members in the first three years.  
** In spite of a profit of R69 918 in the ten months ended December 2000, the 
retained income calculation for February 2002 suggested that the business 
closed its first year with a loss of R1 698 in February 2001. 
*** The accountant admitted in his interview that the profit for 2004 would not 
remain as high once the draft accounts would be finalised.   
 
The accounts for 2002 and 2003 show a positive operating profit but a negative 
bottom line, after considering financial costs and the remuneration of members, 
which is relatively modest and has decreased between 2000 and 2003. 
In 2004, after the departure of the second member, the business seems to have 
come back to profitability, paying his single member as much as 180K of salary 
in 2004 and still generating a profit of 179K. However, there are several 
indications that this result is not real but the accounts were tuned for the purpose 
of the loan application with the bank. 
Asked whether they were satisfied about the business’s profitability, Mr. R. A. 
(member) and Mr. A. D. (administrative officer) had rather different responses. 
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According to Mr. A. D., the business was generally profitable, but they were 
never satisfied, always trying to do better. Asked for more details, Mr. A. D. 
acknowledged that in the past 3 years the results were indeed just enough to pay 
the owners’ salaries, and there had been no possibility to accumulate equity – 
although the business would need it, especially since it is planning to buy 
premises. “It is only in the past few months, that things are beginning to 
escalate”, he added. The surge in turnover generated by the new sales 
representative will hopefully bring additional profit. 
Mr. R. A., meanwhile, said he was fully satisfied with the profitability, and saw 
no need to generate a profit since he was paying himself a sufficient salary and 
did not need any dividends. He did not seem to see that, especially for the 
purchase of property, the business would need a strong equity base, which it did 
not currently have. 
Again, the contradiction between the losses illustrated by the official figures (at 
least up to 2003) and the member’s satisfaction raises questions. Mr. A. D. 
insisted that there was no tax-driven policy of concealing profits. It therefore 
seems more probable that the member, as a borne seller, was exaggeratingly 
positive in the interview. There is also a possibility that he found alternative 
ways of remunerating himself, e.g. shifting personal expenses on to the 
business’s account. This possibility will be further explored under the heading 
“accounting transparency score”. 
 
6. Financial management 
Sales and Cost Capture and Monitoring 
The financial management capacity of the business is quite limited, with only 2 
staff members working in the administration (the secretary and the newly 
appointed ‘administrator’). The records have always been purely manual in the 
past, and the severe lack of space means that it is unlikely that it is unlikely that 
records have been filed thoroughly (The little office showed only limited 
cupboard and shelf space for files). However, the business has acquired a new 
PC in January 2004, which will be used to support the financial management.  
There seems to be no systematic forecasting and monitoring taking place on a 
regular basis. However, projections are prepared occasionally especially at the 
bank’s request – that is, in 2000, when the overdraft facility was granted, and in 
2003 when the second partner left the enterprise. I specifically asked whether 
any forecasts or budgets had been prepared before engaging on a more 
aggressive sales strategy (employing a sales representative, using electronic 
client databases). Mr. R. A was rather vague about this, suggesting that (a) the 
various marketing decisions that were taken were nothing drastic, and were 
rather guided by instinct, (b) the salesperson was engaged on the condition that 
he would generate enough turnover to pay for his costs within 6 months – which 
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did happen, and (c) whenever formal forecasts were required, the accountant 
would handle it.  
Accounting and setting up of financial statements 
Due to the limited administrative capacity, the business is reliant on its external 
accountant, who comes in once a month to collect records and update the books. 
According to Mr. A. D., the co-operation with the external accountant is going 
well. He is not aware of any problems. He reserved comments on the cost of 
accounting, which represents 3% of gross margin.  
The accountant similarly indicated that the co-operation with the business was 
going well and that he could always obtain all the documentation that he felt he 
required for the purpose of setting up the statements. 
There are several indications that this general satisfaction comes from a lack of 
interest (unless it is a shared interest for inexact accounting) rather than an ideal 
co-operation. For example the question of debtors shows that the accountant has 
not correctly reflected customer credit, but this did not raise any concerns from 
the member or the administrative officer. Even more characteristic is the fact that 
for the financial year ended 29 February 2004, the accountant has prepared very 
optimistic financial statements, which – when asked for explanations – he 
dismissed as being “just pro forma accounts which the owner wanted in order to 
apply for a credit at the bank”. He confirmed that he would, in due time, prepare 
a final set of statements to be sent to the Receiver. If the accountant occasionally 
prepares “pro forma accounts” to serve the immediate needs of the business, 
without indicating in any way that these are not final accounts, then one cannot 
exclude that the accountant also uses opportunistic accounting for other 
purposes. 
If opportunistic accounting has been used for tax-saving purposes, then some 
cost items might be inflated in the 2002 and 2003 statements. A possible 
confirmation of this hypothesis is the fact that the rental expenses recorded on 
the income statements for 2002-2004 is consistently and significantly higher than 
the R5 700/month which Mr. A. D. had indicated. The difference is 13% in 2003 
and 26% in 2004.  
Within the enterprise, the lack of interest for accounting details and financial 
statements was manifest. As for many small businesses, Mr. R. A.’s enterprise 
does not keep a copy of financial statements in its offices. The only statements 
that were sent directly from Mr. R. A. to me, were the 2004 statements, which 
Mr. R. A. had kept in his files, because he needed them for his loan negotiation 
with the bank.  
The administrative officer does not know to whom the financials are being sent, 
in particular, whether the bank receives regular accounting updates: he says that 
the accountant handles that.  
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Accounting transparency score  
The analysis of the four sets of financials available yielded a relatively poor 
score of the business, as follows: 
Quantitative score 13,5 / 20 
Formal Quality Score 16 / 25 
Transparency Score 20 / 55 
Suspicion of manipulation *  
   
Total score 49* / 100 
 
The main issues that emerged from the analysis of the reliability of accounting 
figures were the following:  
• The 2004 accounts are not prepared with care (e.g. inconsistencies between 
balance sheet and income statement with regard to depreciations and stock); 
they are clearly done to convey the bank a certain impression (high profit, 
high member’s remuneration); 
• The provision for bad debts related to both customer defaults (for a total of 
app. R70 000) was not reflected in the 2004 statements. This cost item would 
significantly reduce the (pre-tax) profit for 2004, unless the member’s salary 
gets reduced accordingly. 
• The earlier financial statements seem to be prepared with more care but there 
are contradictions between the figures and verbal explanations, especially on 
working capital. Accounts receivable and payable, stock and cash balance do 
not correspond to interview evidence. 
• The profit for December 2000 is not confirmed in February 2001. There is 
also a possibility that profits for 2002 - 2003 have been minimised for tax 
reasons. 
 
Working capital and Cash management 
The evidence from the financial statements regarding the working capital cycle 
contradicted the interview data, suggesting either frequent strategic changes in 
time, or (more likely) a weakness of the accounting process. 
Suppliers credit 
According to all interviews carried out within the business, the business is 
currently buying most of its supplies on 30 days credit, an advantage which it has 
acquired through the years, by gradually improving its relationships to its 
suppliers.  
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As Mr. R. A. said, from the beginning he tried to buy on credit, but initially, 
suppliers would only give him low credit limits. He had to rely on his credit card 
and later on the bank overdraft. Fortunately, the access to supplier credit 
increased with time, and is not a problem any more. The business occasionally 
pays suppliers cash, but this is quite rare and motivated by the management’s 
own choice (because they can obtain a better price), or to secure some materials 
that are vital for the business, or because they trade with new suppliers which do 
not offer credit.  
According to Mr. R. A., he currently buys app. 25% of his materials COD 
(especially when he needs to buy specific items, that are not part of his usual 
business, e.g. if he gets an order for golf shirts or corporate shirts), while the rest 
is on 30 days.  
From the balance sheets emerges a completely different picture (see Table 33.2). 
The accounts suggest that in the early stages of the business (2000 is the first 
year of operating as a CC), accounts payable were amounting to over R90 000. If 
one assumes that these accounts payable corresponded to purchases for the 10 
months between March and December 2000, this would correspond to an 
average credit of 38 days – rather unusual for a young business. Of course, it is 
possible that the business has been late payer, stretching the credit limits granted 
by suppliers because of liquidity constraints. However, at the same date the cash 
balance was comfortable, not justifying such late payment. 
Meanwhile, the accounts payable recorded in the following balance sheets, 
especially for 2003 and 2004, do not reflect the 30 days payment terms that the 
interviews mentioned. The average payment terms as calculated from the 
accounts payable and purchases went down from 19 to 2 days and back to 5 days 
in 2004. 
Neither the owner nor the administrative officer could see any reason why the 
accounts payable were so low and could not think of any seasonal effect 
affecting these. 
Table 33.2 – Accounts payable as accounted for  
 Dec. 2000 Feb 2002 Feb 2003 Feb 2004 
Accounts payable 90 048 71 328 8 332 41 328 
AP in % of purchases 12,8% 5,3% 0,5% 2,0% 
Average payment terms in days 3833 19 2 7 
 
Asked for the reason of this contradiction, the accountant pretended that up to 
now, the business was almost always paying suppliers on delivery or on receipt 
of invoice. It was apparently Mr. J. S., Mr. R. A.’s former partner, who used to 
                                                 
33 The result of 38 days is based on the assumption that the period closed on 31 December 2000 
comprises only 10 months. 
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settle all invoices quickly. Only since this member’s departure has the business 
started to make more use of supplier credit. 
Although not expressively mentioned, the rationale of the accountant’s 
clarification could be that Mr. J.S.’s departure would have put a strain on the 
business’s liquidity (possibly because the loss of some collateral caused the bank 
to reduce the overdraft facility), forcing Mr. R.A. to delay the settlement of 
invoices. This explanation is only partly convincing. First, according to Mr. 
R.A.’s comments, his partner himself was not very liquid (and his member’s loan 
has not changed in the three years of his membership) nor has his departure 
caused a change in the overdraft limit. Secondly, it is surprising that the external 
accountant should know better about Mr. J.S.’s payment habits than his partner 
himself. In addition, if Mr. J.S.’s departure had caused Mr. R. A. to start 
practising the 30 days payment which he indicated, then this should be reflected 
in the accounts by a significant increase of accounts payable in February 2004, 
which is not the case.  
It seems more probable that the communication on outstanding invoices between 
the business and its accountant has been incomplete, so that the accounts do not 
reflect the real extent of supplier credit. 
Stock  
For inventories, similarly, there were contradictions between the figures 
observed and the answers collected in the interviews. 
According to the administrative officer, the ability to keep stock has been 
reduced since the move into new premises during the course of 2001. The lack of 
space simply compels the business to keep stock at its minimum.  
According to Mr. RA, on the other hand, there is no intention to keep the stock 
low; on the contrary he is trying to build-up certain lines. Whenever he has 
excess liquidity, he buys stock so as to be better prepared to serve clients’ orders. 
He prefers to buy large quantities in order to benefit from discounts and also 
reduce transport costs for the elements that come from out of town. He indicated 
that on average, he was trying to keep his stock at R200 000.  
The financial statements were more in line with Mr. A. D.’s than M. R.A.’s 
statement. They showed a level of stock that is far below the R200 000 
mentioned by the owner, and fluctuating between 55 and 86 thousand Rand, but 
consistently decreasing in relation to the turnover. Hence, if the accounting 
figures are right, the stock turnover went down from about 1 month to about 10 
days, which significantly reduced the need for working capital. 
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Table 33.3 – Inventory as accounted for 
 Dec. 2000 Feb 2002 Feb 2003 Feb 2004 
Inventory  73 296 86 414 62 155 55 385
34
 
(in % of turnover) 10,4% 6,4% 3,8% 2,7% 
(in days of turnover) 3135 23 14 10 
 
This accelerated stock turnover would also explain why the business has been 
able to pay its suppliers more quickly in the latest years. 
Customers credit 
Again, there is a contradiction between the financial statements and the 
comments given by the member and the administrative officer. According to the 
interviews, the business has always granted 30 days credit to most its customers, 
although initially it tried to collect payments more promptly when possible to 
ease the liquidity burden. 
In addition, the interviews revealed that in 2004, two accounts to customers went 
seriously overdue, for a total value of approximately R70 000.  
Except for December 2000, the financial statements give a widely different 
picture, with no bad debts and even no debtors, except a very low amount in 
February 04 corresponding to 4 days of turnover.  
Table 33.4 – Accounts receivable, as accounted for 
 Dec. 2000 Feb 2002 Feb 2003 Feb 2004 
Accounts receivable 79 000 0 0 32 659 
(in % of turnover) 6,8% 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 
(in days of turnover) 24 0 0 4 
     
Bad debts 0 0 0 0 
 
Again, it is not clear what causes this discrepancy, but the most likely 
assumption seems to be a miscommunication between the business and its 
external accountant. If one assumes that the representation of accounts 
receivable, accounts payable and stock is incorrect, it becomes difficult to obtain 
a good idea of the working capital cycle.  
                                                 
34 This is the “closing stock” as read in the 2004 Income Statement (Cost of sales calculation), 
which does not correspond to the 2004 balance sheet (the latter showed precisely the same 
value as for 2002, R86 414). 
35 The result of 31 days is based on the assumption that the period closed on 31 December 2000 
comprises only 10 months.  
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Assuming that the average delay of supplier settlement equals the average 
duration of normal customer credit at slightly under 30 days, then the need for 
working capital would mainly come from the stock (which, if equal to R200 000 
as suggested by the member, would have a cycle of approximately 35 days), the 
production cycle (a few days), as well as bad debts. The excess of member’s 
loans (the only source of long-term capital in the balance sheet) on fixed assets, 
in February 2003, is less than R80 000, hence it is unlikely to cover this need for 
working capital. One would therefore expect a significant use of the overdraft 
facility. 
Cash and Overdraft  
There is some confusion about the exact amount of the overdraft facility and the 
date it was granted: according to Mr. A.D., the limit of the overdraft facility is 
currently R80 000. Mr. R. A. first mentioned an amount of R100 000, granted in 
2001, then – prompted by my question – corrected himself to R80 000. This 
contrasts with the data from the bank file, in 2001, which mentioned an overdraft 
facility of R100 000. A possible explanation for this contradiction is that the 
bank, left with lower amounts of collateral after the departure of Mr. R. A.’s 
partner, may have reduced the overdraft limit to the business. Mr. R.A. assured, 
though, that the facility had never been reduced.  
In any case, according to Mr. R.A. and Mr. A. D., the limit is never really fully 
used. It was essential in the early stages, when access to trade credit was rather 
limited. Now, with supplier credit balancing customer credit, the meaning of the 
overdraft is mainly to enhance the firm’s buying power, and is therefore used 
only occasionally for big purchases.  
The three balance sheets available do not show any use of overdraft at the dates 
of closure of the financial years. Instead, the balance sheets suggest cash surplus 
of 64, 43 and 21 thousand Rand respectively, and as much as 83 thousand Rand 
in 2004.  
These high positive cash balances are consistent with the assumption that 
customers pay on delivery and that the stock is very low (as reflected in the 
accounts), but they are surprising if one supposes that customer credit and stock 
turnover are as indicated by the member (see above). In this case one would 
expect a full utilisation of the overdraft facility. 
In fact, according to the accounts, the interest charges are quite high, suggesting 
that, if the business was paying Prime +2% (which was found to be an average 
interest rate on overdraft among SMEs in the sample), the average utilisation of 
overdraft may be in the region of R30 000 to 40 000.  
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Table 33.5 – Estimation of average overdraft from interest paid 
 Period ending 
Dec. 2000  
(10 months) 
Period ending 
Feb 2002 
Period ending 
Feb 2003 
Period ending 
Feb 2004 
Interest paid 1 728 5 932 6 181 6 606 
approximate average prime 
rate over the period 
15% 14% 16% 14% 
Theoretical average 
overdraft utilisation @ 
Prime+2% 
-11 695 -37 006 -34 339 -41 288 
Cash (Overdraft) at end of 
period 
64 208 43 048 21 339 83 048 
Source: Interest paid from income statements, cash (overdraft) from balance sheets, 
prime rate from SARB, average overdraft utilisation as calculated.  
Mr. A. D. confirmed that R30 000 to 40 000 corresponded approximately to the 
average level of utilisation of the facility. Neither Mr. R. A. nor Mr. A. D. knew 
exactly the interest rate paid on the overdraft, but Mr. A. D. suggested that in his 
opinion, the cost was acceptable, because they “did not really have a choice”.  
The business’s long-term financing scheme 
a. Member’s loan  
As Mr. R. A. said, his member’s loan “was always there”. Unlike many 
businesses where the member’s loan changes almost on a daily basis each time 
the owner pays an invoice on behalf of his business, Mr. R.A.’s and his partner’s 
loans were written on the books at the start of the CC and have been kept 
constant from 2000 to 2003. Only the 2004 balance sheet suddenly sees a drop, 
with Mr. J.S.’s loan being withdrawn and Mr. R.A.’s loan decreasing from R67 
585 to R 44 734.  
Mr. R. A. could not comment on this change, nor did he seem aware of the 
amount of his loan to the business. Asked whether he would ever want to 
increase or decrease his contribution to the business, he answered that at present 
he saw no need for such intervention but - if he ever needed it - he would need to 
talk to his accountant.  
Asked for more details, the accountant said that the members loans corresponded 
to investments in kind made by the members initially, corresponding to 
equipment and other assets brought in. Indeed, the gross value of fixed assets in 
2000 (net of the share of the vehicle that was financed through instalment credit) 
was approximately R117 000, which represents a large portion of the R142 000, 
the total amount of member’s loans. The remainder may have been stock brought 
in by Mr. R. A. from his previous business. 
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Nevertheless, there remains some doubt on the loan decrease observed in 2004, 
which seems to have responded to the accountant’s need to balance the balance 
sheet (especially after the high profit announced) rather than a reality. In any 
case, the accountant himself had described the 2004 balance sheet as a rough 
exercise “just for the bank”. But one may wonder whether the previous years’ 
amounts are more reliable, especially considering the contradiction between Mr. 
J.S.’s inability to invest 50 thousand Rand, according to Mr. R. A., and his 
apparent constant member’s loan of R74 789, as shown in the accounts.  
b. Instalment finance  
In 2000 and 2001, the business has used an instalment credit to finance the 
purchase of its delivery van. This facility, like the overdraft facility, was granted 
at a time when the business was just 2 years old and had just been registered as a 
CC. It was hence still in a phase with a statistically high risk of failure.  
As explained above, according to the bank file, the instalment credit facility 
amounted to R40 000, but the members chose to use only a portion of it, since 
the vehicle they bought cost them R30 000 (unfortunately Mr. R. A. did not 
indicate which portion of this was debt-financed). They also chose to repay the 
credit within 24 months. 
The short maturity, the partial utilisation and the built-in security (possibility for 
the bank to repossess the vehicle if not paid up) reduced the risk for the bank, 
and explained the relatively low risk premium of 2% above Prime rate. 
The importance of collateral 
For the two facilities granted in 2000 (overdraft and ISA), the bank’s collateral 
requirement has been relatively high.  
According to the bank file in May 2001, the security requirements36 for an 
overdraft of 100 Thousand Rand and an instalment sale credit of 40 thousand 
Rand, was as follows: 
  2 mortgage bonds for a total of R336 000 
 house owners’ insurance  
 unlimited suretyships of 2 owners 
 variation agreement R140 000 (?) 
2 life insurance policies @ 2 x R140 000 
Total: R756 000 + unlimited suretyships 
 
                                                 
36 The data available do not enable to recognise whether the bank has positively obtained from 
the members a legal cession of all these securities for its benefit (the note in the bank file may 
have been a simple listing of possible security options). 
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If one assumes that the collateral was meant primarily to secure the overdraft, 
then the extent of coverage for the bank would be over 750%, not including the 
unlimited suretyships of both owners. This seems exaggeratingly high, but it 
must be admitted that the limit of R100 000 is relatively high for a business that 
has just registered and has no credit record within the bank. 
One may then wonder how the bank has reacted to the departure of the second 
member, which suddenly deprived the bank from approximately half its sureties. 
This may be the reason for the possible revision of the overdraft limit, although 
Mr. R. A. disputes that there has been such a decrease. On the other hand, the 
fact that the instalment debt has been repaid faster than scheduled (it was entirely 
settled before February 2002), and the quality of the relationship between the 
bank and its client, may have helped to reduce the bank’s risk estimation and 
hence have eased the prolongation of the overdraft facility in spite of a loss of 
security. 
c. Finance requested to purchase property  
At the time of my last interview with Mr. R. A., the business was preparing to 
approach the bank again to negotiate a long-term facility to enable the purchase 
of property. 
Mr. R. A. did not indicate how much he was requesting, since he was still busy 
calculating his needs – but it makes no doubt that, even if residential property is 
cheaper than industrial property, the amount needed would be substantial, even 
more since the building would request significant renovations and adjustments to 
be used for industrial purposes. In addition, Mr. A. D. had indicated that the 
purpose of a move to new premises would be to enable an upgrade of the 
manufacturing capacity, which means that there would also be a need for 
equipment finance.  
Given the business’s meagre equity base and the absence of profits up to now, as 
well as the departure of one member which could be interpreted as a weakness, it 
is probable that the negotiation with the bank would be difficult.  
d. Contacts with the bank 
From my questions to both the administrative officer and the member it seems 
that the business had a reasonably good, but arms length relationship with the 
bank.  
For day-to-day banking, Mr. A. D. uses internet banking, which means that the 
contacts with the bank staff are rather few and anonymous. Occasional contacts 
take place when customers phone in for references. 
Mr. R. A. was the main person keeping the relationship with the bank, but he did 
not seem to be particularly engaged in the relationship. He mentioned that he has 
contacts with them on the phone and meets them from time to time if there is a 
need, but is not concerned with his standing with the establishment. He could not 
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confirm, for example, whether there was an annual contact on publication of the 
annual financial statements, or generally whether accounts were sent through for 
monitoring.  
A possible explanation for this apparent lack of interest or involvement is that 
Mr. J. S. has actually been the main person looking after the bank’s relationship 
with the business. Indeed, Mr. R. A. admitted that he had previously been 
banking with another institution, and moved to this new bank because of his 
partner’s good standing with them. This may explain why the CC has been able 
to obtain substantial financing, in particular a fairly high overdraft facility, in the 
very year of its establishment as a CC.  
This would also explain why the departure of Mr. J. S. has required some 
arrangements with the bank, although Mr. R. A. was rather vague about it. In 
addition to the loss of collateral already mentioned, the bank may have lost its 
usual contact person in the business. But Mr. R. A. assured that there had been 
no problem and that he was generally in good terms with his bank. 
Whether this generally good relationship with the bank would suffice to obtain a 
large credit for the acquisition of property, is questionable. Visibly the member 
chose to “boost” his chances by presenting a (partially distorted) set of financials 
for 2004, which shows a high profit and hence an improvement of the equity 
base.  
e. Concluding words: financing strategy  
Overall, compared with other cases, the business has adopted a phased financing 
approach, relying primarily on its members initially while establishing itself as a 
credible business.  
The only use of debt finance up to now was for the financing of vehicles (and 
computers) on instalment, which have been promptly repaid, as well as to make 
up for the lack of supplier credit in the early stage – a few years on, the facilities 
seem to be only partly used. Mr. R. A. confirmed that it was important for him to 
start prudently, as he did not want to “fall along the sideways” like so many 
other overly audacious entrepreneurs. 
Both Mr. A. D. and Mr. R. A. told me that, in their opinion, the business has a 
good standing with the bank and will be able to access larger sums of capital 
when needed.  
While the data confirm that the business has been managed prudently, it must be 
noted that the firm has not yet been able to build up equity. Its operations were 
only slightly profitable, and overhead costs lead to successive small losses, 
which have eroded the members’ investment. One may also wonder how the 
bank will interpret the “escalation” of the latest months, with the separation of 
both partners and the major investment in new premises. This decision to buy 
property may seem somewhat precipitated, since Mr. A. D., in my first 
interviews, had told me that the major move would not be before the following 
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year. 
Nevertheless, the few years of relationship building without major incident will 
supposedly positively influence the bank’s decision on Mr. R. A.’s bid for the 
establishment of a major production factory.  
 
7. Financial ratios 
Cost structure 
It is difficult to obtain a clear picture from the business’s cost structure since the 
profitability of operations has varied from one year to the next.  
If one excludes the members’ remuneration, which is not fixed but rather 
depends on the profits for the year, and if one admits that the 2004 income 
statement includes all relevant costs (although we have seen that at least R170K 
have been “omitted”), the cost structure would be as follows: 
Table 33.6 – CS3’s cost structure 
 Low 
(2002) 
High 
(2004) 
High 
revised 
Mean 
(revised) 
variable costs 80% 83% 83%  
fixed costs (higher and lower estimation) 191 000 210 000 380 000  
members' salaries 110 000 180 000 180 000  
breakeven (to cover fixed costs only) 955 000 1 235 294 2 235 294 1 595 147 
breakeven (to cover members’ salaries) 1 505 000 2 294 118 3 294 118 2 399 559 
latest known turnover 2 856 588 2 856 588 2 856 588 2 856 588 
margin over breakeven (fixed costs only) 199% 131% 28% 79% 
margin/deficit (including members’ 
salaries) 
90% 25% -13% 19% 
 
It appears that costs are mainly variable, corresponding to cost of sales, salaries, 
and motor vehicle expenses. With such a low margin on variable costs, the 
breakeven point is highly sensitive to the level of fixed costs.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this calculation, several approaches were taken for 
fixed costs. In the first line, the fixed costs were included as calculated from the 
financial statements, with 2002 presenting the lower estimation (2000 would 
have been even lower but it was not considered since this was less than a full 
year and the business at that time was sensibly smaller), and 2004 providing the 
higher estimation. These costs are mainly made of the rent and telephone and fax 
costs, as well as other administrative costs. In an additional column the 2004 
estimation was majored by the assumption that at least R170 000 have not been 
properly reflected in the financial statements (corresponding to bad debts as well 
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as the indemnification of the former member). This approach leads to an almost 
doubled level of fixed costs, which is not entirely satisfying for a general cost 
analysis since the added costs are partly extraordinary items.  
In an additional step, the members’ salaries were added to the fixed costs thus 
obtained. Again, especially in the high (unrevised) estimation, this inclusion 
almost doubles the fixed costs. Again, it is not entirely satisfying since the 
business does not treat the remuneration of its members as a fixed item but rather 
as a pre-tax distribution of profit. Especially in the high (revised) estimation one 
may assume that if the additional R 170 000 of costs had been recorded in the 
accounts, Mr. R. A. would not have paid himself such a high salary, which is 
more than three times higher than his remuneration in the previous two years. 
Although not entirely satisfying, those estimations give a range of breakeven 
points between 0,95 and 2,2 million Rand excluding members’ remuneration, or 
between 1,5 and 3,3 million Rand including it. Except for the highest estimation, 
which is actually too high for the reasons presented above, one can say that the 
2004 turnover, at 2,86 million Rand, is comfortably above breakeven. In other 
words, the efforts of Mr. R. A. to increase the sales of its business have paid out 
and have brought him into the profitability zone.  
Of course, the increase of staff (especially the engagement of a sales 
representative in 2004) and the move to new, larger premises with the acquisition 
of new equipment, will cause an increase in the fixed costs (especially related to 
financing and asset depreciations), pushing the breakeven point up. It cannot be 
said whether the turnover will be increased accordingly.  
Interest coverage 
At this stage, interest costs are relatively limited, so that there is no concern with 
interest coverage. Especially in the more profitable year of 2004, the interest 
costs are almost 30 times covered by the EBITDA. Even after revision of the 
operating profit to account for non-recorded, and partly exceptional, costs, the 
interest coverage is above 5. 
Table 33.7 – CS3’s interest coverage calculation 
 
2002 2003 2004 
2004 
(revised) 
EBIT 5 336 4 689 186 089 16 089 
EBITDA 26 913 23 211 195 848 35 848 
Interest paid  5 932 6 181 6 606 6 606 
coverage ratio 4,5 3,8 29,6 5,4 
 
Again, the contraction of new credits for the acquisition of premises and new 
equipment will significantly increase financial charges and there is no guarantee 
that the interest coverage will remain satisfying. 
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Equity ratio 
The equity ratio, including members’ loan as a form of quasi-equity, is generally 
high since the business has hardly any external debts (except supplier credit and 
overdraft). This is visible in Table 33.8. 
Table 33.8 – CS3’s equity ratio calculation 
 (as in statements) (revised) 
 Feb’ 2002 Feb’2003 Feb’2004 2004 
Member's interest 100 100 100 100 
Accumulated profits or losses -2 294 -3 786 179 483 122 988 
Quasi-equity (mb loan) 142 374 142 374 44 734 67 585 
Member’s capital  140 180 138 688 224 317 190 673 
Total Assets 211 508 147 020 265 645 425 710 
Equity ratio  66% 94% 84% 45% 
 
However, since the supplier credit and possibly also the overdraft are likely to be 
improperly reflected in the balance sheets, the estimation of the equity ratio is 
biased. Further problems come from the 2004 balance sheet, in which the 
accumulated profit is somewhat misrepresented: firstly, the losses accumulated 
in previous years, which should have reduced the 2004 retained income, have 
disappeared; in addition, no tax provision has been made on the 2004 profit, 
which, in any case, is quite questionable. Finally, the decrease in Mr. R. A.’s 
member’s loan is not explained. 
If one were to assume that, in 2004, the accounts payable are close to R141 000 
and the overdraft close to R41 000 (see above), and if one were to grossly correct 
the accumulated profit by incorporating previous losses and subtracting a tax 
provision, while leaving Mr. R. A.’s member’s loan at the level of previous 
years, then correcting total assets accordingly (to reflect higher accounts 
receivable and inventory), the equity ratio would be significantly lower (45%). 
The effect would be similar in previous years. 
Nevertheless, for a South African SME, even this lower equity ratio is not bad. 
The business remains essentially equity-funded, with little interest-bearing debt.  
Again, the intended purchase of new premises will significantly change the 
picture, increasing the share of debt. Assuming that Mr. R. A. requests a 
mortgage loan of R500 000 for the property and an equipment loan of R150 000 
for the machinery, the equity ratio would drop from 45% (2004 revised) to [190 
673 / (425 710+650 000) = 17.7%] (2005 plan).  
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Debt maturity  
Apart from the member’s loan, there is currently no long-term debt, so that the 
ratio of current liabilities to total assets is the complement to the equity ratio 
above. 
Table 33.9 – CS3’s debt maturity 
 (as in statements) (revised) 
 2002 2003 2004 2004 
current liabilities 71 328 8 332 41 328 234 709 
total assets 211 508 147 020 265 645 425 710 
Current debt / Total Assets 34% 6% 16% 55% 
 
For the revised estimation in 2004, the current liabilities have been assumed to 
be made of trade creditors for R141 000 (see estimation above), overdraft for 
R41 000 as well as a tax liability for 30% of the 2004 profit, after deduction of 
previous losses. 
Although this revision gives a far higher ratio of current debt to total assets, it 
does not mean that the debt maturity is inappropriate, since the short-term debt is 
entirely used to finance short-term assets. 
Working capital cycle  
Again, there is here a need to distinguish between the figures appearing in the 
financial statements, and those assumed to be real according to the interviews.  
Table 33.10 – CS3’s working capital cycle 
 (accounts) (interviews) 
in days of turnover 2002 2003 2004 2004 
Purchases: Supplier Credit (average) 19 2 7 25 
Inventory  23 14 10 25 
Production cycle (assumed) 1 1 1 1 
Sales: Customer credit 0 0 4 25 
Total need for working capital 5 13 8 26 
     
Theoretical average overdraft utilisation  
assuming Prime+2% (in Rand) 
R37 006 R34 339 R41 288  
overdraft utilisation (in days) 8 5 5  
 
From the financial statements emerges a picture of relatively low supplier credit 
(except in February 2002) balanced by low advances to customers, so that the 
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need for working capital results primarily from the inventory, which turns over 
relatively quickly. 
From the interviews, it would seem that trade credit, both on the supplier and 
customer side, are significantly higher than reflected in the balance sheets, but 
this has only little impact on the need for working capital since the two balance 
each other reasonably well (usually a 30 days credit). On the other hand, Mr. R. 
A. suggested in the interviews that he was trying to keep his stock high in order 
to reduce the cost of his supplies, and he mentioned a target value of inventory at 
R200 000, which corresponds to approximately 25 days of turnover. If this were 
true, this would create a more significant need for working capital, than what the 
financials show. But this statement of Mr. R. A. contradicts answers given by 
Mr. A. D. 
The estimation of average overdraft utilisation (based on interest charges) 
suggests that the need for working capital is not actually as high as suggested in 
the “revised” calculation. This probably hints to a lower inventory than 
pretended by Mr. R. A. 
In any case the working capital cycle is relatively balanced and needs are well 
covered by the overdraft facility. 
Variability of ratios 
The business seems to follow a stepwise growth with strategic / structural 
changes once every few years, followed by a few years of relative stability to 
recover from the move. 
Indeed, the financials betray important changes between December 2000 and 
February 2002, consistent with interview data: move to new premises generating 
a higher rent, acquisition of a vehicle enhancing the delivery capacity, increase 
of the retail activity causing a sudden drop in the gross margin. 
Thereafter, the business has been relatively stable between 2002 and 2004. The 
nominal turnover growth has been surprisingly regular at 26% per annum 
between 2000 and 2004, while at the same time the gross margin was slowly 
improved (supposedly thanks to an improved relationship with suppliers). 
Meanwhile, some overhead costs were reduced (financing costs and 
depreciation). In the year ended in February 2004 the growth has been sufficient 
to reach breakeven. 
2004 also marks the beginning of a new move, with the departure of one member 
causing some reductions in the equity, while the (intended) large investment in 
premises and equipment will create new fixed costs that will need to be absorbed 
by accordingly high turnover growth.  
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Business value 
In order to assess the cost of the broken partnership with Mr. J. S. to the 
business, it is interesting to compare the amount of indemnification (R100 000) 
with the supposed value of the business.  
As already mentioned, the indemnity promised to Mr. J. S. represents 
approximately 70% of the firm’s book (net asset) value in 2003. This may be 
justified if the business can be considered as having good prospects for growth 
and profit, which can be attributed to Mr. J. S.’s time as a partner. To verify this 
possibility, a discounted cash flow calculation was carried out based on some 
assumptions on cash flow growth. 
Forecasting future cash flows is difficult based on the business’s history. In spite 
of sustained turnover growth, the annual operating cash flows up to 2003 have 
declined rather than increased. Considering this history, it would be speculative 
to predict more than a 10% increase in cash flows for the following years (eternal 
growth). It may even be more appropriate to plan with a 0% growth. 
In light of this, two estimations were calculated – a pessimistic evaluation based 
on constant cash flows equal to the 2003 cash flow; and a more optimistic one 
assuming an eternal 10% growth based on the (revised) 2004 cash flow (after 
correction for the R170 000 of costs not accounted for). The discount rate used 
was 35% - corresponding to the average required rate of return of venture capital 
funds in South Africa in 2001 (source: Taylor, 2001 p. 97). The values resulting 
from this exercise have been again corrected for the accumulated losses up to 
February 2003 and for the unequal amounts of members’ loans, and led to an 
appropriate indemnification of the departing member situated between R26 049 
and R 90 477 (see Table 33.11).   
This result suggests that, even based on the value of future cash flows, the 
indemnity of R100 000 which Mr. R. A. agreed to pay to J. S. was high. In other 
words, the equity provided by Mr. J. S. for three years has been expensive capital 
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Table 33.11 – Discounted cash flow valuation for CS3 
 “pessimistic” “optimistic”
Last cash flow incorporated 2003 2004 revised
Assumed CF growth, 'eternal' 0% 10%
Discounted value of future Cash Flows 48 657 67 031
Accumulated losses in Feb 03 -3 786 -3 786
Net value of business 44 871 63 245
Value of non-interest bearing debt in Feb 2003 -142 374 -31 891
Value of equity in Feb 2001 -97 503 31 354
Value of 50% equity stake -48 751 15 677
Value of Mr. B.S.’s member loan in 2001 74 800 74 800
Correct indemnification for Mr. B. S.  26 049 90 477
 
8. Final reflections 
In spite of its absence of profits, CS3 must be regarded as a relatively successful 
enterprise, which has built up a sound reputation on the market, and grown 
significantly while avoiding the most frequent threats of cash shortages and 
excessive debt. Its relative success can be attributed to a number of factors: 
• The support of the owner’s family, especially in the early stages, though 
subcontracting, selling a vehicle at a discount, etc. 
• The owner’s good knowledge of the field, especially the clients, which 
enabled him to obtain arrangements (e.g. with regard to delivery); 
• the owner’s good business intuition, probably gained from early exposure to 
small business (family) 
• community arrangements enabling the owner to start-up without major initial 
investment, hence reducing the initial financial burden.  
 
During those years of building up strong operations, the financial management 
has remained relatively weak. In fact, the owner and the administrative officer 
displayed relatively limited financial awareness: the level of stock was dictated 
from the availability of space more than by costs; the choice of supplier was 
determined by the price more than by the availability of supplier credit; the sales 
representative and additional staff was engaged without doing a budget; the 
owner did not know the exact limit of his overdraft or its cost. The relation of the 
owner to his bank seemed to be relatively hands-off. This situation may have 
arisen from a task distribution between Mr. R.A. and his previous partner, Mr. 
J.S., in which the latter was looking more closely after the firm’s finances. The 
breakdown of the partnership may leave the business vulnerable.  
In this context, it can seem worrying that the owner adopted an aggressive 
growth strategy, with a more proactive marketing driven by a new sales 
representative. Two major customer defaults have already sent warning signals 
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about the necessity to manage growth prudently. Nevertheless, the business 
remains on an aggressive course, planning to contract debt to start an ambitious 
manufacturing unit on new premises. This strategy creates multiple risks:  
• Legal risks came from the property rezoning,  
• Operating risks would arise from the construction work, the actual move, 
the need to adjust human capital to the new fixed capital, and the 
uncertainty regarding the markets for the new manufacturing output;  
• The main financial risks could be summarised in a drop of the equity 
ratio (from 45% to probably less than 20%), an increase in fixed costs 
which was likely to ruin, at least temporarily, the profitability of 
operations; and an escalation of financial costs. Due to the limited 
financial awareness of the manager it was uncertain whether he would 
manage these risks correctly.  
• Under this light, the owner’s zero-profit strategy as well as his tendency 
to draw a high salary when the performance is good, which were 
perfectly acceptable in the context of the firm up to now, may need to be 
revised in the new circumstance of major expansion.  
Data was insufficient to conclude whether the business would be able to cope 
with these risks.  
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Annexure 34 – Narrative of Case Studies 4a and 4b  
Township-based ‘tendering’ businesses 
 
An illustration of the hopeless struggle of survivalist entrepreneurs lacking both 
skills and resources, and operating in a spirit that differs from the 
commercial/capitalist logic  
 
1. Business Short Portrait: 
Business Code Name: CS4 a + b 
Member’s initials: Mr. M. and Mrs. S.  
Member owns 100% of capital  
Member’s ethnic background: African  
Member is also manager 
Form of registration: CC  
 
Sector of activity: 
- Primary activity: SIC 9 (Cleaning) 
- Secondary activity: SIC 5 (painting, renovating, tiling) 
Product or Service: Industrial and home cleaning, painting and renovating, tiling, gardening, 
construction, woodwork, carpet-laying, etc. 
Business concept: independent  Market: Mainly government, a bit private  
Start-up date CS4a: 1998 
Current status: dormant 
Start-up date CS4b: 2003 
Current status: active 
Staff members: 2 + Casuals 
- Managers: 2 
- Permanent employees: 0 
- Casual staff: 3 to 20 
Annual turnover: CS4a started with 350K, 
but then was reduced 
CS4b has under 200K 
Gross fixed assets: taken together, R 15 
thousand  
=> Size category: micro 
Main sources of finance:  
- Hire Purchase, micro-lenders 
- (Trade credit and Bank Overdraft are minimal) 
 
2. The case study procedure 
The close corporation (CS4a) was found on a listing of black-owned businesses. 
I was specifically looking for African-owned incorporated businesses, and 
therefore contacted Mr. M. It was Mrs. S. who answered the phone, but both 
easily accepted to participate. At the time of selecting the case, I wasn’t aware of 
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the fact that they now owned two entities, the older one (CS4a) having 
effectively become dormant, and that the two entrepreneurs were facing 
considerable difficulties.  
I also did not appreciate that, for both CS4a and CS4b, the registration as a close 
corporation was image-related, “for the tender documents”. Faced with the 
absence of financial statements and the de facto informal character of the CCs, I 
considered dropping the case, but decided to keep it as an antidote, as it were, to 
the sample’s bias – and as an illustration of the specific types of obstacles 
encountered by the smallest African micro-entreprises.  
The case study was essentially based on 2 interviews of the members. 
Unfortunately, unlike the other case studies, the interviews were not conducted 
on site, at the owners’ choice. They justified this choice by the argument that it 
would be complicated for me to find them in Khayelitsha, but when I insisted 
that I would prefer to meet with them in their premises, they declined to give me 
a physical address or explain me the way, insisting that they would come to me 
instead.  
The reason for this was not clear to me: it could have been the legacy of 
apartheid, raising the expectation that white people should not bother to travel to 
“black people’s townships”. A white lady visiting would also not remain 
unnoticed by their neighbours and this may have been embarrassing, just as they 
could have been embarrassed to let me see their (supposedly poor) house and 
living conditions. Although these reasons alone would have been sufficient, there 
is still a possibility that the choice of a meeting place outside the business 
premises was meant at keeping some distance, or even at knowing where I was 
in order to come back to me at a later stage. 
Other sources were a document presenting the business, not dated but 
supposedly prepared in 2002, as well as a short enquiry among suppliers of 
cleaning machine suppliers. 
3. The business owners 
Background 
Although they do not carry the same surname, Mr. M. and Mrs. S. are spouses, 
respectively 55 and 45 years old. They stay with their children in a house in 
Khayelitsha. Their background is typical of black people of their generation, i.e. 
rather poor. They have received poor formal school training in the Transkei, Mrs. 
S. went as far as Standard 10 but did not complete it, while Mr. M. went to a 
technical school in the Transkei where he learned woodwork.  
Following their schooling, they have never had a proper employment, nor have 
they received other convincing formal education. Mrs. S. has followed two 
training courses, one in computer literacy and another one in team leading. 
Meanwhile, Mr. M. has done backyard works in the townships, helping building 
precarious shelters. He was later “appointed”, as he put it, to run a sheltered 
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workshop for the disabled, in furniture making, but this occupation was not 
really paying him a salary. He also followed supervision courses.   
After being unemployed for a long time, they decided that Mr. M. would start a 
business (CS4a). According to the document presenting Mr. M’s business, he 
appointed his wife Mrs. S. as a “manager”. Later, when Mr. M found himself 
unable to acquire new contracts, it was decided that Mrs. S. would start her own 
business (CS4b).  
Character 
Mr. M. appeared in the first place as a craftsman, a practical and pragmatic 
person. Smallish and rather frail, he spoke rather softly and seemed to choose his 
words to convey a professional impression. Meanwhile, Mrs. S. could have been 
a caricature of an African “mama”, tall and large, moving slowly, but talkative 
with a pinch of aggressiveness in her tone.  
It soon became clear that Mr. M. and Mrs. S. were keen to talk to me about their 
problems, because they were hoping for, at least, some advice – or at best, some 
material help. They asked several times for my knowledge in various areas, 
especially in tender processes and access to finance. Even after I gave them a 
few indications and told them that apart from that I could not offer much help, 
they remained seated and eventually Mrs. S. asked again “if maybe [I] could help 
with finance” – and while I was wondering how she had meant it, she added: “If 
you know how to talk you could go and talk to people to help us” (needless to 
say, a vane attempt). 
In fact, it seemed to me that this expectation was not only directed to me – it felt 
rather like a general attitude: they were following the principle that the way out 
of trouble should be to obtain help from others – and that others actually owed 
them such help. Especially Mrs. S. frequently had an accusing tone when 
reporting about the lack of support received from other agencies: “We‘ve been to 
Khula, we’ve been to Khethani Business Finance, even DTI, they all don’t help 
you, I have lost a lot of confidence”, and “The moneylenders, they talk nice but 
they are very cruel, they are killing you”. 
Personal Finance 
It is difficult to ascertain the exact financial situation of Mr. M. and Mrs. S, as 
indications are sometimes contradictory. For example, Mr. M. lamented several 
times about having to feed their children, as if even the satisfaction of these basic 
needs were not always guaranteed.  
On the other hand, several indications on the lifestyle of Mrs. S. and Mr. M. 
would mean that they belong to the better off in Khayelitsha, although it seems 
that they cannot really afford this relatively onerous lifestyle.  
Mrs. S’s answer on my question on property gives a first indication of the 
mismatch between lifestyle and financial resources. In 1989, the couple chose to 
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buy a house; they were granted a loan. (It is not exactly clear how the bank 
approved the loan since, according to responses given to other questions, neither 
wife nor husband has ever been formally employed). After a while, since both of 
them were unemployed, they turned unable to repay the loan, so that the bank 
repossessed the house, which they are now renting.  
They own a large car, which (from the outside) looks reasonably good although 
Mrs. S. was lamenting that this car was giving them “lots of problem”, she 
couldn’t wait to replace it, for example the windows can only be opened with the 
help of a spanner. They also chose to send their children to private school – a 
decision which, it would seem, one does not take when one is effectively 
struggling to survive.  
They have a bank account, a funeral cover, and are part of a rotating savings 
scheme.  
On the question of whether they have debts, Mrs. S. replied negatively – 
probably meaning that they had no debt with formal financial institutions, for 
other comments make it difficult to believe that the household is entirely self-
financed and up-to-date with the payment of its costs and bills. Mrs. S. did admit 
that they have defaulted on their debts twice (once on the house, and once on a 
Telkom bill), each time for amounts “less than 3 000 Rand”. (As far as the house 
is concerned, she probably means that the annuity that they defaulted on was 
under 3000 Rand, as it would be difficult to believe that the total value of the 
loan outstanding would have been so low).  
4. How the business started 
Start-up date 
Mr. M’s Close Corporation (CS4a) was registered in July 1997, although he had 
been (informally) involved in renovation and repairs of buildings since 1994. 
Mrs. S’ business (CS4b), meanwhile, was only registered in 2003.  
Initial investment 
Asked about the approximate value of the assets that he started with, Mr. M. 
could not give me a clear response. He initially (first interview) mentioned that 
he had only a few tools and mops, then (second interview) added substantial 
equipment like a circular saw, a drill, a sander and a router, for a value of 
approximately R 3 500. However it is not clear which of these assets have been 
there since the beginning.  
Mrs. S’s business, meanwhile, holds substantial assets, although details given in 
the second interview were inconsistent with previous answers. In the first 
interview she had mentioned that the business owned 2 vacuum-cleaners, worth 
R2000, and 2 sewing machines, worth R8000.  
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In the second interview she focused on two industrial buffing machines, which 
she acquired (new) in February 2004 (that is, a few weeks before my first 
interview on 9 March). At first, she suggested that the buffing machines had a 
value of R 5 500 each, and came to complement the two vacuum cleaners for a 
value of R 1500 each. Adding these values to the R8 000 initially proposed as a 
value for the sewing machines, would give a gross value of fixed assets of 
R22 000 altogether.  
But later in the interview she admitted that she had acquired the buffing 
machines together with the vacuum cleaners, for a total cost of R11 000, 
including R3 000 worth of chemicals (which would mean that the gross value of 
those four cleaning machines would be only R8 000). A short telephonic enquiry 
among suppliers was undertaken to probe the possible value of the equipment, 
and suggested that, while vacuum cleaners exist in a wide range and are supplied 
everywhere, industrial buffing machines are only supplied by a handful of 
enterprises and usually cost over R6000 each. 
In addition, prompted to give more details on the sewing machines, Mrs. S. 
replied that she had paid R 5 000 for the two (a more credible amount 
considering that they were second-hand machines and presumably not the most 
sophisticated kind). This gives a total gross value of fixed assets of R13 000, 
significantly less than the R22 000 initially proposed.  
The interviews also revealed at some other stage that the couple owns a 
photocopy and fax machine, which was bought for the purposes of the tenders.  
Financing of the equipment  
Mr. M. financed all his business tools with his initial savings and, later on, with 
cash flows from his operations. He mentioned that, having a bit of cash out of the 
business, he had just acquired a new drill to replace the old one, which was not 
working well. He confirmed that this was his usual way to deal with cash 
surpluses: whenever the business generates a bit of money, he would use it to 
improve his equipment.  
(This practice was confirmed by other interviews with township entrepreneurs, 
for example a lady running a Bed & Breakfast in Khayelitsha told me that 
whenever she got some cash, she would immediately spend it to improve her 
home – this urge to spend the money will be discussed later).  
On the other hand, Mrs. S. bought her equipment in two ways. The sewing 
machines were bought several years ago, second-hand, from Mrs. S’s own 
savings. She added that she was participating in a ROCSA scheme (Rotating 
Credit and Savings Association), which gave her, at regular time intervals, the 
possibility to spend accumulated money to acquire certain goods. At the time, 
she chose to buy sewing machines, although she then admitted that “the sewing 
machines have never worked out”. When I asked her whether these machines 
were now in use, she said that she had lent them to her sister-in-law, who was 
trying to earn a living with them. Hence, these assets were utilized in a sensible 
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way inside the family, but not directly generating income for the purposes of the 
business.  
As to the vacuum-cleaners and the buffing machines, they had been bought on 
credit. “I am still paying them”, said Mrs. S. The process for obtaining credit, as 
she described it, was the following: Mrs. S. registered her business in 2003 and 
applied for some tenders. When, in February 2004, she was awarded a cleaning 
contract, she went to the supplier of machines and “showed him the contract”. 
The supplier of machines did not ask for any further information, “he trusted 
me”, and gave her three months to pay the R11 000 in full. Supposedly, both 
parties relied on the expectation that, if Mrs. S. was to start working on 1 March, 
she would get her first payment by 15 April, and would then be able to repay the 
machines in full. They did not seem to be aware that the payment for the first 
month of trading would be used for working capital and would not leave enough 
surplus for the repayment of equipment debt.  
At the date of the second interview, at the end of May 2004, Mrs. S. had repaid 
only R5 000, hence had R6 000 outstanding and overdue. She immediately 
added that she was “worried”, because there was a possibility that she would get 
another cleaning contract, to start early July, in which case she would need to 
purchase additional cleaning machines (since the machines bought at the 
beginning of the year would still be in use for the present contract). “But, she 
added, he won’t give me a credit because I haven’t repaid the R6 000”. It struck 
me that she was thinking of the next credit before commenting on her plans to 
repay the current one. When I asked whether she had such plans, she responded 
with a vague “yes, I have plans, but you know it never works out that way”. She 
was not able to give a date by which she thinks she would repay the debt, in fact 
it did not seem to preoccupy her much. She indicated that “it is not that debt 
alone, there are many other things, the school fees that we must pay, etc”, as if 
the existence of other costs would exempt her from having to repay her debts.  
I enquired whether the supplier of the machines might repossess them if they 
were not paid. Mrs. S. confirmed that he had threatened to do so, which is why 
she has now taken the machines away from the Simonstown site, into her house 
in Khayelitsha, hoping that he will not find her in her house. This had 
consequences on her ability to carry out her cleaning contract: because of petrol 
costs, she would only bring the machines to the site once a week, and back in the 
evening, so the cleaning was happening only once per week instead of every day 
as stipulated in the contract. She admitted that this would, at some stage, lead to 
problems with her client, but for the moment the client was not aware of the 
problems so she was continuing this practice.  
Working capital  
In addition to the equipment finance mentioned, the businesses have had to 
source working capital before starting a new contract. Both husband and wife 
were largely unprepared for this financing need, hence did not have a proper 
strategy to deal with it. They both insisted that buying materials, consumables 
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etc was always difficult. Even at the time of our interviews, having experienced 
it, they did not seem to fully understand the concept or to appreciate that it was a 
normal and common situation for small businesses.  
To deal with his need for working capital, Mr. M. apparently chose to tap the 
easiest source of finance, namely supplier credit: he bought his consumables on 
credit, as often as he could. Some suppliers indeed occasionally granted him one 
month credit. However, this turned to be a costly option. According to Mr. M., 
“if you buy something for R200, after a month you have to pay R250” to which 
Mrs. S. added “or even R300”. This indicates interest rates of 25% to 50% per 
month. Converted (linearly37) to annual rates, the interest rates would be 300 to 
600% p.a. These rates are consistent with the ones found in the informal 
township microlending sector (see Coetzee & Grant 2000:69 38). 
As to Mrs. S., she was adamant that she would pay cash as often as possible 
(because she would not like to have debts!), but, having insufficient own 
resources, she had to turn to moneylenders. They charged similar interest rates. 
The moneylender will be the object of a separate section under “financial 
management” below.  
5. Business model and operations 
Business model  
The activity of the two businesses does not fit into the usual sectoral 
classifications, as it includes a great variety of low-skilled services. The best 
description of the businesses’ activity would probably come from a statement of 
Mrs. S. in her first interview, when she explained that: 
“After having been unemployed for so many years, we decided to go into 
that tendering job”.  
Tendering was indeed one of the only consistent features in the jobs performed 
by the two businesses. The other feature would be that they were low-skilled 
services, typically the kind of services that African people have been expected to 
perform for white people in the apartheid dispensation.  
On the question of whether they would select some specific tenders out of those 
they found in the newspaper, they gave contradictory answers. Mr. M. suggested 
that they would “choose what is good for us”, to which Mrs. S. added “but since 
there is very little work, we will just tender whatever”.  
 
                                                 
37 A compound interest rate from month to month is unlikely since township trade credit is 
believed to be very unsophisticated 
38 “The 25-30,000 informal township lenders continue to operate as they always have, charging 
effective interest rates in the 360-600 percent range for relatively small loans.” 
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Mr. M’s business profile describes the enterprise as a “Specialist (sic!) in 
cleaning train coaches, platforms, offices, houses, windows, painting, carpet 
cleaning, building alterations, deep cleaning and sanitizing, joiners and cabinet 
making”. Although extensive, this list does not include gardening or general 
woodwork, which Mr. M. also mentioned in his interview.  
Mrs. S’s business potentially performs the same activities, to which she added 
catering, although it is quite a different business. She did not mention any textile 
/ sewing-related work, although she had indicated that the business owns two 
sewing machines.  
This lack of focus on product was not a single case, it was found in other 
businesses contacted during the research project. For example, a Mfuleni-based 
business described its activity as “catering, cleaning, supply of office stationery, 
clerical jobs and other works”, a Gugulethu-based business was involved in 
“cupboards, tiling, flooring and other works” while a business from the GEM 
sample indicated as activity: “construction services/palisade fencing/stationery 
supply/protective clothing” 
Two corporations for one business 
In fact, although I tried in my interviews to distinguish between the two 
enterprises, the limits between the two, as well as between business and personal 
accounts, were actually fluid. Mr. M. confirmed that, each time they wanted to 
apply for a tender, they would submit two applications (one under each company 
name) to increase their chances. It appeared that the newest business, formally 
owned by Mrs. S., was the only one winning tenders at present, possibly because 
of “affirmative procurement” practices which increasingly tried to source 
contracts in priority to female-owned companies. It may also be that Mr. M.’s 
business had built a negative reputation in its previous contracts, hence does not 
win tenders, while Mrs. S’s business was still free from such reputation.  
For example, the two entrepreneurs mentioned that they had been busy with 
renovation and painting works for various government buildings – it was 
essentially Mr. M.’s work to organize these contracts, but it is likely that putting 
Mrs. S’s name on the tender application would favour them since most other 
tender applications in the construction field would classically come from male 
owners.  
(It is also possible that the choice of keeping surnames different, although they 
presented themselves as being husband and wife, was meant to hide the 
connection between the two businesses or, between Mrs. S, owner of the 
contracting business, and Mr. M., project supervisor).  
Assets 
Consistent with the fact that the two corporations were actually one business, the 
equipment described above was used wherever it was needed. For example, 
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although the paint brushes and rollers, drill, saw, and other tools, were formally 
mentioned as being owned by CS4a (Mr. M’s business), they were obviously 
used for the renovation and painting works mentioned above, although these 
were carried out under Mrs. S’s business name (CS4b).  
From that point of view, although Mr. M’s corporation was no longer actively 
trading, its equipment was still in use.  
On the other side, as mentioned, the expensive machines of Mrs. S’s business 
were under-used because of the need to “hide them” from the supplier. It is even 
possible that these machines were suffering from excessive transport, with a risk 
of reducing the lifetime of these machines. 
Management style and philosophy 
Mr. M. and Mrs. S. are managers “on the move”: since they work on several sites 
in parallel, they are often called to commute from one to the next, which can be 
at great distances. Their cellular telephone is rarely used for its purpose, namely 
accompanying them wherever they need to be, since it also stands for inexistent 
landlines in the various premises. This explains why I have had difficulties in 
accessing them on the phone: they had left their telephone at a site but were not 
present there. Also, appointments have had to be rescheduled several times, with 
Mrs. S. explaining that: “We can never plan, we get a call and then we must be 
here, then must be there”. 
It seems that this commuting from one site to the next, trying to solve problems 
experienced by the teams working on the various contracts, and other logistic 
work, is indeed the role that the entrepreneurs assigned to themselves – in 
addition to the job-hunting. Even in the advice that they asked from me, I saw 
that they were not concerned about thinking anew about their business, but only 
about continuing the same linear pattern of activity: looking for tenders in 
newspaper (or even better, looking for private jobs), filling in the tender 
documents and forms (at that stage, they felt a need to understand the process 
better, to know under which circumstances tenders are awarded), organising the 
logistics, especially acquiring equipment, and driving around.  
Their comments also showed that their hands-on involvement in their businesses 
was limited. For example, when Mr. M’s enterprise was engaged in cleaning 
trains, he and his wife (the two ‘supervisors’ listed on the business profile) were 
not regularly on the sites while the cleaning teams were operating (at night). 
Rather, Mr. M. would receive phone calls from his clients complaining that his 
cleaners were absent or too few, in which case he had to go and find casual 
workers to replace them immediately. The distance between, for example, his 
home in Khayelitsha and the working site in Cape Town station, the difficulty of 
communicating in the absence of appropriate cell phone equipment and budget, 
as well as the low morale of staff, with a high level of absenteeism, made it 
difficult for Mr. M. to control the quality of work.  
However, Mr. M. did not seem to think about it as a challenge that would require 
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his intelligent intervention, for example by selecting staff members, training 
them about the consequences of absenteeism and creating appropriate incentives. 
Rather, he would see it as an immutable fact which his clients did not have 
enough understanding for. “You can’t be there all the time, petrol is so 
expensive”. 
(More reflections on management style will be found in Section 8. Approach to 
business). 
Market, Tender process and Competition  
Mr. M and Mrs. S’s market is made of national, provincial or local government 
institutions, as well as parastatals and, occasionally, private persons. Typical jobs 
that they have carried out were the renovating or cleaning of trains, government 
buildings and schools.  
Although they would like to work for private clients as well (especially because 
they perceive it as a less competitive market), they do not have a strategy to 
access such jobs. The public tenders are easy to identify in the newspapers. They 
apply for app. 10 tenders a month (each time lodging two applications, one for 
each CC) and win only a few tenders every year (in the case of Mrs. S’s business 
– none for Mr. M’s business). They added that they “just take what comes”.  
The tendering process itself is a relatively extensive one, which often takes 
several months. First, Mr. M and Mrs. S. find potential jobs advertised in 
newspapers. They must then go and collect tender documents, and are later 
invited for site viewing. After that, they are usually given a week or two to 
prepare the long tender questionnaire. They have never been asked to provide 
additional documents, like financial information: all information needed would 
be asked in the questionnaire. After submission of the applications, they typically 
do not hear any further news for a long time, up to several months. Occasionally, 
a fax comes to inform them, as Mrs. S. put it, that “we are in selection but we 
must sign more papers”. She obviously did not appreciate the exact meaning of 
the papers that she had to sign, and showed an example of them to me. It was a 
letter informing her that the process has been delayed, and asking her whether 
she would agree to an extended period for the contract.  
Even when all papers are duly signed and faxed back, a long period of time 
usually elapses without any feedback from the potential client. Mrs. S. must then 
resort to the telephone to check the status of the decision, and hear, either, that it 
is still in the process, or that the contract has been awarded. When she is the 
lucky winner of the contract, she receives notice approximately two weeks 
before the job starts.  
The lack of transparency about the tender awarding process probably explained 
the unease of Mr. M and Mrs. S. in defining a strategy to cope with the 
competition, which is intense in all sectors they are involved in (cleaning 
services, building repairs and renovations, catering). In both interviews, Mr. M 
and Mrs. S. confirmed that the competition was a major threat to their business. 
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For cleaning services, for example, the yellow pages lists 14 companies under 
industrial cleaning services and as many as 68 under office and other cleaning. 
There are presumably many more competitors, which are not listed in the yellow 
pages (Mrs. S’s business for example is not listed). Indeed, they do not need a 
listing since they are acquiring their business by tender and not by advertising.  
Mr. M suggested that his contract with Metro-Rail, which was the biggest 
contract his enterprise has received, was not renewed because of new entrants 
who quoted very low prices. “You can’t work proper business with these prices, 
the competition is too strong”, he commented.  
Unlike all other entrepreneurs encountered, though, the couple could not 
articulate a convincing strategy to deal with the competition, apart from striving 
to keep their prices low. They felt unsure about the tender awarding process and 
could not identify which factors, apart from the price, would determine their 
access to jobs.  
Costing, Pricing and Credit Policy 
Before writing a quote on a tender application, Mr. M. and Mrs. S. would 
attempt to estimate their costs. They would budget the workers’ salaries, the 
equipment and materials, the transport and petrol, then add a margin as profit: 5 
or 10%, they said, adding “but eventually we don’t get the profit, there are 
always more costs”. Especially the transport costs were usually higher than 
anticipated.   
Mr. M. mentioned that in principle he was obliged to include insurance to cover 
the risk of accidents by their workers, adding “but then it becomes too expensive 
so we often don’t do the insurance”. He did not make it clear whether he would 
omit the insurance costs in his quote to be more competitive (it is rather unlikely 
that this would make a difference to the client, since the cost was only R2000 per 
year), or if he would include it in the quote but not actually take the cover on (a 
more credible interpretation).  
A peculiar aspect of the “tendering business” was the nature of the relationship 
between the business and its client. Even after the business had been selected 
among many, and the contract signed, the relationship was still nowhere near a 
normal client-supplier partnership. Mr. M. suggested that “when the client sees 
that you don’t have enough money, they try to make things difficult for you”. 
“They want to penalize you”. Asked for details, he mentioned that inspectors 
would, for example, make dirt after the place had been cleaned, and generally 
adopt a racist behaviour. Instead of working positively towards the same goal 
(clean trains or premises), they are grateful for the opportunity to reprimand their 
subcontractors.  
It is barely surprising then, that the entrepreneurs’ attitude to their clients was 
equally bad. The example of Mrs. S. omitting to inform her client that she was 
no longer cleaning his premises every day because of the need to hide the 
machinery in her home, is a blatant illustration of this. It is not impossible that 
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Mr. M., at some stage in his relationship with Metrorail, adopted a similar 
behaviour, and this would suffice to explain why his enterprise has not received 
any further tenders since then. Such assumption could not however be verified. 
The reference person indicated in Mr. M’s “business profile” for the Metrorail 
job, was not listed in the Metrorail staff directory (he may have left the 
company). 
Profitability and Members’ remuneration 
In the absence of written financial information, it is difficult to ascertain the level 
of profitability of the businesses. Asked whether they were doing any profit, or 
earning anything beyond their costs, both entrepreneurs said that they never saw 
any profits coming in. They added that they never paid themselves a salary 
(although Mrs. S. added that “now that we have seen that it is how people do it, 
so in future we will pay ourselves a salary too”).  
But it seems that by answering so, they had a perception of profit and salary as 
some liquid money that is left over, and goes to rest on a bank account because it 
can’t be better used elsewhere.  
In reality, the stated absence of profits or remuneration had to be pondered by the 
following considerations: 
- Although they did not pay themselves a salary, Mr. M and Mrs. S. would 
“automatically” (as they put it), use business funds to cover private 
expenses. They suggested, for example, that the business was necessary 
to enable them to feed their children or pay the school fees. There is 
therefore some form of informal remuneration taking place. 
- They also gave indications that they were able to buy new equipment out 
of the business’s cash (e.g. the drill). Of course, one can wonder whether 
the funds spent were ultimately the business’s own (i.e. profit), or owed 
to the various creditors.  
 
To ascertain the income potential of the businesses more precisely, I asked for 
Mr. M’s monthly income and expenses in his previous contract with MetroRail, 
and simulated an income statement as follows.  
Table 34.1 shows the pro-forma monthly income statement as reconstituted 
through the interview: 
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Table 34.1- Reconstituted annual income statement for 1998 – Metrorail 
contract 
 Monthly annual  
Turnover 35 000 420 000 (this was Mr. M’s best year)
Wages and salaries    
    - permanent staff 20 000 240 000 (not including members’ salaries)
    - casual staff 500 6 000 (guess - when permanent staff is sick or 
absent)
Unemployment Insurance Fund 2% 4 920 
Chemicals and consumables 2 500 30 000 
Petrol 2 000 24 000 (for the supervision of workers)
Telephone 500 6 000 
Insurance 
  
2 000 (to the extent that it was indeed being 
paid) 
Torches and batteries   1 000 
Overalls   1 500 
(Operating) Profit  104 580 
Theoretic Profit margin   25% 
Possible other costs: rent, 
stationary, finance costs, 
depreciation, etc   ? 
(interviewees could not give details)
 
At first, the theoretic profit margin of 25% resulting from this simulation appears 
surprisingly high. The table seems to indicate that the businesses were indeed 
able to earn over 100 thousand Rand per year for Mr. M. and Mrs. S’s private 
needs (or for the purchase of additional equipment for the business). If so, the 
businesses would no longer qualify as the “survivalist businesses”, which the 
interviews had suggested.  
However, it is clear that this simulation is too optimistic, for the following 
reasons: 
- This calculation is based on Mr. M.’s first year of working with 
MetroRail. This, however, was his best year – after earning a monthly 
R35 000 in the first year, his sales went down to 20 and later 17 thousand 
Rand in the second year, and 12 thousand Rand in the third year.  
- The income statement is not complete, although Mr. M. confirmed that 
he had included all costs that he could think of. Especially, the 
calculation does not include any financial costs although they may have 
been very high. The following sections estimate interest costs.  
Mr. M. was also not able to quantify costs for the general administration 
of his business, like stationary, tendering costs, depreciation of his assets, 
etc. These additional costs may turn the profit figure calculated into a 
loss.  
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- It is also possible that the business had expenses that were not used for 
any economical purpose. For example, Mrs. S. mentioned that she was 
renting a small house for R480/month, with the intention of using it as a 
spaza shop. Since the shop was not actually in operation, the rent could 
be considered as additional “deadweight costs”. 
- On the other hand, Mr. M. was so keen to prove me that his work was not 
generating any decent profit, that he may have slightly inflated his cost 
indications. This, however, cannot be verified.  
6. Financial management 
As close corporations, both businesses are bound to some legal requirements; 
however, their financial administration is almost inexistent. The CC registration, 
it seems, is just used to create the illusion of a professionally managed enterprise. 
Or as another Gugulethu-based informal entrepreneur said, “you need to be 
registered otherwise they take advantage of you”.  
Sales and Cost Capture and Monitoring 
The keeping of records is rudimentary. Due to the nature of the business, there is 
no need for the usual sales records – but Mr. M and Mrs. S keep their contracts 
as well as the slips of their payments (in a shoebox-type filing). They also keep 
receipts of the purchases they do and “pile them together”. Lastly, they record 
the wages paid to their workers in a staff register.  
They indicated that they saw no other records to keep: they had no accounts 
payable since they were paying cash as much as they could. They could also not 
afford to keep stock, hence there was no need for a stock record. 
There is also no record of the business funds being used for private purposes, and 
inversely. Mr. M. suggested that they did not actually distinguish between the 
two accounts: “when you have a need, you automatically use the money from the 
business”. On the other hand, the equipment listed as business assets could just 
as well be regarded as private assets. The sewing machines, for example, were 
purchased prior to the registration of Mrs. S’s CC. 
Accounting and setting up of financial statements 
Prior to setting up the first interview with the couple, I asked Mrs. S. 
telephonically, in accordance with the case study procedure, whether they would 
agree to give me an access to the financial statements of their businesses. She 
answered positively.  
However, during the first interview, it became clear that none of the businesses 
had any financial statements to provide, Mrs S.’s because her business was still 
too young, Mr. M’s because he considered that he could not afford the cost of 
accountants.  
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Mr. M’s business 
Mr. M. argued as follows: 
“When you are very small, you start things on your own, because you 
don’t know how it goes. Then you have problems, you look for people to 
help. I had an accountant, but it costs you a lot of money, so you leave that 
one, you take another one. But eventually you don’t get right people to do 
things good for you” 
At that stage, however, he was indicating that he had partial accounting, and that 
he was striving to put order into these accounts.  
“Yes, I have statements but they are not complete statements.” “Now I 
have no work but I try to put my books straight”. 
On the following interview, after he was asked several times to show me what 
his rudimentary accounts would look like, he produced a ‘business profile’, that 
contained no accounting information apart from the size of the jobs that he had 
been contracted to do in the past. On the question of whether he had ever been 
doing tax filings, he answered: “No, I send the tax my papers and that is all”. It is 
probable that he had not been paying tax at all. He indicated that the businesses 
were not VAT registered, which was in contradiction to his business profile, 
which indicated a VAT registration number.  
Mr. M’s business profile also included the references of an accounting officer, in 
line with the requirements for CCs, however this accountant was not listed in the 
telephone directory.  
Mrs. S.’s business 
Similarly, when registering her CC, Mrs. S must have appointed an accounting 
officer. However, it was probable that her accounting would also soon be 
inexistent. Mrs. S suggested that “[she] would like to have someone to help [her] 
keep [her] books in order, because [she] do[es] not have the skills. But [she] 
can’t pay for it”. It is unlikely that, after closing her first year of operation, Mrs. 
S. will produce any kind of financial statements on her business.  
Working capital and Cash management 
Working capital finance seems to have been the most fatal issue for Mr. M’s 
business. His wife pretended to have learnt lessons from his misfortune: “I have 
learnt from my husband not to rely on credit. Now I pay cash as often as I can”.  
Mr. M’s business  
Mr. M., otherwise reserved, got very talkative about the issue of working capital, 
related to the tender process. He indicated that it had been very difficult for him 
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to cope with it. In the one to three weeks that elapsed between the signature of 
the contract and the start of the job, he had to organize everything, buy the 
equipment and the materials, hire workers, etc. – even if he may not have had the 
funds for that. He was resenting that the client did not give any help for start-up 
finance.  
This was only one part of the problem, because after the first month of work, 
when he was able to write his first invoice, he would again face more costs for 
the payment of his workers and the purchase of consumables for the second 
month. The client usually took one more month to pay, sometimes more.  
In business terms this meant that, in addition to equipment finance, the business 
had a need for 2 months of working capital. Presumably, Mr. M. went into this 
business with very little initial capital. It is possible that he was able to borrow 
from friends and family on an interest-free basis, but this was unlikely to be 
sufficient. If he had to borrow the balance at an interest of 30% per month, the 
interest costs would have considerably eroded his profit, hence his repayment 
capacity. This would have exacerbated his debt, with a risk of him being caught 
in a spiral of debt. 
To illustrate this, a simulation was run with two different scenarios, as illustrated 
in Table 34.2. Although speculative, these two simulations show that, if the 
business starts its first job with no or hardly any working capital, the costs of 
finance will force it to fail. The profit is not sufficient to cover the exorbitant 
interest charges, so that – even if the client pays a constant contribution as agreed 
– the business is obliged to take on a loan whose amount increases every month 
to pay for the interest. 
Based on the reconstituted annual financial statement simulated in Table 34.1, if 
one assumes average monthly interest charges of R9 800, the annual costs would 
be R117 600, which would more than use up the operating profit of R104 580.  
If, on the other hand, the business starts with an interest-free capital of R3 500 
(scenario 2), this will be just enough to reduce financial charges so that they can 
be covered by monthly profits. In that case, the working capital loan rolls over at 
a level of app. R26 000, bringing monthly interest costs of R8 100, or R97 200 
for the year, slightly lower than the operating profit. However, even this scenario 
applies only for as long as the clients’ payments are on time and are kept on the 
same level. In the case of Mr. M’s Metrorail contract, the extent of the job was 
revised down after the first year, presumably bringing the business’s turnover 
under breakeven and condemning it to failure.  
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Table 34.2 – Simulation of interest costs for CS4a 
Mr. M.’s best past 
Metrorail contract 
Scenario 1: 
Initial own or interest-free capital = 
R500 
Scenario 2: 
Initial own or interest-free 
capital = R3500 
Day –7 (i.e. 7 days 
before starting the job) 
Cash out = 525039 
Loan 1 = R4750 for 2,25 months 
(until first payment) to cover upfront 
expenses 
Loan 1 = R1750 for 2,25 
months  
Day 28 (end of first 
month) 
Cash out = 25 50040 
Loan 2 = R25 500 for 1 month, to 
cover costs of first month and upfront 
expenses of 2nd month 
Loan 2 = R25 500 
Day 60 (end of second 
month: first contractual 
payment of  
R35 000) 
Cash out = 25 91041 + 
financial costs 
Interest charges on loan 1 and 2 @ 
30% per month: R10 856 
To repay these two loans and the 
interest, and cover the expenses of the 
second month, business must contract 
a new loan for 1 month: 
Loan 3 = R 32 016 
Interest charges on loan 1 
and 2 = R8831 
 
Loan 3 = 26 991 
Day 90 (second 
contractual payment)  
Cash out = 25 910 + 
financial costs 
Interest charges on loan 3: R9 605 
Loan 4 = R 32 531 
Interest charges on loan 3: 
R8 097 
Loan 4 = R 25 999 
Etc.   
Estimated Interest 
charges per year 
R117 600 R97 200  
  
In addition to this reality, which rationally condemns the under-resourced 
business to failure by the interplay of low profit margins and high interest costs, 
it is possible that some management mistakes have aggravated the situation of 
Mr. M.  
Indeed, the scenarios above are based on the assumption that clients’ payments 
are entirely allocated to reimbursement of old debts and corresponding interest 
charges, and that loans are always contracted only to cover operating expenses. If 
Mr. M. has occasionally diverted part of the cash inflows to other purposes, such 
as the purchase of new business equipment, or for private purposes, e.g. in 
                                                 
39 Composed of: small tools and overalls prior to starting job: R2500; materials for 1st month: 
R2500; petrol: R250. 
40 Composed of: Wages for first month: R20500, Petrol: R2000, Telephone: R500, Consumables 
for 2nd month: R2500 
41 Same as Day 28 plus UIF contribution for 1st month, R410 
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connection with the children’s school fees. In this case, the debt spiral would 
have been accelerated.  
Mrs. S’s business  
Mrs. S. was adamant that she learned from Mr. M.’s failures by avoiding the use 
of supplier credit. However, it is probable that her learning curve remained 
wishful thinking, since she was not exempted from the need to keep a high level 
of working capital, nor did she had other alternatives than debt. In addition, other 
than Mr. M., she was involved in activities that required substantial equipment 
investments upfront, which she could even less afford. 
Again, a simulation was run – this time based on a prospective contract of Mrs. 
S. The job was to start on 1 July – so she expected notification around the 15 
June.  
The management of working capital for Mrs. S. in this contract would be slightly 
less difficult than for Mr. M. above, because she would have the benefit of being 
paid 15 days after setting up the invoice, instead of 30 days or more for Mr. M.  
However, her situation is made more difficult by the fact that she needs R16 500 
for equipment finance. She is hoping to cover this need by a 2 months supplier 
credit as last time – a hope which is unlikely to materialise since she has 
defaulted on her first loan. Even if she was successful, the need to repay the loan 
after 2 months, even with no interest, would bring her back to where her husband 
had been: it would create a need for cash almost as high as one month’s 
operating costs. 
As a result, she would have a rolling over need of working capital that would 
fluctuate between app. R20 000 at the middle of every month, and R 40 000 at 
the end of the month. She is unlikely to be able to finance this need cheaply. 
Assuming a 30% p.m. interest rate, she would have interest charges of R8 500 to 
R10 000 per month. 
Asked whether she was aware of that need for rolling over capital, she replied: 
“Yes, I am aware, but I cannot find that money, that is my problem”. She was 
nevertheless hoping that she would be granted the contract.  
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Table 34.3 – CS4b’s interest cost simulation  
Mrs. S. prospective 
cleaning contract 
Scenario 1: 
Initial own or interest-free capital = 
R500 
Scenario 2: 
Initial own or interest-free 
capital = R3500 
Day –7 (i.e. 7 days 
before starting the job) 
Cash out = 21 00042 
Loan 1 = R16 500 for equipment 
(supposedly interest-free) 
Loan 2 = R4 000 for upfront 
expenses for ¾ month 
Loan 1 = R16 500 for 
equipment  
Loan 2 = R1 000 for 
upfront expenses 
Day 30 (end of first 
month) 
Cash out = 18 90043 
Loan 3 = R18 900 for ½ month Loan 3 = R18 900  
Day 45: first contractual 
payment of R 20 790 
Interest charges on loan 2 and 3 @ 
30% per month: R3 735 
Loan 4 = R22 345 for 1 month 
Interest charges on loan 2 
and 3: R3 060 
Loan 4 = R18 670 
 
Day 60 (end of second 
month) 
Cash out = 18900 
To cover the expenses of the second 
month, business must contract a new 
loan for 1 month: 
Loan 5 = R18 900, i.e.  
total amount outstanding = R41 145 
Loan 5 = R18 900, i.e.  
total amount outstanding = 
R37 570 
Day 75 (second 
contractual payment) R 
20 790  
Interest charges on loan 4 and 5: 
R9 539 
Loan 4 = R20 455 
Interest charges on loan 4 
and 5: R8 436 
Loan 4 = R16 780 
Etc.   
Estimated Interest 
charges per year 
R102 000 R120 000  
 
Ongoing access to finance and relationship with creditors 
Mr. M 
From general statements made in the interviews, it seems that Mr. M. had no 
proper strategy about securing finance for his contracts. This probably came 
from being unprepared for the need for finance and having no time. This 
explains why he chose supplier credit as the most straightforward source. 
Although he gave clear indications that this mode of financing did not work well 
for him, he did not give further details about how he dealt with the problems that 
                                                 
42 Composed of: machinery and equipment : R15 000, uniforms R1 500, chemicals : R3 000, 
petrol : R1 000, telephone : R500. 
43 Composed of: Wages for first month : R14 400, Costs for 2nd month : R4 500 
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came up. One may only speculate that suppliers put pressure on him to repay 
debts and refused to grant further credit, and that he may have been obliged to 
turn to other solutions, in particular, delay staff payments.  
Mrs. S 
Building on her husband’s experience, Mrs. S. chose not to make any use of 
supplier credit. She decided to prefer pure moneylenders. However, her 
experience was also not conclusive: 
- Formal Microlenders: 
Mrs. S. reported about her attempts to draw on funds from formal micro-
lenders (“the ones in the City”). “They are difficult. Because for example 
if you have a judgment against your name, even if the amount is under 
R3 000, they don’t want to give you. Like me, my name is in the Credit 
Bureaus for under R3 000, they don’t want to know”. 
- Informal (township) moneylenders: 
In her first interview, Mrs. M. was still optimistic about township micro-
lenders. “They trust me, they understand where I come from”. On the 
question of the procedure to be granted a micro-loan from a township 
lender, she just casually replied that she “had to fill-in the forms”.  
At that stage, she only complained about the exorbitant interest costs that she had 
to pay. “If I ask for R100 for a month, I will pay back R25 or 30 interest at the 
end of the month”. This is close to the interest rates practiced by the suppliers.  
In the second interview, though, she proved to be far less optimistic about the 
process of borrowing from moneylenders.  
“They are very cruel. They take advantage of you. They know that you 
are desperate. So they wait until the 11
th
 hour, when you are very 
desperate, and then they make you sign papers, you don’t know what you 
sign. They are very, very cruel, they want to kill you”.  
This radical shift in her view about the informal moneylenders within a month 
visibly corresponds to the borrowing cycle. From being at the receiving end, 
Mrs. S. suddenly found herself unable to repay and probably found that the 
procedures of these lenders to recover owed funds were as unscrupulous as the 
loan-granting process was easy.  
Government agencies  
At some stage, Mrs. S. expressed a wish about what government policy should 
do, which betrayed her naivety:  
“They should lend me enough money so that I could fill all my gaps, and 
then I would have only one person, I would talk to you”. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 34: Narrative on case studies 4a+b Page 517 
 
 
7. Tentative Financial ratios 
Calculating financial ratios is speculative since there are no financial statements 
for any of the businesses. However, a simulation of these ratios gives interesting 
insights; it shows that the two businesses cumulate all financial problems. The 
working capital cycle will not be treated again here since it has eben reviewed in 
detail in the previous section.  
Cost structure 
The first problem is a high level of costs, or in other words an insufficient 
margin. There are two main reasons for this: the high competition of tenders, and 
the presumed high levels of overhead costs, especially finance costs, of which 
the entrepreneurs are not fully aware and which are therefore not properly 
reflected in the offers made to tenders.  
Table 34.4 – Estimated Cost Structure for Mr. M’s business (contract with 
MetroRail) 
CS4a Low High Mean 
Variable costs (wages, UIF, consumables, petrol) 72,6% 72,6% 72,6% 
Fixed costs (telephone, insurance, small 
equipment, protective clothing) 
10 500 10 500 10 500 
Finance costs (estimated) 97 200 117 600 107 400 
Possible other costs: rent, stationary, 
depreciations, etc 
800 3 000 1 900 
Breakeven 395 985 478 467 437 226 
    
 Year 1  Year 3 
Actual Turnover 420 000  144 000 
Break-even (average, with adjusted financial 
costs)44 
437 226  199 033 
Deficit to mean breakeven -4%  -28% 
 
In this simulation, it appears that the margin on variable costs, which would 
suffice if finance was available free of charge, is too low to cover the high 
                                                 
44 For the breakeven calculation, it would have been incorrect to treat finance costs as absolute 
fixed costs, since these costs are related to the working capital, hence decrease when turnover 
decreases. However, expressing interest charges as variable costs would bring the level of 
variable costs to 96% (low estimation) or 101% of turnover, in which case a breakeven analysis 
becomes meaningless. Therefore, financial costs were re-estimated for Year 3 (which has the 
lowest turnover) following the same logic as for Year 1, showing that the decrease of financial 
costs was less than proportional to the turnover decrease. Hence the deficit to breakeven is 
aggravated. 
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presumed financial costs.  
This causes in almost every scenario a loss, which was estimated as follows: 
Table 34.5 – Estimation of CS4a’s profit or loss 
 Year 1 Year 3 
 Best case Worst case Mean Best case Worst case Mean 
Profit / Loss 6 580 -16 020 -4 720 -12 086 -21 886 -16 986 
In % of turnover 2% -4% -1% -8% -15% -12% 
 
For Mr. M., dealing with the problem of costs involved several difficulties. The 
possibilities to cut costs are often restrained by contractual clauses, especially as 
far as labour costs are concerned: as Mr. M. emphasised, government contracts 
often stipulate the number of employees and their wages. Therefore, businesses 
can only cut other costs, such as drop the workers’ insurance (although it is 
presumably also stipulated in the contract), buy less expensive chemicals 
(although, as Mr. M. mentioned, the brand of chemical to be used is also fixed in 
the contract). 
An additional problem is the possibility of deadweight costs. This possibility 
could not be exhaustively studied in the two interviews, but Mrs. S.’s mention 
that she has been renting a house for several months (in the hope of setting up a 
spaza shop at some later stage), indicates that the couple does not have a real 
understanding for the real necessity of costs and their adequate timing. Decisions 
such as this one could unnecessarily exacerbate the businesses’ cost problem. 
It then seems that the position of Mrs. S.’s business in respect of costs is not 
better than the one experienced by her husband earlier.  
Interest coverage 
Again, calculations are hypothetic since all elements, and especially interest 
charges, are estimated. Nevertheless, it is clear that the business has an interest 
coverage problem. 
Table 34.6 – Estimated interest coverage for CS4a (Year 1 and 3) 
 Year 1 Year 3 
 Low High Low High 
Operating profit 104 580 104 580 27 714 27 714 
Interest charges 97 200 117 600 39 000 47 800 
coverage ratio 1,1 0,9 0,7 0,6 
 
Under the assumptions made, it would seem that only in the first year and under 
the low estimation of interest costs (that is with a start-up capital of R3500), the 
operating profit would have sufficed to cover interest charges (ignoring all other 
Un
ive
r i
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 34: Narrative on case studies 4a+b Page 519 
 
 
possible costs, such as rent, depreciations, etc). In the higher estimation, there is 
already a deficit of 11% to cover finance charges, and in the simulation that was 
run for Year 3, where the turnover is far lower, the deficit is even larger. 
Again, even though Mrs. S. has attempted to escape from this debt trap by 
avoiding supplier credit, and if she has managed to obtain a (so-called) interest-
free equipment loan, the circumstances of her business have forced her to turn to 
moneylenders, so there is every reason to believe that her business will suffer 
from the same deficits regarding interest coverage.  
Equity ratio 
To estimate the equity ratio, it is necessary to validate assumptions on the initial 
investment made by entrepreneurs – which Mr. M. and Mrs. S. could not indicate 
clearly. 
Table 34.7 – CS4a’s equity ratio simulation, depending on initial investment 
 High Low 
Assumed initial investment  R3 500 R500 
Initial Equity Ratio    
Equity Yr 1 3 500 500 
Debt 3 months 25 999 32 531 
Equity ratio (middle of Year 1) 11,9% 1,5% 
   
Equity Ratio End of Yr 3   
Initial contribution 3 500 500 
Profit or loss Yr 1 6 580 -16 020 
Loss Yr 2 -2 753 -18 953 
Loss Yr 3 -12 086 -21 886 
Debt end of yr 3 (stand alone) 12 000 15 000 
Plus debt carried over from 
previous years 
6 500 24 398 
Total Equity -4 759 -56 359 
Total Debt 18 500 39 398 
Equity ratio (End of Year 3) -34,6% Not meaningful 
Sources: simulations based on statements made by Mr. M. 
As the table shows, the multiplication of debts to secure working capital has 
been such that the equity ratio has probably already reached critical levels as 
early as after the first three months of trading. Even assuming an initial 
member’s contribution of R3 500, the equity ratio after three months would be 
under 12%. In the case of an initial investment of R500 only, the equity ratio 
would have been only 1,5%. 
After three years of business with MetroRail, with turnover decreasing and 
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deficits aggravating, there is almost no chance that anything remained of the 
initial equity. In the pessimistic scenario, the accumulated losses may even have 
been over R50 000, in complete disproportion to the initial investment. In that 
case, an equity ratio is not meaningful anymore since the losses accumulated are 
even higher than the debts that might have been secured. Even in the optimistic 
scenario, the equity ratio is far under 0 at almost –35%. 
One may wonder if these estimations are correct, since they seem in conflict with 
a statement by Mr. M., who indicated that he has occasionally bought further 
tools and equipment, based on cash surpluses generated by his business. If these 
surpluses correspond to profits, then it would mean that the business has been 
able to raise its asset value by accumulating some equity. However, it is more 
likely that the cash flow has been diverted from creditors for the purpose of 
enabling occasional new investments, even if the business could not really afford 
them. In other words, it seems to have been Mr. M’s strategy, knowing that he 
was caught in a spiral of debt which he was not able to repay, to rather default 
consciously on his debts and use the cash flow for his own benefit.  
Debt maturity mismatch 
In addition to the level of debt, the problem of the maturity is worrying. Mr. M. 
and Mrs. S. have been unable to secure long-term finance, and Mrs. S. has had to 
finance even her equipment through short-term funds.  
Even with the strongest financial discipline and with the best luck, Mrs. S. could 
never have been able to repay her equipment loan within 3 months or even 
within 12 months. In fact, assuming that she had been able to realise the 
expected profit of R1 890/month as soon as month 3 (implicitly ignoring 
financial and other overhead costs), assuming that the profit in the first profitable 
2 months would have been used to constitute a “fund” to cover working capital 
needs, and further assuming that from the third month the monthly profit would 
have been used by half for the remuneration of the member and by half for the 
repayment of the equipment loan, she would still have required 22,5 months to 
repay the machinery. 
Considering financial and probably other costs, it is already clear that her profit 
will not materialise and she will have to default on her equipment credit. 
Mismanagement of course aggravates the situation.   
Variability / evolution of profile  
If the two businesses may have seemed courageous and attractive initially, 
winning tenders because of the institutions’ will to encourage black micro 
entrepreneurship, they seem to be both condemned to a linear degradation of 
their profile in all respects, although this may not yet be visible for Mrs. S’s 
business, which is still able to win contracts.  
Instead of experience and references, it seems that the two businesses can only 
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accumulate losses, new credits and new defaults. All ratios have rapidly “turned 
red”. Maybe even more serious is the presumed accumulation of bad reputation, 
at least in the cleaning sector: the history shows that Mr. M’s business has lost 
all his contracts and Mrs. S., having deceived her client with regard to the 
presence of machines on the site, is unlikely to be recommended or even engaged 
by the client again. There may be more hope in the building renovation area, 
where Mr. M. is still occasionally granted jobs (under Mrs. S.’s business name). 
The only appearance of improvement which they seem to safeguard is with 
regard to their equipment, as they still manage to replace tools and acquire new 
ones – although this is at the cost of more defaults on debts. 
8. Approach to business 
In the two interviews, it became increasingly clear that Mr. M. and Mrs. S.’s 
approach to business was a decisive element explaining the businesses’ failures. 
Documenting this approach properly would no doubt require more qualified and 
focused investigations, but the case study would miss an important point if it 
wasn’t at least attempting to tackle this complex issue.  
The discussions that took place during the semi-structured interviews invariably 
ended with the same unspoken conclusion: that business was not going well, that 
the entrepreneurs were in trouble. Each time, I tried to understand the 
entrepreneurs’ strategy, the way out. I was hoping for (and unconsciously trying 
to provoke) a realistic but courageous statement acknowledging the flaws in the 
current concept, and looking for the hard ways to redress the situation.  
Invariably, two groups of equally naïve comments came: one highly optimistic 
(“we have to keep going and hope that little by little things will get better”), the 
other one pessimistic (“nobody helps us, those people they are very cruel”). 
Never did Mr. M. or Mrs. S. acknowledge that their business model was 
condemned to fail.  
The entrepreneur’s social status  
A factor that possibly blurs the perceptions of Mr. M. and Mrs. S. about their 
business performance is the satisfaction with their social status as entrepreneurs. 
To some extent this status involves some altruist considerations: Both 
entrepreneurs were talkative about their desire to help the community by giving 
jobs, training people, etc.  
The fact that they do employ neighbours or relatives, however precarious this 
employment may be, probably procures them at least respect, if not privileges 
within a community in dire need of job opportunities.  
This impression of success reflected by the community’s perception causes Mr. 
M. and Mrs. S. to nurture even more unrealistic dreams. They confirmed that 
they see their businesses as a first phase by which they would accumulate skills 
and capital in order to later realise their dreams. Mrs. S had the biggest visions, 
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seeing herself owning a big factory and employing about 50 people whom she 
would train and nurture and “supply them with machines”, while running a spaza 
shop with a telephone (an activity which she perceived as very lucrative), to 
provide additional income. Mr. M. suggested that his dream was to invest in a 
large-scale wood workshop, where he could go back to the work he was trained 
for, while providing jobs to the community. 
Such a fantasy seems difficult to believe in a context where, economically 
speaking, the two enterprises are effectively destroying value, and the 
skills/experience gained in the first failure have helped little to prevent the 
distress of the second. But one may wonder how long the community’s sympathy 
will last in a context where the number and amounts of debts that are not 
honoured increases every month.  
The passive attitude in business 
Unlike many other entrepreneurs who have invested much personal creativity 
and involvement into their firms, the attachment of Mr. M. and Mrs. S. to their 
businesses seems to come only from resignation and a lack of alternative 
projects. A sentence frequently repeated by Mr. M. illustrates this attitude: 
“Yes, this is no good, but what can we do, it is better than folding hands when 
children must go to school.”  
In fact, the perception of their role in the business was submissive and linear 
(procedural). This may be a legacy from the apartheid time, where black people 
were expected (and trained) to be executors rather than thinkers.  
Other empty sentences from Mr. M. showed that his ambition was quantitative 
rather than qualitative: “As long as you have something to do, work is going on” 
or “Business has to grow”. 
Therefore, as described in the previous section “management style and 
philosophy”, both husband and wife seemed not to be involved directly in their 
businesses, but rather filling in forms, organising, driving around, “supervising” 
as written on their document. They certainly did not show any concern for the 
customer’s satisfaction – a paradox in entrepreneurship. 
Another consequence of their focus on doing their “homework” properly was 
their tendency to incriminate other people for their lack of success. If in spite of 
all their efforts they are in distress, then someone is “cruel” or cheating them. 
The various formal and informal financial institutions, credit bureaus, as well as 
government-based SME support schemes and even the clients themselves were 
alternatively blamed for the difficulties encountered.  
Conversely, the passive attitude – and the fact of being usually confronted with 
negative reactions to their pleas – may also have generated an absence of critical 
thinking about offers made to them. In particular, it is probable that Mr. M. did 
not think much about the cost and conditions of the credit that suppliers were 
offering him – or about possible alternative ways of covering his need for 
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working capital. Similarly, although she was determined to avoid the trap of 
supplier credit which her husband had been victim of, it is probable that Mrs. S. 
did not think long before accepting the two-months credit offer made by the 
vendor of cleaning machines. If she had given it enough thought, she would have 
known that 2 months would be far too little time for her to generate sufficient 
cash flow to repay the machines in full. If she had planned it correctly, she may 
have been able to seek alternative and more appropriate financial support, for 
example from NGOs supporting female micro-entrepreneurs. Instead, in 
accepting the vendor’s credit, as well as in signing microfinance agreements, she 
seems to have obeyed to the wisdom of “Whatever you get, take it, otherwise 
you may end up with nothing” – a wisdom that brings disillusions. 
9. Final reflections 
The purpose of this last section is to reflect on internal (personal/financial) and 
external (structural/political) factors contributing to the failure of the two 
businesses presented. The aim of this exercise is not so much to identify a 
“culprit” for the situation observed, than to highlight some specific contextual 
factors which are particular to these township businesses, and may not be 
immediately present to the mind of readers used to “first world” SMEs. Lastly, 
we seek clues about the representativeness of these two cases.  
Internal problems 
Literacy problem  
The first obvious issue that hindered a sound and thoughtful management of the 
businesses was the deficient literacy of both entrepreneurs. Although they had 
had a basic schooling and had learnt to read and write in English, they did not 
cope with the formal language of business correspondence, tender documents, 
and probably other documents like the possible credit documents provided by the 
moneylenders.  
The impression gained in the interviews was that, when confronted with such 
documents, their reactions were guided by the context rather than the content. 
Although anecdotal, the episode of the fax illustrated this fact: while the fax was 
merely asking about their availability in a context of modified dates of the job 
tendered for, their comments showed that they had no clear understanding of the 
content, but they knew they had to sign it, in order for the process to “go on”. 
While the blind signing of this particular fax was of little practical consequence, 
the same fact has had dramatic consequences in other circumstances, especially 
in connection with microcredits. In particular, Mrs. S. was not aware of the 
commitments that she was taking on by signing – and realised only later the 
drawbacks for her.  
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A further issue in the regard was the lacking financial literacy45. The intuitive 
understanding of Mr. M. and Mrs. S. for financial matters was limited, it seemed, 
to the most basic concepts. They were aware of the concepts of income and 
expenses (or rather cash in and cash out), and were able to fund a basic costing / 
pricing calculation on these. They also understood the concept of interest and 
knew the price of borrowing money, but this cost was not sufficiently present to 
their mind since they forgot to include it into their cost calculations for tenders. 
They also did not seem to be aware that the level of debt that one can afford to 
take on had to be kept in proportion to ones’ own assets or income, and that the 
fact of taking on a substantial debt meant exposing oneself to the personal risks 
of insolvency (risk of losing personal property).  
Lastly and most dramatically, they seemed unable to carry out any rational 
planning, especially cash planning, and, although Mr. M. had been confronted 
with it early on, they still did not seem to have a proper grasp of the fact that in a 
business like theirs, working capital is a permanent, rolling-over need.  
Financial needs 
Financially speaking, working capital was, indeed, the key factor of failure for 
Mr. M. The jobs he was fulfilling had a low barrier to entry, as far as required 
equipment was concerned. But, as many entrepreneurs, Mr. M. was unprepared 
for the need for working capital. The lack of back-up resources in a poverty-
stricken community compelled him to use expensive credits which his business 
could not pay for.  
Mrs. S. thought she was learning from him, and apparently made alternative 
arrangements for her working capital needs – unfortunately she did not give 
many details about these arrangements. Sadly, she did not realise that the 
business she was engaging in was more capital intensive, and that she had to 
contract substantial debts to build up the equipment. Hence, ironically, she who 
had “learnt not to rely on credit” was the most indebted of the two! 
It is sometimes argued that obtaining equipment finance is easier than working 
capital (GEM 2002), especially for entrepreneurs who cannot provide collateral. 
One may indeed assume that, in spite of her negative credit records, a new 
female entrepreneur like Mrs. S. may have been able to secure some long-term 
support for the purchase of machinery – or else, she may have been able to make 
other arrangements, such as leasing. But Mrs. S., unaware of possibilities and 
incapable of critical financial planning, did not draw any benefits from these 
apparently more favourable prospects, and got caught in the trap of debt even 
more rapidly and dramatically than her husband had been. 
                                                 
45 The National Foundation for Education Research in the UK have defined financial literacy as: 
“the ability to make informed judgements and to take effective decisions regarding the use and 
management of money.” (1992, quoted by Coetzee et al, 2004, p. 7)   
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Financial behaviour generally  
Beside a lack of literacy and a lack of resources to cope with the financial needs 
of their enterprises, both entrepreneurs seem to have had an inappropriate general 
behaviour in relation to their finance: 
• Engaging in expenses that are not currently useful, only in prevision of future 
needs (e.g. renting a house with the plan of converting it to a spaza shop, 
“later”); 
• Not keeping any reserves, but rather spending as soon as cash comes in (e.g. 
purchase of a new drill instead of settling debts).  
• Hiding rather than seeking amicable arrangements with creditors (especially 
the vendor of cleaning machines) 
 
The former two types of behaviour, which are related, seem to respond to an 
urging need to spend any cash that comes in, rather than keep it. This urge may 
be caused by (a) the lack of a supportive infrastructure for savings, especially 
access to and cost of bank accounts, (b) a fear that physically keeping the cash 
(in the pocket or under the bed) may not pay off, either because of robberies or 
because of the pressure of family and the every day environment to spend the 
cash, or (c) the attraction of marketing / awareness of what is missing, making 
the entrepreneurs permanently unsatisfied with what they have, as opposed to the 
psychological satisfaction procured by spending money, which gives the illusion 
of being rich. 
The latter behaviour was probably caused by despair, as Mrs. S. saw no 
possibility for her to repay the debt. However, it would have been more 
appropriate to seek (if need be with the support of a legal advisor) a rescheduling 
of the credit to approximately 2 years, which is a more reasonable time for the 
payment of such equipment. But this behaviour seems to be typical of poor 
people’s psychology, as commented on in different contexts:  
“When every possibility of efficient handling on the present is 
excluded, what is left is cheating, tricking out the present reality and 
all its interdictions, in a very costly way since it is rarely effective. This 
is how it goes almost always and everywhere with the life of the 
poorest in the richest societies.”
 46
 
                                                 
46 Abdelmalek Sayad, 1995, pp. 97-98 (Un Nanterre algérien, terre de bidonvilles – Editions 
Autrement, Série Monde/Français d’Ailleurs, Peuple d’ici, HS n° 85, Paris, 1995) – freely 
translated from French. 
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External factors hindering Mr. M. and Mrs. S.’s success 
Reckless lending?  
The first question is whether they have been victims of reckless lending, either 
on the part of suppliers of materials (for Mr. M.), the supplier of equipment (for 
Mrs. S) or the moneylenders.  
Suppliers and moneylenders charged very high interest rates, but this is current 
practice in informal areas and seems to reflect at least partly the risk of lending 
(high default rates) as well as the proportionately high administrative costs 
incurred in lending very small amounts. High interest rates are tolerated, under 
certain conditions, for microcredits in the revised Usury Act. The interest rates 
can thus be regarded as acceptable, but other practices of these lenders may 
correspond to reckless lending. This includes lending to highly indebted 
individuals, providing insufficient information to borrowers, implementing 
recovery procedures that disregard the usual legal frameworks. Unfortunately, 
the data available are insufficient for a definitive conclusion on these aspects. 
Another question is how to judge the behaviour of the vendor of cleaning 
machines, who has offered a 2 months credit to Mrs. S. for an expensive package 
of equipment, while it was rather unlikely that she would have been able to repay 
it so quickly. Was the credit period standard in the supplier’s dealings with large 
institutional customers? Has this vendor undertaken any check of the business’s 
credentials before offering the credit and if so, has he consciously profited of the 
naivete of Mrs. S., in the hope of repossessing the equipment after receiving a 
partial payment? Or was he just as naïve as she was? Has the vendor actually 
offered Mrs. S. the choice between a longer credit (possibly for 2 years) and a 
prompter repayment, with her deciding for the second option in order to obtain a 
discount?  
Flaws in Tender process  
While the data do not suffice to pinpoint inappropriate behaviour of lenders, who 
are private parties with their own interests, the public tender process – which has 
the explicit aim of supporting black economic empowerment – clearly needs 
improvements. The following aspects are flaws which make business particularly 
difficult for black emerging enterprises: 
• Delays and lack of communication during the tender procedure; 
• Selection of candidates only on the basis of written forms, while an interview 
would help to recognise to what extent the entrepreneurs were really 
prepared for the challenges of business; 
• Lack of information to unsuccessful candidates when their application is 
rejected; 
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• Very short notice to successful candidates before starting the job, giving the 
entrepreneurs little time to get organised; 
• Splitting the contracts into tiny jobs, which can no longer be made profitably 
(especially for the MetroRail contract, which after the first year was so 
reduced that it was impossible for Mr. M. to cover his costs); 
• Lack of a partnership approach between client and supplier – even mutual 
respect is not guaranteed; 
• And last but not least, absence of financial support, while a deposit upfront 
would help the entrepreneurs to cover their initial expenses and would avoid 
difficulties to organise working capital. 
 
For public actors there is certainly a potential to have a better efficiency in their 
procurement policies by adopting a more partnership-like relationship with their 
contractors, providing them with an optional mentorship programme and 
especially paying them promptly (or even upfront) to lower their need for 
working capital.  
General issues related to township infrastructure  
In addition to the factors above, Mr. M. and Mrs. S. have been victims of a series 
of general issues that are specific to township enterprises and affect the business 
climate in these areas: 
- poor town planning (long distances to drive, deficiencies of public 
transport); 
- lack of a proper infrastructure in the townships (telephone, banking 
infrastructure, business premises, etc.) 
- lack of safety.  
 
An additional factor, which is not specific to townships but tends to be even 
stronger there, is the lack of awareness about the availability of supports. For 
example, businesses should know where they could find legal help, business 
training or mentors, or other forms of advice.  
Generalisation  
The last question that needs to be addressed is whether these two cases are 
typical of township businesses, or rather an extreme exception.   
A first caution is to operate a clear distinction between “African (black) 
businesses” in general, and “township businesses” in particular. Black 
entrepreneurs who are able to establish their firms in developed urban areas, are 
not usually faced with the challenges that confront township entrepreneurs. 
Especially if they are young and come from the middle class, they are likely to 
have a better initial training, better back up resources and a better access to SME 
support services, than older, poorly trained and impoverished township 
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entrepreneurs. In other words, there are certainly many African micro businesses 
that are well managed.  
Looking specifically at township businesses, it would also be inappropriate to 
suggest that all of them follow the pattern described in these two case studies. 
There are certainly strong variations especially in the character of entrepreneurs, 
and we found that a number of them prefer to restrict their growth, and even 
remain dormant for long periods of time, rather than contracting debt to engage 
in unaffordable jobs.  
Nevertheless, both the internal (literacy and backup resources) and the external 
factors listed above, that have contributed to the difficulties of the two 
enterprises, are frequent in township environments. Therefore, it would not be 
surprising to find similar situations in many other businesses, with other 
entrepreneurs but in similar circumstances. There are plethoric reports of 
specialised institutions (such as the MFRC) to illustrate the spread of over-
indebtedness in poor communities, including small business owners. 
Another indicator of the frequency of debt-trapped individuals is found in the 
records of credit bureaus relative to delinquent debt. In 2004, Credit bureau 
Transunion ITC had 17 million “credit active” names on its database, with 
adverse credit reports on 15%, or about 2,5 million, of these.47 It can be hoped 
that increasing efforts of various government and financial sectors institutions, as 
well as NGOs, to increase financial literacy and borrower protection, will bear 
fruits and prevent a further escalation of these statistics.  
If they do not, the much-praised empowerment-focused procurement policies of 
public institutions will not help the likes of Mr. M. and Mrs. S. to develop 
successful businesses. The only consolation in the case of Mr. M. and Mrs. S. is 
that their businesses have enabled the couple to pay their children a better 
education than the one they have received, so that one can hope that the next 
generation will grow out of their parents’ distress. But this is a distant, slow and 
rather speculative outcome for the cost of the procurement policy. 
 
                                                 
47 Mail & Guardian, 11 May 2004, in “Delinquent debt tops R40bn” 
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Annexure 35 – Narrative of Case Study 5  
Operator offering Township Tours 
 
A seasonal business with a highly commited owner, which, after initial losses, 
has grown tremendously to become a key player in its niche, but has avoided 
bank debt for its operations.  
 
1. Business Short Portrait: 
Business Code Name: CS5 
Member’s initials: Mr. A. J. 
Member owns 100% of capital (since he bought 
the share of his former partner Mr. B. S.) 
Member’s ethnic background: coloured  
Member is also manager 
Form of registration: CC  
 
Sector of activity: 
Primary activity: SIC 7122 (Safaris and sightseeing bus tours) 
Product or Service: Township tours, other tours, airport transfers 
Business concept: independent – but starting other related company which will supply 
business to the older one 
Start-up date: 1998 
Current status: active 
 
Staff members:  
- Managers: 1 
- Permanent employees: 13 
- Casual staff: 1 
Annual turnover: R 1.1 million  
Total assets : R 434 thousand  
=> Size category: very small  
Main sources of finance:  
- Initially loans from friends and bank loan of father 
- Vehicle finance  
- Member’s loan 
 
2. Case study procedure 
In the process of searching suitable candidates for case studies, it appeared that 
many black entrepreneurs were likely to fall into the category ‘unconstrained’, 
especially because they had few fixed assets. This raised the thought of seeking 
more capital-intensive black entrepreneurs by targeting the township tourism 
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sector, which appeared likely to combine high black ownership as well as 
substantial asset bases (vehicles).  
Following this thought, brochures of operators were collected at Cape Town 
tourism. Mr. A.J., the owner of CS5, was the first entrepreneur contacted and 
asked for his willingness to participate in the study. He immediately accepted. 
Since it was the beginning of winter, hence a quiet season in the tourism 
industry, he was able to offer two long interviews in addition to further 
brochures and his financial statements.  
The study is based on the following sources: 
- 1 pre-telephonic interview  
- 2 on-site interviews of the member 
- financial statements for the years ended 28 Feb 2001, 02, 03 (with 
comparative figures for 2000) 
- 1 short interview of the “general manager” or head of administration  
- brochures  
- e-mail correspondence with the member (and accountant?) 
 
3. The business owner 
Background 
Mr. A. J. is in his early 40s. He holds a degree as well as a Higher Education 
Diploma, and worked as a teacher for 5 years before starting his business. As he 
put it, he “hated teaching so much, that [he] had to do something else, but [he] 
didn’t quite know what”.  
In 1997, a friend of him suggested that he could try to get involved in tourism, 
which was just beginning to develop after several decades of isolation but 
seemed a promising field. To Mr. A. J., it was clear that if he was to engage in 
tourism, it would be to show travellers the “real” South Africa, in its cultural 
diversity and riches.  
Mr. A.J. then took a tour guide course and registered as a tour guide with SA 
tourism. The tour guide training of the time left him unsatisfied, because it was 
too strongly focused on European history and culture, while he was eager to 
show to European travellers the non-European component of South Africa. Once 
a registered tour guide, he found two partners ready to support him, and felt 
ready to go into business. 
The partnership  
Interestingly, Mr. A.J. also had difficulties with his initial partners. Like in Mr. 
R.A.’s case (Case Study 3), this was not mentioned in the first interview. At the 
time, he had only briefly mentioned that he had been in partnership in 1997 and 
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then started a CC on his own in 1998. After reading contradictory evidence in the 
financial statements, I came back to this issue in the second interview and 
obtained a more detailed account.  
Mr. A. J. did his first steps in the tourism industry in partnership with two young 
men. The first attempts were not very successful, as the partners were all 
inexperienced and “trying around”. This first partnership was dissolved after 1 
year.  
After this first year, Mr. A. J. remained with one of the partners, Mr. B. S., and 
they registered a CC. Unlike Mr. A. J, who was conducting the business 
operations on a full-time basis, his partner was essentially meant as a “sleeping 
partner”, bringing in some capital and his formal business skills (he held an 
MBA). Mr. B.S.’s initial contribution was rather small, though, his member’s 
loan remaining constant throughout the period at R6 000. In addition, Mr. B.S. 
contributed only little time since he was employed elsewhere. Formally, the two 
partners were equal, each owning 50% of the capital. 
The arrangement was that Mr. B. S. would look after the administration of the 
business. The problem was, according to Mr. A. J., that his partner was 
“seriously risk averse” – possibly because he had little control over the firm’s 
trajectory. Mr. A. J. said that his partner was even reluctant to engage in simple 
steps like acquiring a credit card payment facility. While for Mr. A.J. enabling 
clients to pay with their credit card was a key to customer service and hence 
growing turnover, for his partner it was a risk since it would create additional 
costs. As a result, Mr. A. J. soon felt that his partner’s analytical works were 
putting a brake on his own efforts to grow his venture (“by the time he had 
finished his analyses, opportunities were gone”).  
As years passed, the imbalance between the two partners grew, with Mr. A. J. 
identifying himself more and more with the business, which he was managing on 
a full-time basis, and financing more and more out of his own pocket since he 
was withholding his own salary payments in order to maintain enough liquidity 
in the enterprise. Meanwhile, the involvement of Mr. B. S. remained unchanged, 
that is, marginal. The tensions became worse when the business reached 
breakeven. Mr. A. J. still resents this difficult time, because he felt that he had 
done the most sacrifices in the first few years (working until late at night, 
without taking a salary). When the business started to work well, his partner 
suddenly wanted his share.  
The conflict ended with a termination of the partnership in 2001, but this was a 
difficult process, which is still keeping Mr. A. J. busy. As he put it, he “wanted 
him out, at any cost – and it has been a great cost”. The partner asked to be 
indemnified on the basis of Discounted Cash Flows, based on earnings 
projections that he did himself. Mr. A. J., lacking the financial acumen and 
desperate to end the partnership, agreed to these conditions and signed, in his 
terms, “this ridiculous deal”, committing himself to paying R115 000. 
(Considering that his partner had brought only R6000 in initially, and had not 
worked full-time for the business, this was a really high price indeed).  
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In retrospect, Mr. A. J. considers this partnership as his “mistake no 1”. He now 
preaches the principle that, in a partnership, both parties have to be equally 
committed, share the same passion or simply the need to earn a living as soon as 
possible. As to the indemnity, he still has not paid it and is considering 
consulting an attorney to see if there is a “way out of this deal”.  
Character 
Mr. A. J. is another charismatic entrepreneur. Extremely friendly and quite open 
throughout, he was also intelligent and, it seems, knowledgeable about the 
history of Southern Africa. His enthusiasm about the inspection of new sites 
betrayed his curiosity and passion.  
To realise his dream, he has visibly had to work hard – “getting up early in the 
morning and staying out there until 10 o’clock pm”. He said he is always 
irritated to hear people saying that “there is no work”, because in his view there 
is always much work to do – maybe it will not pay you immediately, but it is 
worthwhile nonetheless “so long as you set the foundations of something that 
will bring you further”. This belief drove him and made him hold through the 
difficult times of his business.  
In Mr. A. J’s personality transpired as much aggressiveness as prudence. From 
his comments, it seems that he used to be far more aggressive and “bullied” in 
the early stages of the business. Nowadays, he admits having lost some of the 
drive – partly because the need to earn his keep is not so urging any more, partly 
because the experience accumulated helps him anticipate risks. One of the visible 
elements of prudence was his aversion to debt, even now – after having 
established himself as a key player in his field.  
He also appeared cost-conscious, sometimes at the extreme, seeking every 
opportunity to avoid paying certain costs. For example, he mentioned his 
reluctance to pay the commission owed to intermediaries, like hotels and 
guesthouses, who orient their clients to his company. He tried to invent new 
calculation schemes aimed at reducing the level of commissions, but his 
accountant warned that this would not be acceptable and he had to admit that as 
long as he got business from these intermediaries, he could do nothing but to pay 
these commissions. There were other anecdotes which betrayed some naivety in 
the drive to avoid costs.  
He also seemed sensible and, in a way, humble. When talking about his financial 
management, for example, he showed a good intuitive understanding of the 
mechanisms at stake (although he would confuse, for example, debtors and 
creditors), but he was not ashamed to ask me basic questions. “I have no idea” 
was a phrase that came frequently in our conversation, although the following 
comments made clear that he actually was reasonably aware of the issues. There 
was often an undertone in his statements suggesting that, in spite of his success, 
it may well change and he was not immune against insolvency.  
In six years, he has come a long way but still considers himself “a worker rather 
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than a boss”, and is conscious of the need to share the benefits of his success 
with the community that he comes from. He therefore co-founded the Tourism 
Community Development Trust, and is involved in many other community-
based projects.  
Involvement in other projects  
His generosity and enterprising spirit made him get involved in a number of 
other projects and ventures. Apart from the Tourism Community Development 
Trust, he indicated that he lent money to many other start-up entrepreneurs who 
were in the situation in which he had been initially – he estimates that in total he 
has lent about R50 000 – but is not sure to recover that money.  
He also became involved in two other business ventures: on one hand, he has 
been involved as a director of a Johannesburg-based venture whose ambition was 
to market hand-held audio guides to South African tourist sites – but the system 
has not worked, there has been little interest in the product and the business is 
now “in a standstill” – the Johannesburg entrepreneur is currently looking for a 
buyer for the technology. “All I lost there was time and effort, but I feel sorry for 
my partner because he has lost a lot of money”.  
In addition, in 2001 Mr. A. J. was part of a partnership which founded a tourism 
related retail company. However, in 2003 Mr. A. J. sold his share in this 
company, in order to generate cash which was pumped into his newest project, 
started in 2003.  
The newest company started by Mr. A. J., in partnership with a friend, is an 
inbound tourism company, which means that it operates one level up from the 
other CC. While the CC is a “ground handler”, which operates only locally with 
its own vehicles, the inbound company could be seen as a tourism wholesaler, 
contracting directly with the foreign groups/clients and arranging their entire stay 
in the region, subcontracting local tours to other ground handlers (they would use 
the sister CC as a Cape Town operator, but use third party subcontractors in all 
other regions where the client would go).  
But apart from the latter project, which Mr. A. J. places many hopes on, he is 
mainly attached to his first business, which he has put much effort in. He has had 
the opportunity to sell his CC to big groups, but he has always refused, not 
seeing himself in a corporate environment. He mentions a friend and competitor 
who, after being caught in a shooting during a township tour and having feared 
for his life, has accepted such an offer. “But for me, they will have to shoot 200 
times at me before I sell!”, says Mr. A. J., adding that the only reason that could 
make him sell would be if his newer business was becoming so successful that 
he would need to concentrate 100% on it. 
Personal Finance 
Mr. A.J’s home, from which his business operates, is a good illustration of the 
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financial situation of its owner. It is situated in Grassy Park, at the South end of 
the Cape flats, in one of the most attractive parts of a generally poor-reputation 
area. It is a surprisingly big estate, composed of a relatively large house, with 
another building at the back hosting the business… as well as a bar and a “party 
room”. The garden itself is large enough to host without crowding at least 4 
minibus-type vehicles, a swimming pool, a swing, a picnic table, and some lawn. 
The property belongs to Mr. A. J., although he has not yet fully repaid the bond.  
Mr. A. J. privately owns one car (driven by his wife, while he uses business 
vehicles as needed), and the “odd life insurance policy” – but no significant 
financial investments: “This is my investment”, he says, pointing at the business.  
His personal debts are limited to his bond, the credit on his wife’s car, as well as 
his own credit card. He has never defaulted on a debt, adding (probably more out 
of humility than real worry) that “it might change”.  
While his property placed him above the average black entrepreneur, he 
indicated that he has never had to use it as a collateral for the business – because, 
in fact, he had never used bank finance other than for the purchase of vehicles. 
However, a factor that played in his favour was the availability of cash among 
his friends and relatives.  
 
4. How the business started 
Initial investment 
Not surprisingly, the first major asset bought by Mr. A. J. was a vehicle. 
However, at that stage he made his “mistake no 2” by choosing an inadequate 
vehicle (a stationwagon), for he was too unaware of the market requirements. He 
bought that vehicle for R15 000. Unfortunately, he soon realised that the vehicle 
was not suitable for his needs and ended up not using it much, rather working as 
a guide (subcontractor) for other agencies and driving with their vehicles.  
After one year, he sold the stationwagon and bought a microbus.  
Business financing scheme 
In the pre-selection interview that I did with Mr. A. J. over the telephone, he had 
indicated that finance had been an “absolute problem; in fact, I’ve given up on 
finance”, which had made me think that he was self-rationing his growth 
considerably because of his lack of success in seeking finance.  
The interviews showed that the reality was quite different. Initially, he was so 
pessimistic about his chances to get a bank credit that he did not even try. As he 
told me, he was unemployed at the time, and did not have any contacts to “bank 
people”, so he would have little chance. More generally, he felt that for a poor 
black entrepreneur in the late 1990s, it would have been unheard of to ask for a 
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bank credit; “black entrepreneurship was such a crazy thing”, there was no 
established policy framework as there is nowadays.  
Mr. A. J. was initially quite vague about the way he covered his financing needs 
–indicating that he “borrowed from Peter, John and Michael”.  
In the second interview he admitted that, for the purchase of the first vehicle, he 
used a credit that was granted by the bank to his father. This was by no means an 
ideal solution, because, as a result of that, the vehicle was technically owned by 
his father, which created some problems for the business. Also, that financial 
construction meant that, although the payments for the vehicle were actually 
coming from the business, the CC could not build up a credit record with the 
bank. The father’s credit hence supposedly covered most of the need for initial 
equipment finance.  
As to working capital needs, Mr. A.J. borrowed from a circle of acquaintances 
and relatives. He illustrated the process as follows: “If I needed, say, 15 thousand 
Rand, I would target people whom I knew had some money, among the friends 
and relatives, and I would ask them to lend me two thousand or five thousand, 
until I had the entire sum. I would organise the repayments gradually, I would 
say to the first one “I’ll pay you after 6 months”, and to the next one “I’ll pay 
you after 9 months”, etc”. He decided about the repayment dates instinctively, 
adding that he “had no idea whether he would have cash to repay on the day that 
the money was due”. But he did honour all his debts. 
Access to finance 
This period, searching for finance and striving to establish the foundations of the 
business without any income coming in, was a very difficult time (”one of the 
worst times of my life”).  
But Mr. A. J. had decided to start this project and would not go back. He knew 
that he would not get any support from outside. As he commented: “People 
expect money from the government, but that just doesn’t happen – there are so 
many forms to fill in, even for me as a teacher this was too much – so how would 
the less educated people be able to cope with that?”. As to banks, apart from the 
historic divide between black entrepreneurs and financial institutions, Mr. A. J. 
felt that they were too expensive, and he could not afford the finance charges.  
This family and friends’ network was the key to Mr. A. J’s start-up finance. 
Since the money came from people who knew and trusted him, he could obtain 
the funds without a formal procedure. It would have been difficult for him at this 
stage to provide anything like a business plan. The ‘social collateral’ replaced the 
financial sureties that he did not have. He was also exempted from the interest 
payments, which sometimes put a strain on the profitability of start-ups. 
Supposedly, this financing choice also gave him some flexibility in the 
repayment schedule, although Mr. A. J. was adamant that he “always paid back 
when [he] needed – but it was sometimes more difficult than other times”. 
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5. Business model and operations 
Business model  
Mr. A. J. defines his business as “cultural tourism”. Initially the focus has been 
township tours, but he has learnt to diversify to include other destinations, 
however always with a historical/cultural focus (Robben Island, District Six, but 
also the Winelands and other places). In addition, Mr. A.J. offers airport transfers 
and general touring - a lucrative side activity.  
Apart from the “routine” scheduled tours (which happen every day at fixed 
hours, when a bus picks up tourists from hotels and defined spots), the business 
also offers special events on demand, like theme tours. He gave the example of 
an incentive trip that brought people form a hair product company to South 
Africa last year – for the group, Mr. A. J. organised a tour through the 
“hairdresser’s route”, visiting different township hairdressers, African hair-
plaiting stands in town, etc. He would also organise African evenings, with 
marimba bands.  
The business is currently run by a team of eight permanent employees: three of 
them are guides, and paid on a variable fee basis, three are drivers, he has 
recently increased his administrative staff to three, and the other two employees 
are responsible for cleaning and vehicle maintenance, with one of them 
occasionally stepping in as a driver as well. He also works with freelance guides 
in season to create additional capacity.  
The business is highly seasonal. In spite of efforts in the industry to promote the 
“secret season”, there is still little activity during the winter months. Mr. A. J. 
estimates that 90 to 95% of turnover happens between October and May.  
Assets and premises  
Vehicles  
For local tour operators, a key criterion is to “have wheels”. Indeed, the 6 motor 
vehicles (minibus size) represent 93% of the gross value of fixed assets in Feb 
2003. The remaining assets are computers and furniture.  
The decision of how many vehicles to own is not an easy one: although they are 
used at full capacity in season, in winter most of the vehicles stand still, bringing 
no income but generating finance charges and a strain on the cash flow. 
Therefore, Mr. A. J. prefers to work with a limited number of vehicles, and 
charter out other people’s combis or outsource excessive business in season, to 
keep the financial flexibility.  
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Premises  
When he started his business, Mr. A. J. felt the need to rent premises outside his 
home. He settled in a modern office block in central Cape Town for 2 years, 
1998-99. Considering the limited earning capacity of the business in the first few 
years, this decision was expensive: he paid R2 000/month for about 20 square 
meters. The income statement for the year ended February 2000 indeed mentions 
costs for “rent, water and electricity” of R26 000. This cost certainly was a 
burden for the early working capital management.  
In spite of the costs, Mr A. J. felt that the decision was correct, because it gave 
him a profile initially. As he put it, the tourism sector is a “glamour industry”, 
what you sell in the first place is an “image”, and he knew that he would not 
have enough credibility in the early stages if he was operating from home. 
After two years, having established himself as a credible market player, he could 
afford to move his office back to his home. After the first year when the business 
paid no rent, Mr. A. J. decided that the enterprise could now afford to contribute 
to the house’s costs, and draws a rent to finance his bond. According to the 
income statement for the years closed February 2002 and 2003, the rent 
(including electricity and water) has been in the region of R17-18 thousand per 
year. 
Apart from the office room where the administration takes place, and the parking 
which is important to keep his vehicles safe, Mr. A. J. occasionally uses the 
facilities that he built into his home (the swimming pool, bar, etc) to socialise 
with clients or partners, e.g. inviting them for a “braai” over the week-end.  
Management style and philosophy 
Mr. A. J. is adamant that an entrepreneur should be involved with the business: 
“don’t be a boss” is his general advice to young people asking for his advice on 
starting a business, “act like a worker, not like an MD”. In spite of his 
involvement, he feels that he can no longer know and follow all the details of the 
business, like which company has booked a tour when.  
Initially, Mr. A. J. was, in his own terms, an “entrepreneur” more than a 
“manager”. This involved a visionary attitude and a readiness to take on risks. 
He was guided by the industry’s potential and his focus was to get the building 
blocks in place to get where he wanted to be. He was not scared to take hard 
short-term decisions if he felt that they would pay off on the long run. His device 
then was: “OK we’re gonna take a knock now but in 3-4 years it is going to be 
worthwhile”.  
After six years, this has changed a bit. As he put it, he is “grappling with the 
lifecycle”. The South African tourism industry seems to have reached a plateau, 
and this also applies to his company. This situation calls for a change in 
management style, to focus more on the quality of the routine: “We need to 
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defend our jobs on the basis of merit more than on the basis of being the flavour 
of the month.” 
To some extent, this situation worries him: “you lose the motivation and the 
drive, you have to reinvent yourself”. 
Accordingly, Mr. A. J. seemed to hesitate between managing and enterprising.  
He admitted that, up until recently, he had not put enough effort into the 
administration of his business. As he says, “I have been spoiled because I have a 
good team”. But, having reached a low-growth phase, he can for the first time 
afford to spend some time analysing his operations and seeking some potential 
for optimisation. His major intervention is this regard was to put in place a new 
accounting and information system under ‘Pastel’, for which he was, at the time 
of the case study, training his staff. He expected a lot from this new tool, in 
particular the possibility to gain better insights on cost-reducing options.  
On the other hand, Mr. A. J. still saw his major role as “growing the brand, 
keeping the profile, getting more clients”. He felt mainly responsible for 
maintaining the market share, which required constant effort on his part. For 
example, last year, he engaged on a rebranding exercise, changing the company’s 
logo and improving its brochure.  
Visibly, Mr. A. J. remained an entrepreneur as much as a manager: eager to step 
out of the routine, seek new projects, set up new targets to achieve in the next 3-
4 years: “reinvent himself”.  
This balance between the short-term managing and the long-term enterprising, 
which he was trying to strike, was probably the right way to address his ultimate 
concern, which was, as he put it, “sustainability”.  
Market and Competition  
Clients 
The township tour operators work for both corporate and private clients. Apart 
from the direct bookings, which are rather rare, business is usually provided by 
two sources: local intermediaries and national or international agencies. The 
local intermediaries include partners in the accommodation sector (hotels, B&Bs, 
guesthouses), as well as Cape Town Tourism, and similar places frequented by 
tourists. They earn a commission, varying between 5% and 20%, for each client 
that they bring.  
Agencies are usually large tourism agencies in South Africa (such as Springbok 
or Welcome) and occasionally abroad. Tourism fairs overseas are particularly 
useful to make contact with foreign agencies, but Mr. A. J. cannot afford them 
regularly.  
Mr. A. J. talked with little passion of the local intermediaries, whom tour 
operators tend to call the “mafia”. According to him, they are not interested in 
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the client’s satisfaction but merely in their commission; and it requires the tour 
operator heavy presence to make sure that they are still advertising his company, 
exhibiting his brochures, etc. While this regular presence is easy for small tour 
providers, who are not so busy and have much time to “hang out here and there”, 
it becomes difficult for SMEs that are too involved. Mr. A. J. took the example 
of Cape Town Tourism: when his business was still small, he was visiting them 
regularly and had a good personal contact to the consultants – but now that he is 
bound in his office, he cannot afford to spend time there and they therefore tend 
to refer tourists to other small operators.  
Meanwhile, the agencies usually bring the larger deals but do not work on an 
exclusivity basis. At best they would consider Mr. A. J’s business their 
“preferred partner”.  
Competition 
Over the years, the township touring market has become more and more 
competitive, with numerous very small operators and a few big ones. However, 
the relation with most of the competitors is reasonably good. They work 
together, passing business over when they do not have the capacity to handle all 
groups.  
A result of this open relationship is that there is much transparency in the 
service, price structure and even internal details of the various providers.  
When Mr. A. J. started his business, he was one of the first entrants in the 
township tour market. In 1997 there were two other companies involved in 
township touring, one of which is no longer in existence. He always had a good 
relationship with the other companies: he even learnt most of the business by 
working as a freelance guide for one of them, which also enabled him to earn 
some extra income.  
But he knew that his company would have a different approach from his 
competitors: at the time, the other companies were essentially offering visits to 
specific community projects within the township (such as, a home for unmarried 
mothers) and not to “normal” residential areas. The reason for this choice was 
probably that at the time, these “enclaves” felt safer than wandering through the 
open streets. Mr. A. J., though, decided to be bolder, his aim was to visit the very 
people that live in the townships. In this he was a pioneer.  
Year after year other companies began to offer similar township tours, and the 
weight of the competition became stronger. For part, competitors are other micro 
or small entrepreneurs from a similar background. But a new development at the 
time of the case study (2004) was that the larger tourism groups started to enter 
the market, either by buying small operators (e.g. the Thebe group bought 
Southern Trips), or by setting up their own operations (Rainbow, African Eagle, 
Springbok). These are more dangerous competitors since their financial strength 
enables them to squeeze small players out.  
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Nevertheless, Mr. A. J. still “wants to believe (sic) that he is one of the leading 
companies”, with a good brand and a reputation of delivering. That is his main 
competitive strategy, “making sure that after their tour people are so incredibly 
happy that they would not even think of going somewhere else”. He also relies 
on his current size to provide some stability, whereas the younger micro 
operators are at risk in winter.   
Costing, Pricing and Credit Policy 
Pricing 
As a result of the competition and the regular information flow between the 
market players, the pricing is essentially market-driven. Mr. A. J. knows what his 
competitors charge, on average, for each type of tours, so he sets his prices 
accordingly. Up to now, he has tried to come at the top 40% of the price range, 
not willing to work at a discount. He mentioned that his clients occasionally try 
to bargain, citing one competitor who offers the same tour for R220 instead of 
his R290 – but he then cautions the clients against these dumped prices, arguing 
that his price reflects the value of the service.  
This coming season, though, Mr. A. J.’s intention is to keep prices constant 
although most competitors are going to increase their prices by 10 to 15%. This 
will place him in the lower half of the price range, but he hopes that it will help 
him to regain lost market shares. In explaining this decision, he refers to 
“classical” marketing case studies like Nike/Reebok, and hopes that “the market 
will judge [them] according to [their] reputation and not according to [their] 
rates”. 
Costing 
Since the pricing has not been driven by cost, the business has not up to now had 
a pressing need for a rigorous costing system. In fact, at the time of the case 
study, Mr. A. J. did not know exactly what a day tour costed him. He was 
however planning to put such a costing in place, in order to manage his bottom-
line more properly, as well as to deal with specific questions. For example, he 
had been requested by SARS to separate the transport component of his service, 
which is non-VAT-able, from the service component, which should bear VAT. 
He also wanted to reduce costs, especially telephone (cell phone), insurance and 
stationery. 
With the new accounting software in place, he hoped to have a more proper 
costing available during the course of the year (2004).  
Credit policy 
The business did not have a credit policy: in principle all business was cash 
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business. Small customers, such as the individual tourists joining the routine 
tours from their hotel or guesthouse, paid on the day of the tour. Larger 
customers were invoiced at the end of each month, and usually took 7 days to 
pay. Considering delays in invoicing, this may represent an average credit period 
of 21 days (2 weeks until invoicing + 1 week for settlement) for corporate 
clients, and 0 for private clients, that is – assuming a 50/50 split – an average 
credit period of about 10 days. 
However, especially in winter, large agencies choose to stretch their settlement 
for 3 or 4 weeks. Added to the average 2 weeks up to the invoicing, this may 
represent up to 5 or 6 weeks of credit. Mr. A. J. was visibly genuinely worried 
about this situation, because while he waited for the settlement of his invoices, 
he became unable to keep his bank balance positive. The routine calls of the 
banks, reminding him that his bank balance was negative, made him nervous and 
he urged his staff to pressure his debtors. The administrative manager of the 
business confirmed that it was always a stressful situation for them. 
Profitability and Member's remuneration 
Profitability 
Asked in the first interview whether the business was profitable, Mr. A. J. 
answered: “yes, it kind of is” adding “I don’t live uncomfortably, and more 
importantly, I’ve created employment for other people”. As for other emerging 
businesses, he had a more “social” reading of the concept of profit.  
The financial statements confirmed that, after losses in the years up to 2001, the 
business turned profitable in 2002 and doubled its profit in February 2003. But 
2003 has been the first year in which he was able to completely absorb 
accumulated losses, so that the profit history remained modest.  
Member’s remuneration 
Initially, Mr. A.J. had to make personal sacrifices. He afforded himself only a 
meagre salary in the first 2 years, which he reinvested in the business (member’s 
loan) rather than expending it. Even in 2000 he paid himself only 28 thousand 
Rand for the year. “The main worry was being able to pay for my staff and for 
the vehicle – as to me, I would take whatever money I really needed, but not 
more”. For all that time, he survived on his savings from his previous job as 
teacher, as well as his earnings as a freelance tour guide in 1997-98.  
Since the business has come closer to breakeven, the situation has become easier 
but Mr. A. J. is still not interested in drawing large amounts of money out of the 
business. He indicated that he paid himself a monthly salary of R500048, adding 
                                                 
48 In 2003, though, the financial statements show a member’s remuneration of R102 500 (he is 
the sole member), significantly more than R5 000 per month. This may have been an attempt 
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that the business covered a part of his private expenses as well: it paid for his 
vehicle (Mr. A. J. occasionally used one of the firm vehicles for his own 
purposes), the petrol, and the bond (the business paid a rent for using a part of 
the house). Mr. A. J. was not interested in taking further dividends: his main 
worry, as he put it, was “to be able to invest while maintaining the business on a 
positive cash flow footing”.  
Table 35.1 – CS5’s member remuneration, 2000-2003 
 Feb-00 Feb-01 Feb-02 Feb-03 
Members’ salaries (in R) 28 000 40 000 55 000 102 500 
Source: Income statements 
Need to cut costs 
Although the business did not seem to be in cash distress, Mr. A. J. appeared 
truly concerned, almost obsessed, about this objective: keeping sufficient cash 
flows to be able to invest further. Since the growth potential had become limited, 
his new strategy was to cut costs. He explained, when I met him on a Monday, 
that “his mission for this week” was to run through the administrative processes 
with his office employees, to identify cost-cutting potentials.  
It is not entirely clear what caused this obsession: it may simply be the drive of 
the entrepreneur to “always do better”, to quickly take advantage of the new 
accounting system in place, combined with Mr. A. J.’s fundamental nervousness 
in winter because of the slower payments of customers. 
It may also be that, by the middle of 2004, he had found out the result of his 
financial year 2003-2004, which may have been less profitable than the previous 
year – but this could not be verified. Lastly, it was probable that the ambitions of 
Mr. A. J. in starting up the new business had created an urgent need for 
investments and that Mr. A. J. had realised that the older SME’s cash flow would 
not suffice to support the new business as much as he would like it to.  
The impact of the new business  
Since 2003, the close corporation has had to bear the impact of the creation of a 
new tourism company, started in partnership with a (women) entrepreneur who 
also owns her own business. The business model of this new start-up can be 
simplistically described as a tourism wholesaler specialising in cultural tourism, 
and contracting local operators in Africa for the actual performance of their 
tours.  
Mr. A. J. has easily acknowledged that a major source of finance for this new 
                                                                                                                                    
to reduce the tax burden for the company, or to distribute a part of the cash in order to make it 
available for investments into the new business.  
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venture has been the older business, adding that his partner also brought in some 
capital from her own enterprise. This support materialised in the following 
dimensions: 
- Whenever possible, the cash needed for the new business was taken out 
of the older enterprise49; 
- The old company also supported its sister by providing human resources 
(especially the time of its member); 
- The tour operator enabled its new sister to utilise its vehicles. In some 
cases, the older business has even had to bear some costs, hiring a new 
vehicle while the business’s own sprinter was being used by the new 
company. 
 
Unfortunately, the February 2003 statements do not yet reflect any form of 
support from the tour operator to the new company, and the interviews alone 
could not provide sufficient data to quantify the burden that this represented for 
the older business – up to now, and for the future. Mr. A. J. had offered to find 
out from his accountant the exact amount of the intercompany loan, but did not 
come back to me. 
 
6. Financial management 
General remarks 
Mr. A. J. considered financial management as the weakness of the business. This 
was true in the sense that the financial system was poor, but on the other hand, 
risks were compensated by the intuitive prudence of the owner and his staff, 
especially, his extreme debt aversion. 
Mr. A. J.’s relationship to financial management is thus paradox: initially, he had 
consciously decided to limit the place of financial analysis because he needed to 
seize the opportunities promptly in order to get off the ground. But for all that 
time he had a feeling of not being in control and tried to compensate this by a 
prudent attitude. For example, although he had often been urged by his banker to 
contract an overdraft facility, he has not done so yet, worried that “it can become 
a crunch”.  
He admitted that he is “scared” about the lack of control: “As you grow, you 
forget about financial management, that can kill you. You need to keep control, 
to account for the money you spend”.  
                                                 
49 Technically, Mr. A. J. has supposedly written off his member’s loan to the older business 
(which amounted to R28K in February 2003), in order to invest it into the new venture – thus 
depriving the older operator from a fundamental source of liquidity. It is even possible that, 
beyond the amount of the older member’s loan, the older business has granted a loan to its 
sister. 
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Mr. A. J. believed that he took many bad decisions as a result of not knowing 
exactly where he was. He admitted that he spent too much money, instead of 
keeping cash in the business for difficult times to come.  
A particular difficulty in the sector was how to utilise the high levels of cash that 
are generated during the season: one needs to balance between the need to invest 
to grow the business, and the need to put money aside for the winter – and 
without a good information system this balance is difficult to find.  
Luckily Mr. A. J. has benefited from the support of a mentor that helped him 
straighten up the financial administration. The one-year mentorship was part of 
the services provided by SATSA (the SA Travel Service Association, supposedly 
in partnership with Government) to its members, and Mr. A. J. could choose the 
area where he had the greatest need – he chose financial management. This 
mentorship gave the impulse necessary to reorganise the financial 
administration.  
He was looking forward to the exciting new possibilities that would open up 
once the Pastel system is fully operational: he would be able to get management 
reports, review the performance of each vehicle, the profitability of each client 
account, etc. 
Sales and Cost Capture and Monitoring 
Forecasting 
Mr. A. J. has hardly ever done any budgets and forecasts. In particular, he did 
not write up a formal business plan when starting up. “When I saw what it took 
to make a business plan I thought, that is going to take me weeks of sitting and 
writing. I’ve got better things to do.”, he explained. While he felt that the 
analyses made sense, he was mostly reluctant to the “school exercise” of putting 
together a nicely written document which nobody would need since he was 
already convinced that he would not ask for a business loan from the bank at that 
stage. So he tried to “pick” the most important issues from the business planning 
process, and to mentally go through the steps required: “I have done it all, I’ve 
looked at the market, I’ve looked at my company, at the resources”. He did not 
however venture into forecasting because he felt that he could not guess what 
future would bring.  
The circumstances forced him to prepare a business plan a year later, when he 
bought his second vehicle. But he has never repeated that exercise or tried to 
compare his forecasts of the time with his actual achievement.  
Capture and Monitoring of sales 
On my first telephonic pre-selection interview with Mr. A. J., he gave me a 
symptomatic answer to my question about his annual turnover: “I have no idea”. 
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While I insisted that at that stage I needed an order of magnitude rather than a 
precise answer, he still could not answer, asked his staff to look for the figure, 
and it took approximately 10 minutes for them to come back to me with an 
answer: R1,2 million. 
The business’s sales history, as read in the consecutive financial statements for 
the last four years (see Table 35.2), partly explains the confusion of Mr. A. J.: 
between February 2001 and 2003 the turnover has been almost multiplied by 4. 
In a later interview I touched on this tremendous growth and the entrepreneur 
commented: “Yes, there was a year when we just shot. I was amazed when John 
[the accountant] told me that I had doubled my turnover, because I don’t see it, 
you know”. 
Table 35.2 – CS5’s turnover growth, 2000-2003 
 Feb-00 Feb-01 Feb-02 Feb-03 
Annual turnover (in R) 325 423 334 072 620 980 1 271 290 
Source: Income statements 
Indeed, incredible as it may seem for a business with more than R1 million of 
turnover, the enterprise does not currently any encompassing sales record. As the 
head of administration explained to me, large customers are normally invoiced 
once a month; invoices are neatly filed and checked against the payment – but 
there is no attempt to add up the invoices for a month or a quarter. As to the 
plethora of cash customers, they are not captured anywhere: the only way to 
track cash business is to consult the “booking schedule” to count, day after day, 
the number of participants to each type of tour. The head of administration 
confirmed to me that this is what the accountant works with to establish the 
annual turnover. 
An additional factor causing confusion is that the business is seasonal: Mr. A. J. 
estimates that 75 to 85% of the annual turnover is earned in the 6 ½ months 
between October and mid-December on one hand, February and May on the 
other hand. The December-January period and the winter months are far quieter. 
This means that the staff can also not rely on monthly figures to obtain an 
estimate for the year’s turnover. 
Under these circumstances, one understands Mr. A. J.’s “amazement” at his 
growth, since he has no way to anticipate the annual turnover figures. However, 
the current work on Pastel should enable more accurate and regular monitoring 
of sales in future.  
Cost 
Costs are a little easier to track than sales. Mr. A. J. looks at his bank and credit 
card statements to see the expenses/deductions (probably more closely in winter, 
when the bank balance is tighter). Therefore, he knows intuitively that certain 
costs are too high. For example, he finds that he spends a lot for cellular phones, 
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and is considering investing in a network communication system in order to keep 
his drivers connected at lower cost. 
He also mentioned stationery: he wants to review possibilities to move towards a 
paperless office (e.g. sending faxes directly from the computer, without 
printing). The more sophisticated bookkeeping software will hopefully help to 
reduce the need for paper, ink, photocopies, etc. 
Separation of personal and business accounts  
Mr. A. J. admitted that in some cases he spent the business’s money for his own 
private comfort, for example doing alterations to his house. He took the example 
of the bar that had been built into his “party room”, and gave the following 
account: “one day I looked in my cash box and I saw that there was R10 000 
there, so I thought, OK, then I can spend R5 000 for a bar – because you know, 
in my stupid mind this was my money”.  
He has also occasionally taken money out of the cash box to go and eat out. He 
called this the “spaza mentality”, like the owner of a spaza shop would take 
sugar from her shop to sweeten her coffee if she has no sugar in her own kitchen. 
Although he acknowledged that this was bad practice, it must be noted that this 
lack of separation of accounts went in both directions. He would often buy 
materials (e.g. stationery) for the business from his own credit card, and omit to 
claim it back.  
He added that he was aware that this was a flaw in his management, and he was 
slowly learning to be more accountable and draw a line between personal and 
business accounts. Apparently the impetus came from his accountant, who 
suggested to Mr. A. J. that his money would “grow faster if it were in the bank”. 
By now, whenever he used money from the business, he would write it down so 
that the amount could be offset against his member’s loan.  
 
Accounting and setting up of financial statements 
Co-operation with the accountant 
It seemed that Mr. A. J. had a very good accountant, whose office was close to 
his own (15 minutes). Unlike other business owners who see their accounting 
officer only once a year and feel that he does not understand their business, Mr. 
A. J. tended to work in close co-operation with his accountant, consulting him 
regularly for financial matters – but he did complain about the costs involved.  
In 2003, the cost for the establishment of financial statements was R12 00050. 
                                                 
50 Source: Interview. The financial statements show that the total accounting costs for the year 
were in the region of R 17 800. 
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Mr. A. J. tried to negotiate the cost with his accountant, who answered that a 
substantial part of the cost came from having to seek and collate many bits of 
information from many various sources (see above: sales capture) instead of 
reading business figures directly from one record. Indeed, it would seem that the 
accounting process as it was at the time of the case study was not only time 
intensive, but also presented risks with regard to reliability of results.  
As to the reliability of accounts, Mr. A. J. was confident that they were good, 
because “[his] brief to John [the accountant] is to draw the financial statements 
not for the bank, but for [us]”. He was aware of the loss of reliability of financial 
statements when used for loan applications.  
The process of entering bookkeeping data into Pastel, which was under way at 
the time of the case study, was expected to bring significant changes in the 
accounting process. The company would be able to do most of the accounting in-
house. Mr. A. J.’s staff has already learnt to do the PAYE, UIF and similar 
returns in-house, and were learning to do the VAT-filings. Ultimately the 
accountant would only compile the financial statements and tax returns.  
Mr. A. J. hoped that this process would enable cutting costs, although the mere 
cost of the Pastel license was as high as the cost of his financial statements for 
2003 (R12 000), not including the training, working hours, stationery etc.  
Tax optimisation strategy 
Asked whether he was trying to reduce his tax burden, Mr. A. J. answered that he 
was willing to do so (“Trevor and me, we are not good friends”), and that the 
lady who helped installing pastel was giving tax advice as well. However, his 
further comments showed that he was far from having a convincing strategy in 
this regard. In any case, the business had only started paying tax in 2003, having 
accumulated substantial losses in the past.  
Ironically, when I asked how he would go about saving taxes, he mentioned that 
he was trying to “reduce gaps between his turnover and the bottom line, in order 
to increase the profit” (something which precisely has the effect of augmenting 
the tax burden). He mainly insisted on reducing administrative costs. There is 
therefore little risk that he inflated his costs to reduce his taxable income.  
Accounting transparency score 
Quantitative score 14,0 / 20 
Formal Quality Score 21,5 / 30 
Transparency Score 38,9 / 50 
Suspicion of manipulation 0  
    
Total score 74,4 / 100 
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Main issues:   
The accounts were formally well structured and well presented.  
The main problem was that the accounts did not give a clear idea of working 
capital and cash. Especially, accounts payable were quite high but fluctuating; 
cash was not always as high as it should be in summer; and it seemed that the 
average cash situation over the year was quite tight (or badly managed). 
Apart from that, the high growth and lack of stability on the cost side made the 
business less predictable than a creditor would wish. 
 
Working capital and Cash management 
Working capital and cash flow were the main genuine worries of Mr. A. J.. 
While he had established a strong customer base and was able to operate 
profitably, he still battled to keep his bank accounts balanced, especially in 
winter.   
These difficulties seemed not too severe, though, since he had never been unable 
to pay salaries at the end of the month – except for his own salary, which he 
readily held back if necessary, because, as he said, the cash problems were 
caused by his own fault, he did not manage the money well.  
Physical management and bookkeeping of cash  
Technically speaking, the management of cash was poor indeed. Up to the set up 
of the Pastel system, the controls over cash movements had been almost non-
existent. The business did not have a cash flow book. Mr. A. J. admitted that, in 
season, he sometimes counted the cash himself and realised that he has R20 000 
or 30 000 there.  
There were several problems associated with this absence of cash management: 
• Lack of knowledge about the amounts of cash available, hence risk of 
uninformed decision-making (as well as accounting risk); 
• Potential risks involved with physically keeping high amounts of cash within 
the business (although he fully trusts his staff); 
• Temptation for the owner to spend some of the money for his own account; 
• Loss of interest earnings; also, if the money was banked, the bank would 
possibly have a better judgement on the business. 
 
Mr. A. J. was aware of these issues. His accountant had also suggested that “his 
money would grow better if it were in the bank” and Mr. A. J. admitted that he 
would need to change the business’s habits. By the time we had the second 
interview, he had done a first step by inaugurating a cash book.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 35: Narrative on case study 5 Page 549 
 
 
Working capital cycle 
Mr. A. J. described the working capital cycle as highly seasonal. In summer, 
clients paid cash and, as he said, there was always a comfortable cash surplus in 
the business. On the other hand, the winters were more difficult, especially the 
end of months, four months per year. This fact is general to the industry, where 
there is a saying that “If you last two winters, you are in business”.  
Mr. A. J. described the reason for this difficulty as a classical mismatch between 
the dates of payments of customer (debtors) and supplier (creditors). As he 
described it, in winter, everybody in the tourism industry tends to have cash flow 
problems, so the big agencies hold their payments back to the smaller agencies, 
who “hold back” to the tour operators (occasionally pretending that they haven’t 
received the invoice), so that it sometimes take up to 3-4 weeks to be paid. 
Meanwhile, his small business was, as he put it, “at the bottom of the chain”, 
there was no one whom he can “hold back” in the same way as his clients did. In 
the interim, the business had to cover its own costs, especially pay the salaries to 
its employees at the end of the month; substantial costs, like the petrol card, were 
deducted from his bank account automatically once a month, he had no control 
over it. In these circumstances it was difficult to keep his bank balance positive. 
A critical check of financial data required correcting some of Mr. A.J.’s 
statements. Compared with other sectors of the economy, Mr. A. J. was 
operating in a sector where payments were relatively prompt, and even 
immediate during most of the year. The few weeks of delay that he experienced 
four months a year are not comparable to the systematic 2 months delay that Mr. 
M. and Mrs. S. (Case Study 4) had to cope with, for example. In addition, Mr. A. 
J. luckily did not experience any bad debts in the 6 years of operation.  
On the creditor side, representing Mr. A. J.’s business as being “at the bottom of 
the chain” was not exactly correct. He did have significant levers and was able to 
delay certain payments: commissions to his freelance guides, telephone bill, 
insurance, vehicle finance. In fact, the balance sheets show that even in summer 
(February), the accounts payable are surprisingly high: between February 2000 
and February 2002, they had been fluctuating between 10 and 18,5% of turnover, 
it is only in February 2003 that they have come back to a more normal level of 
3,6% of turnover – but this is possibly caused by a temporary high level of cash 
caused by the sale of a vehicle.  
If the accounts payable are already as high in summer, then there is certainly 
little room for manoeuvre in winter.  
Cash-flow and cash balance 
The causes of Mr. A. J.’s cash problems, then, were less the unequal power play 
in the supply chain, than the firm’s lack of back up for cases of late payments. 
This in turn came from the habit to spend money as it comes in, instead of 
saving. Indeed, the (reconstituted) cash flow statements show that operating cash 
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flows had been positive at least since 2001, but the investing activities had 
usually consumed most of these cash flows, only partly covered by an increase in 
financing remedies. 
Table 35.3 – CS5’s reconstituted cash flow statement (summarised) 
In Rand 2001 2002 2003 
Initial Cash balance 11 791 -161 20 777 
Cash flow from operating activities 44 352 118 113 180 996 
Cash flow from investing activities -124 537 -51 217 -162 892 
Cash flow from financing activities 68 232 -43 161 125 041 
Final cash balance51 -161 20 777 161 636 
 
Table 35.3 shows that the investing activities have only been moderated in 2002, 
probably in order to redress the negative cash balance of the previous year. On 
the other hand, a review of the cash balances in February 2000 to 2003 show 
that, for summer months, the surpluses were rather low at R11 791 (2000), -
R161 (2001), and R20 777 (2002). Only in February 2003 was the cash situation 
much better (R161 636), but this may have been a temporary situation (the result 
of the recent sale of a vehicle). 
Overdraft 
Strategically, the business had chosen to invest regularly in order to increase and 
upgrade its fleet of vehicles. The drawback was that it deprived the business 
from a cash reserve, so that there was a need for an alternative source of cash in 
winter months. 
The most straightforward source would be a bank overdraft. With its relatively 
large asset base and its credit history, Mr. A. J. could easily convince his bank to 
provide such a facility – and in fact Mr. A. J.’s account manager has often urged 
him to sign up such a facility. But the entrepreneur, during our first interview, 
mentioned that he was reluctant to doing this step, for fear of a “credit crunch”.  
During our first interview we discussed the possibility of an overdraft in further 
detail. Mr. A. J. admitted that he might actually decide to take up such a facility, 
in which case he would ask for R15-20 000, which was approximately the 
highest need that he had during those winter months. Up to now, when the 
business’s bank balance reached an (unauthorised) overdraft of R20 000, the 
bank called in to check the reasons for this process; but they never put too much 
pressure on Mr. A. J., they seemed to understand that this situation was only 
temporary.  
                                                 
51 The initial cash balance and various elements of cash flow do not necessarily exactly add up to 
the final cash balance, suggesting possible minor mistakes in reconstituting the cash flow 
statement. However, the extent of the mistakes does not invalidate the conclusions. 
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By the time we had our second interview, Mr. A. J. announced that he had finally 
contracted an overdraft facility for R28 000, which was “more than [he] needed”, 
but was the amount offered by the bank after reviewing his profile. 
 
Ongoing access to finance and Relationship with 
creditors 
Vehicle finance 
With the exception of his first vehicle (the stationwagon) which was bought 
under his father’s name, all other vehicles were bought on credit under the 
business’s name. The purchase of the first microbus was the occasion for Mr. A. 
J. to write his first (and last) business plan at the request of the bank. 
In six years, Mr. A. J.’s business had bought eight or nine vehicles, thus building 
up a reputation with the vehicle finance branch of his bank. This reputation had 
substantially facilitated the process: “they don’t bat an eyelid”. He just needed to 
phone the bank, giving the details of the vehicle that he had selected for 
purchase, indicating the deposit that he wanted to pay upfront and the number of 
years for which he wanted the credit. After a few days, the credit document 
would be ready and bank representatives would even come to his premises to 
have him sign it. This was far easier than in the early days, obviously because the 
bank sees him as a good risk.  
According to information found in the financial statements, Mr. A. J. would tend 
to pay a 25% deposit and use bank credit to finance the remaining portion52. 
Initially he tried to buy the vehicles over 3 years, so that, once paid-off, it would 
“become an asset”. But he realised that “a vehicle never becomes an asset”: by 
the time it is paid off, it has to be replaced. So his new strategy is to stretch the 
repayment period over the whole lifetime of the vehicle (4-5 years), almost as if 
he was renting the vehicle. Although the longer period of credit increases the 
finance charges, it has the advantage of lowering the cash burden in winter 
months.  
Considering that the interest rate on equipment finance is usually lower53 than 
interest charged on overdraft, the choice of longer vehicle credit periods seems to 
be a good strategy. 
                                                 
52In February 2001, the notes to the balance sheet shows an Instalment Sale Agreement for R182 
237 (including deferred finance charges), secured over fixed assets to the value of R237 556. 
Similarly, in 2003 the ISA is R296 889, secured over fixed assets amounting to R387 399.  
53 According to financial statements, the interest rate for the instalment sale agreements is 
assumed to be approximately prime +1.5% (14.4 to 18.4%). We have no data on the rate 
charged for the overdraft.  
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Relationship with the bank  
Mr. A. J. had a good relationship with his bank account manager; they were in 
frequent telephonic contact, and a further element causing the good relation was 
that they had children in the same age, who played cricket together.  
However, Mr. A. J. did not want to rely too heavily on this good relationship, 
arguing that banks have changed, they are more centralised, the decisions are 
taken in the Head Office in Pretoria. Nevertheless, he admits that it is an 
advantage to have a dedicated partner in the bank, commenting that “[his bank 
manager] goes that extra mile for [him]”.  
 
7. Financial ratios 
The following sections present some key financial ratios for the last three years. 
Although 4 years were available, the comments below concern essentially the 
years 2001-2003, because the year 2000 corresponds to a different “era” of the 
business, when it was still building up and operating from its offices in central 
Cape Town. It is only since 2001 that the business started to take its current 
profile. 
Cost structure 
Independently from its growth, Mr. A. J.’s business has not remained static with 
a stable structure of fixed and variable costs. Instead, the variable costs have 
fluctuated significantly from one year to the next, while the fixed costs have 
increased in plateaux as the asset base and the administrative capacity of the 
business have expanded.  
Table 35.4 - Cost structure and breakeven calculation  
 low high mean 
variable costs 49% 61%  
fixed costs (higher and lower estimation) 182 700 258 350  
breakeven (range) 354 757 657 379 506 068 
latest known turnover 1 271 290 1 271 290 1 271 290 
margin over breakeven 258% 93% 151% 
 
The main factor contributing to the fluctuations of variable costs have been the 
tour expenses, which amounted to 21% of turnover in Feb 02, but 34% in Feb 
2003. Mr. A. J. explained that this came from a general increase in tourism-
related costs in 2003-04, which have not (yet) been reflected in the operators’ 
prices: 
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• Guide fees (market-related) have increased in 2003, possibly due to the 
general situation of the tourism industry, which has reached a plateau, so that 
the players are getting more concerned about their sustainability and increase 
their prices. Mr. A. J. is currently busy putting one of his three guides “on 
salary” instead of fee, which will spread the cost throughout the year.   
• Entry fees have increased considerably in the last 2 years, partly due to the 
renovation and opening of new projects (the new District Six Museum, or the 
Robben Island Museum) 
• Also, a number of intermediaries (mostly hotels and guesthouses as well as 
some agencies) have increased their commissions to 20%, while some of 
them were only asking for 15% in the past.  
• Also, an increasing proportion of clients pay their tour with credit card – in 
which case 5% of the transaction value goes to the credit card company. 
 
Meanwhile, fixed costs have also increased as a result of investments in 
administrative staff, computers and vehicles. In three years, the fixed costs have 
almost doubled from R131K to R258K54, especially the result of (a) increased 
administrative salaries; (b) increased bank, accounting and computer expenses; 
(c) finance charges and depreciations linked to the expansion of the fleet.  
Under the current fixed and variable cost situation, then, the breakeven point 
(prior to member’s salary) would be in the region of R657K. Luckily, the 
increased fixed costs have enabled a more-than-proportional growth in turnover, 
which by 2003 was almost double the breakeven point, at 1,27 million Rand.  
Hence, despite the heavier cost structure, there is no doubt that the increase in 
turnover has enabled economies of scale, which have been beneficial to the 
business’s profit.  
Unfortunately, the 2004 results were not available to verify whether growth and 
profits have been maintained. It is therefore difficult to elaborate a judgement on 
the strategy of Mr. A. J. not to increase its prices in the 2004-05 season, in order 
to regain market share – this decision may reduce the margin on variable costs 
and thus put pressure on the profits (and cash flow), but it may also strengthen 
the firm’s position if the turnover has been declining in 2003-04.  
Interest coverage 
Since the improvement of its profitability, the business has been able to cover its 
finance costs without problems. In 2003, the earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciations were almost 8 times the level of financial costs (finance charges 
and interest). 
                                                 
54 Not including the member’s salary, which also went up from R28K to R102,5K. 
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Table 35.5 – Interest coverage, 2001-2003 
 Feb 2001 Feb 2002 Feb 2003 
EBIT 3 106 71 506 171 234 
EBITDA 40 531 128 070 234 395 
Interest paid (incl. Finance charges) 12 234 20 784 30 042 
coverage ratio (EBITDA) 3,3 6,2 7,8 
 
Equity ratio 
As usual in businesses started up by previously disadvantaged individuals, and in 
spite of the contribution of a second (dormant) partner, the initial equity base 
(including members’ loans) has been slim (supposedly R12 000). Luckily, the 
managing member has been able to increase his member’s loan in the first few 
years, giving the business the necessary base for growth.  
Table 35.6 – CS5’s equity ratio, 2000-2003 
 Feb-00 Feb -01 Feb -02 Feb -03 
Strict equity -44 291 -53 419 -2 697 111 905 
Member's loan 51 284 31 891 27 001 28 787 
Equity including member's loan 6 993 -21 528 24 304 140 692 
Total assets 90 918 179 682 200 703 434 114 
Equity ratio: Member’s funds to total assets 7,7% -12,0% 12,1% 32,4% 
 
Nevertheless, the early losses and the need of the manager to tap on his 
member’s loan for lack of another source of income have caused the business to 
be technically insolvent after a few years. Luckily, his creditors (the vehicle 
finance company on one hand, and short-term creditors on the other) did not 
force him to bankruptcy.  
This enabled Mr. A. J. to reach the critical size to turn his profit figures around 
and absorb past losses, so that he was able to build up his equity back to normal 
levels. A total equity ratio of 32% remains low, though, and limits the firm’s 
further growth potential.  
Debt maturity  
The debt levels are the mirror image of the equity ratio, with the particularity that 
the business, compared with the average SME, is not overly reliant on short-term 
debt. The majority of borrowed funds comes from instalment sale agreements, a 
source that is relatively well secured by the value of the vehicles purchased.  
Short-term debt did remain significant nevertheless, even in summer months, 
although the need for working capital is rather low during the season. This 
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means that the business effectively uses a variety of creditors (supposedly 
freelance guides, insurance, telephone) to provide liquidity for the business. If 
one admits that a part of this liquidity is actually used for the cash portion of 
vehicle investments, one could conclude that the business does to some extent 
use short-term capital to pay for long-term assets. However, this is not caused by 
necessity (with its good track record the business could probably buy its vehicles 
with a lower cash portion) but probably by a cost consideration (the short-term 
creditors supposedly don’t charge interest). 
Table 35.7 – Long and Short-term debt  
 Feb -01 Feb -02 Feb -03 
Long term debt (Installment sale) 139 302 101 031 224 286 
in % of total assets 78% 50% 52% 
Short Term Debt (various creditors, overdraft) 61 908 75 368 45 546 
in % of total assets 34% 38% 10% 
 
Working capital cycle 
Because of the seasonal character of the business, it is problematic to base the 
study of the working capital cycle exclusively on balance sheet data from 
February, i.e. from the best season.  
In addition, in a service sector like tourism, the debtor-creditor-chain does not 
necessarily correspond to a classic supplier-customer relationship. While the 
firm’s debtors are supposedly mainly made of actual clients, creditors are 
presumably related to the business administration (insurance, telephone, etc) 
rather than the production cycle. Therefore, it is difficult to express the short-
term credit in days since one cannot really relate these credits to the cost of sales, 
but rather to some administrative costs. 
Subject to these two words of caution, the analysis of the working capital cycle 
does confirm that in summer, there is no concern with working capital. 
Technically, the need for working capital is even negative, which confirms that 
the business has an excess of short-term credits which it is using for other 
(equipment) purposes. 
Table 35.8 – CS5’s working capital cycle 
(in days of turnover) Feb -01 Feb -02 Feb -03 
Various Creditors  67 44 13 
Inventory  n/a n/a n/a 
Production cycle 0 0 0 
Sales: Customer credit 20 14 4 
Total need for working capital -46,5 -29,7 -8,7 
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The trouble of this arrangement is that it is not easily reversible, so that when the 
need for working capital increases in winter (longer delays of customers in 
settling their invoices), the short-term resources of the business are not 
accessible because bound in investments. This causes the cash difficulties of the 
business.  
However, the February 2003 balance sheet shows a significantly lower level of 
short-term debts. If this reflects a long-term trend to better manage the liquidity, 
it is positive since it opens more room for manoeuvre in winter; however, this 
improvement may also come from a temporary improvement of liquidity 
following the sale of a vehicle. 
Variability of ratios 
As a high growth business (average growth of last two years is almost 100%), 
the business does not have very stable financial ratios. In spite of the reduction in 
cost of sales, the turnover growth has generated an improvement of margins, 
hence the accumulation of profits and a reversing of the equity ratio. 
Concurrently, the liquidity improved and short-term debts decreased. 
Table 35.9 – Volatility of CS5’s key ratios 
Indicator studied Feb 2001 to 2003  
Average Turnover growth 95,1% p.a.  
Cost of sales from 24 to 34%  
Operating margin from 24% to 29% (due to cost of sales) 
Net profit ratio from -3% to +11% (due to economies of scale) 
Equity ratio from -12% to +32% (due to improvement of profit 
history) 
Short-term debt / Total assets from 10% to 38% (reason unclear - could be a general 
reduction of debt or a temporary 
increase in cash) 
Total need for working capital from -9 to -47 days  
 
Value of the business 
Although this is not normally a part of the analytical framework for these case 
studies, in this particular case an estimation of the enterprise value was of 
particular interest since Mr. A. J. in 2001 bought out his former partner for a 
discounted cash flow value calculated by this partner.  
The discounted cash flow value in Early 2001 was estimated according to two 
points of view: firstly, with the knowledge of the time, then with the benefit of 
newest knowledge. Both values were calculated using a discount rate of 35%, 
corresponding to average required rate of return of VC funds in SA in 2001 
(Taylor 2001: 97). 
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In 2001 Mr. A. J.’s business was only about to emerge from three years of 
consecutive losses. Even if it had gain some credibility on the market, when 
measured by the net profit it was not yet a financial success. However, with 
substantial depreciations, the operative cash flows were positive and growing.  
For the estimation of the discounted cash flow value (1) in 2001, the growth of 
cash flows was assumed to be continuous at 25% per year (a growth rate that is 
hardly sustainable on a very long term, but a conservative assumption for the 
first few years for a young business in a booming sector – between 2000 and 
2001 the cash flow growth was 56%). Under those assumptions the value of 
future cash flows would be R 282 970 for 100%.  
Table 35.10 - Operating cash flows for 2000-2003 
 Feb-00 Feb-01 2002 2003 
Net profit -7 885 -9 128 53 519 114 602 
Depreciation 25 970 37 425 56 564 63 161 
Operating CF 18 085 28 297 110 083 177 763 
  56%   
 
Table 35.11- Value calculation 
   
after correcting for non-
interest bearing debt 
 “ex ante” “ex post” “ex ante” “ex post” 
Based on Cash Flow knowledge up 
to year 2001 2003 2001 2003 
Assumed ‘eternal’ growth rate of 
cash flows 25% 10% 25% 10% 
Present (2001) value of future 
Cash Flows 282 970 498 920 282 970 498 920 
Accumulated losses in Feb 01 -53 519 -53 519 -53 519 -53 519 
Net value of business 229 451 445 401 229 451 445 401 
Value of non-interest bearing debt 
in Feb 2001   -31 891 -31 891 
Value of equity in Feb 2001   197 560 413 510 
Value of 50% equity stake 114 726 222 701 98 780 206 755 
Value of B.S.’s member loan in 
2001   6 000 6 000 
Fair indemnification for B. S.    104 780 212 755 
 
Considering this calculation, it is not surprising that Mr. B. S. has asked for 
R115 000 of indemnification. The net value of Discounted Cash Flows in 2001 
under the assumptions chosen (25% growth starting from the 2001 operating 
cash flow, and 35% discount rate, i.e. second column in Table 35.10) is almost 
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exactly 230 000 for 100% or R115 000 for 50%.  
One could even argue that this calculation is advantageous for the remaining 
member Mr. A. J., since ex post – that is, with the knowledge of the tremendous 
growth and profitability improvement which the business has experienced after 
2001 – the value would be even higher at R222 701 for 50%. This argument 
would merely serve as a consolation as it would of course not be correct to give 
Mr. B. S. the benefit of an improvement of profits after his departure. 
A more correct calculation however would take into account the various levels of 
financial involvement of the two members. Even though formally they each 
owned 50% of the equity, Mr. A. J.’s loan was higher than his partner’s and as 
such he should be entitled to a larger part of the overall business value.  
Assuming, as is usual in the financial sector, that the net value of equity can be 
obtained by subtracting the nominal value of debt from the total business value 
resulting from DCF, the correct indemnification would go down to R104 780. 
From the statements made by Mr. A. J. in the interviews, it would seem that even 
this corrected amount would seem too high for him. Intuitively, there are two 
issues that can be disputed in this regard. The first is whether it is correct to 
indemnify a partner on the basis of high future operating cash flows, when the 
book value of the business is negative and when the net cash balance, after all 
necessary investing activities, is tight. To Mr. A. J. this seemed a contradiction, 
yet it is the very sense of young business valuation, since the value of emerging 
firms typically lies in their future rather than in their present.  
The other issue is whether the partner effectively has a right on 50% of this 
value, considering his limited overall contribution. Firstly, his nominal capital 
input (equity + loan) is, at R 6 100, only 23% of the total contribution of the two 
members (equity + loan). Secondly, he has hardly been involved in management, 
so the business does not owe its growth and cash flows to him. Unfortunately for 
Mr. A. J., the ownership rights on the value of a CC legally result from the 
shares of members to capital stricto sensu, regardless of the levels of members’ 
loans or management involvement.  
Mr. A. J.’s disappointment reminds of the mixed feelings that business owners 
have with venture capital, when they experience investors exiting with a profit 
that seems high compared with both their initial capital investment, and the 
amount of effort put into the business. However, this high return in successful 
investments is the very essence of venture capital and compensates for the high 
investment risk characteristic of that segment. In a way, Mr. B. S.’s investment 
in Mr. A. J.’s business was also a form of (informal) venture capital, with the 
difference that there has not been a formal request from the main owner and 
hence no awareness on his part as to the bond that would link him to this partner 
and the financial cost that this would involve.  
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8. Final reflections 
From all enterprises reviewed in case studies, CS5 was the most successful, in 
spite of a trajectory that has not always been smooth. It has gone through several 
years of writing losses and battling with a tense cash flow.  
The reasons for this success include the generally good performance of the 
tourism sector over the period, especially in the niche of township tourism, and 
the competitive advantage of Mr. A.J., who was among the first ones to move 
into this niche. This strategically favourable move was not just the result of luck, 
as the data have shown the entrepreneur’s ‘visionary’ character, which seems 
likely to carry him further forward: when he noticed that the tourism market was 
becoming saturated, he looked early for other developments.  
Mr. A.J. has done mistakes, though, like engaging into a wrong partnership, 
buying the wrong vehicle, managing the firm’s financial resources as if they 
were his own. But – unlike the owners of CS4a+b, who seem blind to the flaws 
of their businesses – he has had the insight of acknowledging his errors and 
correcting the course.  
Maybe the humility of the owner and his keenness to learn and improve himself, 
combined with a strong business intuition, have been keys to his success. When 
he decided to move into the tourism business, he had no knowledge of the field, 
but followed a course and training. In the initial phase, he also did not hesitate to 
work as a subcontractor for his competitors, from which he gained the thorough 
market knowledge that was required to achieve the turnover growth he needed.  
Later, he asked a mentor to give him specific support with regard to financial 
management. He also recognised the need to maintain the co-operation with his 
accounting officer, in spite of the cost. These interventions enabled him to 
gradually strengthen his business’s deficient financial management.  
It may come as a surprise that a firm of this size (with annual sales exceeding 
R1 million) operated without a business plan, without a sales record, with the 
owner being unable to name the turnover’s order of magnitude – yet always 
being able to repay its vehicle finance loans and to pay its wages and salaries on 
schedule. Most probably, the owner’s personality gained him support by banks, 
customers and other partners, including the friends and relatives who initially 
agreed to support the venture.  
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Annexure 36 – Narrative of Case Study 6  
Packaging business specialised in wooden crates 
 
An illustration of a growing business constrained by equipment and working 
capital finance, the support to a related business, and family conflicts  
 
1. Business Short Portrait 
Business Code Name: CS6 
Ethnic background: white (Afrikaans) 
Form of registration: CC  
 
Members: 
- Mr. Wynand D., owner-manager, holds 90% of capital (initially 45%) 
- Mrs. H. J., owns 10% of capital, now dormant member (initially “helping out” in the 
business’s administration) 
- previous member: Mr. Kobus D., sold his 45% stake, now starting his own business 
 
Related company: Black empowerment company  
Members: all employees 
Sector of activity: 
- Primary activity: SIC 8895 (packaging: crating) 
- Secondary activity: SIC 7419(transport / shipping) 
Product or Service: packing items that need to be exported or shipped overseas: artwork, 
furniture, antiques, machinery etc => wrapped, packed in wooden crates or containers 
Business concept: independent (family) Market: Mainly corporate, a bit private  
Start-up date: 1991 
Current status: active 
 
Staff members: 11 
- Managers: 2 initially, now only 1 
- Permanent employees: 2 
- Casual staff: 9 
Annual turnover: R 1,43 million  
Gross fixed assets : R 300 thousand 
Total assets: R594 thousand  
 
=> Size category: small  
Main sources of finance:  
- Member’s loan  - Instalment credit 
- Trade credit  - Bank Overdraft  
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2. Case study procedure 
In the search for financially constrained businesses, after having secured a case 
study on an asset-intensive business (CS5), I wished to find a constrained 
services business. The packaging services industry seemed to potentially match 
the expectations, so I consulted the yellow pages and phoned businesses.  
In my first telephonic contact with the business I spoke to the minority 
shareholder (Mrs. H. J.), who confirmed the firm’s financial constraints and 
agreed to participate in the study. I was probably lucky to have had my first 
contact with her, because her son (who later became the majority shareholder) 
would probably not have been approachable. Even the mother, in a later period, 
may not have been willing to talk about the business.  
During the course of the study, indeed, (between first and second interview), a 
conflict erupted between the main shareholders, causing one of the main 
members to quit, and the minority member (mother) becoming dormant after 
being involved in the administration.  
Accordingly, the case study was based on the following sources: 
- telephonic pre-interview and on-site interview of the minority 
shareholder (mother),  
- financial statements for 2002(01) and 2004(03), including preliminary 
financials for 2004 
- on-site interview of the main member (son)  
 
3. The business owners 
The business is a family enterprise: the founding member Mr. D. died shortly 
after having started it. The enterprise was then taken over by one of his sons, 
Kobus, together with the mother Mrs. J. (who got re-married). The other son 
Wynand later joined.  
I did not have an opportunity to meet Kobus: my first interview was with Mrs. J., 
at a time when the business was owned jointly by two brothers and their mother; 
a month later, Kobus had sold his share and Wynand, who gave me the second 
interview, was trying to run it on his own.  
Background 
Mr. D., father of Kobus and Wynand, has spent most of his life working in the 
transport sector. This has caused him to travel a lot through Southern Africa, 
spending many years in Botswana, as well as Zimbabwe. When they came back 
to South Africa, where they originally came from, Mr. D. decided to start this 
packing/crating business.  
When Mr. D. passed away, Kobus and his mother took over but it seems that 
they were quite unprepared for that. Mrs. J. had been involved in secretarial work 
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from the start but knew little of business management. According to her, Kobus 
had had “no further education”, his background being limited to working as a 
worker in a company involved in equipment repairs and service: his mother 
described his work as “fixing tools”.  
The brother Wynand, who joined the business later, had been trained as a 
personnel manager but had later been employed as a buyer for plastic companies. 
This activity gave him some commercial sense.  
Character 
A woman in her sixties, Mrs. J. was smart and polite, attached to the business out 
of loyalty for her late husband, and hoping that her grandsons would still make a 
living out of it. As a mother, she seemed proud of her sons but somehow worried 
for them, feeling helpless in the harsh environment that they were evolving in, 
disappointed about the difficulties that they were facing, especially with regard 
to finance, as if she had wished more compassion from the bank. Had she wished 
a more glamorous business? Possibly, because she was frustrated that they were 
unable to buy industrial property or a new forklift – wishes that her son Wynand 
dismissed as unnecessary and a waste of money.  
Her son Wynand, an Afrikaner in his thirties, was rather intimidating, tall and 
large, with a stern look and an unfriendly voice. On my first visit to the site, I 
was introduced to him but he stood rigid, at a distance, and did not return my 
greeting. On the second visit, he granted me an interview in his own office, 
promptly pushing away the fishing magazines that were covering his desk. He 
seemed authoritative, nervous and impulsive.  
When asked to explain what had caused his brother to sell his share in the 
business and the mother to withdraw as a dormant shareholder, he mentioned as 
the first reason his own personality, calling himself “a dominating and rude 
bastard”. In our discussions, he showed a strong resentment against his brother 
and contempt for his mother. This emotional background certainly introduced 
distortions into his statements about the business. In particular, when telling the 
business’s history, he tended to blame his brother for most problems, as if 
pretending that there would have been no problems if he had been in control of 
everything. The truth however was probably not as black and white as his 
discourse. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Wynand’s business sense was superior to 
his mother’s; while to her the business was a family dream, he was unemotional 
and cost conscious, and saw no need for expenses that she was fantasising about. 
Having said that, the time spent with Wynand did not give me a clear impression 
as to whether he was hard-working (he did not reply to the phone, just standing, 
smoking and occasionally giving injunctions to his staff). 
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Personal Finance 
According to the indications given by Mrs. J., the family was not particularly 
wealthy, both sons having not been able to accumulate much savings. Mrs. J. 
owned a car and some investments in the region of R200 thousand Rand, but no 
further assets, except the house in which her mother lived, which was in a 
retirement village and had not much value. (She lived on her second husband’s 
property). 
The sons had only recently bought their houses, Kobus taking a home loan in 
2001 and Wynand in 2002. They both did not own any private vehicle (using the 
business bakkies for their own purposes) nor any significant financial 
investments.  
 
3. History of the business  
I collected only little information on the start-up phase since the founding 
member was not available for interview. The interviewees naturally spoke more 
of the period that they knew well. It was interesting, though, that the account 
given by Wynand was quite different from Mrs. J’s report, and probably biased.  
Initial investment 
The business was started when the family came back from Botswana in 1991. 
Mrs. J. surmised that the initial investment was in the region of R45 000, 
essentially for the purchase of an old forklift and some manual tools (handsaws 
and hammers). It was financed on the family’s own savings.  
Expansion and Financing scheme 
Mrs. J. was not very specific about the trajectory of the enterprise but suggested 
that it had expanded slowly, adding new equipment, staff and vehicles, and 
moving four times to new premises to cater for the increased need for space. The 
vehicles and computers were bought on credit, and in addition the bank granted 
an overdraft facility, initially at R60 000, later increased to R100 000 as the 
business grew.  
According to Wynand, when he was asked to join in 1998, the business was 
nearly bankrupt, “it would not have survived 3 months”. At the stage, Wynand 
refused to take a stake in the business, preferring to work as an employee. The 
problem of the enterprise at the time was, in Wynand’s terms, that “there were no 
customers”. The enterprise had no salesforce and no marketing strategy, and 
turnover was too small.  
Wynand spent four months trying to find customers, partly by targeting some 
potential clients, partly just by “walking into people’s businesses” – supposedly 
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a rather aggressive marketing campaign. He set himself monthly turnover 
targets, and the targets kept growing, as he was indeed bringing new business in. 
As business came in, he had to increase the working capacity: this happened 
gradually and the process generated many inefficiencies. For each addition of 
staff or equipment, the business “needed months to recover”, i.e. come back to a 
positive cash flow footing.  
At the time, they were operating from a warehouse so small that, when large 
orders came in, there was no space to work from inside: they had to take all the 
materials and equipment out to the yard in the morning, work outside, and bring 
everything back into the warehouse for the night – a process that took much 
time. To avoid these inefficiencies, they occasionally subcontracted some of the 
work, a process which reduced their margin but enabled them to immediately 
satisfy their clients’ requests while they were busy building up the capacity.   
In the account given by Wynand, it would seem that by the end of 2003 the 
progress was considerable: the business’s capacity was sufficient to serve large 
clients without having to subcontract, and the economies of scale finally brought 
profitability, making up for past losses. The addition of equipment enabled to 
reduce the number of employees although the turnover was still growing 
(substituting capital for labour). Two comparisons would give an idea of the 
extent of growth that was reached: “in one month of 2002 we had more turnover 
than in the whole year of 1998” and “in one hour now, I build more crates than 
we used to do in one day”.  
According to Wynand, in 2003 there was no major cash flow constraint: clients 
were generally paying promptly, and the vehicle finance instalments could 
always be paid on time. It seemed as though they had solved all their problems.  
The black empowerment company 
In 2003 the management decided to set up a black empowerment company that 
would compete in tender applications. All staff members of the company that 
were present at the time became joint owners of this company, with Wynand 
holding 20% of the shares. Mrs. J. had presented this company as a profit-
sharing initiative, although Wynand made it clear that the purpose was to access 
tenders that would not otherwise be granted to his company. He expected a big 
6-months contract to come in soon.  
Effectively, it was not entirely clear yet where the limit would be set between 
this black empowerment company and the main business. The new black-owned 
enterprise had neither material resources nor contacts in the arena, so it would be 
highly dependent on the older white-owned one, which would buy the wood, 
make the equipment available, etc. Wynand suggested that when the contract 
would be there, the members of the BEE company would have to decide how 
many people to employ, these people would have to work at night or on the 
week-ends, and when the money would come in they would have to first refund 
him for his expenses, and then they would need to decide what to do with the rest 
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of the money, adding that there would certainly be heavy discussions about that.  
The conflict between the brothers 
The discord started when Kobus, who had been in the business since his father’s 
death, decided to start another (food-related) business, in partnership with his 
mother. As the salesperson told me, “he got tired of crating”, but according to 
Wynand he was mainly tired of working with his brother. I could not get any 
details about this new venture, which Wynand dismissed as being boring and 
uncreative.  
Kobus’ new project had an impact on the crating business in the sense that, as is 
usual, the older sister company’s cash resources were used to finance the 
younger sister company. Indeed, the February 2004 draft balance sheet reflects a 
long-term loan of approximately R15 000 (interest free and with no fixed terms 
of repayment) from the older to the newer business. Wynand suggested that by 
June 2004 the amount was closer to R80 000 and he had little hope of it being 
repaid.  
Drawing R80 000 out of the crating business precisely during the winter time, 
when cash has always been tight, has put a tremendous pressure on the cash flow 
of Wynand’s business. He feels close to bankruptcy but will try to struggle 
through for the next 6 months, hoping that he will recover – if not, he will have 
to take more drastic measures.  
Meanwhile, the divorce between the two brothers has enabled Wynand to “close 
the tap” and prevent his brother from pumping more money out of the crating 
business. The brothers agreed, though, that Wynand’s business would still have 
to pay off the bakkie which will now be used by Kobus in his own business: a 
way of indemnifying his brother, which leaves the crating business “short of a 
vehicle”.  
Critical summary 
The account of the business’s history given by Wynand can be summarised in 
three periods: from start-up in 1991 until 1998, the business evolved slowly 
towards bankruptcy for lack of customers. In the five years following Wynand’s 
involvement (1998-2003), he built up a client base and brought the business back 
to profitability and cash flow sustainability. But since early 2004, his brother’s 
new ambitions pumped the liquidity out of the business and brought them back 
to near-bankruptcy. In Wynand’s crude terms, “it took 5 years to build it up and 
6 months to fuck it up”. 
This account is probably biased – but the financial statements support most of it. 
In particular, the income statements indicate a sustained, although irregular, 
turnover growth and the appearance of first profits between 2002 and 2004. 
Furthermore, the balance sheets do reflect a significant improvement in the cash 
situation in 2003 (in Feb 2003 the overdraft is down to R11 000, and in the 
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following 12 months the interest payments have been far lower than in the past) 
– although, as the following analysis will show, this evolution was far from 
being sustainable. 
Access to finance 
When I had my first telephonic pre-interview with Mrs. J., she insisted that 
access to finance has been a permanent difficulty for the family, both in terms of 
equipment and working capital.  
When the business was started, the equity was enough to cover the modest initial 
asset base (which Mrs. J. estimated to be in the region of R45 000), but the firm 
has had to grow and upgrade its assets. However, the growth of equity was 
limited by the absence of profits and the lack of savings among the two brothers. 
As the mother put it, both brothers had “no money to throw at the business”. 
Luckily Mrs. J. could grant a substantial member’s loan (close to R140 000 in 
2002, covering the accumulated losses); the loans of the other members were 
more modest. 
Beyond this, the capacity growth therefore had to be financed partly by 
equipment credit, partly by overdraft: the cash inflows from operations were not 
kept for working capital purposes, but immediately intercepted for investments. 
Indeed, Mrs. J. suggested that they keep no cash in bank – whenever there was 
cash it would be invested in fixed assets, such as the computers or saws. 
Considering this strategy for the financing of equipment, it is not surprising that 
the family found it most difficult to secure working capital. Luckily, Mrs. J.’s 
investments enabled the brothers to secure an overdraft – and this is probably the 
reason why she has remained a shareholder after the conflict: Wynand needs her 
collateral.  
 
4. Business model and operations 
Business model  
The financial statements define the nature of business as “Transport, shipping 
and forwarding; warehousing and packing of goods”. Asked to confirm this, 
Wynand indicated that their involvement in transport and shipping was rather 
marginal, while the core of the business was in packaging, especially crating.  
When confronted with shipping requests, the business generally refers private 
clients to their partner freight companies, which also represent the largest part of 
their customer base. Hence, there is a two-way flow of business.  
The core of the business is the packaging (and in some cases, storing) of goods 
that need particular protection, such as artwork or valuable furniture – especially 
in connection with (commercial) export or (private) relocations of households to 
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overseas destinations. Tourism has always been a driver to their business, with 
foreign visitors buying art or furniture, which they want to have transported 
safely to their home country. The items are thus packed in robust wooden crates 
and are ready for transport.  
Compared with more standardised packaging firms, the crating work remains 
relatively labour intensive (due to the special care required by the goods to be 
packed and the case by case handling of them). However, the business has been 
able to significantly improve productivity by acquiring performing machinery. 
At the time of the last interview there were only seven people still involved in 
the wrapping, packing, and carrying of goods. Another two men had higher 
responsibilities of driving and supervising the teams. All those employees were 
employed on a casual basis. The only two permanent employees were the 
administrative staff (including selling). The total staff was then 11 people.  
Premises 
In her interview Mrs. J. had mentioned premises as a critical issue on which the 
bank had disappointed them. “The bank makes it impossible for small businesses 
to buy industrial property”, she deplored. “They ask for a 50% deposit, do you 
think any small business can put so much cash in?” 
Wynand confirmed that, at the end of 2001, the business had wanted to buy 
industrial property. They had identified suitable premises and had put a 
significant amount of capital aside for that purpose. Specifically, Wynand 
mentioned that they had R118 000 available in cash. But the bank rejected the 
loan application, so the transaction aborted. Wynand was not as emotional as his 
mother about this lost opportunity – possibly because, as he put it, the cash 
surplus that they had at the time went into his own private house instead, which 
he bought in 2002. 
After several moves to cater for the increasing need of space, the business is now 
renting two units in the same business park, one for work and office, and the 
other one for storage. For those two units they pay a total rent of R11 000 per 
month, “far too expensive” according to Mrs. J – while Wynand was rather 
satisfied and emphasised that they had “a very good landlord”. The business 
owners reached an agreement with the landlord by which they are going to give 
up the smaller warehouse (which costs them R4 000/month) and build a 
mezzanine in the larger one, which will provide some space for storing. The rent 
for the larger premises, after addition of a mezzanine, will be increased by 
R1 000/month, but this will still lighten the burden. In his interview Wynand 
proudly announced that “my rent will go down from R12 000 to R7 000/month”, 
thus betraying a lack of mathematical agility since the rent was in fact going to 
decrease from R11 000 to R8 000. 
Assets 
The business fixed assets are composed mainly of machinery and equipment on 
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one hand, and vehicles on the other hand. Naturally, as for any small business, 
the amount of equipment is limited by financial affordability and Mrs. J. 
emphasised that this causes permanent constraints on the business and its ability 
to take on larger contracts.  
Plant equipment, it seemed, was a combination of high-performing modern 
machinery and older equipment. Wynand seemed to operate a reasonably strict 
distinction between the essential apparatus, which were used regularly and had to 
be reliable and efficient, and the secondary assets, for which it would not make 
economic sense to buy expensive brands.  
In particular, Wynand mentioned a piece of equipment used to knock big nails 
into wood. Those nails are expensive so the equipment is not used for small jobs 
(in which case it is more economical to hammer smaller nails manually). But if 
the volume is sufficient, that machine saves time – a critical factor in large jobs. 
With this piece of equipment, they can make up to 92 crates a day. Other 
essential pieces of equipment are the circular table saw (with a measuring board) 
and the 2 circular saws. 
In contrast, Wynand regards the forklift, which was one of the first investments 
of the father, as a secondary asset. While Mrs. J. deplored that their forklift was 
old and difficult to move, Wynand insisted that buying a new forklift was “not a 
priority in my life. It was a priority in her life, I know, but I don’t want to spend 
R200 000 on a fancy forklift that will be used two or three times a week – I’ll 
rather spend that money on a truck”. When a specific need for a performing 
forklift arises, the business would rather hire a better forklift since the need does 
not justify a purchase. 
The other major assets are vehicles, especially a truck and two bakkies (one for 
each brother). The truck has been bought in 2002 on instalments over 3 years: at 
the time of the last interview the credit was still running over 15 months. The 
bakkie used by Kobus was also bought on instalments over 5 years, and was not 
yet entirely repaid – a study of the financials would suggest that the instalment 
sale agreement was still recent, concluded only towards January 2004. The 
brothers had agreed that once fully paid-up, the vehicle would move into the 
private ownership of Kobus (as an indemnification for leaving the business). As 
to “Wynand’s bakkie”, it is older and already fully paid-up, which caused 
Wynand to declare: “My bakkie is earning money. Today it has done 3 
collections and 2 deliveries, so it has earned R700 just in a day”.  
Lastly, among the office equipment, there is a PC which is still on instalments; 
the business pays 700R/month to repay it.    
Management style and philosophy 
With the distinct personalities involved in the management of the business, the 
management style has been fluctuating over the business’s existence, although it 
would seem that, since 1998, Wynand’s influence has been more and more 
dominating.  
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Compared with his mother and supposedly his brother’s more “romantic” 
philosophy (Mrs. J. talked about “offering a good service”, “trying to educate the 
staff (forklift license, 1st aid) and make things easier for them”, “promoting black 
empowerment”), Wynand’s approach was more hard-line, down-to-earth and 
strictly guided by economic concerns. This included aggressive marketing 
(“walking into people’s businesses” and “keeping a foot in the door until they let 
[him] in”), improvement of logistics (reorganising work processes to make them 
more efficient) and ensuring that the black empowerment company would work 
in his business’s interest.  
Wynand was also more ambitious as to the growth and contract size that the 
business needed to achieve – whereas his mother had been somewhat reluctant to 
engage into big contracts (such as tenders), as this would require them to expand 
their capacity, which would not necessarily be profitable owing to the fierce 
competition for tenders. 
Mrs. J’s and Wynand’s look to the future also differed significantly, with Mrs. J. 
being “confident that, unless a political or economic crisis cause a major drop in 
exports or tourism inflows, business will remain sustainable”, while Wynand 
was more nervous and focused on the critical ability of the business to recover 
from the current cash crisis. 
Market, Competition and Workload 
Clients 
There has been a shift in the way the business defines its target market, although 
this shift does not yet seem to be reflected in the effective client base.  
Initially, customers were mainly exporters and tourists, who would hear from the 
firm by word-of-mouth advertising. This gave a nice spread of small clients but 
the job flow was discontinuous and job size was limited. The business did not 
have any long-term contracts or even long-term relationships with its clients. 
In a bid to get a more steady work flow and a larger job size (enabling 
productivity gains), Wynand has made a strategic move towards larger clients. In 
particular, he has undertaken to build longer-term ties with shipping agents, both 
in Cape Town and Johannesburg. More recently, he has started targeting the 
large industrial or service companies (including Eskom and Telkom) and 
checking tender opportunities (using the empowerment company as a vehicle for 
tenders).  
Any contract from such a large client would radically transform their turnover 
structure, since the job size would be considerably larger than for private jobs. 
But this strategy has not yet borne its fruits. Wynand remains confident that he 
will eventually have a breakthrough, but it takes time: “big companies are 
resistant to change”. However, his optimism should be pondered by two remarks. 
First, the business’s limited capacity remains a serious obstacle to its ability to 
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gain large contracts. In addition, the power imbalance between an SME and a 
large firm cause unfavourable trading terms, while longer-term contracts slow 
down the working capital cycle – both elements being inconvenient in the 
business’s current cash-tight situation.  
So far, Wynand was proud to announce that for the first time in five years he had 
secured a large, long-term contract. At the time of the second interview, a first 
chunk of the job had been completed, but unfortunately the client was not 
showing much interest for it, and did not wish to have it delivered (supposedly 
the client only wanted to pay once the entire job was completed). This put a 
strain on the business both logistically (they did not have the space to store the 
finished crates) and financially (they would have to wait before recovering the 
costs engaged for this early phase of the job). Nevertheless Wynand wanted to 
keep a good contact with that client, in order to keep “a foot in the door” and 
hopefully gain further contracts later. 
The fluctuating workload 
The reason for Wynand’s persistent efforts towards large clients and large 
contracts was that the lack of a continuous workflow had caused a real problem 
to them in the past.  
As Mrs. J said, “In this business it’s either too much or you have nothing to do”. 
She described the business as follows: They used to start every month not 
knowing what they would have to do. After 3-4 days with no work, they would 
suddenly receive a job that they could hardly cope with, and were working at 
150% of their capacity. This situation caused difficulties in planning and 
additional costs in all respects (labour, since they had to pay overtime; 
equipment hiring when necessary; as well as financial costs, in particular with 
regard to managing the stock and the working capital).  
In addition to these week-to-week fluctuations on the workload, they had an 
annual cycle caused by their dependence on tourism. The summers were usually 
busy, while there was little work in winter. 
The situation was slightly better at the time of the interviews, since the business 
had been able to secure a few contracts, especially from non-tourist based 
sources. In addition to the large long-term contract already mentioned, the 
company was working on two other small contracts. Furthermore, they were 
waiting for the black empowerment contract to come through (Wynand was 
confident that they would win the tender and that it would be profitable). The 
owner hoped that these contracts would help them to plan their capacity, manage 
the stock and smoothen the cash situation.  
Competition:  
Because of the way they had been working previously (with small, mainly 
private clients, on a word-of-mouth basis), the business owners had not suffered 
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from the competition. Mrs. J. even ventured that in the beginning there was no 
competition at all, and they were entirely free to set their prices and conditions. 
As time went and the demand broadened (with an increase of trade and tourism), 
a few more firms entered the market, including one previous client (a shipping 
agent) who had set up its own packing facilities. But at the time of the case study 
there was no feeling of harsh competition, presumably because crating remained 
a niche market, with most new entrants being also small and having a limited 
capacity, while the demand was still vibrant.   
A check of the yellow pages confirmed that there were a few competitors (5 
companies under “crates” and 4 other companies under “packing and crating”), 
but that the marketing positioning of Wynand’s firm was relatively favourable, 
with only two other companies having comparable large display adverts. 
However, of course, in their bid for large contracts and tenders, the business 
would feel more severe competition, probably from the packaging industry as a 
whole, which involved some relatively large companies possibly working with 
other materials (e.g. plastic crates). 
Costing, Pricing and Credit Policy 
Costing and Pricing 
Thanks to the weakness of competition, the business has been able to set its 
prices according to its needs. Costing takes place in co-operation with the 
external bookkeeper; Mrs. J showed me the costing sheets, which include cost of 
materials and labour; she mentioned that they worked on a 13.9% profit margin, 
but did not make it entirely clear whether this was the ex ante margin built up 
into the pricing (it would be an odd number), or the ex post effective margin.  
Credit policy 
Up to the time of the case study, the management had not felt the need to define 
a strict credit policy, and payment terms were agreed according to the client’s 
preferences. A good indicator of how little attention was paid to this issue, was 
the contradiction that came up in the first interview when I specifically asked 
about payment terms: Mrs. J. answered that “most clients pay COD but some pay 
only after 30 days”, to which the administrative employee, who was sitting in the 
same room, commented: “it is rather the other way around” – which, if the 
accounts are correct, was still an under-estimation of reality.  
The best payment terms were obtained when the firm worked in co-operation 
with clearing and forwarding agents. As Wynand explained, on export contracts, 
the firm could hold the clients’ paperwork until the payment is through, thus 
ensuring a prompter payment. Among other clients, though, delays in settling the 
invoices are frequent and not well monitored.  
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The result of this slack credit management has been that cash inflows have been 
more and more delayed, putting a strain on working capital. The balance sheets 
confirm this situation, with accounts receivable increasing from 32 days of 
turnover in February 2001 to 60 days in February 2002 and up to 96 days in 
2004. This latest figure diverges with the indications given in the interviews, 
which had suggested that accounts receivable might have stood at around 30 
days of turnover. If effectively a significant proportion of clients are prompt 
payers, then the late payers must take at least four months to pay.  
Wynand confirmed that they were now “fighting” with a client who had owed 
the firm money for five months. This client had ordered the next job but had still 
not paid for the previous one, so that Wynand was refusing to start a new job. In 
spite of these increasing payment delays, Wynand was not really worried by the 
prospect of customer default: they had had only few bad experiences so far. They 
used application forms to verify their clients’ credentials prior to agreeing to a 
credit. At some occasions they have had to take legal action but it has always 
been resolved smoothly. Wynand believed that the late payments were not 
caused by the bad liquidity of clients, but by the fact that “in Cape Town, people 
are so slack”.  
Around the time of the case study, with the tightening of cash and the need to 
manage working capital more strictly, Wynand determined a new, hard-line 
credit policy – a reasonable step considering that the low levels of competition 
allowed him to dictate terms of trade. He noted: “Things are going to change. 
From now on, all new customers will have to pay COD or on presentation of 
statement. As to the old customers, they will be treated individually, some don’t 
actually mind paying COD, for others we will have to see what we can do”. 
Wynand presumably forgot to mention the case of new large contract clients, 
who would be more inclined to impose the credit terms that suited them; 
Wynand’s business would have to be flexible in order to win these contracts. 
Profitability 
Asked for her opinion about the profitability of the business, Mrs. J. in her 
interview answered “Yes we are keeping a certain level”, adding that “the 
growth has been steady”. This positive account contrasted with her son’s 
statement that “in 1998 the business was nearly bankrupt” and that it had taken 
him 5 years to get it above the water level. 
The financial statements confirm Wynand’s rather than his mother’s version of 
facts. They show substantial accumulated losses in years prior to 2001, followed 
by alternating losses and profits between 2001 and 2004. Only in February 2004 
have the accumulated losses from early years been covered by that year’s profit. 
(The good 2004 result however was partly caused by a profit on a sale of asset, 
although the financial year would have been positive even without this 
transaction).  
As Wynand emphasised, the reason for the lack of profits in the past was the 
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insufficient turnover. Only in 2002 did the business reach a sufficient business 
volume to cover fixed costs (see breakeven analysis), which did not prevent them 
from writing losses again in 2003 as a result of an increase in variable costs, 
especially salaries. Therefore, in spite of the good profit in 2004, the situation 
remained precarious.  
Table 36.1 – CS6’s summarised income statement, 2001-2004 
 Feb-01 Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
Turnover  553 667 1 040 493 1 148 698 1 429 327 
Cost of sales 161 597 482 355 526 639 573 728 
Salaries 42 953 60 768 122 331 128 266 
Wages & subcontractors 87 583 85 904 83 591 86 663 
Other expenses 263 150 323 146 420 786 583 176 
Extraordinary income    34 999 
Profit before tax -1 616 88 320 -4 649 92 493 
Actual tax    12 936 
Profit after tax -1 616 88 320 -4 649 79 557 
 
Member's remuneration 
As a minority shareholder who was not directly involved in business, Mrs. J was 
not taking any salary. By contrast, her sons were dependent on a salary from the 
business for their livelihoods.  
From 2001 to 2003, Kobus, as the then main owner, paid himself a salary of 
between R53 000 and R55 120 (during those years Wynand was working as an 
employee, therefore his salary does not appear separately in the accounts). To 
this cash salary should be added advantages in kind (Mrs. J. mentioned medical 
aid, home bond and car).  
It seems that the improvement of profit in February 2004 caused the brothers to 
pay themselves a premium on their usual salary, since both earned R72 321.  
 
5. Financial management 
Organisation of the business administration   
In the early years of the business there has been no awareness of the need of a 
separate financial management. The work was split between the “plant” and the 
“office”. The latter was regarded as secretarial work only (such as writing 
invoices), and was done by Mrs. J.  
As the business grew, they employed a person to look after the administration, 
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which involved searching suppliers, marketing the services to potential clients, 
doing secretarial work and maintaining proper financial records.  
The largest part of the financial management was done externally by a 
bookkeeper who collected business records once a month, and prepared some 
financial documents. Wynand named a statement of income and expenses, 
balance sheet, register of petty cash, VAT filings etc., but he did not give the 
impression of knowing exactly what he was talking about, or of studying those 
documents thoroughly. 
Another indication of Mrs. J. showed that the bookkeeper was also involved in 
producing costing sheets and monthly breakeven calculations – hence going 
beyond a pure archive-oriented work to include decision-driven analyses. In that 
sense the business seemed to be better served by their bookkeeper than many 
other SMEs studied.  
Surprisingly, the income statements do not show any traces of bookkeeping fees 
– the remuneration of the bookkeeper was probably included in the accounting 
fees.  
Forecasting and monitoring of sales and costs 
Again, there was a contradiction between mother and son as to the existence of 
forecasting and monitoring. According to Mrs. J., the business did not normally 
do any plans or forecasts; in contrast, Wynand said that he redressed the turnover 
by setting himself monthly targets that were permanently updated. This 
statement suggests that at least the sales have been planned and monitored.  
Maybe a correct interpretation of the mother’s statement would be that there was 
no significant planning and monitoring of costs.  
Accounting and setting up of financial statements 
If Wynand gave a correct description of the tasks of the bookkeeper, she was 
significantly involved in accounting, preparing at least management accounts.  
The year-end financial statements themselves, however, were compiled by 
another company, which acted as Accounting Officer. However, Wynand 
indicated that he was considering changing this current arrangement because this 
company was too expensive. (The business paid accounting fees in excess of 
R30 000 in 2003, down to R21 800 in 2004). 
Compared with other SMEs it was relatively easy to obtain copies of the 
financial statements. On my first site visit, a first draft of the latest financial 
statements (February 2004) had just been prepared by the accounting officer and 
laid on the office desk, so that they could be immediately handed over to me 
(Mrs. J. did not even bother to make copies since it was a preliminary version 
which would be replaced by a final version in due time). Older financial 
statements were taken out of the safe and handed out to me. (Again Mrs. J. did 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 36: Narrative on case study 6 Page 575 
 
 
not bother to make photocopies and declined my offer to return the originals 
after making my own photocopies). A few weeks later, after a few phone calls I 
received the main 3 pages of the final 2004 statements by fax.  
The comparison of the draft and final versions of the 2004 accounts was 
interesting. When she handed over the draft financials to me, Mrs. J. indicated 
that the accountant had offered to “adjust” the accounts in order to minimise the 
tax burden. Indeed, for the first time, the business was doing a significant profit 
and using up the tax credits resulting from previous years’ losses.  
The final statements confirmed that a revision of the draft has taken place to the 
effect that the profit before tax was lowered by over 31%. As a result of the tax 
credits available, the effect of this was to lower the tax burden by half. 
Interestingly, only one item was changed in the income statement, namely the 
purchases (which went up from R529 752 to R572 517).  
On the balance sheet side, the lower profit induced a lower tax liability, as well 
as a lower distributable reserve. These changes were compensated by two 
adjustments: on the asset side, a loan receivable amounting to R16K (which 
Wynand had described as representing the money lent to his brother’s new 
business) was removed from the accounts, while the balance was compensated 
by an increase in member’s loan. 
Table 36.2 summarises these main differences: 
Table 36.2 – Comparison of Draft and Final Statements for 2004 
Item 
Value in draft 
accounts 
Value in final 
accounts 
Difference Comments 
Income statement     
Purchases R 529 752 R 572 517 R 42 765  
Profit before tax R 135 258 R 92 493 R -42 765 
Tax R 25766 R 12936 R -12 830 
Profit after tax R 109 492 R 79 557 R -29 935 
automatic 
consequence of 
higher purchases 
Balance Sheet     
Assets     
Loan receivable R 15 765 R 0 R -15 765  
Equity & Liabilities     
Distrib. Reserve R 51 305 R 21 370 R -29 935 
Tax liability R 25 766 R 12 936 R -12 830 
consequence of 
lower profit 
Member’s loans R 150 973 R 177 973 R 27 000  
Source: elaborated from the balance sheets and income statements 2004, draft version 
and final version. 
The table shows an apparent relation between the change in purchases and the 
change in the loan receivable (both ending with 765). This raises the suspicion 
that, for the purpose of saving tax, some purchases that had been paid by the 
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crating business on behalf of the brother’s new firm, have been rebooked under 
the older firm’s name (explaining the disappearance of the loan receivable). 
Also, it is possible that an expense carried by one of the members, for R27 000, 
has similarly been placed on the books of the firm. One may speculate that this 
expense may have also been related to Kobus’s start-up.  
Surprisingly, even after these adjustments, the ratio of cost of sales to turnover 
remains lower, at 40,1%, than in the two previous years (respectively 45,8 and 
46,4%) – so that an external reader of the final statements would not suspect any 
upwards manipulation of this figure. 
Accounting transparency score 
Table 36.3 – Accounting transparency score 
Quantitative score 13.0 / 20 
Formal Quality Score 20.5 / 30 
Transparency Score 37.4 / 50 
Suspicion of manipulation #  
    
Total score 70.9 / 100 
 
Main issues: 
In general accounts are clean and transparent. 
There are shifts between Balance Sheets and Income Statements with regard to 
fixed assets and liabilities, suggesting that some investments have been made at 
end of year and are only reflected in depreciations and financial costs in 
following year. 
There is a strong suspicion that in 2004 some costs (possibly related to brother's 
new start-up business) have been booked under this business in order to reduce 
taxable income. However this does not fundamentally affect the reliability of 
accounts.  
Working capital and Cash management 
Working capital and cash management have become the most pressing problem 
in 2004, in spite of Mrs. J.’s statement, in her interview, that there was “no 
pressure on the overdraft, [they] [were] managing quite well”. Again this 
assertion betrayed either a drastic lack of awareness on the part of the minority 
shareholder, or an effort to brighten up her description of the business. Wynand, 
on the other side, was realistic and admitted being close to bankruptcy.  
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Accounts receivable and payable and Inventories 
A major reason for the tightening of working capital has been late payments by 
customers. “It has been very bad lately”, commented Wynand, adding that it was 
“always the same people who pay late”. He mentioned a “long story” which they 
had in 2003 with a client who owed them R15 000 and took at least 150 days to 
repay (sent a cheque that was not signed, etc). The balance sheet shows that 
accounts receivable have escalated in 2004, rising from an already high level of 
65 days of turnover, to 96 days. 
In spite of these long credit periods, the business has hardly experienced any bad 
debts. In four years, it has written off less than R8 000, or on average 0.2% of the 
turnover.  
This situation has forced the business to stretch their use of supplier credit. 
Wynand mentioned that they got credit on only three items: wood, wrapping, and 
petrol. For those items, the suppliers normally granted a 30 days period. Other 
purchases, such as nails, were paid cash. He added that they used to cope well 
with this 30 days period, and it is only “in the last few months” that they have 
had to further delay the settlement of their purchases. This, though, was not 
confirmed by the balance sheet which suggests that the payment cycle has been 
89 days of turnover since February 2003.  
In any case, the result of this situation was that suppliers were pressurising the 
firm, not willing to supply wood. On my question as to whether they would turn 
to new suppliers, Wynand answered negatively, insisting that “the suppliers 
know us and eventually we can discuss”. 
Needless to say, this situation has made it impossible for the SME to build up 
stock, in spite of the management’s effort to gain larger, longer-term contracts, 
which would require a more even stock. The inventories, which were already low 
in 2002 at 0,8% of turnover, have gone even further down to 0,2% of turnover in 
February 2004. Practically, the business had to buy wood and wrapping as 
needed for each job, and was even regularly obliged to delay work, deliberately 
not starting a new job at the end of a month because of its inability to buy wood. 
Cash and Overdraft  
CS6’s cash was very tight, and followed a monthly cycle, the worst period being 
between the 28th of a month (when salaries are due) and the 7-8th of the 
following month.  
According to Wynand the cash level used to fluctuate between +R30 000 and 
-R40 000, and was well within their initial overdraft limit of R60 000. In recent 
times, though, an increase of overdraft to R100 000 had become necessary. It 
must be noted that such overdraft limit was relatively high relative to the 
business’s size (8,3% of turnover, far higher than found in any other case study). 
This is probably explained by the business’s longer history (it had already been 
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running for 13 years), which gave the bank some confidence that the business 
would resist to difficulties.  
As Table 36.4 shows, except for February 2003, the overdraft facility has been 
almost fully used at the end of every financial year since at least February 2001 
(source: balance sheets). The amount at 28 February 2004 was still within the 
overdraft limit, but it was possibly temporarily affected by a sale of asset (see 
Section 4: profitability).  
Table 36.4 – CS6’s cash balances, 2001-2004 
 Feb ’01  Feb. ’02 Feb ’03  Feb. ’04 
Overdraft -96,279 -83,755 -11,767 -85,495 
Bank balances 0 0 2,076 170 
Source: Balance sheets 
During the months that have followed the closure of the financial year, the cash 
situation has worsened further (source: interview with Wynand), especially since 
the business has lent substantial amounts of money to Kobus’s new start-up – 
something that it could not actually afford to do. As a result, in June 2004 the 
bank balance was beyond the overdraft limit. At the end of May 2004, for the 
first time, the business was unable to pay salaries; the administrative and sales 
employee has agreed to wait until the beginning of the following month before 
taking her salary. 
The reasons for the tight cash situation are manifold and certainly not limited to 
the payments to the sister company. As Table 36.5 shows, the increase in long-
term resources (bank debt and members’ loans) over the three years between 
February 2001 and 2004 was insufficient to cover the investments in fixed assets. 
As a result, 25% of the investments (or R56 160) were de facto paid for by 
operating cash flows.  
From the R250 000 generated by operations over the three years, only R193 000 
were left for working capital. The customers’ increasingly late payments, 
meanwhile, had generated a financing need for over R330 000, of which only 
38% was covered by increasing supplier credit. That imbalance forced the 
business to lower its stock, although the increasing workload would have 
required more substantial investments in stock.   
This pressure on the cash was detrimental to the business in many ways: 
- It effectively depleted the firm’s working capital, thus hindering the 
business from being prepared ahead of contracts, especially because of 
the impossibility to maintain stock; 
- It led to sub-standard maintenance of vehicles; 
- It also affected the ability to generate new contracts, since the work 
capacity of the office employee, who was also sales representative, was 
concentrated on administrative matters (such as the relationship with 
suppliers, SARS and other creditors), leaving her no time to sell. 
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Table 36.5 – CS6, simulation of cash flow statement  
 
Mar ’01 to 
Feb. ’02 
Mar ’02 to 
Feb. ’03 
Mar ’03 to 
Feb. ’04 
Overall 
     
Net profit 88 320 -4 649 79 557 163 228 
Depreciation 20 511 26 783 39 579 86 873 
Operating cash flow  108 831 22 134 119 136 250 101 
     
ccounts receivable 125 975 33 350 172 210 331 535 
Change in accounts payable 31 718 93 170 1 371 126 259 
Change in stock -4 666 -3 475 -1 211 -9 352 
Change in working capital  -89 591 63 295 -156 692 -182 988 
     
Change in LT Liabilities -8 279 63 968 82 681 138 370 
Change in members' loan 11 502 7 025 10 939 29 466 
Cash flow from financing 
activities 
3 223 70 993 93 620 167 836 
     
Investing activities  
(additions to gross fixed assets) 
9 939 82 359 131 698 223 996 
     
Change in Cash Resources 12 524 74 063 -75 634 10 953 
Source: adapted from the cash flow statement, as reconstituted according to balance 
sheets, income statements and notes.  
 
At the time of the case study (June 2004), Wynand was hoping that a harder-line 
credit policy towards clients as well as continued sales efforts would 
progressively accelerate the working capital cycle. The danger however was that 
the sales representative would be too tied up with managing the finances to 
achieve her sales targets. If sales started decreasing, the cash situation would 
only worsen further. To avoid this, Wynand decided to rely more heavily on the 
(external free-lance) bookkeeper for all financial matters. 
Wynand expected that it would take 6-8 months to get back to an acceptable 
level of cash. He indicated that he would monitor it closely and take more drastic 
measures if necessary. The two possibilities under consideration were, either to 
pledge his house in order to secure a new term loan (but Wynand was not too 
keen on taking this risk), or to team up with an external partner who would bring 
in additional capital – he had received offers for partnership but had declined 
them so far.  
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Ongoing access to finance and relationship with creditors 
The business has been with the same bank since it was started in 1991, but Mrs. 
J. laughed when asked about the quality of her or her son’s personal relationship 
with the bank manager. In her experience, the bank was an entirely anonymous 
institution, they had no single person to refer to, and nobody at the bank really 
knew them or their business. “The banks only know you if you have lots of 
investments with them”. 
The absence of a relationship with a bank manager contributes to explaining that 
their use of bank products was limited to standard services (vehicle finance and 
overdraft) rather than services which would have been particularly adapted to 
their need (such as discounting or factoring).  
Nevertheless, the lack of a good relationship with the bank should not be 
exaggerated; after all, the bank has agreed to an increase of overdraft limit to an 
unusually high level compared with the business’s size (8,3% of turnover). 
Equipment finance 
According to Wynand, the investments in fixed assets were financed following 
two rules: vehicles, which were the major expenses, were bought on hire 
purchase, in general over 5 years, while the other (smaller) equipment was 
bought on cash (post-dated cheques over 3 months).  
Instalment finance for vehicles is a standardised product and has been relatively 
easy to obtain, since the value of the assets provide the financial institution with 
automatic collateral in case of bad payments. However, the accounting 
documentation would suggest that the interest rates paid on instalment sale were 
high (except in 2004). As Table 36.6 suggests, the interest rates charged on the 
ISA were 4 to 5,7 basis points above prime rate. This may indicate that the bank 
classified CS6 as a high risk and therefore charged a high premium. On the last 
ISA facility granted, in January 2004 (presumably Kobus’ bakkie), the 
conditions were apparently more favourable, estimated at 2,8 basis points above 
prime55.  
                                                 
55 This latter estimate is based on the prime rate applicable between January and February 2004, 
which is lower than the 12-months average rate. 
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Table 36.6 – CS6 interest rate charged on instalment sale, 2000-2004 
 Prime interest rate 
 
at 28 Feb  
average 
across 12 
months 
interest rate 
charged on 
ISA, as per 
the notes 
calculated 
premium 
over prime  
Mar 2000 to Feb 2001 14,5% 14,5% 18,9% 4,4% 
Mar 2001 to Feb 2002 14,0% 13,5% 19,2% 5,7% 
Mar 2002 to Feb 2003 17,0% 15,5% 21,2% 5,7% 
Mar 2003 to Feb 2004 11,5% (14.3%) 14,3% 2,8% 
Source: Prime rate from SARB, averages calculated from SARB data; interest rate 
charged on ISA as per notes to the financial statements. For the calculation of the risk 
premium in 2004 see footnote.  
Considering this cost, one understands that Wynand preferred the small 
equipment, such as saws and small machines, to be paid in cash – apart from the 
old forklift, which was there from the start, each individual piece of equipment 
costs between R8 000 and R18 000, and was financed from the proceeds of 
larger contracts.  
Short-term finance 
As discussed, CS6 had a tight working capital, resulting from several factors: (1) 
the use of short-term finance (cash flows from sales) for equipment purchases, 
(2) the lack of control over accounts receivable, and (3) more recently, payments 
done for the benefit of Kobus’ new start-up.  
The answer to this tight working capital has been the overdraft facility, which 
has been reasonably easy to get since Mrs. J. could offer significant collateral. 
Mrs. J. indicated that when they contracted the facility, they have tried to 
negotiate a reasonable interest rate with the bank. The limit was increased as the 
business grew.  
However, at the time of the case study, the business was in persistent breach of 
its overdraft limit – a situation that became very costly. Mrs. J. lamented that 
exceeding the limit took away any possibility to negotiate: “the minute you go 
over the limit, they phone you, make you sign papers”. Wynand was not keen to 
comment on this, “well, the bank phones, I cry a bit for them, and that’s it”.  
 
6. Financial ratios 
Financial ratios are particularly interesting here to diagnose the “illness” of this 
business which, in the words of its main owner, is close to bankruptcy.  
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Cost structure 
The cost structure of the crating business is summarised in Table 36.7. The cost 
structure appears as somewhat unstable, with fixed costs going up steadily and 
the ratio of variable costs to turnover moving by almost 9% between 2003 and 
2004. Indeed, all major cost items (purchases, wages and subcontractors, 
salaries, vehicle expenses) have decreased in proportion of sales between 2003 
and 2004. This may come from insufficient prices in 2003, which may have been 
corrected in 2004, or from productivity gains in 2004, which may have been 
enabled by the previous year’s investments. 
 
Table 36.7 – CS6’s cost structure  
 Feb-01 Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
Turnover  553 667 1 040 493 1 148 698 1 429 327 
Cost of sales  161 597 482 355 526 639 573 728 
Other variable costs (mainly wages, 
salaries and vehicle expenses) 191 771 240 637 332 750 360 986 
Total variable costs 353 368 722 992 859 389 934 714 
in % of turnover 63.8% 69.5% 74.8% 65.4% 
Administrative fixed costs (rent, 
insurance, accounting) 107 125 129 996 185 707 239 274 
Financial fixed costs (finance charges 
and depreciations) 41 790 44 185 53 039 53 314 
Total fixed costs 148 915 174 181 238 746 292 588 
Members' salaries 53 000 55 000 55 120 144 643 
Other income (interest or disposals)   20 34 999 
Net profit -1 616 88 320 -4 537 92 381 
Source: elaborated from the income statements 2001-2004. For 2004 the figures are 
based on the final financial statements, i.e. after adjustment of purchases.  
Under these circumstances, the breakeven calculation shoud not be reduced to a 
point estimate but rather a broad range, as shown in Table 36.8.  
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Table 36.8 – CS6’s breakeven calculation  
 
Estimation from past annual 
financials 
 low high mean 
bookkeeper’s 
estimate 
Variable costs 65% 75%   
Fixed costs (higher and lower 
estimation, not including members’ 
salaries) 
238 746 292 588 
 
 
Breakeven (range) 690 017 1 161 063 925 540 
R1,32 million 
(R110K/month) 
Margin of latest known turnover  
(R 1,43 million) over breakeven 
107% 23% 54% 8% 
Sources: own calculations from financial statements, except bookkeeper’s estimate, 
which was revealed in Mrs. J’s interview.  
The table shows a significant difference between the low and high estimations of 
breakeven. The bookkeeper prepared a further estimation, based on monthly 
costs, which placed the breakeven point at R110 000/month, corresponding to 
R1,32 million/year – this estimate is above our higher estimate.  
The higher value in the bookkeeper’s estimate was possibly explained by an 
inclusion of the member’s salary as well as a likely increase in fixed costs since 
the last financial statements. Indeed there were some indications that the 
business invested in fixed assets, financed by instalment sale, towards the end of 
the 2003-04 financial year (this is probably the Kobus’s bakkie); this situation 
creates higher depreciations & finance charges. 
Whatever estimate is taken as a benchmark, the annual turnover registered for 
the financial year ended 29 February 2004 was over breakeven. However, in the 
bookkeper’s estimate, the margin over breakeven was slim at 8%. A turnover 
decline of 8-9% would potentially suffice to bring the business back into the 
deficit zone. This result is worrying if one considers the weakening of the sales 
effort in 2004 as a result of administrative complications. In this light, it was 
essential that management kept a sustained sales effort to maintain turnover well 
over breakeven.  
This shows the vulnerability of every SMME. In 2003-2004, CS6 has been 
profitable and has covered up all accumulated losses from its past. However, 
every addition to fixed assets has the effect of raising the breakeven point, and as 
such it constitutes a bet on the future – the bet that turnover is going to increase 
further. If at some point this does not materialise – i.e. the growth curve plateaus 
– the cost structure may eventually be too heavy for the business, which would 
then slide back into deficits.  
Interest coverage 
So far, the interest coverage has been more a function of the operating results 
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than of the financial charges. In the year ended February 2003, operations have 
been generally less profitable, lowering the interest coverage. However, the ratio, 
as long as it incorporates the depreciation, remains acceptable. (The ratios of 
EBIT to interest and finance charges would be below 1 in February 2003). 
Table 36.9 – CS6’s interest coverage 
 Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
EBIT (after finance charges) 97 510 5 891 95 790 
EBITDA (after finance charges) 118 021 32 674 135 369 
Interest paid (overdraft) 9 190 10 540 3 297 
coverage ratio (interest on overdraft only) 12,8 3,1 41,1 
    
EBIT (before finance charges) 105 366 15 342 102 397 
EBITDA (before finance charges) 125 877 42 125 141 976 
Finance costs (overdraft and instalment sale) 17 046 19 991 9 904 
coverage ratio (total financial costs) 7,4 2,1 14,3 
 
Again, caution is required on this table. The interview data collected suggest that 
in the months following February 2004 the utilisation of overdraft has 
dramatically increased, to the extent that it is almost permanently beyond the 
limit, causing a surge in interest costs. In addition, the new instalment sale 
agreement (bakkie) contracted towards the beginning of 2004 generated 
additional financial charges. As a result, there was some reason to believe that 
the coverage ratio for the first few months of 2004-2005 would be significantly 
less favourable, and might even be below 1 if the operating results have been 
poor. Unfortunately, there were no figures to back this assumption.  
Equity ratio 
As in most SMMEs, the equity ratio stricto sensu is very unfavourable. Only in 
February 2004, after all accumulated losses from the past have been covered, 
does the equity reach a positive value.  
Economically more significant is the broader definition of member’s capital, 
which includes members’ loans. It shows that in 2002, almost half of the firm’s 
assets were financed by family resources. In the following years this proportion 
evolved to about a third, which reflects important investments made on 
instalment sale. Compared with South African SMMEs in general, this ratio was 
reasonably good.  
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Table 36.10 – CS6’s Equity ratio  
 Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
1/ Technical equity 
Members' interest 100 100 100 
Accumulated losses -53 538 -58 187 21 370 
Equity stricto sensu -53 438 -58 087 21 470 
Total Assets 229 663 317 189 578 401 
Equity ratio stricto sensu (1) -23% -18% 4% 
    
2/ Members’ capital    
Member's interest 100 100 100 
Accumulated losses -53 538 -58 187 21 370 
Quasi-equity (members’ loans) 160 009 167 034 177 973 
Members' capital in the broad sense 106 571 108 947 199 443 
Total Assets 229 663 317 189 578 401 
Equity ratio (2) 46% 34% 34% 
 
The business, then, does also not suffer from a dramatic lack of equity resources. 
However, again, two remarks mitigate this statement. Firstly, after the exit of one 
of the brothers in June 2004, the members’ loans have probably been lowered by 
R27 000 to R54 00056. Secondly, the large majority of the members’ loans come 
from Mrs. J., who may have become more reluctant to provide further funds to 
the crating business since the conflict broke out between the brothers. Indeed, 
Mrs. J. now also holds a share in Kobus’s new venture, and she may be tempted 
to invest in his rather than Wynand’s business. 
Debt maturity  
Table 36.11 shows that although the business has not been overly dependent on 
debt in general, its debt has been mostly short-term debt. In February 2002, when 
Wynand’s bakkie was almost entirely paid up, short-term debt represented 
almost 100% of total debt and over half of the business’s resources. In the 
following years, the purchase of new vehicles have slightly reduced the 
dependence on short-term debt but this remained high: in 2003 the overdraft was 
reduced but at the expense of a strong increase in the use of supplier credit; in the 
following year there was virtually no room to increase supplier credit any 
further, so the use of overdraft was stretched again. However, the mainly short-
term character of liabilities appears to be linked to the asset structure, which is 
                                                 
56 Unfortunately, the note giving the breakdown of members’ loans by member for February 
2004 is not available for the final accounts. Kobus’s contribution was R27 000 in the draft 
statements, but in the final statements the total members’ loans are R27 000 higher than in the 
draft. It is therefore possible that the book value of Kobus’ share was R54 000.  
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strongly dominated by short-term assets (especially accounts receivable).  
Table 36.11 – CS6’s dependence over short-term debt 
 Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
Current liabilities 120 407 141 589 216 688 
Accounts payable 36 652 129 822 131 193 
Overdraft 83 755 11 767 85 495 
Current assets 182 448 212 323 383 322 
Total assets (TA) 229 663 317 189 578 401 
CDR (Current liabilities / TA) 52,4% 44,6% 37,5% 
NCDR (Current debt – current assets)/ TA -27,0% -22,3% -28,8% 
Current debt / Total (external) debt 97,8% 68,0% 57,2% 
 
Overall, the dependence on short-term debt remains acceptable in February 2004 
but interview data would suggest that it has increased again in the following 
months, with the overdraft being permanently beyond R100 000 and the 
accounts payable being generally held overdue for even longer periods.  
Working capital cycle 
The working capital cycle was found to be the most critical issue behind the 
business’s problems. As Table 36.12 shows, the business structurally operated 
with long credits to its customers (although the interview evidence did not 
confirm this, suggesting that the management was not aware of this issue), which 
generated an important need for working capital.  
In addition, unlike most retail or service SMEs, there was a production cycle to 
take into account, since goods needed some time to be packed into crates. 
Unfortunately the evidence collected did not include an objective value for the 
production cycle, so that an assumption had to be made. Considering the 
statements made in the interviews regarding the week-to-week fluctuations of 
workload and the gradual shift towards longer-term contracts, it was assumed 
that the average production cycle lengthened from approximately 10 days in Feb 
2002 to approximately 15 days in Feb 2004. Inventory, on the other hand, hardly 
played a role since it was kept to an absolute minimum.  
To deal with this need for working capital the firm had, between February 2002 
and 2003, dramatically increased its use of supplier credit, to almost 90 days – a 
very long period, since interview evidence suggests that suppliers normally 
granted either 0 or 30 days credit. The fact that this value of 89 days had been 
repeated for two consecutive years suggests that it is unlikely to be an outlier. If 
this value is representative, it would indicate that the business systematically 
went 2 months overdue over the credit period granted by suppliers. This practice 
provided temporary relief (the excess of venture capital even enabled to reduce 
the utilisation of overdraft in February 2003), but it was not a sustainable 
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solution. As time passed, suppliers supposedly increased their pressure on the 
crating business.  
Table 36.12 – Working Capital cycle  
in days of turnover Feb-02 Feb-03 Feb-04 
Purchases: average supplier credit 27,4 88,7 89,0 
Inventory  2,7 1,4 0,8 
Assumed production cycle  10,0 12,0 15,0 
Sales: Average customer credit 60,0 65,0 96,0 
Total need for (excess of) working capital 45,8 -10,2 22,6 
 
In the early months of 2004, the situation of the business with regard to working 
capital was critical. After years of slack management of accounts receivable, the 
business was eventually planning to tackle the issue by negotiating with the 
customers. This was rather late, since the flows of cash had slowed down 
considerably. The high amounts overdue on the part of the customers meant that 
the business had little chance to return to normal practices with regard to 
suppliers. The additional pressure on cash caused by expenses made on behalf of 
Kobus’ new venture further complicated the matter.  
The risk of this situation was that the business’s short-term creditors might 
eventually refuse to support it any longer, by either refusing to sell materials, or 
initiating legal action against it.  
Variability of ratios 
The history of the firm shows that its evolution has been uneven. After 2002 
when the business experienced a considerable turnover growth (88%) and 
supposedly wrote its first profit, 2003 was rather unsuccessful with almost no 
turnover growth and a dramatic increase in variable costs, bringing back deficits.  
In February 2004, meanwhile, the accounts were generally favourable with a 
high turnover, low variable costs and the benefit of an extraordinary profit on the 
sale of a fixed asset. In addition, the burden of the acquisition of the new vehicle, 
which was supposedly undertaken shortly before the end of the financial year, 
has not yet its full impact on the business’s cost structure (depreciations and 
finance charges). Finally, interest costs have been low as a result of the previous 
year’s improvement of the cash balance.  
But the evolution of the firm up between March and June 2004 raise doubts as to 
the ability of the firm to repeat the previous year’s profit: sales were likely to be 
weaker, the new vehicle would become a burden (with financial and depreciation 
costs affecting the profits, while the vehicle would be used by the brother in his 
new business), and the dramatic cash situation would generate substantial 
administrative and financial costs.  
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Firm value and indemnification of departing member  
When Kobus decided to sell his stake in the business, Wynand agreed to 
indemnify his brother by paying off the bakkie for him. The vehicle seemed to 
have been bought in the first few months of 2004, and to be valued at R125 542, 
excluding financial costs (source: notes to the balance sheet).  
Again, to verify the fairness of this indemnification, the value of the business in 
February 2004 was estimated according to a discounted cash flow method.  
In this case, making proper assumptions on future cash flow growth is rendered 
difficult by the instability of past results. The operating cash flow has increased 
by more than 500% between February 2001 and 2002, then dropped by 80% in 
the following year, then increased again by more than 400% in 2004. Over the 
period, the average cash flow growth has been 91% p.a., however this cannot be 
seen as a sustainable growth rate for a 13 year-old business. It seemed more 
realistic to assume, in the cautious scenario, a permanent growth of 10% p.a., 
and in the optimistic scenario a growth of 25% for 2 years, followed by an 
eternal growth rate of 15%. According to these assumptions, and using a 35% 
discount rate, an appropriate indemnification for Kobus would seem to be in the 
region of R170 000 to R240 000 (see Table 36.13).  
Table 36.13 – Discounted Cash Flow estimation and fair indemnification  
scenario optimistic cautious 
Assumed CF growth, 2 years 25% 10% 
Assumed CF growth, 'eternal' 15% 10% 
Discounted Cash Flow 628 577 476 544 
Accumulated profit in Feb 04 21 370 21 370 
Net value of business 649 947 497 914 
Value of non-interest bearing debt in Feb 2004 177 973 177 973 
Value of equity in Feb 2004 471 974 319 941 
Value of 45% equity stake 212 388 143 973 
Value of Kobus’s member loan in 2004 27 067 27 067 
Fair indemnification for Kobus  239 455 171 040 
 
If this estimation is correct, the arrangement concluded between the brothers, 
corresponding to a value transfer of approximately R125 500, seemed rather 
favourable for Wynand. However, if one adds the financial costs to be borne by 
the crating business, as well as the estimated R80 000, which Kobus had 
apparently drawn out of the family business between February and May 2004 for 
the purpose of his own new venture, the total indemnification seems fair. 
Especially, the advantage of the vehicle arrangement was that it would not have 
too dramatic an impact on the crating business’s cash position, while paying the 
same amount in cash would have been ruinous. In addition, the credit conditions 
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available to the older business (which have been estimated at 2,8 basis points 
above prime) might be better than what Kobus’s start-up could have obtained.  
 
7. Final reflections 
Overall, the analysis shows a business in a twilight zone. One one hand, CS6 has 
visibly established itself as a significant player on its market, is selling well, and 
has generally profitable operations. Compared with average South African 
SMEs, the substantial loans provided by the mother gave the business a 
reasonably strong equity base. On the other hand, the very slow working capital 
cycle (caused in particular by a weak management of customer credit) forced it 
to exceed the allowed use of supplier credit and overdraft and impeded its 
building up of stock, causing considerable vulnerability.  
Apart from the working capital situation, the ratio analysis does not indicate a 
major crisis in the business, but its conclusions may be too positive, because they 
are based on accounting evidence focused on the firm’s best year – and there are 
indications suggesting that the situation has worsened after the closure of that 
finnacial year.  
A factor of concern is the transfer of resources that has taken place between CS6 
and its new sister company in the months immediately preceding the case study. 
This is likely to have significantly worsened the financial situation of the 
business, and it may appear surprising that CS6’s shareholders approved these 
loans in spite of the company being already so close to full utilisation of its 
overdraft limit.  
It is probable that, at the time, Kobus and his mother, who jointly owned 55% of 
the shares, were oblivious of the actually tense cash situation in the business, and 
had a perception that the older business was in good health, confusing profits 
with liquidity. Wynand, as a minority member (45%) could not prevent their 
decision. The lack of unity between the brothers was surely detrimental to the 
business and probably caused moral hazard in its management. The fact that the 
mother was associated with Kobus in his new venture, while Wynand was not, 
influenced her position in balancing between the sons, and explains why she was 
favourable to the loans. 
With Kobus’ withdrawal, Wynand would now have a full control over the 
business’s decisions, and would certainly be less inclined to allow loans to 
brother. It is probable that this would enable a more consistent management, and 
a harder-line management of cash would probably be beneficial to the business. 
Questions remained, though, such as the quality of Wynand’s managerial 
capacities and motivation (refer to the fishing magazines on his desk), his ability 
to manage teams and maintain a positive work atmosphere (refer to the 
aggressive tone of voice), the chances of success of the new sales strategy and 
the use of the BEE-vehicle to win tenders.  
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Annexure 37 – Case Studies, Synthesis I  
Financial resources and financial needs of SMMEs 
 
 
This annexure draws a synthesis from the six case studies on the existence and 
the magnitude of financial constraints and of a finance gap. For this purpose, the 
annexure first reviews the current (and future) resources available to the 
businesses. It then evaluates the financing needs faced by each case study, as 
derived from their asset base, their working capital cycle and their further 
ambitions. At that stage the demand function is examined more closely. Finally 
the needs are related to the resources, to derive a possible gap.  
 
1. Resources available (presently and in future) 
Per definition, the case study objects were characterised by various financing 
schemes, which will be presented according to the type of finance.  
1.1. Equity finance  
a) Entrepreneur’s own resources 
It is often said that the resources of the owner(s) are decisive in the early stages 
of the business, when institutional finance is unlikely. The case studies 
confirmed this statement, but also showed that the owner’s resources are equally 
needed in later stages, to support the business through its growth phase.  
• Start-up finance: Except for one of the franchises (CS1) and one of the 
township businesses (CS4b), which have received substantial start-up 
credits, all others were initially financed only by the owner and his family 
or friends. Savings from previous employment (CS3, CS5) or a personal 
bond (CS2) usually help to get the enterprise off the ground.  
• This statement conversely means that businesses emerging from 
impoverished black township households have few chances of success, 
even more if the entrepreneurs are handicapped by their previous credit 
history (CS4a+b). 
• Expansion capital:  
Although this is not always found in the literature, the case studies have 
shown that as the business expands, the need for the member’s finance 
remains high or becomes even higher. For no case study was the 
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member’s loan found to decrease; it rather remained stable (CS2, CS357, 
CS5) or increased even more (CS1, CS6).  
 
b) Informal network  
Beyond the owner himself, social networks proved to be a significant source of 
support. This was especially visible in the businesses owned by individuals 
classified as coloured.  
• A first source of support is the family. In the start-up phase, the 
entrepreneurs’ parents are often found to provide support either through 
equity participation (CS6) or through a personal credit contracted for the 
benefit of the son’s business (CS5). 
The family is usually still supportive in the expansion phase of the 
business, either by lending money and providing collateral (CS6, Mrs. J. 
contributed to the majority of the members’ loans for her sons’ business; 
her investments also served as a security for the firm’s overdraft), or by 
helping with the acquisition of assets (CS3 obtained his sewing machines 
and other manufacturing equipment from his mother-in-law, and also 
bought a second-hand vehicle on credit from an uncle). 
• Friends have also the ability to support the entrepreneur, either by 
providing loans (CS5 heavily resorted to this in the early stages), or by 
teaming up as a partner (CS3 was joined by his neighbour for 3 years). 
• Professional informal networks are also crucial: for example, Mrs v.d.S. 
(CS3a) obtained her sewing machines from her previous employer. Her 
son-in-law (CS3) bought his first sewing machine at a discount from a 
subcontractor who did not use it any more.  
• Unfortunately, again, township entrepreneurs (CS4 a+b) could not easily 
rely on their equally impoverished social network, such as family and 
friends, to provide substantial support.  
The importance of informal borrowings from family and friends especially 
among the coloured entrepreneurs has several reasons. Firstly, “social collateral” 
replaced the financial sureties that most coloured entrepreneurs did not have 
initially; in addition, the usual ‘moral hazard’ problem associated with bank 
lending does not take place in a context where generosity leads to co-operative 
reactions, cf Azam et al (2001) and Rabin (1993)). Secondly, these loans are usually 
interest-free. Thirdly, this financing choice usually gives the entrepreneurs more 
flexibility in the repayment schedule, than formal / institutional finance.  
On the other hand, the social cost of such arrangements can be high and failing 
to repay such a loan can be hurtful for friendship or family harmony.  
                                                 
57 except for the effect of a member’s exit, which caused a reduction in member’s loan. 
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c) More specifically “Informal venture capital”  
Equity participations represent a particular form of support by the informal 
network; if it fulfils certain criteria (equity participation limited to a certain 
duration, with the member not being substantially involved in management), it 
can be termed “informal venture capital”.  
In this respect, there was a striking similar pattern among three of the four 
regular case studies (CS3, CS5 and CS6), which have, at some stage during their 
lifetime, been operated in partnership. Although this may not have been foreseen 
initially, fact is that in all three cases, the partnership broke. In addition, in all 
three cases, the remaining member suggested that the former partner had not 
been substantially involved in management. Considered ex post, the data 
available suggest that in at least two cases (CS3 and CS5), this temporary equity 
contribution of an acquaintance is comparable to informal venture capital.   
There was another common trait between the three cases. In each case, the 
divorce happened at a stage when the business seemed to have overcome most of 
its difficulties and was beginning, or about to write profits.  
Although the frequency of this situation (50% of the 6 case studies) may not be 
representative, the circumstance of partnership break is probably a common 
aspect of small business life, for the following reasons: 
• Many young entrepreneurs feel that they need a partner at a crucial time 
of the business’s life. This need is usually felt at start-up, like for CS5, 
but it may also be at a time of transition, like the evolution from the 
informal into the formal sector (CS3), or a change in the strategic path 
(CS6).  
The partnership gives the entrepreneur more assurance in two respects. In 
terms of capital needs, the partner brings in a compulsory financial 
contribution, but he may also provide some collateral, which eases access 
to credit (CS3). Moreover, the partner may bring some management 
know-how (CS5 teamed up with a partner because he had an MBA; CS3 
appreciated that his partner had some experience in running a CC; as for 
CS6 Wynand had more business experience and would be more apt to 
bring the firm back to profits).  
 
• However, it frequently happens that one partner is more involved and 
committed to the business than the other (for easier reference the two 
partners will therefore be qualified as main and minor partner). As long 
as the business needs full-time attention, the main partner has no time to 
worry about this imbalance. However, when the investment starts bearing 
fruits and the minor partner requests its share, tensions come up. The 
main member has difficulties accepting an equal sharing of results when 
the involvement (hence, the responsibility for the growth and profitability 
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achieved) was unbalanced. (This was particularly the case of CS5). This 
causes the partnership to break. 
 
• From the point of view of the minor partner, the involvement in the 
business goes barely beyond an initial equity contribution and the 
provision of some contacts or management advice; his involvement in 
operations remains marginal. When the business starts being profitable, 
the minor member exits and, if he adroitly negotiates his indemnification, 
may realise a substantial profit on the initial investment (this was at least 
the case of CS5, possibly also for CS3). 
 
Generalising from these remarks, the case studies suggest that a form of small-
scale informal venture capital is a relatively significant source of finance for 
emerging small businesses – although it is not necessarily perceived as such by 
the partners initially. It seems to be particularly relevant in communities where 
income levels are too low to enable entrepreneurs to run the business on their 
own, but high enough to allow for significant contributions of acquaintances – in 
present day Cape Town, the coloured community.  
This tentative finding is new: up to now the literature has generally seen family 
and friends only as sources of loans, and informal venture capital was equalled to 
the activity of business angels, who are defined as “high net worth individuals” 
(Hollander & Schirnig, 2001). As an exception, GEM 2001 has admitted the 
existence of “business angels” in lower-income communities, and has pointed at 
a high business angel activity in South Africa (4,5% of adults surveyed were 
found to have provided funds to a business that was not theirs). However, 
GEM’s business angel concept included loan as well as equity contributions, and 
was therefore not conclusive on the significance of informal venture capital.  
The case studies suggest more qualitative insights into the phenomenon of 
informal venture capital, as follows: 
• Since it takes place within the entrepreneur’s social network, this form of 
finance has the advantage of being relatively easy to obtain. In particular, 
the assessment procedures are inexistent (CS5, CS6), or very 
unsophisticated (CS3).  
• However, when the partnership breaks, the need to indemnify the exiting 
partner is usually costly for the business and the remaining member, for 
the following reasons: 
o The main member tends to be reluctant to allocate value 
according to nominal equity shares; 
o Defining a young business’s value is always difficult, 
especially if it has few assets and if the value resides primarily 
in a customer base or brand name; 
o Even if the value is fair, the cash impact is often ruinous for 
the SME: Small growing businesses can be valued at a high 
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price, but are typically illiquid and do not have such amounts 
readily available. (see section on “buy-out capital”).  
 
• Some factors can aggravate the difficulty and may lead to litigations, as 
has been the case of CS5:  
o The later the divorce, the higher the gap between the nominal 
value of the minor partner’s investment, and the firm’s total 
value.  
o An unequal financial acumen of the two members (usually the 
minor member has better financial skills) potentially creates a 
risk of abuse of the main member by the other.  
 
Further sections will come back to this issue. 
1.2. Long-term debt finance 
The small businesses’ access to debt finance was strongly dependent on the type 
of debt required. The following distinguishes between long-term needs for real 
estate, equipment, or for the start of a franchise operation, and short-term capital 
needs.  
a) Finance for real estate investment  
None of the case studies had been granted finance for the purpose of buying 
property, although one (CS6) had attempted to do so and another one (CS3) was 
in the process of lodging an application with its bank.  
  
According to the experience of CS6, the only case study which completed the 
process, access to credit for the purchase of premises seems difficult. In their 
case, the bank refused to support the investment because the deposit that the 
business could pay was not sufficient (apparently it had to be 50%).   
In the case of CS3, it was too early to know the outcome of the negotiation with 
the bank, but it seems unlikely that the firm would have been able to provide 
50% of the property price.  
 
b) Vehicle finance 
Vehicle finance was found to be easy enough to obtain. This is not surprising 
because it is a standardised financial service, usually organised in a separate 
division or subsidiary from the bank, with dedicated staff. In addition, this type 
of finance is regarded as less risky, since the lender can, at any time, repossess 
the vehicle, which will easily find an acquirer.  
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• All but two entrepreneurs from the 6 case studies bought their vehicles on 
instalments in the business’ names. The exceptions were the township 
entrepreneurs (CS4 a+b), who probably had no access to formal finance 
at all and therefore used their own private vehicle for business purposes, 
and the restaurant owner CS2, who did not have a need for a business 
vehicle.  
Among the entrepreneurs who benefited from vehicle finance, most even 
used it several times, adding new vehicles as the business grew (CS5, 
CS6).  
 
• When describing the procedure, entrepreneurs did not mention any 
explicit verification of creditworthiness on the part of the bank. This may 
explain why CS1 was able, in the year prior its liquidation and in spite of 
major liquidity problems, to buy an additional expensive vehicle on 
instalments. There is also some evidence that the procedure becomes 
even lighter and easier for frequent users of this type of credit (for CS5, 
the procedure is limited to a telephone call, after which bank officers 
come to his offices to collect his signature).  
 
• The ability of SMEs to pay their instalments in time has mainly depended 
on the vehicle’s price, the business’s own contribution as well as the 
duration of credit chosen (and of course the business’s cash position in 
general).  
CS3 bought a cheap vehicle and repaid it ahead of schedule, while CS1 
and CS6 have contracted instalment sale agreements for more expensive 
vehicles and found it difficult to adhere to the payment calendar. As to 
CS5, it has taken the habit of taking as long credit periods as possible to 
minimise the monthly cash flow impact.  
 
• It seems that banks have a reasonable tolerance with regard to delayed 
repayments (CS1’s debt seems to have been rescheduled; CS5 with his 
tight cash flow in winter was still regarded as a “good risk” by the 
vehicle finance institution).  
 
c) Equipment finance 
The case studies illustrated only limited cases of debt-finance equipment 
purchases: 
• (i) Computer-related equipment  
Computers, like vehicles, are relatively easily purchased on instalment, 
for the same reasons (the bank can easily value the asset and recover it in 
case of default). Two case studies and one abandoned case study (ACS c) 
had bought computer equipment on instalments (CS3 and CS6). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 37: Case study synthesis I – Financial resources and needs of SMMEs Page 596 
 
 
 
• (ii) Other machinery:  
CS4b, a township entrepreneur, was the only one to obtain a specific 
credit for the purchase of machinery. She was an exception in this regard, 
since no other entrepreneur was found to buy machinery on credit, unless 
it was part of a franchise scheme. However, the credit facility received 
was informal (it was granted by the vendor of the machines, without any 
formality), very short-term (three months), and generally not favourable 
to the entrepreneur. 
 
• (iii) Franchise:  
The only other case of non-vehicle equipment finance in the case studies 
was in the broader context of the initial investment in a franchise scheme 
(CS1, and indirectly CS2). This specific issue will be discussed below.  
 
• For other equipment, the businesses studied did not receive or use any 
debt finance. At this stage, it is not clear whether this is due to supply-
side restrictions, but there is a possible lack of a targeted equipment 
finance offer from the bank. This, in turn, may be caused by the fact that 
(manufacturing) equipment is specialised, difficult to value and 
sometimes difficult to repossess and re-sell. Specialised leasing divisions, 
if they do exist and have appropriate capacity within the bank, are 
presumably not targeting small businesses / small loan amounts. 
 
d) Franchise finance 
The previous analyses had already raised the suspicion that banks are more 
prepared to provide overarching long-term finance to franchise schemes, than to 
other small businesses (8 of the 19 SME files provided by the bank were 
franchises). Indeed, the two case studies organised as franchises benefited from 
substantial support from their banks.  
However, one of the franchise schemes investigated (CS2) had adopted an 
unusual financial scheme (the member contracted a long-term loan in his 
personal capacity and put it at the business’s disposal by means of a member’s 
loan). Nevertheless, it is probable that the fact that the entrepreneur was engaged 
in a well-known franchise scheme eased his access to the loan.  
The other franchise case study (CS1) provided a more conventional example of 
franchise bank funding, which presented the advantage of covering a major 
portion of all start-up costs of the firm (franchise fee, vehicle and other 
equipment, initial working capital)58, on a long term basis (4 to 5 years).  
                                                 
58 Unfortunately, some contradictions in the data caused difficulties in describing the nature and 
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Accordingly, the franchises were the only examples of firms which benefited 
from long-term debt finance for the acquisition of non-vehicle non-computer 
equipment, as well as stock.  
1.3. Short-term finance 
Short-term debt finance is almost systematic in small businesses. This includes 
several sources, such as bank, trade partners and, in the case of township 
businesses, micro-lenders.  
a) Bank overdraft and credit card  
Bank short-term finance was generally limited to overdraft and credit card 
facilities.  
Apart from the “nearly-unbanked” township businesses (CS4), all entrepreneurs 
studied had an overdraft facility. (CS5 contracted such a facility during the 
course of the case study). This, however, is not representative of the overall 
small business population.  
The overdraft limits granted to the small businesses are individual and, in the 5 
case studies concerned, varied between 25 thousand (CS1) and 100 thousand 
Rand (CS6), corresponding to 1,2% to 3,6% of turnover in 4 cases, and as much 
as 8,3% of turnover in the case of CS6.  
Furthermore, the case studies suggested that the firms made different uses of the 
overdraft and credit card facilities. Some used it mainly for seasonal periods 
(CS5), or for extraordinary events (CS2, in case of a breakage), while others 
tended to exhaust their limit and even go beyond it, sometimes for prolonged 
periods. For example, although information is incomplete, it would seem that 
CS1 has been in breach of its overdraft limit for most of the months between 
early 1999 and at least June 2000, i.e. a period of 18 months. At the time of the 
interviews, CS6 was also in breach of its limit, a situation that had started several 
months earlier.  Such breach of limit however, especially if prolonged, generated 
pressure from the bank in the form of repeated phone calls (the interest costs will 
be addressed later).  
Overall, overdraft facilities proved to be common and reasonably easy to obtain 
for a business with a few years of history, but the systematic requirement of 
collateral constituted a strong restriction on the general availability of this form 
of finance (this will be discussed later). In addition, compared with longer-term 
debt, it was an expensive service.  
                                                                                                                                    
characteristics of this financial support. The official financial statements have suggested that 
there was one long-term loan “for the funding, assets and working capital” of the franchise – 
while the bank file mentioned a term loan as well as an instalment sale agreement. 
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b) Other bank products  
• No business, even those with substantial debtors books, were found to 
make any use of factoring/discounting or other instruments. 
• In one case (CS1) a business required and obtained a bank guarantee – 
but further information was not available.  
c) Trade credit 
There were mainly two sources of trade credit: suppliers and customers. 
Customer deposits (advance payments) were disclosed separately in only one 
case (CS1), but they may have been subsumed under “trade accounts” in other 
cases.  
Supplier credit is by far the most frequent form of trade credit. All case study 
enterprises used it to some extent, although the statements made in interviews 
were occasionally contradicting data found in balance sheets (especially for 
CS3). Entrepreneurs had different views on the appropriateness, accessibility and 
cost of supplier credit: 
• The use of supplier credit, as derived from balance sheets, varied from 
app. 5 days of turnover (CS2) to as much as 68 days for CS6, although 
generally suppliers would officially only agree to a credit period of 30 
days.  
• There were only few mentions of particular restrictions with regard to 
access to trade credit, although some suppliers supposedly asked for trade 
references and other information. CS3 mentioned that some vendors 
occasionally asked for bank details. The same business also mentioned 
that when sourcing from a new supplier or buying non-core business 
materials, they would not have access to credit. CS6 also confirmed that 
some materials had to be paid in cash. 
 
Customer deposits  
• Only CS1 (furniture manufacturer) disclosed deposits made by the 
customers on some few occasions. Although infrequent, these deposits 
provided additional liquidity especially at initial stages of the business (in 
1997 they represented as much as 32 days of turnover). 
• There is a possibility that most entrepreneurs are generally reluctant to 
require a deposit from customers for fear to lose them to competition.  
 
Table 37.1 summarises the firms’ average use of supplier credit and customer 
deposits according to balance sheets59.  
                                                 
59 The values for CS5 are not truly representative of the year-average use of supplier credit, since 
all balance sheet values are summer values, while the use of supplier credit becomes more 
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Table 37.1 – Trade credit in days of turnover 
  CS3   CS4 a  
 
CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS5 CS6 &  
CS4 b 
CS1 
Supplier Credit 
(average) 
5.0 9.3 25.0 41.3 68.4 0 to 15 28.6 
Deposits 
(average) 
  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 
Source: average of balance sheet values available, except for two cases: (i) in the case 
of CS3 the divergence between balance sheet values and interview data caused the latter 
to be included as well; (ii) CS4a+b are solely based on interview data. 
d) Micro-lenders 
Not surprisingly, only the township entrepreneurs made use of micro-lenders, 
more specifically informal township-based money-lenders. Unfortunately, CS4b 
could not provide details about the procedure to access such loans, other than 
“filling in the forms” (sic). In addition, the lack of written quantitative 
information makes it difficult to make any additional statements at this stage. 
However, they were generally not satisfied with this source of finance.  
 
1.4. Future finance resources: cash flow potential  
As a last source of finance, internal resources (more particularly, operating cash 
flows) should be mentioned. Previous research has found it to be the preferred 
form of finance for many small business owners (Myers 1984; Howorth 2001 
p.81) and has suggested that the availability of such resource was determinant for 
growth (“internal finance theory of growth”, e.g. Carpenter &Petersen 2002). 
Compared with external sources of finance which require some screening 
procedure, approvals, and interest or other costs, cash in a small business can be 
regarded as the most easy-to-use financial resource. The low levels of 
remuneration of cash savings make it, at first sight, a relatively cheap source of 
finance (this ceases to apply when cash purchases cause the business to break its 
overdraft limit or support other heavy costs for short-term compensations of the 
liquidity, though).  
The cash flow potential of the firms studied varied a lot and depended strongly 
on the profitability of operations; however the tendency to use cash flows for 
investments was not limited to profitable enterprises; on the contrary, it seemed 
to be more frequent among young businesses that were not yet profitable, but did 
not yet have other possibilities: 
                                                                                                                                    
heavy in winter.  
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• CS3 bought its first sewing machine in 1998 and its first vehicle in 2000 
in cash; the owner also indicated that he would use cash surpluses to 
build-up his stock; 
• CS1 and mainly CS6 used cash for the purchase of small equipment and 
tools, the latter suggesting that, each time a contract was completed with 
a cash surplus, they would invest it into some new equipment; 
• CS5 admitted to spending cash on his bar etc.  
 
2. Need for finance  
To evaluate the extent of matching of resources and needs, it is necessary to have 
a wide review of the needs (perceived and real) of the business.  
The needs for finance were classified as follows: the financing of existing assets 
(as they appear in the balance sheet), the working capital cycle, and some 
specific needs that are related to a particular stage of development of the 
businesses. The review closes with a tentative dynamic view to reflect the need 
to sustain a certain investment activity, as well as possible ambitions of the 
owner. 
2.1. Existing fixed assets (balance sheets) 
The review of fixed assets to some extent involves repetitions with the 
presentation of the resources. Indeed, many assets that the business has been able 
to secure have been financed by specific finance schemes.  
a) Property 
None of the businesses studied owned property at the time of the case studies, 
although two of the six case studies had attempted to purchase premises.  
Most businesses do not seem to have any need in this regard: some are able to 
operate from home (CS5), while others have obtained favourable arrangements 
with their landlords (CS2 pays a low rent).  
The case studies however suggested that businesses with a manufacturing 
component were facing more difficulties in respect of premises.  
For two of the three industrial cases studied (CS3 and CS660), the access to 
suitable factory or warehouse space to rent poses problem. Both firms have to 
use split premises as a sub-optimal arrangement (in both cases, the two units 
used are in the same industrial park, but not directly next to each other). 
Especially CS3 was vehement about the problems that this represented, and was 
                                                 
60 Although the Standard Industry Classification labels the crating business as a “packaging 
service” and not as manufacturing, it is here subsumed as an industrial activity since it 
involves a production process. 
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keen to purchase property in order to be more independent and hopefully reduce 
rental costs.  
Hence, there seems to be a need for finance for the purchase of property among 
some industrial firms, although the evidence collected was not sufficient to 
conclude clearly whether premises to buy were significantly more suitable than 
premises to let in this regard.  
b) Vehicles 
Vehicles were an important need for almost all entrepreneurs. All but two of the 
six enterprises studied owned business vehicles, which were almost always 
acquired on instalments. In several cases, the businesses even had to own several 
vehicles (two for CS1 and CS3, three for CS6, more for tourism entrepreneur 
CS5).  
The need for vehicles also applied to most service enterprises. The township 
entrepreneurs (CS4 a+b), involved in cleaning and other services, were heavily 
using their vehicle for business purposes – their choice to register their vehicle 
under their private name rather than under the CC may have been related to the 
age of the vehicle, which may have been anterior to the creation of the business. 
In any case, there was no strict separation of private and business ownership in 
this township enterprise.  
The only business which did not seem to have a need for a business vehicle, 
hence, was the restaurant owner CS2, which supposedly benefited from 
deliveries of food supplies.  
c) Furniture and equipment  
The need for other fixed assets (furniture and equipment) understandably 
depended on the type of business, although it was interesting to find that SMEs 
registered as manufacturing firms did not necessarily have more onerous needs 
than service enterprises.  
As the case of CS3 (a textile SME) showed, manufacturing small firms may well 
choose to specialise on labour-intensive, low-equipment jobs, hence maximising 
their turnover to fixed assets ratio. However, the turnover on fixed assets ratio of 
CS3 was distorted by the facts that the firm was using sewing equipment which 
was not its own, and was also strongly involved in retail. The other 
manufacturing firm, CS1, had more substantial factory equipment, but was 
apparently also trying to achieve a higher capital efficiency than, for example, its 
franchisor.  
Among the service SMEs studied, the need for fixed assets was usually relatively 
high, reflecting the expensive furniture and fittings of the restaurant, the cleaning 
machines of the township micro-business, which were onerous for the size of the 
enterprise, and the quasi-factory equipment of the crating business.  
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In addition, almost all SMEs studied had a need for some limited computer 
equipment (the only exception being the township micro enterprises, which 
could not afford this). In most cases, the quantity and sophistication of 
equipment required were low, limited to a few PCs with hardly any non-standard 
software and possibly a printer and a fax machine. For most case studies hence 
the total computer equipment was in the region of R10 000 (gross value), except 
the franchise restaurant, which had a need for computer equipment in excess of 
R50 000. 
d) Intangible assets  
Except for the franchise fees, none of the balance sheet studied included any 
intangible assets, although it can be argued that in most SMEs the largest part of 
the value is intangible.  
This was strongly argued by one of the abandoned case studies (ACS e, a 
security business), which eventually refused to provide his financial statements 
on the grounds that it would not be meaningful since most of the business’s 
value was its customer base. A similar issue arose when approaching IT 
businesses: they argued that their main asset was their “intellectual property”, the 
technology they would have developed, which would not usually be reflected in 
the accounting.  
A similar reasoning can still apply to most of the enterprises studied: in addition 
to fixed assets acquired, the most decisive investments for their success were 
intangible, including training their staff, building-up relationships with 
customers, suppliers and financial institutions. Although the accounting system 
does not reflect them separately, these investments did represent a heavy cost for 
the businesses – and entrepreneurs that have, often for financial reasons, 
neglected this investment (like the township businesses) were certainly not 
adding any goodwill to their assets.  
e) Preference for owning over renting/hiring 
A last note is required on the discussion of financing needs resulting from the 
use of assets. When assets (such as vehicles or equipment) are regarded as 
“needed”, the need generally refers to the usage, not necessarily the ownership, 
of the assets. In particular, when assets are only occasionally used, or when the 
business is subject to fluctuations in the utilisation of its capacity, an acquisition 
of the assets may be superfluous.  
However, the trade-off between ownership and hiring of asset is a difficult one 
that depends on many practical considerations (availability, fluctuations in the 
need, logistics such as space for storage and complexity of transport, cost and 
finance, commitment to maintenance and ability to alter the asset, etc). In 
addition, individual ‘preferences’ may influence choices, which may be related 
to status (the latter factor seems to have applied, in particular, to the desire of 
Mrs. H., minority owner of CS6, to own premises and a modern forklift).  
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Generally the data collected in the case studies were not sufficient to enable a 
judgement as to whether the enterprises had judiciously balanced ownership and 
hiring / renting. Two case studies have made use of equipment hire (CS5 hired 
vehicles in peak season; CS6 hired a forklift when needed) and felt that it was a 
sensible way of reducing fixed costs and keeping some liquidity in the business.  
For the other firms, three possible cases could be identified where the owners’ 
preference for ownership may be questioned:  
• the acquisition by CS1 of an additional vehicle after 2 years of operation; 
• the decision of CS3 to acquire its own premises (motivated by the 
unavailability of suitable premises to rent, cost considerations, and the 
possibility to alter the property to suit individual needs), and 
• the acquisition by CS4 of cleaning machinery on the basis of one contract 
(probably caused by the absence of alternatives, or the lack of 
consideration of such other options).  
 
However, in these three cases, an informed judgement as to whether the 
businesses could / should have used alternatives is not possible. 
 
2.2. Need for working capital  
If one defines the “gross need for working capital” as the sum of the main three 
activities consuming working capital, i.e. stock keeping, production cycle and 
customer credit, (without considering the offsetting effect of supplier credit and 
possibly customer deposits), the average gross need for working capital of the 
SMEs studied would be as represented in Table 37.261.  
The table suggests that there are three determinants for the (gross) need for 
working capital: 
• Firstly, the type of activity is decisive, especially to explain the 
production cycle as well as the need to keep some stock. The three 
‘industrial’ case studies CS1, CS3 and CS6 have the highest need in these 
two regards – while these items do not apply to transport and cleaning 
services, or are relatively insignificant in the case of the restaurant. 
 
 
                                                 
61 Again, the values for CS5 are not truly representative of the year-average customer credit, 
since all balance sheet values are summer values, while the duration of customer credit 
becomes much longer in winter.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 37: Case study synthesis I – Financial resources and needs of SMMEs Page 604 
 
 
Table 37.2 – Gross need for working capital, in days of turnover 
  CS3   CS4 a  
 
CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS5 CS6 & 
 CS4 b 
CS1 
Inventory 
(average) 
5.2 15.7 25.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 7.1 
Production cycle 
(assumed) 
0 1.0 1.0 0.0 12.3 0.0 5.0 
Customer credit 
(average) 
0 1.3 25.0 12.7 73.7 50 12.9 
Total 5.2 18.0 51.0 12.7 87.6 50 25.0 
Source: The turnover of inventory and customer credit are average of balance sheet 
values available, except for two cases: (i) in the case of CS3 the divergence between 
balance sheet values and interview data caused the latter to be included as well; (ii) in 
the case of CS4 the data are only based on interviews. The production cycle is assumed 
according to interview data.  
 
• Secondly, the type of market served by the SME seems to explain a part 
of the differences with regard to customer credit. Put simply, the SMEs 
serving private clients (in particular the restaurant CS2 and the furniture 
business CS1) are able to obtain favourable terms of payment, while the 
firms dealing with corporate (e.g. CS6) or government (CS4) clients have 
to accept far longer credit periods. The cases of CS3 and CS5 are less 
clear, because CS3 deals with both private and corporate clients, while 
CS5 is in a seasonal business and its customer credit supposedly 
fluctuates between app. 10 days of turnover in summer, and app. 45 days 
in winter.  
 
• Thirdly, the extreme variations in the duration of customer credit seem to 
be more heavily influenced by management policies or the stringency of 
administration, than by market considerations.  
In particular, the very high gross need for working capital noted in CS6 
(assuming that the accounts receivable amounts disclosed in the balance 
sheets are correct) is supposedly owed more to a negligence with regard 
to the management of debtors, than to a business necessity.  
2.3. Needs related to maintaining a capital base  
The case studies brought to light two particular needs for finance, which do not 
easily fit into usual classifications, and are therefore not commonly found in the 
literature, but applied to a significant number of businesses. Common traits 
between these two needs are the facts that (a) they appear at particular stage of 
development of the business, and (b) they are more related to maintaining a 
stable pool of resources, than with a particular use.  
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a) Need to cover accumulated losses 
The case studies revealed that initial losses are a common trait of most small 
businesses, and sometimes reach high amounts. To the extent that accounting 
data were available from the year of start-up, all businesses studied have 
experienced losses at least in the first year, more often in the first few years. 
When no accounts were available for early years, the fact that the first few years 
for which accounts were provided, were closed with deficits, confirms the 
hypothesis of an early phase of deficits.  
The only possible exception is CS3, which seems to have operated with nearly-
balanced accounts during its early years.  
Table 37.3 – Accumulated losses 
Business “code name” CS1 CS2 CS3 CS5 CS6 
Has business achieved breakeven? unclear* no yes yes yes 
Firm’s age at breakeven (years) n/a n/a  6? 4 11 
Accumulated losses until breakeven 
(or until last year available) (ZAR) 
433 672 155 283 3 786 53 519 141 758 
Accumulated losses in % of total 
assets 
76.5% 26.2% 2.6% 29.8% 119.2% 
Source: balance sheets. The mention of “unclear” for CS1 comes from the lack of 
credibility of reported profits.  
 
The reason for these losses is primarily to be found in the time needed to build 
the enterprise up to its critical size, where it can reach breakeven (although some 
enterprises would seem never to achieve this). In some cases, these losses could 
be interpreted as the cost of building a brand, of acquiring a customer base, etc – 
which would lead to the value of intangible assets already mentioned. However, 
apart from the difficulty of valuing these intangible assets, these specific uses do 
not necessarily explain all the losses incurred.  
Therefore, it seems more suitable to approach this issue from a resource-side, 
rather than from an asset-side. Accumulated losses, when they reach high 
amounts, destroy equity and hence deprive the business of important internal 
resources. This is particularly relevant when the losses get close to, or exceed, 
the total value of assets, as in the cases of CS1 and CS6.  
This finding is a strong argument against the occasional belief that owner’s 
finance is mainly relevant at the start-up stage, while after a few years of 
existence businesses are usually able to obtain debt finance.  
In reality, when early losses are high, members’ finance is essential to cover 
them and maintain solvency as well as a debt capacity. Hence, as the business 
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expands, the need for the member’s finance follows an upward curve. The case 
studies show that even after the business has been able to accumulate its first 
profits beyond the previous losses, the members’ loans remain high (e.g. CS5, 
CS6). Understandably the businesses that were still unprofitable were even less 
able to decrease their member’s loans (CS1 increase; CS2 stable). 
b) Buy-out capital 
In a similar spirit, a financing need was identified among several case studies in 
connection with severing relationship with former partner. It has been seen that 
circumstances frequently bring initial partners to divorce. This has two effects: 
an equity effect and a liquidity effect.  
• Firstly, and most obviously, the leaving partner withdraws his 
contribution to the business – actual capital and member’s loan, as well 
as collateral. The business therefore is left with a reduced equity base and 
possibly (as may have been the case for CS3) a subsequent reduction in 
debt facilities, while the activities pursued and the assets owned 
presumably remain constant. This creates a potential resource gap, which 
depends on the actual involvement of the departing member (in the case 
of CS5, the impact was almost negligible).  
 
• Secondly, the indemnification of the withdrawing partner, to the extent 
that it happens in cash, is likely to put a heavy strain on the business cash 
flow. This is especially true if the estimated business value is high, e.g. 
for small growing businesses. Indeed, small young firms are typically 
illiquid, hence not able to free an amount corresponding to half of their 
value. Several mitigating arrangements can be found, like the scheduling 
of the indemnification payment over 12 months (CS3) or an 
indemnification in kind, in the form of a vehicle (CS6). Nevertheless, the 
impact on the firm’s liquidity often remains considerable, and may 
require specific solutions.  
 
Table 37.4 illustrates the needs generated in the three cases encountered: 
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Table 37.4 – Buy-outs 
Business “code name” CS3 CS5 CS6 
Contribution of withdrawing 
member (incl. member’s loan) 
R 74 839 R 6 050 R 27 112 
Indemnification agreed upon R 100 000 R 115 000 R 125 542 
Indemnification modalities 
to be paid in 
cash over 12 
months 
none 
in kind 
(bakkie) 
Source: balance sheets and interviews.  
 
The venture capital industry commonly uses the concept of “buy-out capital” to 
describe the intervention of large funds in facilitating the acquisition of a firm 
either by management (“Management buy-out or buy-in”) or by other individuals 
(“replacement”) (cf. KPMG-SAVCA 1999 p. 4) – but this concept is commonly 
applied to larger businesses (South African venture capital funds are hardly 
prepared to invest less than R5 million – cf. SAVCA 2002).   
The three case studies encountered suggest that the applicability of the concept 
of “buy-out capital” could be enlarged to very small and small businesses, 
referring to both the need to replace lost equity, and the need for liquidity to 
indemnify the withdrawing member.  
 
2.4. Ambitions and investing profile  
After the static consideration of financing needs, following the structure of a 
balance sheet, this section adopts a more dynamic view into the analysis of 
financial needs, to examine future (or unfulfilled) financing needs. Indeed, 
technically speaking, existing assets always have a corresponding resource, so 
that the sole consideration of existing assets would not enable to identify gaps.  
At this stage, the study adopts a more exploratory approach because these issues 
have not really been tackled by literature and are difficult to conceptualise.  
Indeed, future / potential needs for finance depend on managers’ ambitions. 
However, the way these ambitions are expressed is a function of psychology as 
much as economics, and relying on utterances only seems an inappropriate way 
of comprehending an economically functional demand for finance.  
To seek a workable way of dealing with these questions, a combination of 
accounting data from the cash flow statements, and qualitative data from the 
managers’ interviews, was used to derive different “trajectories” or “profiles”.  
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a) Owner’s ambitions  
Although difficult to measure, the owners’ ambitions is relevant to the question 
of financing needs because it influences: 
• the spending behaviour of available resources (e.g. the preference for 
owning over renting/hiring),  
• and the discourse / perception of sufficiency of financial resources. 
 
Therefore, an important aim of interviews was to gather some impression on the 
owners’ ambitions; for this purpose, they were asked for their “visions”, and 
more specifically where they saw themselves in future. The data gathered in that 
respect may be subject to short-term fluctuations (particular state of mind of the 
interviewee at the time of the interview) and communication bias, but provided 
revealing insights.  
A common trait of most case studies selected was the ambition of the owners 
with regard to business growth or diversification. This may not be representative 
since a number of small businesses are said to be unwilling to grow (e.g. 
McMahon, Kesper). Therefore, for more representativeness in this review of 
dynamic needs, abandoned case studies were added to the sample, to the extent 
that they had provided sufficient data.  
Accordingly, the case studies were classified into three categories: 
High ambitions 
High ambitions were manifested by a high “entrepreneurial drive”, causing the 
firm to invest continuously (CS5) or to repeatedly add new operations to the 
existing portfolio (ACSa). Another indicator of high ambitions could be the way 
the entrepreneur defined his strategy against the competition (CS3).  
Lastly, some entrepreneurs expressed bold  “visions”, like the micro-business 
CS4b dreaming of employing and training 50 people. Another example is ACSa 
who, for over a decade, has been dreaming of establishing an HVAC 
manufacturing operation, while being confined to retail by his scarce financial 
resources. However, his eventual breakthrough in 2004 (ability to build up his 
own factory) proved that even ambitious visions can sometimes materialise.   
Modest ambitions 
Three businesses nourished more modest ambitions, for two main reasons:  
• on one hand, the rooting in the family seemed to moderate the ambitions 
of CS6 (where the minority member dreamt of keeping the business for 
her grandchildren) and to some extent ACSc; 
• on the other hand, the weight of present-day preoccupations prevented 
some owners from nourishing ambitious dreams for the future (CS2 and 
ACS c with their difficulties to raise turnover, and CS6 with its working  
capital problems).  
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“Unclear” ambitions: 
ACS b was a 6-year-old micro-business operating in the retail sector, supplying 
sport articles. The entrepreneur, from a coloured background, gave contradictory 
indications with regard to his need for finance, initially suggesting great 
difficulties (“I have been struggling to get finance”), but later being unable to 
substantiate them, betraying a lack of purpose in his business strategy. He 
confirmed that he had wanted to seek some advice but “most companies have 
been charging +/- R6000 for a business plan”. 
b) Actual investment behaviour  
The businesses’ actual investment practices were studied according to two 
aspects:  
• the initial (start-up) investment (expressed as the assumed or measured 
total of gross fixed assets at the end of the first year of operation), and 
• the continued investments for expansion or replacement, measured as the 
average annual amount added to gross fixed assets over the lifetime of 
the business62.  
 
Table 37.5 summarises the quantitative data.  
In terms of initial investment, the businesses can be classified into three 
categories: (a) the “zero” investment, (b) the “low” initial investment and (c) the 
“high” initial investment, with the limit between low and high being arbitrarily 
set at R25 000. The three firms with a high start-up investment are all white 
businesses. It also appears that franchises start with the highest investment 
amounts.  
As to follow-on investments, in theory three types of behaviour can be identified: 
(a) the “zero” investment, which means that assets are not even replaced as they 
age; (b) the “replacement” investment, which means that assets are mainly being 
replaced without a substantial increase in capacity, and (c) the “expansion” 
investments, which create new capacity. Expansion investments are usually done 
in medium-term phases, they are often large investments concentrated on a short 
period of time (one to three years) and followed by slower investment periods, 
while replacements are smoother and suppose the pre-existence of assets. 
Linking these behaviours to figures is however problematic. Some investments 
can have both the character of replacement and of expansion (i.e. replacing a 
small vehicle by a larger one).  
                                                 
62 This measure of “average annual investment” is problematic because investments are generally 
not smooth, so the number of years included in the average, which varies from one firm to the 
next, influences the final number. Nevertheless it is regarded as preferable to “last year’s 
addition to gross fixed assets”. 
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Table 37.5 – Investment behaviour of case studies and some abandoned case 
studies  
Business 
“code name” 
Sector / activity  
Gross Fixed 
assets at end of 
start-up year 
(ZAR) 
Follow-on 
average annual 
investment 
(ZAR) 
Character 
CS2 restaurant 750 000 4 800 replacement 
CS3 safety wear 
0 20 000  
 
expansion  
(R120 000 in 
2000) 
CS5 tourism 15 000 80 000 repl / expansion 
CS6 packaging  45 000 20 000 repl / expansion 
CS4 a 
cleaning, 
construction 
0 400 
expansion 
CS4 b cleaning 13 000 n/a zero 
CS1 furniture  198 000 53 000 expansion 
ACS a 
Heating/Air 
Conditioning  
app. 0 
35 000 
 
expansion  
(R 300 000 from 
2000 to 2002) 
ACS b sport supplies 23 000 0 zero 
ACS c printing app. 10 000 app. 5 000 expansion  
Sources: initial investment usually from interviews, follow-on investments from balance 
sheets (except for CS4a), character of investment from interviews (for practical 
purposes the “zero” investments at start-up have been restated as a symbolic R1 in 
order to enable ratios and logarithmic calculations).  
c) Tentative conclusion 
To draw a tentative conclusion from this exercise, two possible approaches need 
consideration: 
• One approach would be to consider that a gap / contradiction between 
ambitions and actual investment behaviour may reveal a lack of finance 
(however, it may also reveal an inability to put ambitions into practice, 
i.e. the lack of realism of the owners’ visions) 
• Alternatively, a way to distinguish between workable ambitions and mere 
dreams or vague aspirations is to condition the recognition of a proper 
need for finance to the conjunction of both a high ambition and at least 
some investment (i.e. excluding the zero-investments, e.g. CS4 and  
ACSb). 
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3. More insights into the demand function  
The demand for finance to consider when evaluating the existence of a finance 
gap requires correcting the “apparent demand function” by two demand-side 
phenomena:  
• on one hand, self-rationing (i.e. a reluctance of businesses to apply for 
finance, motivated by the conditions of supply of finance) should be 
added to the expressed demand because a relaxation of the supply 
constraints would bring this demand forward; 
• on the other hand, cost-inelastic demand (i.e. the tendency to apply for 
finance even though its cost is excessive) should be deducted because it 
can be regarded as “unqualified” demand.  
 
In addition, the case studies also provided evidence for another phenomenon 
which adds complexity, and relates to the degree of maturation / formulation of 
the demand function. Incorporating this last aspect enables a theoretically 
grounded summary.  
3.1. “Truncated pecking order” and self-rationing  
The case studies findings are generally consistent with the theory that the small 
firms’ capital structures followed some “pecking order” rationale rather than a 
“static trade-off” theory – the firms did not seem to have a target debt ratio but 
decided on financing schemes on an ad hoc basis.  
• Internal vs. external finance: 
The preference for internal over external finance was voiced by several 
firms (CS3; CS4; CS5; CS6), apparently for reasons of lower costs, 
including transaction costs; 
• Debt vs. external equity  
The preference for debt over external equity is indirectly confirmed by 
the three partnership breaks (CS3, CS5, CS6), all to some extent 
motivated by the entrepreneur’s need to have better control over the 
business. Two case studies mentioned that they have been approached by 
larger groups interested in buying an equity stake (CS5, CS6), which they 
both rejected. 
In one case the rejection of an offer for external equity was motivated by 
a definitive aversion to share ownership (CS5: “they will have to shoot 
200 times at me before I sell!”), reflecting a truncation of the pecking 
order, while in the other case the owner suggested that he would only 
consider this option as a last resort (reflecting a low ranking within the 
pecking order).  
• Short-term vs. long-term debt  
The case studies tended to confirm Howorth’s finding (2001, p. 82) that 
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the choice between short- and long-term sources of debt tended to be 
dependent on the type of asset being financed. The relevant criteria 
seemed to be not only the expected life of the asset, but also the total 
cost.  
For example, CS5 had no problem with contracting long-term debt in the 
form of vehicle finance but was reluctant to engage in short-term 
overdraft. On the other hand, CS6 resorted to long-term debt for the 
purchase of vehicles but preferred to acquire his small machinery and 
tools in cash, thereby indirectly using his overdraft since he had no cash 
surplus.  
ACSd, a township furniture entrepreneur, was the only entrepreneur 
voicing an absolute rejection of debt as a whole (“I do not want to 
borrow, because my mother has taught me that I should never take 
debt”). As suggested by Howorth (2001 p. 83), a truncation of the 
pecking order at this point caused a financial constraint.  
• Informal vs. institutional finance  
The case studies suggested another preference, which has not been 
discussed in the literature: the preference for informal as opposed to 
institutional sources of finance. This issue may be specific to the South 
African context, especially non-white entrepreneurs and especially at the 
early stage of the business: CS3 and CS5 turned to their family and 
friends for loans, although this had disadvantages, in particular the 
business’s inability to build up a credit record.  
Similarly, CS4 voiced a clear preference for informal township 
moneylenders (“the ones in the townships they understand me”) over 
formal registered microlenders (“they are difficult”).  
 
Relationship between demand and supply constraints; self-rationing  
In most cases, the aversion to certain types of finance found its roots in personal, 
deeply entrenched beliefs, frequently caused by previous negative experiences. 
For example, CS5’s refusal to share ownership again came from his conviction 
that his initial partnership was “the biggest mistake in his life”. Similarly, 
ACSd’s aversion to debt was rooted in his mother’s warnings about other 
people’s bad experiences. Such strong convictions could not be affected by a 
change in supply conditions.  
Also, to some extent, the reluctance to buy financial services appeared to be 
linked to what could be termed a “do-it-yourself mentality”. This impression 
emerged in particular from the study of CS5, in relation to his long refraining 
from contracting an overdraft facility. Intuitively, such a drive to be independent 
and autarchic, relying primarily on internal resources to survive and grow, seems 
logical in the psychology of genuine entrepreneurs.  
There were however a few examples of ‘withheld demand’ motivated by supply 
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conditions. Among them were two classic conditions of supply, consistent with 
Howorth (2001, p. 83): 
• collateral (ACSe: “I have no assets”),  
• cost (CS5: “bank finance is too expensive for a start-up black 
entrepreneur; when you start you cannot handle the finance charges”),  
 
In addition, two specifically South African factors emerged that influenced the 
firms’ demand behaviour. These issues were considered as ‘supply conditions’ 
because they are not necessarily immutable:  
• The cultural divide between bank staff and (black) entrepreneurs, 
including issues such as language and understanding for the 
entrepreneurs’ background, seemed to specifically explain the preference 
of informal over institutional sources of finance (“black entrepreneurship 
was such a crazy thing”);  
• The exclusion of blacklisted individuals: (CS4: “if you have a judgment 
against your name, even if the amount is under 3000R, they don’t want to 
give you.”) 
 
The cultural aspect seems to be already fading off as banks are diversifying the 
cultural origin of their staff and marketing their specific interest in supporting 
“empowerment-related” enterprises. The constraint regarding blacklisting is, so 
far, still in full force, but there are discussions about relaxing it, which could 
have an effect on the demand for finance by concerned individuals.  
To the extent that the withholding of demand was motivated by supply 
constraints, there is evidence of self-rationing (Levenson & Willard).  
3.2. The cost elasticity of demand 
The inelasticity of demand to cost is related to the study of a financial gap, 
because a business, for lack of alternatives, consciously chooses a form of 
finance that is overly expensive – that is, with little chance of being able to cope 
with the cost.  
There are various degrees of cost elasticity, related to various levels of 
sophistication of the demand behaviour. The standard economic theory models 
cost-sensitive investors, who link their investment plans to precise quantitative 
profit forecasts, hence being able to define the highest interest rate (or more 
generally cost of capital) under which the project is worthwhile. Should the cost 
of capital increase beyond this point, they would drop their projects.  
The case studies confirmed the expectation that small businesses’ behaviour is 
generally less sophisticated. The multiple uncertainties in their operations and 
projects do not seem compatible with a basis-point-sensitive decision model. 
Most of the interviewed business owners were unable to indicate the exact costs 
of the bank facilities that they were using – the only entrepreneur who gave a 
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precise answer was CS2, but his indications of the interest rate were 
contradictory (the mentioned “prime –2%” did not coincide with another 
indication of 11%).  
In that sense, case study evidence suggests that small business owners do not 
have an acute cost awareness and elasticity.  
However, cost elasticity may still exist on a larger scale, in the sense that when 
there are large variations in the magnitude of cost for the various types of capital 
available, entrepreneurs refrain from using the very expensive ones. To test this 
hypothesis, the costs of the various sources of capital used by each business were 
compiled in Table 37.6.  
(Unfortunately, the evidence collected was incomplete, partly because of 
business owners’ ignorance of exact cost, partly because the financial statements 
did not always provide detailed information. In addition, in some cases the cost 
seemed to be fluctuating strongly from one year to the next).  
Table 37.6 – Cost of capital experienced  
All costs in % p.a.  CS1 CS2
63
 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 
Estimated cost of external 
equity (ex post) 
n/a n/a 10.1% n/a 108.8% 16.6% 
Cost of franchise finance P+3% P-2% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cost of vehicle finance P+3% n/a P+2% n/a 
between  
P+0.5% 
and P+3% 
between 
Prime and 
P+5.7% 
Cost of overdraft P+3% missing P+2% n/a missing missing  
Cost of microlending n/a n/a n/a 300 to 600%  n/a n/a 
Cost of supplier credit  missing missing missing 300 to 600%  missing missing 
P: Prime Overdraft Lending Rate 
Sources: own calculations from the data gathered in interviews and financial statements 
(for the cost of external equity); Bank file (for CS1 and CS3); Notes to financial 
statements and prime rate from McGregor Datastream (for the cost of vehicle finance); 
interviews (for CS2 and CS4).  
 
The table shows significant variations between the businesses with regard to the 
cost of bank finance, but the highest costs came from non-bank finance sources: 
the cost of external equity in the case of CS5 exceeded 100% p.a., while the cost 
of microloans and supplier credit in the case of CS4(a+b) was in the region of 25 
                                                 
63 The case of CS2 is atypical since the owner chose to contract debt in his personal capacity 
rather than in the name of the business. This explains the far lower interest rate.  
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to 50% per month, corresponding to 300 to 600% p.a.64  
Those three cases of non-bank finance were raised in a situation where the 
entrepreneurs had felt unable to obtain bank facilities (CS5, being still at the 
start-up stage, had not even tried to apply for a bank loan because he had no 
hope). By contrast, non-bank forms of finance had proved to be more easily 
accessible. This fact raises the question of whether there is evidence of a 
conscious choice of expensive financing schemes motivated by the absence of 
better alternatives. However, this assumption does not seem to apply to CS5, 
since he had not anticipated the cost and would probably not have accepted this 
unfavourable deal if he had been conscious of the cost. 
Therefore, except for CS4 with its reliance on expensive micro-lending and 
supplier credit, the case studies do not provide clear evidence of demand 
inelasticity to the cost of capital. 
A last note is required at this stage, on the fact that CS1 and CS6 indirectly 
financed some fixed assets on a breach of overdraft. This supposedly generated 
high penalty costs, which made the cost of finance overall higher than if they had 
been able to obtain more specific equipment finance. This may be interpreted as 
an inelastic demand caused by a financing gap, but on the other hand, the case 
studies could not clearly show whether the businesses would have made use of a 
different form of finance if it had been available. 
To conclude on this cost issue, the case study findings do not strongly support 
the hypothesis of inelasticity of demand to cost in the case of formal businesses, 
although the elasticity to small changes in cost may be weak. On the other hand, 
the case studies brought another issue to light, which is only marginally related 
to the finance gap issue: there is some evidence of weaknesses in the functioning 
of small business non-bank financial markets, with a few cases of “easy-to-get” 
finance where costs are high, often unexpectedly, and where malpractices may 
be at work: 
- informal moneylending;  
- supplier credit;  
- informal venture capital (partner may abuse the goodwill of the main 
member). 
 
3.3. The ability to articulate finance needs 
In addition to the factors identified in the conceptual framework, a factor that 
emerged strongly from the case studies was that the demand for finance of the 
various businesses verbalising financial constraints was at diverse stages of 
                                                 
64 Identifying these costs as high does not mean that they are unfounded – the case studies show 
that the exceptional growth and cash flow potential of CS5 could explain the high 
indemnification requested by the withdrawing member, while the short maturity, low amounts 
and high risk run by CS4’s creditors may justify their high interest rates. 
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formulation and filtration.  
• The most striking example was ACSb, a micro-business operating in the 
sport retail sector. Having initially expressed financial difficulties (“I 
have been struggling to get finance”), he later admitted that he did not 
know whether he needed finance, and what for – indicating that he had 
wanted to seek advice but “most companies have been charging +/- 
R6000 for a business plan”. 
ACS b seemed to illustrate the case of less self-confident entrepreneurs, 
who have a confuse expectation that finance is needed, as a necessary 
ingredient in the recipe for success – but have little concept about what to 
use it for.  
• Another interesting case was Mrs. J.’s dream of a new forklift (minority 
member in CS6), while the majority member suggested that the need for 
such equipment was only occasional and they could hire a forklift 
whenever the circumstances required this. This case suggested that some 
small business owners forget a fundamental principle of the SME 
economy: since their resources are per essence limited, SMEs must 
remain lean and flexible. In order to compete with large groups, they 
should target niche markets or accept to work with less equipment than 
large businesses do. Mrs J.’s wish could therefore be discarded as 
‘unrealistic’. 
• These two examples, it was felt, were cases of entrepreneurs failing to 
undertake the first preliminary step in articulating finance needs: the step 
of operationalising the need and ensuring that the project was indeed 
necessary to the business.  
• On the other hand, it appeared that other entrepreneurs who described 
themselves as finance-constrained had not entirely run through the 
process of formulating their demand for finance. In spite of having some 
specific, operational needs, they had not yet determined if this need 
would be compatible with their personal financing preferences (e.g. CS5 
felt a need for liquidity but was initially reluctant to use overdraft 
finance), or if they would have any chances under the current supply 
conditions (e.g. ACSe felt that his lack of tangible assets would hinder 
him in obtaining bank finance).   
Under these circumstances it was uncertain whether the need for finance 
would eventually be translated into an effective demand. In the case of 
CS5, it did, because the entrepreneur (possibly influenced by the 
discussions we had had) eventually relaxed his aversion for debt and 
applied for an overdraft facility.  
• Lastly, CS4 provided an illustration of a different phenomenon. In spite 
of having recognised that their business itself is not economically 
worthwhile due to excessive competition for the tenders (“you cannot do 
proper work with those prices”), and having furthermore experienced that 
the cost of finance is unaffordable (“I have learned from my husband that 
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I must not use debt because the interest would kill me”), they however 
kept investing and applying for credits wherever they could.  
Unlike the other cases, it is an example of demand for finance which 
reaches the final stage of formal application although it should have been 
filtered out in at least one of the preliminary stages – a behaviour which 
could be compared with gambling, in the hope that they may against all 
odds hit the jackpot.  
All these examples suggest that the maturation and filtering process found in 
business management textbooks is, in practice, not linear in time: The failure to 
ensure that finance needs are concrete and realistic, which is the first step in the 
articulation of a demand, would not be surprising in infant businesses, which are 
still testing the market; but it is remarkable that it was found in the older case 
studies (CS6 was 13 years old and ACSb was 6 years old). Meanwhile, the case 
of CS4b, a very young firm (less than 1 year old), illustrated a phenomenon of 
shortcut, whereby the last step was undertaken first.  
Figure 37.1 and Table 37.7 illustrate the various stages of the process, the 
shortcut phenomenon and the positioning of each case study on the continuum.  
Figure 37.1 – The demand filtering process and the phenomenon of unfiltered 
demand  
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Table 37.7 – Demand formulation stages of the financially constrained case 
studies  
Business 
“code 
name” 
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Further details  
CS1     X  
CS4b X 
 
  X 
"Shortcut": 
“Finance is very expensive, you cannot do 
proper work with those conditions, but what 
can we do? We have been to [various 
institutions], but they don’t help you”. 
CS5   (X) 
 
X 
Maturation: 
initially: “I desperately needed finance, but 
there was no way that a bank would give a 
loan to me, I knew nobody”. 
then: “My bank tells me to take an overdraft 
but I am worried about the cost, and I don’t 
want to be debt-trapped” 
finally: applies and obtains a facility 
CS6 (X)  (X)   
Diverging expectations from the members: 
minority member would like more external 
finance at a lower cost; majority member 
wants to stick to own resources for now 
ACSa     X 
“I have applied for an increase of my overdraft 
in 2002 but so far [1994] it has not been 
granted yet” 
ACSb X     
• “I have been struggling to get finance” 
• “I do not really know what are my needs” 
• “most companies have been charging +/- 
R6000 for a business plan” 
(ACSd)  X    
“I do not want to borrow, because my mother 
has taught me that I should never take debt”. 
(ACSe)   X   “I have no assets” 
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4. Is there a mismatch of supply and demand? 
A gap can exist because a type of finance is not available at all, or because it is 
not sufficient. 
4.1. Availability considerations 
Rather than a general lack of finance, the case studies suggested that there might 
be gaps with regard to tailored financial facilities, i.e. for the acquisition of 
specific (targeted) assets or the bridging of specific financial phases.  
a) Business Property Finance 
The case studies have provided at least one illustration of the inability of a 
business to purchase property for lack of financial support.  
Further studies would be required to establish the existence, the extent and the 
reasons of a financing gap with respect to the financing of property investments. 
b) Equipment finance  
The comparison of needs and resources with regard to equipment finance may 
suggest a gap in the market for the financing of non-vehicle, non-computer 
related non-franchise small equipment (“equipment micro-finance”). All three 
case studies which had a need for such equipment (CS4b and CS6, as well as 
CS1 in its later years) used short-term resources to fund these investments, and 
in all cases this seemed to cause non-contractual situations such as breach of 
overdraft limit (CS1, CS6) and failure to repay a short-term loan (CS4b)65.  
A similar problem was found in ACSf, which was able to contract a new 
instalment sale agreement when it invested in computer equipment in 2000, but 
had to use its overdraft to buy more expensive furniture and kitchen equipment 
in 2002, causing the current balance to go beyond the authorised overdraft limit. 
 
Further research would be required to verify demand- and supply-side factors for 
this situation: 
(a) on the demand-side, the practice of cash-financing small equipment may 
come from the entrepreneurs’ reluctance to keep cash savings, and the fact that 
amounts were considered small enough for them to handle; 
                                                 
65 CS1 and CS6 bought tools and small machinery in cash while having a negative balance on 
their current accounts – thereby they indirectly used their bank overdrafts for investment 
purposes; CS4b obtained a 3-months credit only. 
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(b) on the supply-side, a possibility is that banks do not provide targeted 
equipment finance to SMEs due to the fact that (manufacturing) equipment is 
specialised, difficult to value and sometimes difficult to repossess and re-sell. 
Specialised leasing divisions, if they do exist and have appropriate capacity 
within the bank, are presumably not targeting small businesses / small loan 
amounts. 
If there is indeed a finance gap in this specific area, it penalises small 
entrepreneurs operating in areas that require specific machinery. Their resorting 
to cash purchases creates a burden on their liquidity.  
c) Buy-Out Capital   
For two of the three cases concerned with the indemnification of their former 
partners (CS3 and CS6), mitigating arrangements were found that would ease the 
settlement of sums due, but there was some reason to believe that the 
requirements would put some financial strain on the businesses (increased use of 
overdraft for CS3 and need to replace the lost vehicle for CS6). 
For the third case (CS5), there was a latent but high need for bridging finance to 
provide the necessary liquidity. However, the fact that the business owner was 
still disputing the validity of the indemnification agreement meant that the 
demand for this type of finance was not yet effective, so that the availability of 
supply could not be tested.  
Altogether, the case studies provided only weak evidence of possible gaps in 
terms of availability of specific financial products.  
 
4.2. Sufficiency considerations 
Intuitively, the question of sufficiency should be of little relevance, for two 
reasons which are commonly believed to apply: (i) larger amounts of debt are 
usually easier to obtain than lower amounts66, and (ii) relationship banking, 
especially the building up of a credit record, usually ensure an easier access to 
capital on the second application, than for the first loan. 67 
Empirical evidence has tended to back this view, cf Guiso (2003 p. 137), who 
showed that the specific average capital structure of small firms (lower long-term 
debt) depends largely “on whether or not firms borrow, but not on how much 
they borrow if they borrow”.  
                                                 
66 Gonzales-Vega (1984) has developed a model to explain why lower interest rates lead not only 
to lower loan amounts for the “rationed”, but also to larger amounts for “preferred 
borrowers”. 
67 for the role of “personal knowledge” and banking record cf. Wolfson 1996, cf. Binks & Ennew 
1998.  
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In spite of this intuition, the case studies did provide some pointers at a possible 
sufficiency problem. With the exception of the township businesses, the 
companies that were most financially constrained (CS6, CS1 and ACSa) had 
however received substantial amounts of financial support by their banks. In all 
three cases, the facilities granted seemed to be insufficient to remove the 
financial constraint: 
 
• CS6, which gave abundant interview evidence of financial constraints, 
had however benefited from substantial bank facilities:  
o It has been granted substantial instalment credits for the purchase 
of three vehicles as well as computer equipment. 
o Its overdraft facility, at 8,3% of the business’s turnover, was far 
higher than in all other businesses studied. 
o A closer analysis of needs and resources suggested that the 
business might have had a need for small equipment finance. 
More importantly, the need for working capital was so high that 
the overdraft, even at this high level, was not sufficient. 
 
• Similarly, CS1, the furniture business, which mentioned “working 
capital” as one of the reasons for its failure, had however benefited from 
substantial bank facilities, in particular:   
o at start-up, an encompassing facility to finance the franchise 
scheme, covering equipment needs, stock as well as half of the 
franchise fee; 
o at a later stage, an overdraft facility (admittedly with a rather low 
limit compared with the business’s turnover) and a bank 
guarantee, and  
o eventually, an additional credit for a new vehicle. 
In spite of these facilities, the case study has shown that (a) the fixed 
assets financed initially may have been far too low for the operating 
needs of the business, justifying further investments and the 
subsequent need for additional finance, and (b) the overdraft limit 
seemed too low compared with the business’s size and needs.  
• ACSa, the HVAC retailer, was equally in breach of his overdraft limit, in 
spite of having been granted instalment finance for R268K, an overdraft 
facility of R180K and a term loan guaranteed by Khula, for R320K, for 
the establishment of his manufacturing operations. The bank had rejected 
his application for an increase of overdraft.  
 
Ignoring at this stage creditworthiness-related aspects, which obviously have 
some relevance, a preliminary conclusion is that there is more evidence of 
financial gaps among already debt-financed firms, than among self-sufficient 
firms. 
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A possible explanation for this is that the businesses may have underestimated 
their financial need when first applying for finance, which causes them to feel 
liquidity constraints, hence building an unfavourable credit record. It is certainly 
difficult to ask for increases when previous repayments have not been on 
schedule.  
 
4.3. Exclusion from finance channels: township micro-
entrepreneurs  
Only one case study provided conclusive evidence of a genuine lack of access to 
finance: the township entrepreneurs CS4a+b have crucially lacked resources to 
operate, both in terms of equipment finance (especially in the case of CS4b) and 
even more in terms of working capital.  
The credits obtained from suppliers, informal micro-lenders and equipment 
vendors, were not adequately meeting the needs of the businesses, on at least two 
grounds: 
• Firstly, the credit terms, averaging 30 days, were too short. In the quasi 
absence of equity, the township businesses would have needed some 
alternative stable resource to build their operations on. This applies 
particularly to CS4b, which had to purchase machinery.  
•  In addition, the cost of credit, at 300 to 600% per annum, was ruinous.  
 
However, even there, it is difficult to talk of a proper financing gap, since the 
demand for finance formulated by these two entrepreneurs – as discussed – was 
not abiding to the rules for responsible borrowing, in particular self-screening of 
project and consideration of financing costs. This issue will be discussed further 
under the consideration of the borrowers’ intrinsic financial quality.  
4.4. Conclusion on financing constraints and finance 
gaps 
Ultimately, the case studies showed that in spite of a high level of financial 
constraints, there was only weak support for the hypothesis of finance gaps. 
Within the population studied (formal businesses which have been running for at 
least 18 months, have sound financial records, and are run by owners agreeing to 
grant me two detailed interviews and an access to financial data), there were 
generally three types of situations causing entrepreneurs to express financial 
constraints:  
• In many cases, the demand for finance was not entirely matured, and 
therefore not actually expressed on the market. To some extent this 
happened because the need was not fully validated. In other cases, in 
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spite of a genuine need, there was a reluctance to use external finance 
either for personal reasons or for reasons linked to the conditions of 
supply – in this latter case it is possible to talk about self-rationing.  
 
• There was one case of demand which was formally expressed on the 
financial market although the filtering process should have caused the 
entrepreneurs to withhold it: this demand was entirely cost-inelastic and 
could be considered as unqualified. 
 
• In all other cases of financial constraints, the demand for finance came 
from businesses which had already been granted substantial long- and 
short-term credit facilities. The constraint hence came not from a lack of 
access, but from apparently insufficient amounts. This raises the 
suspicion of creditworthiness issues, which will be evaluated in the next 
section.  
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Annexure 38 – Case Studies, Synthesis II  
Accounting opacity within case studies 
 
This synthesis presents in greater detail the data from case studies related to the 
quality of accounting, both in the organisation of financial management and in 
the reliability of the output, i.e. financial statements.  
 
1. Organisation of financial management 
 
While large businesses have some form of finance department with dedicated 
and specially trained staff, the organisation of the financial function in a small 
business is usually less rigorous, although it typically changes during the lifetime 
of the firm.  
1.1. At start-up, and micro-businesses  
When it starts, the business is often limited to the person of its owner (or owners 
if it is a partnership), who concentrates the operating, marketing and 
administrative functions. Some micro-businesses never grow beyond that stage, 
so that the owner is still responsible for all these tasks (e.g. CS4, ACS b).  
The procedure for registering a private company or close corporation requires 
that the business should submit a written letter of consent from an accounting 
officer or an auditor to act as such for the business. This formality, although it 
does not always achieve its goal, has at least the effect of pushing people of good 
intention to maintain a relationship with a properly trained and qualified 
accountant, who can provide additional support for the accounting / financial 
function.  
However, it would be too expensive for a micro business to rely exclusively on 
an official accounting officer or chartered accountant for the entire bookkeeping 
and accounting processes. The case studies suggested that this could cause three 
possible evolutions after start-up: 
• The case studies suggested that all businesses who experience significant 
growth become able, at some stage, to employ their own administrative 
staff (like for CS3, 5 and 6),  
• For stagnating or declining businesses, a possible evolution is to sever 
relationships with the chartered accountant, turning to an external 
bookkeeper as a less expensive alternative (e.g. ACS b). Supposedly, the 
budget of the bookkeeper only allows him/her to capture the business 
records into an accounting software and produce trial balances or other 
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outputs with little quality-enhancing procedures, explaining the poor 
accounting quality found (ACSb, CS1); 
• In more extreme cases, micro-businesses may resign about external 
support altogether. An example of this phenomenon was CS4a (“I had an 
accountant, but it costs you a lot of money, so you leave that one, you 
take another one, [and eventually] you start doing things on your own.”).  
If the case of CS4 is representative, this step would be most frequent 
precisely among those entrepreneurs who have no personal financial 
know-how. As a result, the financial function simply disappears. 
 
NB: Two case studies were, to some extent, counter-examples: 
• The franchise operations (like CS2), do not actually go through the stage 
of a micro-business. They immediately employ administrative staff 
according to situation 3 below. 
• CS5 was an interesting case: since one of the initial members was highly 
qualified with regard to business administration, the sophistication of the 
financial function has been very high initially, to the point of being 
premature at that early stage and, in the eyes of the main member, 
counterproductive. After he decided to resign about the support of this 
partner, the main member fell into the other extreme of “working out of a 
shoebox”.  
 
1.2. Growing businesses  
The case studies have shown that, as a business grows, it becomes able to 
employ more people and there will soon be one, later several persons in charge 
of the office / administration. Again, many small businesses presumably never 
go beyond that stage, maintaining an administrative function rather than a 
financial function.  
a) Tasks and qualifications of the administrative function  
In general, the administrative function at this stage seems to aim more at 
organising the paperwork, having a clean desk and ensuring proper payment of 
the invoices, than at providing useful information for the strategic management 
of the firm. The staff responsible for this function is often employed within the 
family and immediate network (e.g. the founding member’s wife in CS6, young 
girls from the neighbourhood in CS5), rather than being selected for their 
qualifications in business or accounting.  
Almost all case studies encountered were organising their finance according to 
this model: 
• CS3, until shortly before our first interview, had only one secretary 
responsible for the entire office work of business with a R2 million 
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turnover (unless the member who left was strongly involved in 
administration and finance); 
• CS5 had several office employees, but the main role that emerged from 
the interviews (prior to the stage 3 of installing a new accounting 
software) was to phone clients to ensure that they would settle their 
invoices. As to record-keeping, the business was “working out of a 
shoebox”, not even keeping a record of its cash sales, which represent the 
majority of its R 1 million turnover.  
• CS6, during the first 7-8 years of its existence, was employing the 
founding member’s wife to do the office work. Interviews showed that 
she had little understanding of business administration; 
• In addition to a secretary, ACS a, a R5 million turnover business, had 
employed two “ladies” whose job was primarily to ensure that clients 
paid their invoices in due time. 
 
b) Owner’s interest for administrative issues and level of 
knowledge on the business  
Interview statements suggested that at this stage, the members tend to view the 
secretarial work as an annoyance, slowing down operations and hindering the 
acquisition of new business. This is illustrated by the statements of CS5: “by the 
time he had finished his analyses, opportunities were gone” and CS6: “[Cathy] is 
so busy sorting out administrative matters that she has not been able to sell”.  
As a consequence of this organisation, management had little knowledge about 
the business’s financial condition, especially with regard to liquidity and 
working capital: 
• At CS3, neither the member nor the administrative officer could explain 
the contradiction between balance sheets and their own statements 
regarding stock, payment terms granted to customers and obtained from 
suppliers… 
• The member of CS3 engaged his business into the purchase of premises, 
without realising how little equity it had; 
• The owner of CS5 said that he “has no idea” about his annual turnover, 
and admitted that he took many bad decisions as a result of not knowing 
exactly where he was. 
• The minority member of CS6 was assuming that “most customers pay 
cash”, being absolutely unaware of the dramatic problem that her 
business had with accounts receivable (which, according to the balance 
sheet for the same year, amounted to 96 days of turnover)!!!  
• Also, two of the members of CS6 have tended to approve considerable 
loans to sister company, because they felt that the business was “doing 
well”, while the liquidity was actually very tense.  
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In the case of the latest business, the lack of knowledge and understanding about 
the financial condition would have been fatal if the only member who was 
reasonably aware had not bought his brother’s stake, hence becoming majority 
owner and able to put an end to these harmful practices.  
For CS3, at the time when the case studies were being run it was still too early to 
establish the harm that lack of knowledge was possibly causing on the business.  
As to CS5, fortunately, the general intuition of the main manager has been 
cautious; especially, he has refrained from taking on too much short-term debt, 
hence guarding his business against the risks of a liquidity crunch.  
 
c) Quality of the co-operation with external accountants and 
bookkeepers 
The co-operation with external accounting service providers emerged as a 
decisive factor for the financial function. Here again the firms studied have 
shown various tendencies:  
 
• In CS3, the co-operation with the accountant seemed to be a pure 
formality: he would come at regular intervals to collect various records 
and enter them into the accounting – and the latest accounts have shown 
that the accountant would occasionally “adjust” the accounting to fit the 
needs of the management. However, there was no sense of a partnership 
beyond this. There was also no particular opinion on whether the 
accountant’s services were cheap or expensive – it simply did not seem to 
interest the management. From the accountant there were also no 
complaints or comments about the quality of the records kept by the 
business, as if that were actually of little importance.  
 
• CS5 seemed to have a close relationship with a serious and reliable 
accountant. Unlike the two other cases, he was in no need of 
opportunistic accounting: “my brief to [John] is to make the accounts for 
me, not for anybody else”. The interviews revealed that the accountant 
was advising the owner in several respects, e.g. with regard to possible 
cost-reducing or liquidity-enhancing strategies, as well as tax matters 
(e.g. VAT-related). In particular, the accountant was the main responsible 
for the owner’s increased awareness of the need to save rather than spend 
all cash flows, and the need to improve his internal records.  
Although the owner of CS5 complained about the cost that resulted from 
this close co-operation, he seemed to benefit from it.  
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• In CS6, the management was working with both an accounting officer, 
who was responsible for the annual statements, and a bookkeeper 
involved in day-to-day activities. As for CS3, the case studies confirmed 
that the accounting officer was involved in “opportunistic accounting” 
choices. Apart from that, there was little co-operation and the new 
majority owner was concerned that this accounting officer was too 
expensive – he was willing to look for a new one.  
On the other hand, the case study showed that the relationship with the 
external bookkeeper was relatively intensive (apart from a pure 
mechanistic job of “keeping the books”, she would get involved in 
providing strategically useful information, like breakeven calculations), 
and the new majority member was keen to intensify it further.  
 
1.3. Established businesses  
A few of the case studies reached a further stage of development of the financial 
function, which – although rudimentary compared with larger organisations – 
can be described as a fully established financial function.  
In this case, the business moves away from the earlier “operations and office 
work” dichotomy to allow for more specialised financial work (or it sets up this 
financial function right from the start, as in the case of the restaurant franchise 
CS2).  
The finance function then is no longer seen as a “necessary formality” but as a 
way of creating information of strategic value. It usually involves the following 
aspects: 
• The business obtains the rights to use an encompassing accounting 
software (CS1, CS2, CS5), which may require specific staff training 
(CS5); 
• On the basis of this software, the management is able to produce periodic 
information about costing, planning and monitoring, several performance 
measurements, working capital management, as well as pro forma 
accounting outputs (CS2, for example, would print and study rudimentary 
income statements every month – also, the monthly balance sheets and 
income statements which CS1 provided to its bank were probably 
prepared internally); 
• As a result, the business becomes more autonomous and less dependent 
on its accountant and/or bookkeeper (e.g. CS5 was looking forward to 
this stage in order to save on accountant’s costs).  
• Nevertheless, the quality of the relationship with the external accounting 
officer proves still relevant (CS2).  
 
At this stage, it is interesting to note that the sole ownership of an accounting 
software without proper know-how of the users, or without the correct 
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motivations to use it, may produce counter-productive effects. For example, the 
very poor quality of the management accounts produced by CS1 would probably 
not have been possible, had the business been obliged to resort to an external 
accountant to produce his monthly statements.  
Similarly, the owner of the franchise restaurant CS2, who studied “rudimentary” 
income statements every month, seemed to gain false impressions on 
performance and profitability: he would not have been as satisfied with the 
results if he had included all year-end fixed costs, which were probably not 
included in the monthly performance reports produced by his software.  
 
1.4. Evaluation of record-keeping practices 
Records for: sales – purchases – inventory – accounts receivable and payable – 
overdue accounts – cash in and out –Cash-flow  
• Franchise restaurant CS2 has state-of-the-art computerised accounting 
systems: the sales, whether cash or per credit card, are fully captured on 
the computer. At the end of every day, the software generates totals of 
sales, stock utilization, and other control sheets that are reviewed on a 
daily basis. Food costs are filed “religiously”, because “at the end of the 
month if there is a bill missing for thousand Rand it will never be 
possible to find what it was”. 
• Safety wear business CS3 keeps a record of sales and purchases, which 
are all paid by cheque – but the records on accounts payable and 
receivable as well as inventory seemed to be either poor, or poorly 
known, since there were many contradictions between interview 
statements and accounting figures. In fact, the physical organisation of 
the business, crowded in a tiny office space, does not leave much room 
for neat filing. Nevertheless, the accountant suggested that the 
bookkeeping records of the business were satisfactory. 
• The record-keeping of township cleaning business CS4 consist of a box 
in which she keeps the slips of the equipment she purchased, as well as 
other receipts; and a register of the wages paid to her workers.   
Since she currently has only one client/contract, and pays all her 
materials in cash, records for sales, accounts receivable and payable do 
not pose problems. Similarly, she argues that inventory records are 
unnecessary as she always only buys stock for a month. There is no 
record of cash in and out.  
• The bookkeeping practices of tourism business CS5, in spite of its 
R1million turnover, were almost as rudimentary as for CS4. The 
enterprise has no comprehensive record of sales or purchases. There is a 
filing of monthly invoices sent to large customers, as well as their 
payment – but the only way to track the plethora of cash customers is to 
consult the “booking schedule” to count, day after day, the number of 
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participants to each type of tour. Costs are tracked on the owner’s as well 
as the firm’s bank and credit card statements. Overdue accounts, 
however, are followed closely in winter as they cause tension on the 
business’s liquidity. However, the firm was currently installing a new 
accounting software (Pastel) which should enable more accurate records 
and monitoring of sales and costs in future.  
• None of the two owners of CS6 whom I interviewed was particularly 
aware of the record keeping practices of the business. They had an 
administrative employee who had to “deal with the invoices”, look after 
UIF and other SARS matters, whereas the external bookkeeper would 
prepare statements and inventory the petty cash on a monthly basis.  
 
Only CS2 and CS6 kept a copy of their historical financial statements at their 
offices - other businesses referred me to their accountant to obtain these. In the 
case of CS6, the office employee digged the financials out of her cupboard and 
left me with the only copy she had, declining my offer to make photocopies – 
suggesting that these documents were of little usefulness to her.  
 
2. The quality of financial statements  
Although the case studies (with the exception of CS1 and CS4) have been 
selected among enterprises which kept better-than-average accounts and whose 
statements appeared reasonably transparent, the process has shown that even 
then, there were substantial quality problems in the outputs of accounting.  
(In the case of CS3, the initial score in the pre-selection process was 55.6, which 
seemed sufficient for running the case study – but on the day of the last 
interview, the owner provided a new set of financial statements, which were of 
poor quality, forcing to revise the overall accounting score).  
2.1. Factors causing reliability problems  
The case studies usually confirmed the elements from the conceptual framework 
about the quality and reliability of small business financial statements:  
In the first place, the quality of the accounting outputs was a function of the 
business-specific balance between need for financial information, and resources 
available: 
- The quality was best when the accounts were primarily sought for their 
internal usefulness (CS5), or at least when there was some indication that 
the owner was interested in the financial information produced (CS2, 
CS6).  
- Cases where the financial statements were mainly produced to respond to 
an external pressure might have caused an increase in the quantity of 
information disclosed, but not an increase in the quality and transparency 
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(especially CS1 and CS3 were found to produce statements for the 
purpose of the bank: their statements show poor transparency scores); 
 
- The availability and affordability of accounting skills were often 
influencing the quality of the output. For example, in the case of CS1, 
there was an obvious lack of in-house competence, visible in particular in 
the technically erroneous cash flow forecast; meanwhile, the owner was 
probably not willing to spend high costs on accounting services.  
For CS4 too, the reason for the absence of financial records was the 
owner’s lack of skills and the unaffordable cost of external advisers.   
On the opposite, CS5, although complaining about the costs engendered, 
was both lucky to be in contact with a good accountant, and willing to 
pay for his services. 
 
- As expected, the compliance to legal obligations did not represent a 
strong guarantee for good quality accounting. In fact, the case studies 
suggested that what the law or the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices define as minimum requirements were rather interpreted as 
“targets” and eventually proved to represent the upper, rather than the 
lower boundary for effective quality. For example, all case study firms, 
which were registered CCs, omitted to produce a cash flow statement. In 
three cases, though, the notes to the financial statements included a note 
to explain, in varying wordings, that: “The CC has not complied with 
GAAP as it has not prepared a Cash Flow Statement. The members are of 
the opinion that compliance will entail additional expenses out of 
proportion to the needs of the members”. (CS2, CS5, CS6). In this 
particular case it would seem that the accountant himself systematically 
offers to its small clients the option of non-compliance as a means to 
reduce costs.  
Other more serious examples of non-compliance came from CS1, a 
pretended Pty (ltd) but which produced even less information than a CC; 
or CS4, a CC which has no records whatsoever.  
 
In addition to the balance of needs and skills, the complex economic reality of 
some small businesses sometimes affected the transparency of financial 
statements: 
- The fluidity of the boundary between the owner’s account and the firm 
account was a common problem, with almost all entrepreneurs 
suggesting that they would occasionally use firm assets for their own 
purposes, if not drawing funds out of the cash box without keeping a 
record of this. While the limit tended to become stricter as the size of the 
business grew, there is also some confusion in the case of the largest case 
study enterprise (CS2), which was mainly financed by a member’s loan 
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attracting a sizeable interest: this creates a risk of adding a hidden 
remuneration to the real interest costs.  
 
- Similarly, the phenomenon of serial entrepreneurship (whereby an 
entrepreneur, after having run his first firm for a few years, creates a 
second one, which often rather informally borrows some of its funding 
from the first) generated ambiguities about the allocation of some debts 
or costs (e.g. when CS5 put some vehicles of its first business at the 
disposal of the second, one wonders whether to which firm the 
corresponding costs were attributed; also CS6) 
 
- The informality in the record keeping caused some uncertainty about the 
reality of the figures (e.g. CS5 did not even have a record of cash sales – 
in fact it is surprising that this business was able to reach such a high 
score in its accounting evaluation while having such a poor record-
keeping system!) 
 
- In all businesses except the franchise restaurant, the instability caused by 
the high growth experienced (or, in the case of CS1, caused by other 
reasons) makes it difficult to ascertain the realism of the figures, because 
ratios become very variable, hence reducing the meaningfulness of year-
to-year benchmarking.  
 
- An additional factor of instability to which small businesses are more 
sensitive is the seasonality. It was particularly relevant for businesses 
related to tourism (CS5, and to a lesser extent CS6). 
 
Lastly, in all but one case, the case studies raised suspicions of some extent of 
manipulation, which in most cases was assumed to be benign and could rather be 
subsumed under the heading of “opportunistic accounting”. The evidence 
confirmed that the phenomenon of account manipulation could be conceived as a 
result of motives, opportunities and owner’s integrity: 
- Two main motives were identified which (may have) caused some ex 
post interventions on the accounts: the will to save tax (certainly for CS6 
and possibly for CS2) and the need to convince the bank of one’s success 
while applying for a bank facility (CS1, CS3). 
 
- Opportunities depended on the auditor’s or accountant’s attitude as well 
as internal controls. In some cases it seemed that the accountant himself 
provided the opportunity: in the case of CS6 he faxed a first version of 
the statements and from his own initiative indicated that the accounts will 
only be final once they have discussed opportunities to reduce the profit 
figure in order to save tax. In other cases the accountant agreed to adjust 
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financial reporting to the circumstances of the business (in CS3 the 
accountant produced an optimistic but incomplete set of statements to 
enable the business to apply for a bank loan).  
 
- Regarding internal controls, there was conflicting evidence as to the 
relationship of shared ownership and opportunities for manipulation. In 
the case of CS5, one could argue that the withdrawal of the initial partner 
reduced the moral hazard tendency of the managing partner: being sole 
owner, he felt more committed to its business, less inclined to informal 
drawings, and more keen to have accurate information on its real 
condition. A similar interpretation could be made for CS6, where one 
owner took over his brother’s share primarily in order to avoid 
unsustainable loans to the sister company, and improve discipline in 
financial management. The opposite effect may have been prevalent for 
CS3, which had been reasonably stable until the second owner withdrew: 
there is a possibility that the remaining member allowed himself more 
liberties once he became sole owner, e.g. reducing his member’s loan 
which had been constant since registration of the CC, and starting to use 
the accounting for opportunistic purposes. 
 
- In some cases, the auditor’s vigilance proved to be of little use, since the 
business simply repudiated his auditor, and presented non-audited 
financial statements to the bank and supposedly the Receiver of Revenue 
(CS1);  
 
- Lastly, there was evidence that some businesses used multiple accounts. 
In particular, CS2 and ACSe expressly indicated that if they were to sell 
their businesses, they would circulate different profit records than what 
they use for tax purposes.  
 
2.2. The transparency scoring  
In some cases, the quality judgement was homogenous (generally good for CS5, 
generally poor for CS1), while in other cases the reports of specific years seemed 
to be problematic, supporting the hypothesis of opportunistic accounting (in the 
case of CS3, profit figures were inflated in 2004, corresponding to a bank loan 
application; in the case of CS6, profit figures were reduced in 2004, the first year 
in which tax was to be paid).  
The main quality issues were the following:  
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Table 38.1 – Main quality issues 
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Comments 
CS1 X       
Accounts are very irregular, with gaps and 
overlappings 
CS1  X      
no comparative column, many negative 
liabilities 
CS1   X     Turnover figures seem to be falsified 
CS1    X    
no depreciations, no tax, inappropriate 
treatment of finance charges: all these tend 
to “inflate” the profits 
CS1     X   
apparent falsification of members' loans 
and retained income to hide negative equity 
CS1      X  
no stock adjustments in IS; contradictions 
on Accounts Receivable  
CS1       X 
Lack of clarity on member’s loan and 
member’s remuneration  
CS2    (x)   X 
The performance figures contradict 
interview data (probably correct though); 
owner may have drawn hidden 
remuneration 
CS3    X    
2004 accounts are clearly done to convey 
the bank an impression of high profit 
CS3      X  
Accounts receivable and payable, stock and 
cash balance contradict interview data 
CS5      (x)  
Accounts do not give a clear idea of 
working capital and cash (seasonal) 
CS6    X   (x) 
In 2004 some costs related to brother's new 
venture were booked under this business, 
reducing taxable income. 
Total 1 1 1 4 1 3 3  
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2.3. Particularly sensitive items 
Table 38.1 above shows that the lack of reliability of financial statements 
affected mainly three areas: 
a) The bottom line 
Profit figures were generally difficult to interpret, for two reasons:  
• Firstly because, technically, they are calculated as the residual balance of 
all income and expense items, so that they are affected by all errors or 
abnormal developments that take place in these items; 
• secondly because there may be contradictory interests in reporting either 
a low, or a high profit figure.  
 
However, the case studies also came to the finding that  
• In most cases (CS2, CS3, CS6), profit figures found in the financial 
statements were more credible than statements made by the owners in 
their interviews (for example, the owner of CS2 made statements on the 
operating margins which, in view of the accounts, seem highly 
questionable; the minority owner of CS6 suggested that the business had 
always been profitable, whereas it had only achieved profitability in the 
last year); 
• In the cases of suspected manipulation of accounting, it was generally 
possible to correct the statements to arrive at more realistic profit figures. 
In particular, non-operating expenses, such as financial charges and 
depreciations could be estimated from balance sheets and were found to 
be frequently understated (e.g. CS1, CS3); missing extraordinary items 
could be identified from the interviews (CS3), and tax could be estimated 
based on all the above (CS1). 
• The truth of operating income and expenses was often more difficult to 
establish, especially when turnover figures themselves were questionable 
(CS1), but contradictions in the data often enabled to trace manipulations 
(e.g. overstated cost of sales in CS6).  
 
Even the simulation of income statement undertaken for CS4a, although 
rudimentary and solely based on interview evidence, was more informative than 
the members’ statement that “we never do any profit”.  
 
b) Current assets and liabilities; cash  
The current assets and liabilities, including the cash level, were generally subject 
to more uncertainties than the profitability figures.  
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Indeed, there were frequent contradictions in the data on debtors and creditors, 
often to the effect that the balance sheets did not reflect any accounts receivable 
(CS1 February 1997 balance sheet, CS3) and only low accounts payable (CS1 
January 1998, CS3), although other evidence would indicate that supplier credit 
and customer credit were more significant.  
In addition, in the case of CS3, the value of stock indicated in balance sheets was 
significantly lower than stated by the owner.  
Unlike for the income statement, these contradictions seemed to be rather linked 
to improper accounting, possibly caused by a lack of records on the date of 
payment of invoices and/or a cost-related omission of heavy procedures like 
stock valuation.  
The opposite contradiction applied to CS6, where the balance sheets tended to 
suggest far higher credit periods than indicated by the owners in the interviews. 
In that case, there were indications of more proper record-keeping and sound 
working procedures on the part of the accountant, so that the presumption was 
rather a lack of awareness of management on the extent of the problem.  
In addition, short-term fluctuations may have complicated the interpretation of 
current net assets. Generally, cash levels follow a monthly rhythm (the need to 
pay salaries at month-end often causes a tightening of cash at that period, 
although this could not be verified for CS3), so that accounting figures, which 
are always at month-end, are often too pessimistic. More specifically, longer 
fluctuations happened in the cases of seasonal businesses (CS5 and CS6) and in 
the occurrence of short-term variations of cash level due to investments and 
disinvestments (for example, in CS5-2003 and CS6-2004, the sale of vehicles 
may have relaxed cash constraints and have caused a temporary reduction of 
accounts payable).  
In the cases where the uncertainty about current assets and liabilities was high 
and affecting the interpretation of accounts (especially CS3), it was chosen to use 
two competing sets of figures (labelled ‘CS3 Balance sheets’ and ‘CS3 
interviews’).  
c) Related parties transactions 
A last major area of uncertainty was the array of transactions with related parties, 
especially members – and, if applicable, other businesses owned by the 
members.  
Members’ loans 
In the first place, the correctness of the member’s loan was often difficult to 
establish, especially in the cases where it fluctuated from year to year, which 
applied to the majority of cases.  
Only two of the five case studies had examples of quasi-constant member loans: 
in CS3 the loans were determined at the date of incorporation, according to 
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contributions in kind made by each member (source: interview with accountant), 
and remained untouched until one of the member withdrew. Similarly, in CS5, 
the ‘sleeping’ member kept his member’s loan constant throughout the duration 
of his involvement.  
In all other cases, including the main member of CS5, the member’s loan 
fluctuated to reflect a variable number of transactions. In some cases, the main 
causes to changes in the member’s loan would be the retention of member’s 
salaries (this was heavily practiced by CS5 in the first few years of the business, 
consistent with Howorth 2001 p. 81) or simply periodic additions to the current 
loan amount as the need was felt (Mrs. J. in CS6).  
In other cases, the member’s loan was continuously affected by frequent 
transactions made by the member on behalf of the business (e.g. if the member 
used his personal credit card to pay materials, or paid wages from his own cash), 
or conversely the use of business liquidity for the member’s private purposes 
(CS5 indicated that he would occasionally use the business’s cash for his own 
entertainment expenses, in which case he undertook to write this against his 
member’s loan).   
Finally, in some cases (notably CS1 and possibly CS3-2004), the interview data 
did not allow to identify any particular transactions, but there was a suspicion 
that the member’s loan was calculated “per difference”, as the amount balancing 
total assets and total liabilities and equity – in which case the figure reported 
would bear all the contradictions, errors and omissions from the balance sheet 
and income statements, in particular inaccurate profit figures and inaccurate 
reporting of current assets and liabilities.  
 
Member’s remuneration  
A related issue is the reporting on members’ remuneration. There were three 
main cases of contradictions in this regard.  
In CS1, the analysis of monthly and interim statements would suggest that after 
two years without declaring any remuneration, the owner may have drawn a 
monthly salary of R20 000 for a period of 13 months (Jan 1998 to Feb 1999)– a 
very high compensation for a business which had not achieved turnover targets 
and was not writing profits. There is a lack of clarity on the subsequent 
remunerations, especially with the apparent salary of R45 000 for the sole month 
of January 2000. It is not entirely clear whether the business has falsified its 
reports to convey the impression of success (a successful entrepreneur is one 
who either achieves high profits or earns a high salary), or whether the owner did 
indeed draw such high amounts out of his business. 
In CS2, the member’s statement in the first interview (“I don’t really pay myself 
a fixed salary, but if the business generates some excess capital, I put it into my 
bond”) contradicted accounting data, which showed neither a profit or positive 
operating cash flow, nor a reduction of the member’s loan, nor any other form of 
remuneration of the member or transfer of capital. While the owner may have 
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elegantly used a conditional phrase to avoid admitting his inability to earn a 
salary from the business, the absence of a formal compensation raises suspicions 
about possible hidden remunerations, for example through the interest-bearing 
member’s loan. However, detailed analyses did not uncover any significant 
evidence of such remunerations.  
The last case was the 2004 statements of CS3 – where the member’s salary was 
far higher than in previous years (R180 000, after R52 500 in 2002 and 2003), 
again possibly to convey the bank the impression that the entrepreneur was 
successful. However, the analysis of accounts shows that such a salary will not 
be sustainable once several costs have been allocated, including tax.  
Transaction with related businesses 
Among the cases investigated, there was only one case of a related business 
whose dealings with the main business were, or should have been, reflected in 
the accounting: CS6 and the new business started by Wynand’s brother.  
(The other cases of related businesses were CS2 with the DVD business, and 
CS5 with the ‘inbound’ tourism company, but it seemed both these businesses 
were created after the date of closure of the last financial statements available, 
namely February 2003).  
A comparison of two versions of the 2004 statements, recouped with interview 
data from Wynand, enabled to identify that some of the costs related to the 
brother’s new venture had been shifted to the crating business for tax-saving 
purposes.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 39: Case study synthesis III – Creditworthiness Page 639 
 
 
 
Annexure 39 – Case Studies, Synthesis III  
Creditworthiness 
 
This annexure presents the detailed financial ratios calculated for the case 
studies. After a review of individual ratios, a diagnosis is deduced on the health 
of each firm and its ability to draw benefits from additional finance.  
 
1. Review of ratios  
The analysis of ratios was purporting to answer the six questions below:  
1. Does the business have enough markets/clients? (breakeven)  
2. Are the operations profitable? (operating margin) 
3. Are financing costs consuming all operating profits? (interest coverage) 
4. Is the business able to finance its operations? In particular, does it control 
its debtors sufficiently? (working capital cycle; bad debt) 
5. Is the business over-indebted or does it rely excessively on short-term 
debt? (equity ratio; current debt ratio) 
6. Is the business stable? (variability of ratios) 
 
The case studies furthermore emphasised the relevance of additional questions / 
ratios: 
7. Does the business keep liquidity reserves? (liquidity ratio) 
8. Is the business owner committed to its business (remuneration scheme)? 
 
1.1. Sufficiency of turnover  
For all 6 case studies, a tentative breakeven analysis was undertaken, and the 
assumed breakeven point was compared with the latest achieved turnover figure.  
In some cases, especially for the growing enterprises, methodological issues 
complicated this attempt. Indeed, the successive investments aimed at 
developing the enterprise’s capacity caused fixed costs to rise permanently, with 
two consequences: first, the traditional distinction between fixed costs and 
variable costs was blurred. Secondly, the costs reflected in past income 
statements were usually too low to reflect the costs that would be relevant in 
future (see especially CS6). To avoid distortions in results, the latest achieved 
turnover was compared with the breakeven resulting from the latest income 
statement, rather than a mean over the period (however, while the resulting 
figures are slightly different, the conclusions were not affected by this choice). 
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The study of breakeven enabled to identify three cases of firms, i.e. half of the 
case studies, which seemed to have an insufficient turnover: on one hand, the 
two franchise businesses (CS1 and CS2) did not generate sufficient business to 
justify their high initial investment; on the other hand, the township micro-
businesses, although they had only low fixed costs, were only operating under 
discontinuity, with prolonged periods of inactivity between two tenders, so that 
their turnover was not sufficient to cover their costs. In those three cases, the 
issue of insufficiency of turnover was worrying since none of these firms was 
experiencing a significant growth of sales. Under stagnation or decline there 
were no prospects for the businesses to reach operating profits.  
All other firms tended to have grown sufficiently to reach their breakeven point, 
and CS5 was even far beyond this point.  
Table 39.1 – Breakeven analysis  
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 
(revised) 
CS4 a CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
franchise 
restaurant 
safety 
wear 
cleaning 
services 
tourism packaging 
Latest margin 
(deficit) over latest 
breakeven 
-19% -5% 165% –28% 72% 59% 
Evolution of sales → → ↑ ↓ ⇑ ↑ 
Legend:  →  stagnation; ↓  decline; ↑  low growth; ⇑  rapid growth  
Source: analysis of income statements – in the case of CS4 the calculation is 
based on a simulation of income statement using interview data.  
 
1.2. Interest coverage 
The interest coverage was defined in the broader sense as the number of times 
that the operating cash flows (calculated as the EBITDA) covered total interest 
costs for the same year. This definition was deemed more practicable than the 
EBIT-based definition, because of the frequent occurrence of negative EBIT 
values.  
Technically, the levels of interest coverage tended to fluctuate from one year to 
the next within the same firm, probably because the operating cash flows and 
interest costs are negatively correlated (on good years, the operating cash flows 
are high, hence the firm does not need to use its overdraft and has low interest 
costs, while on bad years the opposite happens). Therefore, the results are 
presented below in three lines: lowest value for the period, highest value for the 
period, and mean.  
The ratios show that the coverage levels are generally poor, with only two cases 
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where the lowest values are higher than 2, remaining however in all cases under 
4. This means that if the coverage had been calculated on the basis of the 
operating profit (EBIT) rather than cash flow (EBITDA) the lowest values would 
hardly have been higher than 1.  
Not surprisingly, the worst coverage ratios are found among the enterprises with 
the worst operating margins (CS1 and CS2) or with the highest financial costs 
(CS4a). In two of these cases (CS1 and CS4a), the mean coverage was below 1, 
indicating interest costs higher than the firm’s operating cash flow.  
CS3, CS5 and CS6 have generally better coverage values, but in bad years the 
financial costs, as well as depreciations, use up the operating profits – except for 
CS3.  
Table 39.2 – Interest coverage  
 
CS1 CS2 CS3 
(revised) 
CS4 a CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
franchise 
restaurant 
safety 
wear 
cleaning 
services 
tourism packaging 
lowest interest coverage 
in the period 
-2  1,4  3,8 0,6  2,3  1,8 
highest interest 
coverage in the period 
+3,4 2,2 4,5 1,1 7,8 14,3 
mean for the period 0,5 1,8 4,1 0,8 4,9 6,4 
 
1.3. Working capital cycle and bad debts 
Again, there were two methodological issues with the study of the working 
capital cycle and bad debts from the annual accounts: 
• Firstly, some of the case studies (especially CS5 and to some extent CS6) 
have a seasonal character, while balance sheet data were generally only 
available for the month of February, which in both cases represents the 
best season.  
• Secondly, considering that the SMEs’ accounting is generally relatively 
rudimentary and essentially cash-based, it is not certain that provisions 
for bad debt have been appropriately reflected in the accounts. 
 
These reservations in mind, the case studies presented the following working 
capital cycles and bad debt problems: 
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Table 39.3 – Working capital cycle of Case studies 
   CS3    
 
CS1 CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS4 
a&b 
CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
franchise 
restaurant 
safety wear 
cleaning 
services 
tourism crating 
Purchases: Supplier 
Credit (average)68 
29 5 9 25 15 41 68 
Deposits (average) 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inventory (average) 7 5 16 25 15 0 2 
Production cycle 
(assumed) 
5 0 1 1 0 0 12 
Sales: Customer 
credit (average) 
13 0 1 25 60 13 74 
Total need for 
working capital (in 
days) 
-14 0 9 26 60 -28 19 
Source: balance sheets and, in the cases of CS3 revised and CS4, interviews. The 
total may not coincide to the sum of items due to rounding differences.  
 
The table shows that SMEs can be classified into three types: 
• Some, like CS1 and CS5, have a negative need for working capital, i.e. 
they are able to use working capital (in particular, supplier credit) as a 
resource for the financing of other assets. In the case of CS5 this situation 
however is only applicable in summer, since in winter the debtors book 
increases, supposedly creating a positive need for working capital.  
• Others like CS2 are working capital neutral – their operations are 
essentially cash based; 
• A last group, especially businesses working for corporate or government 
clients, has a positive need for working capital, mostly caused by the 
need to grant credit to customers and in some cases, the need to keep 
stock. The need for working capital ranges from a few days to two 
months of turnover (CS4). 
 
In two enterprises, customer credit was particularly acute and explained most of 
the need for working capital: in the case of CS4, debtors management procedures 
would have done little to improve the situation since late payment was a given 
condition of government tenders. However, in the case of CS6, it is probable that 
more stringent credit management procedures would have improved the 
                                                 
68 In the case of CS5 the term of “supplier credit” may be confusing, since the firm does not use 
‘suppliers of materials’; the short-term creditors are mainly free-lance tour guides as well as 
institutions like Telkom, and the providers of insurance and vehicle finance.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Dysfunctional market or insufficient creditworthiness? 
Submitted by:  Magali von Blottnitz  
Annexure 39: Case study synthesis III – Creditworthiness Page 643 
 
 
situation. 
Table 39.4 – Bad debts in relation to turnover 
 
CS1 CS3 
(revised) 
CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
safety 
wear 
tourism packaging 
highest value over the 
period 
3.5% 2.5% 0.0% 0.6% 
mean 0.9% 0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 
 
Bad debts did not seem to represent a serious problem for the case studies: 
• Two case studies had no risk of bad debts: the restaurant CS2, because it 
did not sell anything on credit, and the cleaning businesses CS4a and 
CS4b, which were only operating with government clients.  
• The other four businesses had hardly experienced any bad debts, with the 
mean ratio of bad debt written off to turnover being under 1% in all 
cases. However, this result may be distorted by a failure to write off such 
bad debt.  
 
1.4. Reliance on debt, especially short-term debt 
a) Equity ratios 
Table 39.5 – Equity ratios  
   CS3   
 
CS1 CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
(white) 
franchise 
restaurant 
(white) 
safety wear  
(coloured) 
tourism 
(coloured) 
crating 
(white) 
mean equity ratio 
(incl member’s loan) 
20%* 93%* 82% 45%** 10% 30% 
evolution of equity 
ratio over the period 
↓ → → ↓ ↑ ↓→ 
Legend:  →  stable or uneven evolution; ↓  decline; ↑  growth;  
  ↓→ first decline, then stabilises 
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Notes:  
The equity ratios incorporate the members’ loans because they can usually be 
understood as quasi-equity, and in many cases they represent the largest part of 
an SME’s equity, especially among firms having accumulated losses.  
* The equity ratios derived from the data for CS1 and CS2 must be interpreted 
with caution. In the case of CS1, as discussed, there is a major uncertainty about 
the member’s loan figure, which may have been calculated by difference and 
reflect all other errors and manipulations affecting the accounts. In addition, 
accumulated profits may not be real. It is symptomatic that the only financial 
statements of CS1 validated by an external accountant (February 1997) 
suggested a negative equity ratio at –8%, while the “home-made” accounts all 
indicate equity ratios ranging from 20 to 42%.  
As to CS2, the member’s loan was the main, and almost the sole source of 
finance for the business – but it corresponded to a personal long-term bank loan 
contracted by the entrepreneur and placed at the business’s disposal.  
** The difference in the two versions of equity ratios calculated for CS3 
illustrates the “dilution” effect caused by higher current assets and current 
liabilities, particularly strong in this case where fixed assets have a low book 
value: although the equity (nominator) remains unchanged, the denominator 
increases considerably, causing a significant reduction of the ratio.  
 
The equity ratios varied significantly from one firm to the next and, interestingly, 
showed little correlation with the ethnic background of the owners (one may 
have assumed that white entrepreneurs would have more easily maintained high 
equity ratios). The equity ratios found are relatively high in CS2 and CS3(BS), 
but generally lower in the other cases. The equity ratio was particularly low in 
CS1 and CS5, for a combination of three reasons:  
- Firstly, both these businesses were started with a low initial contribution 
of the member. At least in the case of CS5, the low resources of a young 
coloured man in the 1990s explained the low initial capital.  
- Secondly, the accumulation of losses over several years has created an 
equity gap. Although the member’s loan has filled this gap, it has not left 
room for further equity build-ups.  
- Thirdly, the expensive fixed assets (especially vehicles) required for 
these two businesses caused them to contract relatively large amounts of 
long-term debt – in contrast to firms like CS3, which had almost no long-
term debt on its balance sheets; 
- (It is not surprising, then, that these two firms have had a relatively heavy 
use of short-term credit, as already described). 
 
The same three factors applied, to a lesser extent, to CS6. In that case, the 
relatively low initial capital was explained by the motivation of the founding 
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member, who was starting this firm as an occupation for his retirement years and 
did not have particular ambitions. When the sons took over the business, they 
engaged on a bolder growth path, but did not recapitalise the business, either for 
lack of resources (they were still young) or for lack of awareness. 
Furthermore, although no ratios were available to corroborate this assertion, it 
made no doubt that the same factors were also relevant to CS4. Started with 
hardly any capital, the business has had no opportunity to accumulate profits 
since the gains that were realised – if there were any – were urgently needed by 
the members for their private purposes (such as children’s schooling) and 
therefore not retained in the business. The fixed assets, although not expensive in 
the absolute, were too heavy for the owner’s financial capacity and caused them 
to use debt.  
CS3 (also coloured) was started with an even lower start-up capital than CS5, but 
the light nature of the business, and the entrepreneur’s skills for bargains (in the 
selection of its vehicles and arrangements for the use of sewing machines) 
helped him avoid accumulation of losses and expensive fixed assets, so that he 
was able to maintain its equity ratio at a reasonable level.  
 
b) Evolution of equity ratio: frequent absence of equity build-up 
for growth  
More than the mean over the period, the evolution of the equity ratio was found 
to be relevant for an assessment of creditworthiness. Two opposite tendencies 
were observed: 
• In young (CS1) or fast-growing (CS6) businesses, the equity ratio tended 
to decline as a combined result of the lack of profits and the need to grow 
current and possibly fixed assets.  
• On the contrary, in the case of CS5, a substantial profit in the last year of 
review (2003) brought the equity ratio up to 32%. The profits are likely 
to be maintained in the next few years, compensating the low initial 
equity ratio.  
 
These quantitative findings were corroborated and explained by qualitative 
insights, which emerged from almost all case studies. Interviews revealed that 
small entrepreneurs, even in growing concerns, do not have much interest in 
building-up equity. There seems to be a lack of understanding for the need to 
strengthen financial structure as business grows.  
This lack of interest seems to be related to the following facts: 
• Small entrepreneurs (especially coloured and black entrepreneurs, it 
seemed) have a biased understanding of the concept of profit. They do 
not perceive it as the growth of the firm’s structural resources but as 
liquid money in the bank account, that is, a cash surplus. A telling 
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comment from CS3’s owner was that “rather than writing profits, he 
would prefer building-up his stock”. (He did not realise that doing profit 
would augment his own resources, which he could choose to invest into 
stock).  
• Related to this, small entrepreneurs intuitively reject the capitalistic 
approach. This applies especially to “lifestyle entrepreneurs” who have 
built up their business on their own. They are more concerned by their 
operations than by their financing, which again is associated with 
investing money in financial markets, and is not regarded as desirable. 
Their concerns revolve mainly on the business’s (turnover) growth, the 
ability to create employment, and to pay themselves a proper salary (CS3, 
CS5, CS4). This seemed to be less relevant for entrepreneurs who bought 
into a franchise (CS1, CS2) or who acquired the business at a later stage 
(CS6) – but this dichotomy may also come from a cultural gap between 
white and non-white entrepreneurs.  
• A last aspect is that, once the existing business is perceived as becoming 
sustainable, the entrepreneurial drive leads some business owners to use 
cash surpluses for investment in new ventures (CS5, CS6). This deprives 
the old businesses from the opportunity to accumulate cash and equity. 
 
Tellingly, the only business which achieved a significant growth of its equity 
(CS5) was the sole csae study entrepreneur who, in the interviews, revealed a 
concern for strengthening his financial structure for sustainability, even though 
he did not seem to be fully aware of the role of equity (“My main concern is to 
be able to invest while maintaining the business on a positive cash flow 
footing”). CS5 also admitted that this worry was quite new to him, the result of a 
long maturation.  
c) Reliance on short-term debt  
The case studies showed different levels of dependence on short-term debt, but 
mitigated the frequent assertion that most small businesses overly rely on short-
term debt.  
• There was no sign of excessive reliance on short-term debt for CS2 and 
CS569, whose current debt ratios were well under 33%. Both firms had 
secured long-term bank facilities covering the largest part of their 
financing needs; 
• In CS3, the evidence was contradictory – but even the high ratio derived 
from interview data was not worrying since the short-term debt was used 
for the financing of short-term assets (stock and debtors); the same 
applied to CS6.  
                                                 
69 In the case of CS5, seasonal factors are believed to cause relatively little distortion of the 
current debt ratio, since the overall balance sheet structure is dominated by long-term assets 
and liabilities.   
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• The ratios confirmed qualitative evidence that CS1 could be regarded as 
the most dependent on short-term debt, because its strong use of current 
debt, in particular bank overdraft, was not matched to the maturity 
structure of assets.  
 
Table 39.6 – Current debt ratios  
   CS3   
 
CS1 CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
franchise 
restaurant 
safety wear tourism crating 
mean current debt to 
total assets 
39% 7% 18% 55% 29% 45% 
(compare to current 
assets to total assets?
70
) 
28% 7% 39% 75% 8% 60% 
Net current debt ratio 11% 0% -21% -20% 21% -15% 
 
For CS4, no balance sheet ratios were calculated, but it makes no doubt that the 
two micro enterprises were over-reliance seriously restricted by their excessive 
dependence on short-term debt.  
 
1.5. Liquidity reserves 
The liquidity ratios, visible on Table 39.7, raise the following comments: 
• In the case of CS1, the moderate mean ratio is occulting a deterioration of 
the liquidity situation across the lifetime of the business: the use of 
overdraft reached –11% of total assets in June 2000, suggesting a serious 
lack of liquidity. The negative cash flow meant that there was no hope for 
the liquidity situation to recover - which is why the business had to be 
liquidated; 
• CS6 also seriously lacked liquidity. However, while its mean liquidity 
ratio was the worst of all case studies, the situation presented in the 2000 
accounts was less critical than for CS1, since the operating cash flow still 
covered the overdraft.  
• Although no ratio was calculated for CS4, it is assumed that the micro-
business did not keep any significant liquidity reserve.  
 
                                                 
70 excluding cash and cash equivalents 
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Table 39.7 – Liquidity ratios  
   CS3   
 
CS1 CS2 (balance 
sheets) 
(inter-
views) 
CS5 CS6 
 
furniture 
franchise 
franchise 
restaurant 
safety wear tourism crating 
Mean year-end liquidity 
to total assets 
-1% -4% 22% 16% 15% -24% 
Evolution of liquidity 
reserves 
↓ → → → ↑ ↑↓ 
Cash Flow to Overdraft  
-154% 
(neg CF) 
299% n/a n/a n/a 139% 
(add a reference to 
unused OD capacity?) 
      
Legend:  →  stable or uneven evolution; ↓  decline; ↑  growth;  
  ↑↓ first improvement, then decline 
Notes:  
* The difference between the two ratios in CS3 comes only from the revision of 
total assets to reflect higher values of inventory and accounts receivable, as 
suggested in interviews.  
* The liquidity ratios must be interpreted with caution, for they may be affected 
by short-term variations. In particular, in the case of CS5, seasonal variations 
tended to favourably distort the ratio.  
* The ratio of liquidity to turnover, as opposed to fixed assets, did not yield 
significantly different conclusions.  
 
The interviews provided some insights into the general lack of cash saving 
among small businesses. To some extent, it was related to the lack of equity 
building, which has already been mentioned. Furthermore, the following factors 
may have played a role: 
• Firstly, significant amounts of operating cash flows were spent 
immediately, notably for the purchase of small equipment. Several 
entrepreneurs admitted that, whenever they get paid for a large contract, 
they immediately acquire new equipment or tools (CS4, CS6). 
• In addition, the township entrepreneurs (CS4a+b) expressed a reluctance 
to save which could be interpreted as a fear that they might not be able to 
benefit from their savings. Although they did not give further 
explanations, possible reasons for this might be the poor performance of 
financial markets, the poor image of the banking system, the high 
criminality threatening the savings kept out of the bank, and the social 
pressure for sharing which came from the township environment.  
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• Also, anecdotal evidence suggested that visions of “what they could do if 
they had money” create irrational temptations and spending, illustrated 
by CS5 using his business’s money to build a bar in his home, next to his 
office.  
• These remarks should not be interpreted as a sign that entrepreneurs had 
no interest in saving: there was clear evidence of cost-cutting (CS5) and 
avoiding to overpay when investing (CS3). But the maintenance of sound 
liquidity levels was not a priority. 
 
1.6. Owners’ commitment to the business (Remuneration 
scheme) 
The members’ salaries, to the extent that they truly reflect the remuneration that 
takes place between the business and its owner-manager, are a good indicator of 
the owner’s business philosophy. Generally, a high member’s salary, especially 
if it does not coincide with a high business performance, suggests that the 
member views the business as a lucrative opportunity, whereas a low salary 
indicates that the member’s focus is on the business’s growth and sustainability.  
However, there are numerous other ways for an entrepreneur to draw advantages 
out of their position, like medical aid / provident fund, the use of a business 
vehicle, the contributions to the repayment of a home loan (e.g. if the business 
pays a rent to the member for operating from home). None of the businesses was 
found to pay dividends to its members.  
Table 39.8 – Highest and mean remuneration of owners  
 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS5 CS6 
monthly (equivalent71) salary per member 
• mean salary over the period 11 938 0 7 740 4 698 4 905 
• highest salary over the period  20 000 0 15 000 8 542 6 027 
salary in % of operating profit 
• mean over the period  40% 0% 42% 30% 36% 
• highest ratio over the period 77% 0% 53% 35% 45% 
Source: financial statements  
 
                                                 
71 the term ‘monthly equivalent’ is used to cover cases where members are not paid on a monthly 
basis, but rather at year-end depending on the year’s performance. In this case the period’s 
salary was divided by the number of months.  
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Notes:  
* Reference is made to the general caution required when dealing with reported 
salaries (see section on ‘information opacity’). 
* The CS1 percent figures may be distorted by an overstatement of operating 
profits.  
* In addition, the mean figures for CS1 hide a very irregular pattern, starting 
with no remuneration in the first 22 months, then a remuneration at 
R20000/month for over a year, which was only reduced as the business 
approached bankruptcy and was forced to strongly reduce its salaries to the 
member.  
* The CS3 results are distorted by the high member’s salary proposed in the 
2004 (draft) statements, which suggested an abnormally high profit; it is 
probable that this high remuneration could not be maintained in the final 
statements. The mean remuneration, excluding this last year, would be R5319 
per member.  
* There is a possibility that CS2 indirectly earned a remuneration via the interest 
payments from the business to the member. However, this could not be 
established precisely.  
 
In spite of the weaknesses of the ratios, Table 39.8 suggests differences between 
the businesses as follows: 
• The high cash remunerations practiced by CS1 during the middle period 
of its life (R20 000/month after the first 20 months of operation, or 77% 
of operating profit) seem suspicious for a young business, which has not 
yet reached breakeven. It suggests that the entrepreneur was not strongly 
committed to its business.  
• CS2 illustrated the other extreme, with the owner officially earning 
strictly no salary for the period under review. Interview evidence showed 
that the entrepreneur had expected a decent remuneration but this would 
not be affordable to the business under present circumstances. However, 
the zero-remuneration should not be interpreted as a sign of commitment 
to the business, since the lack of success in the first 2 years caused the 
owner to withdraw from management and consider selling the business.   
• CS3, CS5 and CS6 had more average, yet overall modest, remuneration 
behaviours, always adjusting the member’s salary to the business’s 
performance for the year. The interview evidence however suggested 
differences in attitude between two types of businesses:  
o “Lifestyle entrepreneurs” (CS3, CS5), having built up their 
business on their own, were highly committed to it and would 
always moderate their remuneration ambitions to enable the 
business’s growth; 
o CS6, historically a family business, inherited the remuneration 
pattern discussed above, but the new majority member, who 
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bought his stake at a later stage, seemed to have an attitude closer 
to that of CS2: if the business’s performance failed to improve, he 
may well consider to sell his stake rather than maintain his modest 
ambitions.  
 
Qualitatively, interview evidence raises the attention noto another risk criterion: 
the involvement of the owner in multiple projects (CS2, CS5, CS6). This factor, 
which cannot be measured in terms of ratios, has both managerial and financial 
implications for the first business, as follows:  
• The owner’s private resources (equity, including member’s loan, and 
ability to pledge collateral) are shared between a larger number of 
commitments. This was visible in particular for CS2 whose member’s 
loan to his restaurant decreased in 2003 when the owner started a new 
DVD business; 
• The requirements of the newer businesses often cause the older one to 
have to grant some of its fixed assets to the newer one(s), often without 
compensation (both CS5 and CS6 provide examples of new businesses 
using the vehicles initially purchased for the older businesses); 
• The same applies to costly resources such as liquidity (CS6 mentioned 
high sums borrowed by the brother’s new start-up from the older 
business’s already negative current account); 
• The personal commitment of the owner to his first business gets reduced 
(at least CS2 and CS5 provided examples of this).  
 
8. Variability of ratios (year-to-year) 
Table 39.9 suggests that the volatility of firms’ ratios varied from case to case as 
follows: 
• CS2 and CS3 were found to be relatively stable (although the first case 
may be distorted by the lower number of years). Factors for this stability 
seem to be:  
o the relatively low turnover growth (normal in a franchise like 
CS2, while in the case of CS3 the considerable growth of the 
previous years has slowed down after 2000); 
o the quasi-absence of follow-up investments in the period, causing 
a stability of the financing structure.  
• On the contrary, CS5 and CS6 were unstable (in the case of CS5 the 
instability is for the better since it is a general improvement), apparently 
as a result of: 
o high turnover growth  
o continued investments  
o improvement of profitability  
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• CS1 generally showed relatively high volatility measures, in spite of not 
being growing. In this case the volatility may be explained by: 
o continued investments, as for CS5 and 6, and 
o the lack of profitability (the accumulation of losses caused an 
imbalance in the financing structure, which gradually 
deteriorated). 
Table 39.9 – Volatility of a few ratios over the period of review 
 
CS1 CS2 
CS3 
(revised) 
CS5 CS6 
Number of years included 4 2 3 4 4 
Compound turnover growth p.a. 4.4%* 10.4% 26.9% 57.5% 37.2% 
Investment to turnover  2.1% 0.2% 0.2% 16.0% 9.2% 
Standard deviation of: 
• Operating margin  7% 1% 6% 5% 4% 
• Equity ratio 21% 7% 14% 18% 19% 
• Current Debt Ratio 19% 7% 14% 13% 6% 
• Liquidity Ratio 8% 4% 9% 16% 18% 
• Owner’s remuneration in % 
of operating margin 
34% 0% 10% 6% 9% 
• Interest coverage  2.39 0.50 0.41 2.54 5.88 
• Need for working capital 15.73 2.32 4.04 15.49 24.55 
 
Notes: 
* For CS1 the turnover growth rate must be interpreted with caution, because of 
inconsistencies in the reporting of turnover (possibly due to tax-saving attempts). 
To minimise the impact of inconsistencies, the growth rate was calculated 
between January 1998 and June 2000, i.e. the first financial statements for 
February 1997 were ignored, because it seems that turnover was not established 
along the same method as for following years.  
Comparisons between the firms should be done with caution, because the 
varying number of years included in the data sets influences the volatility 
measures. Automatically, firms which have provided only two sets of financials 
were found to be less volatile than the ones who could be tracked over 3 or 4 
years. CS4 was not included in the table because the data collected did not 
adequately reflect the entire period of life of the business. 
The volatility varies strongly from one indicator to the next. In particular, the 
range of variations of the interest coverage ratio and the need for working capital 
are by construction unlimited, while all other ratios are normally fluctuating 
between 0 and 100% (although negative values are possible for the operating 
margin and the equity ratio).  
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2. Summary of ratio assessment  
Table 39.10 summarises the main findings of the ratio-based analysis for each 
case along this classification.  
Table 39.10 – Summarised creditworthiness assessment for all case studies  
  CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 
Fundamental deficiencies             
(1) insufficient market x xx   x     
(2) unprofitable operations x x (x)       
(7) lack of member’s 
commitment 
xx (x)  x  (x) 
(7bis) involvement in multiple 
businesses 
 x   x x 
Financing difficulties 
(possibly transitory)             
(3) excessive financing costs x (x)   xx     
(4) lack of working capital       xx (x) xx 
(5) over-indebtedness x     x x   
(5bis) over-reliance on short-
term debt (x)     x     
(6) lack of liquidity reserves (x)     x   x 
(8) instability x       (x) (x) 
Legend:    x: existing constraint   xx: main constraint   
  (x) possible or occasional (e.g. seasonal) constraint  
(See also Annexure 21 for a summary of creditworthiness scores, including 
qualitative scores, of case studies) 
 
Hence, the case study methodology led to diverse diagnoses as to the problems 
of small enterprises: 
- CS1 was found to be non-creditworthy, with lack of turnover; lack of 
initial equity; insufficient member’s commitment (member’s salary); 
questionable integrity of owner; being the main concerns; 
- CS2 was a mixed case. While it had less downside risks, the fundamental 
weaknesses, especially the lack of turnover, meant that the upside 
potential was unlikely to materialise; the interest costs were high if 
interest paid to member was included; 
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- CS3 was regarded as creditworthy, although not very profitable. The 
business did not seem able (or willing) to accumulate equity to support 
growth – this may become problematic when the business decides to take 
a new, bolder strategic path.  
- CS4 was found to be non-creditworthy, with a lack of everything. There 
was a crucial lack of working capital, but also a lack of commitment and 
discipline;  
- CS5 was regarded as creditworthy, although too illiquid (all resources 
were tied in fixed assets). This caused a cash problem in winter, when 
working capital cycle slows down; in addition, strong investing activities 
used up operating cash flows. Up to now, equity had been insufficient, 
but profits were expected to help to build it up. The new business being 
created represented a risk, though;  
- CS6 was another mixed case: It had significant immediate risks, 
especially with working capital and liquidity, dependence on short-term 
debt; sluggish management of working capital. The lack of discipline on 
the part of brother and divergences between the owners seemed to be 
resolved by the exit of one brother, bringing hope that the business might 
recover. Hence, if supported through this phase, it might be able to reach 
a more stable stage. 
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Annexure 40 – Case Studies, Synthesis IV  
Remarks on franchise firms 
 
Before concluding on creditworthiness, a specific look at franchises was taken, 
because they seem to be treated slightly differently from other businesses, and 
indeed have an easier access to finance.  
1. The reasons for banks’ preference for franchises 
Banks (for example ABSA 2002) indicate several reasons for their willingness to 
provide capital to franchises: 
• Franchise operations are regarded as more stable and more predictable 
than independent SMEs. This is understandable since a principle of 
franchise (which may not always materialise in practice) is that the 
business starts up at its critical size and with a pre-established market.  
Indeed, in the case of CS2, it seems that the financial structure and 
performance have been remarkably stable compared with other case 
studies, but there were only two years available.  
• Since all assets needed are acquired at start-up, the initial investment is 
usually equal to the total investment. Therefore, apart from possible 
liquidity needs, the bank runs little risk of escalation of its commitments.  
• Banks usually believe that, since franchise entrepreneurs are less 
dependent on a learning curve (a successful business format is already in 
place), they have higher survivorship rates than independent businesses 
(ABSA talks about “statistical evidence”).  This survivorship advantage 
has, however, been contested in literature (see for example Stanworth et 
al, 1998).  
 
In addition to the arguments usually found in the literature, the case studies 
brought the following other reasons to light: 
• The relationship of the bank to the franchisor influences the support 
given to the franchisee. The franchisee, instead of being one of many 
anonymous small business owners, benefits from the franchisor’s credit 
record. This was apparent in the case of CS1, where the “franchisor’s 
approval” seemed to be more prominent in the bank file than any 
reflections on the person of the franchisee. By giving their support to the 
establishment of a franchise operation by one of their client, the bank to 
some extent bound itself to also provide support to the individual 
franchisees (even if the interests of franchisor and franchisee may be 
divergent and the risks dissimilar).  
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• The fact that there is an active and organised “secondary market” for 
established franchise operations may have eased access to finance for 
CS2, who invested in a well known restaurant franchise. If the owner 
resigns about running this business, his good prospects for selling the 
operation at a profit limit the bank’s risk. 
 
2. The specific risks of franchises 
In spite (or maybe precisely because) of this easier access to bank finance, the 
cases studied suggested that franchises are not necessarily less risky.  
• None of the two franchise operations included in the case studies was 
really successful; one (CS1) had to be liquidated, apparently with great 
loss to the bank, while the other one (CS2) just seemed unable to reach 
the profit zone. Mr. R. A.’s partner, in CS3, similarly got involved in a 
third case of franchise that did not work (but no details were available). 
• The main reason for the risk of franchises is probably the high initial 
investment. Unlike independent businesses, whose growth curve follows 
market (demand) and affordability considerations (usually internal 
finance), the initial size of franchise operations is dictated by the 
franchisor’s market estimations as well as a need to maintain the chain’s 
image. This may lead to oversizing. The two franchise operations 
included in the case studies were indeed suffering from an insufficient 
turnover, compared with their level of fixed costs; considering their low 
turnover growth, there was little hope for them to reach breakeven. CS2 
appeared to be a typical case of an outlet which was strategically 
important for the franchisor (the franchise’s name had to be visible in this 
very busy restaurant street), but which made little business sense for the 
franchisee (as the competition was too tight in this area). This illustrates 
that even the market presence of the franchisor may not be sufficient to 
guarantee sufficient sales. 
• In addition, the expectation that the initial investment is sufficient may 
not materialise. In the case of CS1 the bank has not been able to avoid an 
escalation of its commitments. 
• In addition, the hypothesis of a secondary market does not apply well to 
new franchise networks such as CS1’s franchise. Under these 
circumstances, the bank may become unable to recover the franchise fee, 
which may represent a substantial part of the finance provided.  
 
Other risk factors include the facts that: 
• Franchisees may be less screened than other entrepreneurs who have to 
prove, rework and ensure the viability of their business concept with 
every hurdle that they experience. Even though CS2 participated in a 
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selection process as well as a training organised by the franchisor, the 
two processes hardly included any financial management; 
• Franchise business owners may be less committed to their businesses 
than genuine entrepreneurs who cherish their enterprise as their child. 
None of the three entrepreneurs encountered who have been involved in 
franchise (CS1, CS2 and the partner to CS3 in its previous investment) 
appeared really bound to their business. From all the success factors of a 
small business, though, the owner’s commitment seems to be one of the 
most crucial ones (see below).  
 
Altogether, the case studies tended to convey the impression that franchise 
operations were not necessarily better risks for a bank, than independent 
businesses. However, this impression may be distorted by a (survivorship and 
self-selection) bias in the data on non-franchise operations (except for CS4 a+b). 
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